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ABSTRACT

The 1896 elections in Louisiana produced a Regular Democrat as governor, but
a reform government within New Orleans. The turbulence o f the Populist era led to the
unification of political factions behind disfranchisement of blacks and a narrowing o f
the electorate. In spite o f attempts to make their triumph permanent, New Orleans
reformers gave way to a resurgent Regular Democratic organization, the Choctaw Club,
which dominated city politics for the first half of the twentieth century. Mayors Paul
Capdevielle and Martin Behrman successfully led the city in an era o f commercial
expansion, public works, and municipal reform. That leadership persisted through
factional political conflict because the underlying consensus favored the major policies
typical of southern progressivism.
Three public works projects, and their accompanying governmental structures,
demonstrated the progressive consensus in New Orleans. The Sewerage and Water
Board oversaw the development of the water, sewerage, and drainage systems o f the
city. The Board of Commissioners of the Port o f New Orleans constructed and
administered the docks, wharves, and landings of the city and the surrounding area
along the Mississippi River. The New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission built
and operated a public railroad that facilitated the exchange of commerce, particularly
along the riverfront. The construction and operation of these public works occurred
vi
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during the administration o f Regular Democrats, but all political factions supported the
role of both state and municipal governments in these projects. The consensus in favor
of public activity drew strength from the southern progressive assumption that economic
development, commercial expansion, and municipal progress represented ideal methods
of addressing social concerns.
By the end of the second term o f Martin Behrman, the reform faction in New
Orleans sought to regain power through the introduction o f a new form o f city
government-the commission. Mayor Behrman and the Regular organization accepted
commission government and the city adopted a new charter. But the elections results
under the new system did not fulfill the expectations o f the reform faction. The
Regulars stayed in power, continuing the pattern begun in 1899 o f ineffectual reform
challenges to the Regular organization.

vii
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INTRODUCTION

New Orleans was the largest city in the South from the time o f the Louisiana
Purchase well into the twentieth century. It remains the largest city in Louisiana and
enjoys a reputation for a colorful history, not least because o f an impressive array o f
cultural influences that included colonial French and Spanish, African-American,
German, Irish, Italian, and, more recently, Vietnamese, and Central American. This
cultural melange thrived in unlikely geographical circumstances—swamps, sinking land,
difficult transportation, and frequent floods. One observer, noting the Crescent City’s
triumph over its precarious site, called New Orleans “the impossible but inevitable
city.” By the end o f the nineteenth century, New Orleans had long since passed its
golden age, the antebellum boom times of cotton, sugar, and the steamboat trade. The
first decade o f the twentieth century brought a different excitement to the city: the
challenges o f modernization. This investigation o f the history of New Orleans focuses
on the years 1896 to 1912 and provides a case study o f urban political and economic
development in the era of southern progressivism.1
The narrative begins with 1896 for two reasons. In that year, the Regular
Democrats o f Louisiana defeated a strong challenge by a Fusion candidate, who

1Peirce F. Lewis, New Orleans: The Making o f an Urban Landscape
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1976), 17.
1
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2
represented an unlikely coalition o f wealthy sugar planters, hill-country Populists, urban
reformers, and independent black voters. Thereafter, Populist political activity went
into a long period of inactivity, to be awakened in the 1920s by Huey P. Long. Also in
1896, the Regular Democrats of New Orleans lost control o f the city government to the
Citizens’ League, one o f a series of reform groups periodically organized to challenge
the power of the Regulars. The League cooperated with the Louisiana legislature to
bring to the city the beginnings of progressive municipal reform. In the same
legislature, white politicians of all factions united to eliminate black voters by adopting
a new state constitution.
The elimination o f black voters and the decline of Populism drastically reduced
multi-party political contests. Subsequently, factional candidates for state office
contended within the Democratic party, rarely straying from Regular orthodoxy. In New
Orleans, the Regular organization, called the Choctaw Club, was the political
beneficiary of the increased Democratic loyalty. The Regulars reorganized after their
1896 defeat, attracted defectors from the reform ranks, and recaptured the city
government. Many businessmen, formerly associated with the Citizens’ League,
became active, influential, and loyal members o f the Choctaw Club. Building on the
foundation o f legislation passed from 1896 to 1899, the Regular administrations of New
Orleans embraced most of the progressive initiatives of their predecessors, especially
the organization o f new administrative units of the city and the state, which transformed
New Orleans by building and operating major public works. By 1912, when the study
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3
ends, the Regulars enjoyed political control and the gratitude of the voters, who could
see the products o f public works projects and the changes brought to the city.
The examination o f New Orleans events from 1896 to 1912 reveals lively
political conflict, embodied in the factional split between reformers and the Regular
Democrats. But it also establishes the existence of a strong, underlying consensus in
favor of progressive policies. That consensus grew out o f political decisions to
disfranchise blacks and in response to the need for substantial public development and
investment. For the leaders of New Orleans, “progressive” was synonymous with,
progress. The progress that they strived for was inextricably bound up with the
commercial advancement of the city. This consensus crossed community income
groups, occupations, and political inclinations, and favored what this study will call
progressive civic development.
Many of the changes in New Orleans constituted progressive reforms, both in
the substance of the changes and in the governmental structures utilized to implement
the reforms. Regardless of whether those changes began as the result of the reformers
or the Regulars, both political factions and, subsequently, scholars considered the
policies deserved the label progressive. Also, the changes in New Orleans were broadly
civic in nature. In reaction to fears o f private monopoly power and aware o f nationwide
trends toward municipal ownership, a clear majority of New Orleanians agreed w ith
activist city administrations. Citizens accepted the efficacy of public financing,
ownership, and operation. Finally, the consensus most strongly supported the
promotion of economic and commercial development as a defining municipal interest.
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4
Factional disputes paled in comparison to the unanimity on the need for business
success and the creation o f wealth.2
The most pressing arguments in favor o f the existence o f such a consensus for
progressive civic development are found in the shared attitudes toward major public
works. This study examines three new governmental entities, products of the
progressive era, and the public works completed by each: the Sewerage and Water
Board, which built a modem sewerage, water, and drainage system, the Board o f
Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, which reconstructed the city docks, and the
New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission, which constructed the railroad car
transfer system crucial to the movement o f freight along the docks. These entities,
though isolated from the impacts of direct democracy, built public facilities, maintained
public ownership, and carried out operations by means o f public administration.
The results o f this study demonstrates the existence o f a consensus for
progressive civic development, but consensus did not imply unanimity. In at least three
ways, the limitations of the consensus were apparent. First, the vast majority of blacks
who had participated in politics prior to the Constitution of 1898 no longer had the
opportunity to join or reject the consensus. Second, at least two crucial elements o f the

2 The author wishes to acknowledge the insights o f Matthew Schott in “The New
Orleans Machine and Progressivism,” Louisiana History 24 (Spring 1983): 141-153.
Schott wrote o f the New Orleans “conservative leaders who identified civic progress
with economic growth and development which the consensus believed would occur
with municipal and state government working in harmony with business interests.” The
present study attempts to build on that insight by more closely examining the interplay
among progressive ideas, the commercial leadership, the reform faction, and the Regular
Democrats who controlled city government.
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5
national progressive agenda—reform o f patronage and the control o f morality—were not
part o f the New Orleans consensus. The reform and Regular factions continued to differ
on the value of civil sendee reform as well as attempts to control gambling, promote
prohibition, and suppress prostitution. Third, in spite o f the successes o f public utilities
in New Orleans, a segment o f the political and business leadership remained skeptical
about the advisability of public ownership. Electric power, street lighting, and streetcars
remained in private hands. Nonetheless, evidence for the existence o f the consensus for
progressive civic development is strong, particularly in the behavior of the city’s two
political factions, the reformers and the Regulars.
Although there were vigorous electoral contests in New Orleans, 1896 to 1912,
those contests did not disturb the fundamental consensus for progressive civic
development. Both factions in New Orleans politics agreed with the essential southern
view o f progressivism. Between 1896 and 1912, there were five municipal elections.
The two factions staged vigorous contests in all but one of the mayoral races, and, in
each contest, the rhetoric of each faction corresponded to the expected constituencies
and interests. Reform candidates emphasized efficiency in government, low taxes, and
restoration of honest government. The Regulars praised Democratic unity, their
connections to the people, and the practical progress accomplished in city government.
But behind the rhetorical flourishes, and the sometimes bitter campaigning, neither
faction sought to challenge the prevailing consensus or alter the governmental structures
put in place to carry out the progressive reforms.
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There were many examples o f the reluctance of either political faction to
challenge the initiation or implementation of progressive policies. The reliance on
independent boards and commissions received support from both factions at the state
and local levels. The appointments to those boards and commissions, while not
explicitly non-partisan, drew from a pool of businessmen and interested citizens that did
not vary significantly whether the reform or Regular faction made the appointments.
Numerous tax and bond referenda enjoyed support from both factions; from 1896 to
1912, no such referendum was seriously contested nor defeated at the polls. And in the
most important structural change in city government—the adoption of a commission
form of government—both factions agreed with the essential elements of the new plan.
The two political factions in New Orleans corresponded to Richard Hofstadter’s
dichotomy o f reformer versus machine politicians. The reform faction in the city
included a slightly higher percentage of Protestants, and its members had somewhat
more wealth than the members o f the machine. But the social and ethnic patterns of
New Orleans did not correspond to those in the northeastern urban centers, and the
Hofstadter status-anxiety model only occasionally fits the Crescent City’s political
environment. The machine faction, known as the Regular Democrats, not only included
a large number of Protestants, but also attracted numerous businessmen that
Hofstadter’s model would normally place in the ranks o f the reformers. The policies of
the city administrations did not fit a preconceived model of reformers versus the
machine. Martin Behrman, Mayor o f New Orleans from 1904 until 1920, led the
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machine faction, but also supported a remarkable list o f progressive reforms and
municipal improvements.3
The evidence also undermines the traditional semantic treatment o f the two
political factions. The assignment o f the word “reform” to one faction and “machine” to
the other leaves little to the imagination. George Orwell’s famous essay “Politics and
the English Language” warns that English becomes “ugly and inaccurate because our
thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness o f our language makes it easier for us to have
foolish thoughts.”4 The use o f “reform” and “machine” is not foolish p er se, but
indiscriminate and unexamined acceptance of the terms is inim ical to historical
precision. The capture o f the “reform” label by those opposed to the Regular faction in
New Orleans ought not lead to the automatic assumption of a Manichaean political
contest, wherein the opposite o f “reform” must necessarily stand for the tainted status
quo, governed by political “bosses.” In particular, there is a danger that the “reform”
faction and progressive policies become identified as one, and it is imperative to
disconnect progressive policies from factional rhetoric and labels. With these cautions
in mind, the term “reform” is used to identify the insurgent faction w ithin the
Democratic party, and its opposition is identified as the Regulars or Regular Democrats.

3 Richard Hofstadter, The Age o f Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York:
Vintage Books, 1960). See also John Buenker, “Sovereign Individuals and Organic
Networks: Political Cultures in Conflict During the Progressive Era,” American
Quarterly 40 (June, 1988): 187-204.
4 George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” in Sonia Orwell and Ian
Angus, editors, In Front o f Your Nose, Volume IV of The Collected Essays, Journalism
and Letters o f George Orwell (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), 127.
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The term “boss” is also retained. Though the reformers used “boss” as a term of
reproach, many Regular leaders accepted the label, sometimes with pride.5
The rejection of the reform versus machine dichotomy is not based on the New
Orleans experience alone. Howard Chudacoff, in the Evolution o f American Urban
Society, praised the contribution o f the bosses and their political machines, and pointed
out that “Prestige, service, loyalty, accomplishment. . . were what the machine offered
inner-city residents, and these were what enabled the boss system to withstand heated
attacks for so many years.” Chudacoff summarized the reality o f boss rule by asserting:
Men like [the political bosses] would not have lasted as long as they did if they
had not served real needs o f large segments of the urban population. Machines
were less immoral than amoral, less illegal than extralegal. They were not
reactionary but pragmatic, not one-dimensional but flexible. Moreover, bosses
did express higher goals, if not in their words then in their deeds. Bosses were
both villains and heroes—and something more.
Previous work on the same period o f New Orleans tended to accept the traditional
reform-boss dichotomy. Robert Williams provided a largely sympathetic portrait o f
Martin Behrman, but asserted that “Behrman was no reformer .. but identified himself
with many elements of contemporary civic reform.” Matthew Schott’s valuable
biography of John M. Parker stressed the social bases of Parker’s antagonism toward the
Regulars, rather than significant policy disagreements. Even though Schott credited
Behrman with a “responsible, constructive, and businesslike administration,” he
nonetheless concluded that “Behrman undoubtedly lacked the idealistic devotion to

5 Less charitable labels assigned to the Regulars included not only the
“machine,” but also the “ring.”
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honest and efficient government which characterized Parker.” In his study of New
Orleans politics 1896 to 1900, Oscar Nussbaum discussed the election of 1900 during
which the Regular organization accommodated insurgent factions within several wards.
“These insurgents,” said Nussbaum, “could not be described as reformers because they
were merely seeking the leadership for themselves.” Later, in a discussion of
comparative campaign rhetoric, Nussbaum refers to the Regulars’ “shameless
manipulation of public opinion.” The analysis of the reform versus machine split
extended to state and regional studies as well. Dewey Grantham, while giving credit to
the accomplishment o f the bosses, including a specific mention o f Martin Behrman o f
New Orleans, claimed that “in some cases urban reform came in the guise of city boss
and organization leadership.” And C. Vann Woodward, in reference to state political
conflict, referred to traditional Democratic “interests” that “were defended by southern
apologists .. .strongly entrenched within the old party and frequently controll[ing] it
through bosses and state machines

The struggle for progressive democracy was

directed against [the bosses] and was carried on within the old party between
conservative and reform factions.” Contrary to these views, the evidence from New
Orleans demonstrated that the consensus for progressive civic development in New
Orleans owed far more to the leadership o f the Regulars and their political machineincluding support from the state party—than to the good intentions o f the New Orleans
reformers and their haphazard political organizations.6

6 Chudacoff, The Evolution o f American Urban Society, 2nd edition (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 160; Michael McCarthy, “On Bosses, Reformers and
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No single city or state can provide a picture sufficiently broad to answer all o f
the questions about southern, urban progressivism. But New Orleans in the first
decades of the twentieth century offers a view into three worlds: the South, progressive
reform, and urban life. The city was within the South, but, perhaps, not completely o f
the South. It was, by the start of the new century, an old city, by United States
standards, whereas most southern cities were just developing. As a seaport, it shared
characteristics with northeastern coastal cities, particularly as a destination for
immigration. Finally, its politics shared at least the rhetoric o f the progressive era, as
self-proclaimed "reformers" entered battle against the New Orleans "ring." One
particularly interesting aspect of N ew Orleans government during the post-Civil War
period was its dependence upon governmental forms that provided a precursor to
progressive reforms. The sheltering o f certain functions of government from democratic
impulses began with the establishment o f the Board of Liquidation of City Debt. The
dependence on such boards continued throughout the 1890s and beyond with the

Urban Growth: Some Suggestions for a Political Typology o f American Cities,” Journal
o f Urban History 4 (November, 1977): 29-38; Robert Webb Williams, “Martin
Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss o f New Orleans, 1904-1926" (M. A. thesis, Tulane
University, 1952), 12; Matthew James Schott, “John M. Parker and the Varieties of
American Progressivism” (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1969), 100-103; Oscar
Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in New Orleans, 1896-1900” (Ph.D. diss., Tulane
University, 1974), 193,208; Dewey W. Grantham, Southern Progressivism: The
Reconciliation o f Progress and Tradition (Knoxville: University o f Tennessee Press,
1983), 287-288; C. Vann Woodward, The Origins o f the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), 371-372. In a later publication,
Matthew Schott gave Behrman credit for the accomplishments o f the his administration,
but suggested that “whether Behrman’s leadership deserves any credit for these
achievement may be debated.” See Schott, “The New Orleans Machine and
Progressivism,” 144.
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establishment of state-sanctioned levee boards, the Public Belt Railroad, Dock Board,
and, by the turn o f the century, the Sewerage and Water Board in New Orleans.
Specific analysis of New Orleans during this era is limited. In 1930, Harold
Zink included a chapter on Behrman in his study o f city bosses, and George M.
Reynolds published a study of New Orleans politics in 1936 drawing on interviews with
members of the prominent New Orleans political organization. The period 1896 to
1900 is covered in Raymond Oscar Nussbaum's "Progressive Politics in New Orleans,
1896-1900," a doctoral dissertation for Tulane University in 1974. More recently,
Terrence Fitzmorris authored "Pro Bono Publico: New Orleans Politics and Municipal
Reform in the Progressive Era, 1912-1926," a dissertation covering the later years o f
Mayor Behrman’s administration through the mid-1920s. Works utilizing the state as a
focus include Schott’s biography o f John M. Parker and studies o f minority voting, the
Populist movements, and Republican politics. More recently, Edward Haas has written
o f New Orleans politics in the beginning of the twentieth century and compiled a useful
statistical comparison of reform and machine leadership. His characterizations of the
reformers and the Regular Democrats provided valuable information and insights into
the composition o f the political factions.7

7 Oscar Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in New Orleans, 1896-1900”; Terrence
Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico: New Orleans Politics and Municipal Reform in the
Progressive Era, 1912-1926” (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1989); Schott,
“John M. Parker of Louisiana and the Varieties of American Progressivism”; William
Ivy Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest: Louisiana Politics, 1877-1900 (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969); Henry Clay Dethloff, “Populism and
Reform in Louisiana” (Ph.D. diss., University of Missouri, 1964); Phillip Uzee,
“Republican Politics in Louisiana, 1877-1900” (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University,
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The historiography of progressivism, once a staple o f consensus, has been in
turmoil for nearly two decades. The work of Richard Hofstadter set the standard and the
intellectual assumptions for the study o f progressivism and progressives, but Peter
Filene’s “obituary” for the movement marked a turning point by noting the impossibility
o f identifying progressivism as a distinct movement and the elusive nature o f clear
definitions. From the early 1970s to the present, a spirited argument has raged over the
usefulness of the concept progressivism. Certainly there is less agreement now than
several decades ago on whether or not there existed a central organizing set o f tenets of
progressivism. In another development, a new approach to progressivism captured the
attention of historians. The organizational synthesis promised an explanatory
framework for progressivism, to be found in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century transition from “villages” to a bureaucratic, urbanized society. Such an
approach echoed Hofstadter’s emphasis on the professional middle-class, but offered an
explanation for the ambivalent, even paradoxical nature o f the movement. If
progressivism were a “search for order” emphasizing new organizational forms, its
tendency toward conservative, anti-democratic elitism became understandable.8

1950); Harold Zink, City Bosses in the United States: A Study o f Twenty Municipal
Bosses (Durham: Duke University Press, 1930); John R. Kemp, editor, Martin Behrman
o f New Orleans: Memoirs o f a City Boss (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1977); George M. Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 1897-1926 (New
York: 1936); Edward Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City: New Orleans in the
Progressive Era, 1896-1902 (Ruston, Louisiana: McGinty Publications, 1988).
8 See for example, Peter Filene, "An Obituary for 'The Progressive Movement,'"
American Quarterly, 22 (1970): 20-34; Richard L. McCormick, The Party Period and
Public Policy: American Politics from the Age o f Jackson to the Progressive Era (New
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Cautious historians now write o f progressivism as a set of attitudes, rather than
as a consistent view o f the world, and a series of shifting coalitions, rather than a
coherent movement. Richard McCormick identified three reasons for the decline in the
use o f the term progressivism: the discomfort with using a “value-laden” term, general
discouragement over the “liberal reform tradition,” and a growing recognition o f the
“complexity and diversity of early twentieth century reform.” In a search for the
identity of progressives, scholars find multiple groups in favor of progressive reforms.
“Many groups had a hand in it,” wrote McCormick, including “urban residents
[crusading] for better city services, more efficient municipal government, and,
sometimes, the control of social groups whose habits they feared.” McCormick added
that “businessmen, too, lobbied incessantly for goals which they defined as reform.”9
These observations fit the history of New Orleans, where a range of citizens clamored
for progressive reform. But progressivism in New Orleans not only echoed national
experiences; it also took place in the South, and bore the characteristics o f that region’s
uniqueness.

York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Daniel T. Rogers, “In Search o f Progressivism,”
Reviews in American History 10 (December 1982): 113-132; JohnD. Buenker, “The
Progressive Era: A Search for a Synthesis,” Mid-America 51 (July, 1969): 175-193;
Louis Galambos, “The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modem American
History,” Business History Review 44 (Autumn, 1970): 279-290; Robert Weibe, The
Search fo r Order (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); Dewey W. Grantham, “The
Contours of Southern Progressivism,” American Historical Review 86 (December,
1981): 1035-1059.
9 Richard L. McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy (1986), 263.
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The study o f southern history pays somewhat less attention to the progressive era
than to the antebellum or Reconstruction years. In part, that relative neglect can be
traced to the tremendous interest in slavery and race relations, but it can also be
explained by the overwhelmingly rural nature o f the South, even during the progressive
era. But a paucity o f urban influence did not prevent the emergence of a southern
progressivism. In Origins o f the New South, C. Vann Woodward stated that the South
“developed its own variety o f progressivism in the era that followed hard upon
M cKinley.. . . [a] phenomenon [that] has been pretty universally ignored—or
misconstrued.” Woodward argued that “the Southern counterpart o f a Northern
progressivism developed nearly all traits familiar to the genus, but it was in no sense
derivative. It was a pretty strictly indigenous growth.”10
The most obvious characteristics of the South that made its variety of
progressivism different were the composition o f its electorate and the high proportion of
African-Americans among the working classes. According to Woodward, “Southern
progressivism generally was progressivism for white men only, and after the poll tax
took its toll not all the white men were included.” Woodward also pointed the way to
the cities as the logical starting point to examine southern progressivism. “Southern
progressivism was essentially urban and middle class in nature, and the typical leader
was a city professional man or business man, rather than a farmer.” Dewey Grantham’s
study of southern progressivism made a similar point. “Since most black southerners

10 C. Vann Woodward, The Origins o f the New South, 1877-1913, 371.
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had been disfranchised, along with many poor and illiterate whites, the southern urban
electorate was relatively homogeneous and increasingly middle- and upper-class in
makeup.” Grantham also noted that urban life emerged as a key element in the
discussion o f southern progressivism and confirmed the usefulness o f a municipal study
to demonstrate southern progressive policies. “Municipal reform,” Grantham wrote,
“made up an essential part of southern progressivism. While it reflected all o f the
progressive tendencies o f the age, the most significant aspect o f municipal reform in the
South was the movement to modernize the organization and administration o f the city.”
He emphasized that "the expanding role o f cities in Southern life brought notable social
changes," and that "proliferating organizations . . . provided an indispensable matrix for
the growth of progressivism in the South."11
In addition to urban influences, southern progressivism was formed by strong
local traditions in rural areas. In The Paradox o f Southern Progressivism, William Link
cited patterns of “traditional governance” and “republican libertarianism” as
countervailing tendencies to the modernizing and centralizing force of progressivism.
His thesis reinforces the argument in favor o f the uniqueness of southern progressivism.
Another element of that uniqueness was the nature of the Southern working class and its

nDewey W. Grantham, Southern Progressivism, 260. A number o f state studies
provide insight into local conditions in the South, and two studies o f particular cities—
Memphis and Birmingham—add valuable local examples to the general questions about
the interaction of southern and progressive tendencies. See, for example, Sheldon
Hackney, From Populism to Progressivism in Alabama-, William D. Miller, Memphis
During the Progressive Era, 1900-1917 (Memphis, 1957); Carl V. Harris, Political
Power in Birmingham, 1871-1921 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977).
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relationship to suffrage, which created a social configuration that necessarily affected
political alignments and the agenda of progressive politicians. J. Morgan Kousser, in
his Shaping o f Southern Politics, added an important dimension to the study o f the
progressive years in the South through an examination of the disfranchisement
movement. Kousser argued that the movement to reduce the black electorate reflected
not only the politics o f race, but also the desire of the Democratic party in the South,
and its middle- and upper-class leadership, to establish and maintain a monopoly on
political power. Suffrage laws and constitutional changes in Louisiana altered the
electorate o f New Orleans in the early twentieth century and, consequently, altered the
shape and course of progressivism. Jack Temple Kirby examined the interplay between
race and progressive reform in Darkness a t the Dawning. Kirby argued that the “desire
for reform ran deeper and broader in the South than in other regions.” But the
“seminal” reform for Southerners was the segregation and disfranchisement o f blacks.12
These views o f progressivism and its southern variant provide a composite
backdrop against which the civic development of New Orleans can be examined,
southern progressivism promoted municipal reform, public health, regulation o f
industry, education, and economic development, goals it shared with its northern

12Link’s thesis also suggests a basis for studying the role of the South’s urban
areas in weakening rural adherence to tradition and republicanism. William A. Link,
The Paradox o f Southern Progressivism, 1880-1930 (Chapel Hill: University o f North
Carolina Press, 1992), xi; J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping o f Southern Politics:
Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment o f the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Jack Kirby, Darkness at the Dawning: Race and
Reform in the Progressive South (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1972), 1-5.
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counterpart. But southern progressivism operated within a social and political context
that disfranchised large numbers o f its workers, suffered from oppressive poverty, was
dominated by rural values, and, yet, struggled to promote economic development and to
join the mainstream United States economy. This study o f New Orleans seeks an
understanding o f southern progressivism as practiced in a urban setting. The evidence
supports the existence o f a consensus in favor of progressive civic development
developed and sustained during the period 1896 to 1912. But in a departure from much
o f the literature, the evidence also supports the finding that the Regular Democrats, the
so-called machine, helped to develop the consensus and were largely responsible for the
successful implementation of progressive reforms and improvements in civic
development.
This study begins with a chapter describing the politics of Louisiana and New
Orleans in the 1890s, the end of the Populist revolt, and the beginning o f the progressive
era. Chapter Two discusses the new Louisiana electorate and the organization o f New
Orleans political factions; Chapter Three looks at the election of 1899 and the return o f
the Regulars to political power. Chapters Four and Five provide brief histories o f the
mayoral terms of Paul Capdevielle (1899-1904) and Martin Behrman (1904-1908).
Chapters Six through Eight break the political narrative to discuss the three great public
works of the early twentieth century in New Orleans: the sewerage, water, and drainage
systems, the New Orleans port, and the public belt railroad. Chapters Nine and Ten
describe Martin Behrman’s second term as Mayor, the adoption of commission
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government in New Orleans, and Behrman’s election to a third term under the new
commission plan.
The study ends with the adoption of commission government in New Orleans,
although Martin Behrman serves through 1920 and is once more elected Mayor in 1925.
By 1912, the Regulars had demonstrated conclusively that progressive policies did not
depend upon the rule o f a reform administration. At the end o f Behrman’s second term,
the Regulars accepted progressive structural reform and demonstrated that their political
skills would outlast those of the reformers. The Regular Democrats, complete with a
ward boss system, an effective political organization, and a dependence upon patronage,
presided over a consensus in favor o f progressive civic development that transformed
New Orleans into a twentieth century city.
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CHAPTER I
THE LIMITATIONS OF FUSION POLITICS:
PROTEST AND REFORM IN LOUISIANA AND NEW ORLEANS

The story o f New Orleans during the progressive era begins in the state and local
conditions of the 1890s. Louisiana politics in that era were uncommonly turbulent. The
decade started with a significant agrarian revolt, continued with major disputes over the
state lottery and tariff protection for the sugar interests, reached a tense battle in the
disputed gubernatorial election of 1896, and ended with major constitutional change and
the disfranchisement of most black voters. Conditions in New Orleans, the largest city
in the state, were no less tumultuous. The lottery dispute intruded upon city politics, the
city council suffered a major scandal, a reform ticket ousted the Democratic machine in
1896, and disfranchisement not only eliminated the city's black voters, but threatened
large numbers of white voters as well. These developments transformed New Orleans
and its politics and provided essential background to the progressive era in city
government.
Agrarian protest was particularly strong in Louisiana as the result of falling
cotton prices, natural disasters, and the anti-authoritarian impulses o f the hill country
farmers of the northern part o f the state. Upset with the refusal of their Regular
Democrat congressmen to endorse the subtreasury plan, independent-minded voters in

19
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the Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts challenged the incumbents in the 1890
elections by urging their followers to stay away from the polls, and the resulting drop in
participation signaled a high level of unrest. Not content merely to boycott the
elections, the organized opposition in Catahoula Parish put forth a congressional
candidate who polled a majority in that parish, but lost the district-wide vote to the
incumbent. Although both Regular Democratic congressmen triumphed, the political
establishment took note o f the danger. The challenge engendered enthusiasm among the
insurgents and helped to develop leadership that would carry the Populist banner
through the middle of the decade. Within a year, Louisiana representatives o f the
Peoples’ Party had attended organizing conventions in Ocala and Cincinnati. By
October, 1891, Alexandria was host to the first Populist Party convention in the state,
consisting of seventy-eight delegates from seventeen different parishes, including thirtyfive from the city of New Orleans.1 The New Orleans Daily Picayune at first assessed
the convention's attendees generously as “men of the better classes,” but later
editorialized against what it viewed as the revolutionary nature o f the third party efforts.
“The organization o f a ‘Third Party’ movement in Louisiana,” the paper complained, is
“the inauguration of a revolution designed to change the entire character of the
government; it is the movement not of a party but o f a proletariat.. . . It is a gathering of

1In Louisiana, counties are called parishes. The City o f New Orleans is an
incorporated entity and consists of the entirety of Orleans Parish. For details o f the
formation and growth o f the Peoples' Party in Louisiana see William Ivy Hair,
Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest: Louisiana Politics, 1877-1900, 198-233.
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all the discontented, dissatisfied and unprosperous elements . . . a war o f classes against
classes [and] a movement toward a radical revolution.”2
Opposition to the power o f the Regular Democrats seen in the Alexandria
convention reflected economic, racial and political resentments. Farmers faced weak
economic conditions; cotton production in 1890, for example, lagged behind that o f
thirty years before, and bad weather reduced Louisiana output during the years 1891 to
1893. Yet increasing production from other states and countries resulted in an
oversupply, and prices for cotton declined severely. Per pound prices dropped below
eight cents by 1890, reached a low of less than five cents within three years, and did not
exceed eight cents again until the turn of the century. One investigation o f the prices
concluded that proceeds from the sale of cotton in Louisiana in the early 1890s did not
match the cost of production. Populist complaints about monopoly power and the ills of
small producers found a ready audience among farmers suffering under the effects of
such an economy. Complaints about race found receptive listeners as well.3
Racial resentments by the Populists derived from the peculiar distribution of
population in the state. The agricultural alluvial parishes along the Mississippi River
and the Red River held disproportionate political power based upon a pronounced
imbalance between black and white residents. These parishes produced approximately

2 New Orleans Daily Picayune, October 2, 1891, 2; October 3, 1891, 1; October
4, 1891, 7; October 5, 1891, 4 (hereinafter cited as Daily Picayune).
3 Lucia Elizabeth Daniel, “The Louisiana People's Party,” Louisiana Historical
Quarterly 26 (October 1943): 19; Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 5156; Gavin Wright, O ld South New South (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 81-123.
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two-thirds of the state's cotton with the labor provided by predominantly black tenant
fanners; in some parishes the black population outnumbered whites by ten to one or
even more. In most of these areas, white planters controlled the votes of their black
laborers and enjoyed an inherent advantage at election time, although the extent of
control over the black vote varied greatly from one electoral district to the next. New
Orleans black voters enjoyed a high level of independence as did their colleagues in
some o f the southern sugar-producing regions.
Populist anger at the manipulation o f black votes shaped their attitudes and
tactics toward potential black allies throughout the decade. Although members o f the
Colored Alliance were allowed to speak at the Alexandria Convention in 1891, relations
between the two races were always difficult. A second convention in Alexandria went
so far as to place two black Populists in nomination for statewide offices, but the
convention ultimately chose an all white ticket. The convention's platform reflected the
ambivalence of the delegates. Although it included a statement on behalf of equality
under the law, the platform also asserted that “the interests o f the white and colored
races in the South. . . would suffer unless the undisputed control o f our government
were assured to the intelligent and educated portion of the population.” By organizing
those who rebelled against the Regular Democratic organization, the Populist Party
began to gain electoral support; its candidate for governor carried four parishes in the
election of 1892.4
4 Normal Pollack, editor, The Populist Mind, a volume in The American
Heritage Series edited by Leonard W. Levy and Alfred Young (New York: BobbsMerrill, 1967), 385-386; Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 222-225. Populists
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The third-party movement was not the only threat to Regular Democratic
hegemony. Though it did not often face an effective Republican opposition, the
Democratic Party displayed a tendency toward bi-factionalism, as coalitions formed and
dissolved around issues o f religion, geography, and attitudes toward gambling.
Factions within the party arose to challenge current orthodoxy and to seek political
advantage. The controversial Louisiana lottery, for example, served as a lightening rod
for political opinion. First chartered in 1868, the lottery faced numerous attempts to
abolish it, but the courts ruled that its contract with the state could not be abrogated by
legislative action. When a convention rewrote the state's constitution in 1879, delegates
chose to retain the lottery, but set a time limit on its existence. In the absence o f further
action, the lottery would expire on January 1,1895. If lottery proponents were to extend
its life, the governor and legislators elected in 1892 would have to act.
As the deadline approached, pro- and anti-lottery forces supported candidates for
state office who would determine if the deadline were to be extended, an issue o f
“increasing warmth.” In 1890, those opposed to the extension organized the AntiLottery League as a vehicle for electoral politics, particularly looking toward the
gubernatorial race in 1892. In that contest, the Anti-Lottery League settled upon
Murphy J. Foster as its candidate, but reached beyond the Democratic base by joining
with the Farmers' Alliance. Even before the formation of the League, the farmers had

eventually joined a statewide push for disfranchisement as a solution to the alluvial
parishes’ manipulation of black votes.
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opposed the lottery and were willing participants in the campaign against its renewal.5
But the Democrat-Alliance partnership diluted the effectiveness of the Farmers' Alliance
on other matters.6
Attitudes toward the lottery were more complex than the simple question o f
whether or not one opposed gambling. The lottery provided financial support to a
number of Louisiana projects, not the least of which was the levee system. During the
flood season of 1890, the company contributed $100,000 to state levee districts. The
reform mayor of New Orleans accepted $50,000 toward flood protection and had to
defend himself against charges from religious leaders that the funds were tainted.7
During the campaign, lottery proponents made extravagant promises to assist
public works, including a direct subsidy for drainage in the City o f New Orleans.

5 John S. Kendall, History o f New Orleans (Chicago: Lewis Publishing
Company, 1922), 2: 483, 492. At the Farmers' Union convention in Lafayette, the
keynote address emphasized opposition to the lottery. Within two days, the Daily
Picayune reported that “ the Anti-Lottery League and the Farmers' Alliance have come
to terms [on the upcoming election].” See Daily Picayune, August 5, 1891, 1,4; August
6, 1891,1; August 7,1 8 9 1 ,1 ,4 . For brief accounts of Murphy J. Foster, see Joy
Jackson, “Murphy J. Foster,” in Joseph G. Dawson, III, editor, The Louisiana
Governors: From Iberville to Edwards (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1990), 189-193 and Glenn R. Conrad, editor, A Dictionary o f Louisiana Biography
(New Orleans: Louisiana Historical Association, 1988), 315.
6 On the lottery issue, see Joy Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 121-135; John R. Kemp, editor, Martin
Behrman o f New Orleans, Memoirs o f a City Boss, 13-20; George M. Reynolds,
Machine Politics in New Orleans, 1897-1926, 23-26; Dethloff, “Populism and Reform
in Louisiana,” 82-120; Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 168-169, 201-204.
Hair considered the absorption o f the Farmers' Union by the Anti-Lottery League “one
o f the most Machiavellian maneuvers in the long, squalid history of Louisiana politics.”
7 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 125.
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Samuel D. McEnery had served as Louisiana governor from 1881 to 1888, acquiring the
nickname “the levee governor” in the process, though his enemies tagged him with
“McLottery” as well. He supported the extension o f the lottery's charter and sought
reelection in the 1892 campaign. He and Foster fought almost to a draw in the
Democratic primary, but Foster prevailed by a narrow margin. McEnery then declared
as an independent and stood in the general election, losing to Foster once again, but by a
more decisive margin.8 The new governor had run with the support of the reformers,
but Foster proved no hero to the state's reform elements. Although partners with the
Alliance during the election, he quickly formed political connections with the Louisiana
Regulars who had supported McEnery and with the New Orleans Regulars lead by John
Fit2patrick. Populists who had resisted the fusion movement suggested by the Farmers'
Union, and who had insisted on their own candidate for governor, felt vindicated when
Foster abandoned the Alliance soon after the election.9
In addition to the rise of the People's Party and the lottery issue, a third factor
disturbed the power of the Democratic party in the 1890s—the defection of the state's
sugar producers from the ranks o f the Regulars. Although the agricultural depression o f

8Not only the Democratic Party was split on the lottery issue. The Republican
Party also divided into pro- and anti-lottery factions, adding two more candidates to the
general election. The People's Party candidate rounded out the field o f five, although
only the two Democrats polled significant numbers.
9 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 135; Schott, “John M. Parker and the
Varieties of American Progressivism,” 50. John Fitzpatrick, leader o f the New Orleans
Regulars, had represented the McEnery faction on the committee which assessed the
results of the Democratic primary in March, 1892, but his association with Foster's
opponent did not prevent post-election cooperation.
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the mid-1890s lowered the prices o f sugar as well as cotton, economic troubles o f a
different sort befell the sugar producers o f south Louisiana when national tariff policies
and politics exacerbated the effects of the price drop. During the Republican
presidency, sugar producers enjoyed a per-pound bounty o f two cents, which offset low
prices and helped to protect the industry. After Cleveland's second term began, national
Democrats revised tariff policy and removed the bounty in favor o f an ad valorem tariff.
Outraged Louisiana planters bolted the party and joined the Republicans. In September,
1894, John N. Pharr, a sugar planter from St. Mary's Parish, led the effort. Regular
Democrats expressed concern that the split “would encourage the return of Negro rule”
and Governor Foster, although a sugar planter himself, condemned the move. It would,
he said, “bring the Negro back into political prominence and would breed strife and
turmoil.”10
Not content with their new political home, the planters organized the National
Republicans, dedicated to white supremacy (in contrast to the other Republican faction
in the state, National Republicans called themselves the Lily Whites) and sugar
protection.11 The new faction offered candidates for Congress in 1894 but could not
defeat the Regular Democrats. Nevertheless, this was a danger to the Democratic Party
different in kind from the Populists. National Republicans were part of the state's elite,
enjoyed great wealth, and controlled significant black votes o f their own that might

10Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 227; Glenn R. Conrad and
Ray F. Lucas, White Gold: A BriefHistory o f the Louisiana Sugar Industry, 1795-1995,
Louisiana Life Series, Number 8 (Lafayette: Center for Louisiana Studies, 1995), 58-59
11 Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 246-248.
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counter the effects o f the cotton region. Regular Democrats had held power by avoiding
such issue-based divisions within the party. Faced with insurgency from the left and the
right, the state’s regulars sought stability in the state’s largest city. At least there—or so
they hoped—the city’s Regular organization would provide a steady majority in state
elections. But even the New Orleans Regulars found the 1890s a challenge to political
stability.12
Post-Reconstruction politics in New Orleans was a battle ground between
Regular Democrats and periodic challengers, usually organized under the banner of
reform. The election results had alternately favored Regular and reform elements o f the
city's leadership. The Regulars triumphed in 1884 and 1892; the reformers won munici
pal elections in 1880,1888, and 1896. The reform group represented many o f the city's
commercial elite and often placed issues and interests ahead o f formal party affiliation.
In spite o f their participation in the Redeemer movement, the reformers often had more
in common with the national Republican Party and held to a Whiggish view o f
governmental functions and finance. For many years after Reconstruction, the
candidates of the Regular Democrats questioned the party loyalty of the reformers, often
with good cause. For their part, the New Orleans reformers tried to have it both ways
politically, adhering to the emotional tradition of the anti-Republican Redeemer
movement, while at the same time proclaiming non-partisanship as an ideal and

12 Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 226-228.
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reserving the right to run against the Democratic Party, generally known as the Regulars,
in city elections.13
Within New Orleans, the Young Men's Democratic Association (YMDA) carried
the reform banner in 1888. The YMDA drew its support from the city's commercial
exchanges, particularly the Cotton Exchange. The Association took up the cause of
reform from several predecessors, including the Committee o f One Hundred and the
Law and Order League. Those organizations undertook investigations o f the city
administration of Mayor J. Valsin Guillotte, lobbied for state legislative intervention
into city affairs, and provided evidence to local grand juries, but without noticeable
effect. The YMDA sought success at the ballot box instead.14
Mayor Guillotte declined to run for reelection and Judge Robert Davey became
the Regular candidate for mayor in 1888. Davey was not only a prominent Regular, he
was one of the so-called “Big Four” ward bosses which governed the Regular
organization and the city’s seventeen wards. Burdened by the public perception of an
inept, if not corrupt, city government, and by the defection o f normally loyal Ring

13 The city Democrats are referred to herein as Regular Democrats or Regulars.
Opposition newspapers and political opponents often referred to the Regulars as the
Ring or the Machine.
14 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 92-95. The YMDA “was not made
up strictly o f young men, or of Democrats.” William W. Howe, “Municipal History of
New Orleans” in Herbert B. Adams, ed., John Hopkins University Studies in Historical
and Political Science (Baltimore, 1889), 187 quoted in Jackson, New Orleans in the
Gilded Age, 95. The New Orleans commercial exchanges played an important role in
the political and economic life of the city. In addition to the Cotton Exchange,
businessmen organized the Sugar and Rice Exchange, the Stock Exchange, the Board o f
Trade, and the Mechanics, Dealers and Lumber Exchange.
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members, Davey lost by over 7,000 votes. YMDA candidate Joseph. A. Shakspeare
entered the mayor's office for a second time (he had served an earlier term from 18801882) along with a city council pledged to YMDA principles.15 But governing
successfully proved more difficult than winning the election. Having gained power, the
YMDA adherents sought to constrain the authority o f city government. Some
restrictions echoed standard good government reforms, such as purchasing
requirements, advertising o f bids prior to award o f leases, and ordinances to control
hiring practices. More controversial changes included the establishment o f a Police
Board, the Orleans Levee Board, and a municipal fire department to replace the old
system of volunteer companies. In addition, the M ayor helped to refinance bonds at a
favorable interest rate, and put the city on a firm financial basis, balancing the budget in
1890.16
Shakspeare's term in office exhibited the frustrations faced by the reform
elements. The urge to remove politics from city administration served to weaken his
authority and control. As boards and commissions took over city functions while still
other municipal services remained in private hands, the mayor's ability to affect policy
was minimal. During the Shakspeare administration, Maurice Hart, a N ew Orleans
financier, held influence over the ostensibly reform council, opening the Mayor to

15Daily Picayune, April 20-31, 1888; Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age,
96. For the political status o f Davey, see Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City,
16, 35 and Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 20. Robert Davey subsequently
served the city as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives and remained a loyal
member of the Regular Democratic organization.
16Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 95-109.
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charges o f hypocrisy. Finally, Shakspeare’s voter base included the city's black
population. Any attention paid to black voters attracted the scorn of the city's press and
political opposition.17
In 1892, after four years of Joseph Shakspeare, the city's Regular Democrats
nominated John Fitzpatrick for the office o f mayor, one o f the “Big Four” o f the Regular
organization. Observers later complained that the nominating contest had been held at
the same time that the city was celebrating the reunion of the United Confederate
Veterans and that the “best element” o f the electorate was otherwise occupied. City
Democrats had little to fear from the new Populist Party or from the Farmer's Alliance,
but the anti-lottery campaign took center stage in the city elections as it did at the state
level. In spite of a political history that included attempts to suppress the lottery, the
Fitzpatrick group followed the pro-lottery stance of McEnery. Shakspeare, although
personally in favor of the regulation, not outright suppression, of gambling, followed the
Foster faction in its crusade against the lottery company.18 Martin Behrman later
recalled the bitter fight between Foster and McEnery:
I was a delegate to the convention o f the McEnery, the pro-lottery faction in
Pike's Hall, Baton Rouge, in the fall o f 1891. The Foster faction met in the State

17 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 109.
18 By the time o f the 1892 election, two o f the “Big Four” were no longer ;n
politics. Behrman's recollections assert that “political power tended to spread itself
more evenly among the wards [as a result].” Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans,
20; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 503. Kemp’s work consists o f edited
newspaper columns published as “Behrman Tells.” The memoirs were printed in the
New Orleans Item after Behrman’s 1920 defeat for a fifth consecutive term as mayor.
The columns—and Kemp’s edited version—provide a valuable source of information
about the Regular organization, state and local politics, and the thoughts o f Behrman.
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House. I have some recollections o f the appointment o f a committee on
harmony to get the two factions together, but it is not distinct, and I am told that
there was no such committee. As I remember the excitement over that issue, I
guess a committee on harmony would have had little chance to do anything.19
Although Foster won at the state level, the city organization carried the day for
Fitzpatrick by over 3,000 votes. Foster's rapid rapprochement with the Regulars
lessened the possibility of adverse state legislation, and Fitzpatrick settled in for an
eventful four-year term. Regular Democrats controlled the New Orleans city council as
well as parish-level offices essential to the organization's patronage system.20
The new mayor had learned that system well. During his service with the
Louisiana National Guard he acquired the nickname “Captain John.” He served for six
years as the city's Commissioner of Public Works, a position that controlled a large
payroll, spread liberally among the city's Irish-American population in particular. One
account o f his activities lists memberships “in the Elks, the Knights of Columbus, the
Ancient Order o f Hibernians, the United Irish League of New Orleans, the Continental
Guards, and the Firemen's Charitable and Benevolent Association.”21
19 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 13-14. The Regular Democrats
often utilized a committee on harmony in instances where two or more strong
candidates threatened to split the loyalty o f the group.
20 Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, Chapter VII; Kendall, History o f
New Orleans, 2: 499, 505. The City of New Orleans and the Parish of Orleans have
identical boundaries; however, two sets o f elected officials serve. One set represents the
municipal government, established by charter; the other set fills parish (county)
positions such as criminal sheriff and district attorney. Both sets o f offices came under
the influence o f the Regular organization.
21 Mayor’ Office, Administrations o f the Mayors o f New Orleans compiled and
edited by the Works Progress Administration, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana
Division (New Orleans, 1939), 198-203; Conrad, A Dictionary o f Louisiana Biography,
303; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 15-18.
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The first half o f Mayor Fitzpatrick's term held great promise for the city and for
the political career o f Captain John. He committed the city to the completion o f public
works projects, some of which had been started by the previous administration. The
notoriously bad streets of New Orleans, laid on land subject to flooding, received
Fitzpatrick’s attention, and by 1894 the mayor boasted to the council that major streets
“are [now] graveled roads, while most all the cross streets are likewise paved, much to
the credit of the city's enterprise and progressiveness. Square block granite pavements
have also been laid on Rampart, Burgundy and St. Philip streets” in the French Quarter.
Behrman later commented that “the gravel did not turn out so well as was expected, but
the people were satisfied with it at the time. There was not sufficient money to use the
large granite blocks” on all the streets.22
The Shakspeare administration had reorganized the volunteer fire department,
but the completion o f the task was left to Fitzpatrick. The city purchased the assets of
the volunteer associations and assumed the responsibility for fire protection in
December, 1891, but the city's obligations for payments fell into the subsequent three
years. (Behrman recalled the figure owed at $700,000, but other accounts put the
obligation much lower.) Fitzpatrick honored the commitment and paid the funds. He

22 Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 135, quoting from John Fitzpatrick,
Mayor's Message to the City Council o f New Orleans (New Orleans, 1894), 8.; Kemp,
Mayor Behrman o f New Orleans, 22. Street paving became a priority for Behrman after
his election to the mayor’s office in 1904, but remained a perpetual problem. No mayor
has permanently conquered the difficulties of maintaining streets on reclaimed swamp
land. In the 1989 mayoral campaign, Mayor Sidney Barthelemy was challenged about
the conditions o f city streets by a voter. The mayor replied in frustration, “Did you ever
try to pave a sponge?”
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also completed several large construction projects begun by his predecessor, including a
courthouse, police, and jail complex. Behrman would later recollect that the Fitzpatrick
administration replaced the city's gas lamps with electric versions with the result that
“small boys were deprived of the fun o f annoying the gas man as he came around at
sunset to light the gas lamps.”23
These projects and others put a heavy demand upon city finances, but the
administration effectively met the challenge. More efficient collection o f revenue,
reduction o f debt, and a slow but steady increase in assessments provided sufficient
revenue for the ambitious program. In the judgement o f one historian:
If Fitzpatrick had left office in early 1894, his administration would have
appeared to be one o f the most successful since the Civil War. With a balanced
budget, a surplus in the treasury, and public improvements for all to see, the
Third Ward's favorite son was at the peak of his career. He could even look
forward to the possible capture o f the governorship at some future date.24
But the last two years o f Fitzpatrick's tenure would eliminate any talk o f the
governorship and would burden the Regular organization for years. The mayor's alleged
connections to emerging scandals would doom Fitzpatrick's future political ambitions
even within the city.
The proximate cause for the mayor's trouble came from a new reform
organization, the Citizens' Protective Association, a direct descendant o f the YMDA, the

23 Kemp, Mayor Behrman o f New Orleans, 21-23; Jackson, New Orleans in the
Gilded Age, 136; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 18
24 Oscar Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in New Orleans, 1896-1900,” 16;
Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 137-138. Fitzpatrick later tried to secure the
Democratic nomination for governor, but the attempt failed.
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anti-lottery group, and the commercial exchanges. The association reacted to the
council's award of a franchise for the construction o f a public belt railroad to an agent of
the Illinois Central Railroad. At about the same time, the council awarded a favorable
contract for garbage disposal at a increased cost to the city over the previous
arrangements. Although both developments addressed important municipal problems,
the method o f awarding franchises and contracts attracted the attention not only o f the
Citizens' Protective Association, but also of the city's law enforcement establishment.
During the latter half o f 1894, Fitzpatrick's administration and members o f the
council faced investigation by the press, the Citizens' Protective Association, and the
grand jury. Eventually, indictments fell on twelve city officials, including ten members
o f the council. The most serious charges involved public bribery and three of those
indicted served time in prison. The council acquired the nickname “Boodle Council,”
and the press expanded its charges to include the mayor himself. Fitzpatrick fought
back by suing for libel, an action he eventually won against the Daily States. Not able to
find specific criminal activities with which to charge the Mayor, but still pressed by the
Citizens’ Protective Association for some action, the district attorney agreed to an
impeachment hearing in civil court.
In March, 1895, the Mayor defeated the attempt when the judge found in his
favor. The repercussions o f the council scandals, the libel trial, and the impeachment
process provided the background to the next city election, which would be held on the
same day as the state contest for governor. Once again, the outcome of the city and state
elections would be intertwined, but instead o f the 1892 crusade over the lottery, the
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1896 election included a significant challenge to the dominance of the state's Regular
Democrats and a replay of the 1888 and 1892 contests between the reformers and the
Regular within the city of New Orleans. The Regulars at the state level survived the
challenge, but the New Orleans Democratic organization did not.25
At the state level, Foster's fusion with the Farmers' Alliance in 1892 had split the
agrarian movement. Populists nominated their own candidate in 1892 and the Alliance
faded from the scene. As the election of 1896 approached, Regular Democracy in
Louisiana faced numerous threats. Populists represented a potential adversary, one that
had proved independent of attempts at absorption. An influential segment o f the
Redeemer elite-wealthy sugar planters, mostly from the southern part of the state-had
defected from the Democratic Party entirely. And the prospects for the Regular ticket in
New Orleans had dimmed, which made Foster's reelection outlook even more
precarious. In Foster's favor, however, was the disparate nature of the opposition and
the prior success Democrats had in coopting rebellious factions. “Democrats found that
one o f the most effective ways o f combating political insurgency and the reform
movement lay in absorbing part o f the reform program. This occurred sometimes
reluctantly, sometimes purposefully, and sometimes under coercion, but it happened.”26

25 For accounts of the investigations, trials and civil actions, see the Daily
Picayune, June, 1894, through April, 1895; Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age,
139-144; Kemp, Mayor Behrman ofNew Orleans, 20-21; Dethloff, “Populism and
Reform in Louisiana,” 258-260; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 19;
Kendall, History ofN ew Orleans, 2: 511-514.
26 Dethloff cites numerous examples of successful Democratic attempts to coopt
the opposition, including Foster's activities with the anti-lottery forces, endorsement of
free silver by some Democrats in 1894, and various bills regarding election reform.
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The perennial Republican challenge to the Democrats would be strengthened by
the addition o f the National Republicans, still angry over Democratic policy on the sugar
tariff, but the possible combination o f that group with both the agrarian Populists and
city reformers seemed implausible. Foster had faced the threat o f fusion in 1892, but in
that year the Republican Party divided its votes between two candidates, and the left
wing of the Alliance formed the People's Party and offered a candidate o f its own. To
the chagrin of the Regulars, however, the unlikely fusion took place and seriously
threatened Bourbon Democracy. The election of 1896 tested the strength o f the Fusion
movement, the ability of the Democrat Party in the state and New Orleans to respond to
this challenge, and even the civil stability of the state.
The combination against the Regulars in 1896 resulted, in part, from the
congressional elections two years earlier. Both the Populists and the Republicans
attempted to win congressional seats in that year, but without success. In the northern
part of the state, Populists candidates ran strong campaigns in the Fourth and Fifth
Congressional Districts. In the former, Congressman Henry W. Ogden adopted the free
silver stance o f his Populist opponent and won by a margin o f over 6,000 votes. The
Populists contended that election fraud had cost them the seat. Study o f the election
returns indicated that manipulation o f the black vote helped to provide Ogden with his
apparent margin. In the Fifth Congressional District, the Regular Democrat, Charles J.
Boatner, held fast to the gold standard in defeating Alexis Benoit by over 10,000 votes.
More charges o f fraud came from the Populist camp, and Benoit took his case to
Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 137-138.
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Congress. Although the investigation resulted in a new election, Boatner's m argin o f
6,000 in the rematch was sufficient to convince Congress to award him the seat.27
Republicans fared no better in the First through Third Congressional Districts in
the 1894 elections; three candidates put forward by the Republicans suffered defeat by
Regular Democrats. In these elections, as well as those in the northern part o f the state,
charges of fraud tainted the Democratic victories, but the dominance of the Democrats
was clear. If opposition parties were to mount serious efforts to capture the
governorship and other state and federal offices, a combination between the Republicans
and Populists was essential. A third partner in the anti-Regular effort would bring
success even closer: the urban reform movement in New Orleans. The success o f
Foster in 1892 had demonstrated the necessity o f gathering substantial support from the
state's largest city even in the absence of support from the urban Regulars.28
On November 8, 1895, New Orleans reformers organized yet another electionyear association, the Citizens' League. The League had common membership with the
Citizens' Protective Association and earlier organizations enlisted to fight the Regulars.
Cotton broker John M. Parker assisted in the formation of the League, as did prominent
lawyer Walter Denegre and insurance executive Charles Janvier. Opposition to Mayor
Fitzpatrick had grown as the scandals multiplied, and the League pronouncements made
clear that recapturing the mayor's office was the group's first priority, but, as a side

27 Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Reform, 239-243.
28 Uzee, “Republican Politics in Louisiana, 1877-1900,” 145-150; Hair,
Bourbonism and Agrarian Reform, 247; Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,”
235-236.
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effect o f the city reform effort, statewide challengers to the Democratic Regulars gained
potential allies.29
The economic aspirations of the hill country small farmers paralleled the
political goals of the city reformers. Both fought against the constraints o f Regular
Democratic organizations and the use of vote fraud and manipulation. Brought together
from opposite ends o f the economic spectrum by shared concerns, urban and rural forces
formed an unlikely alliance as the election o f 1896 approached. What emerged in
Louisiana in 1896 was an opposition to Regular Democracy held together primarily by
its common target, not by a joint program or a shared ideology. Wealthy sugar planters
formed an alliance with upcountry small fanners, and sophisticated urban reformers
joined (albeit tentatively) with rural Populists opposed to machine rule, whether it
dominated the city or the alluvial parishes. A common adversary united the disparate
groups whose members found themselves at odds with the dominant party’s objectives.
As one historian later explained, “The criteria for determining why a Louisiana
Democrat became a Populist will also largely explain why an Allianceman became an
anti-lottery Democrat, or a sugar planter a Republican, or an urban Democrat an antilotteryite or a Citizens' Leaguer. Democratic solidarity . . . prevented each of these
interests from obtaining [its] objectives within the regular processes of the Democratic
party.”30

29 Daily Picayune, February 26,1896,1, 5; Schott, “John M. Parker,” 57;
Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 312; Kendall, History ofNew Orleans, 2: 517.
30 Schott, "John M. Parker,” 39-90; Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in
Louisiana,”!53, 173,256. Schott notes that in 1895 John M. Parker and Farmers'
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Partners in the Fusion movement o f 1896 did not easily reach agreement on a
candidate. Populists and the remnants o f the Farmers' Alliance harbored suspicions
toward their partners; memories of the betrayal that followed cooperation with Foster in
1892 led to a high degree o f caution. Negotiations between factions o f the Republican
Party and the Populists began in mid-1895 and continued later that year. The
Republicans pledged to await the Populist nominating convention in early 1896 and,
assuming the selection of a broad-based ticket, promised their backing for the nominees.
In fact, the National Republicans preempted the Populists less than a week before the
convention by nominating E. N. Pugh, a wealthy planter, for governor. The Populists
proceeded with their own plans, but had difficulty in selecting a nominee. After a series
o f mishaps and negotiations, competing nominees stepped aside and all parties to the
coalition—Populists, National Republicans, and Regular (Radical) Republicans—settled
on John N. Pharr, a wealthy sugar planter from the southern part o f Louisiana, as the
Fusion nominee for governor. Pharr had led his planter colleagues out o f the
Democratic Party in response to the Wilson-Gorman Tariff, possessed sufficient wealth
to run a plausible campaign, and exhibited enough sympathy toward the Populist
platform to convince the agrarians that he could be trusted to uphold their interests if
elected.31

Alliance leader Thomas Scott Adams advocated common political reforms including the
secret ballot. Dethloff gives Adams substantial credit for actions that resulted in the
formation of the Citizens' League. The direct quote is found in Dethloff, “Populism and
Reform in Louisiana,” 153.
31 Hair offers the most complete account of the nominating process and
speculates that Pharr's wealth and subsequent support o f Populist newspapers eased the
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The New Orleans reform movement did not take part in the nominating process
as a formal organization, but connections between the city's elite and the sugar planters
had always been strong. The city's business interests supported tariff protection, and
many reform supporters had economic or family ties to the sugar regions. The Fusion
ticket could expect substantial votes from the city, if not an official endorsement. By
the time o f the election, therefore, Regular Democracy was under siege both at the state
level and in its largest city. The Regular Democrats fought back, employing legal and
illegal means. Orators for Foster denounced the Fusion opposition for its left-wing
tendencies, its disloyalty to the memory o f the Civil War and Reconstruction battles,
and, most energetically, for its implied threat to white supremacy. Pharr’s somewhat
moderate record on race proved an easy target for such claims.32
At the same time as the state contest, the Citizens' League fought to take back
the New Orleans mayor's office from the Regulars. The League nominated Walter C.
Flower, attorney, successful businessman, and former president of the city's Cotton
Exchange. He accumulated substantial wealth as a cotton broker, but contracted
tuberculosis and moved from the city to recover his health. After recuperating, he left
retirement to make the mayoral race. It was his first attempt at elective politics, a
presumed deficiency in experience that reformers turned into an asset when contrasting
the League ticket with the Fitzpatrick administration. Although Flower's party

way toward Fusion. Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 248-256; Dethloff,
“Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 126.
32 Schott, “John M. Parker”, 68-70.
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credentials as a Democrat were somewhat suspect, as a young man he had participated
in the Battle of Liberty Place, the 1874 revolt against Reconstruction authority that
achieved mythic status in subsequent years. Charles Janvier, leader o f the Citizens'
League, announced Flower's candidacy a month before the election, and the local
newspapers mentioned the crucial role that Janvier had played in the selection process.33
The Regulars faced a difficult task in deciding upon their own mayoral candidate
and accompanying ticket. Fitzpatrick's administration carried the weight of scandal, but
the mayor still commanded popularity among many voters and, more importantly, the
loyalty of his Regular colleagues. The selection would normally fall to the Regular
caucus where Fitzpatrick enjoyed his greatest strength, but this was not a normal
election. Mindful of the Fusion threat and needing a strong vote from New Orleans,
Governor Foster intervened and pressured the Regulars to drop the notion of a
Fitzpatrick candidacy. His influence and that of the press convinced the Regulars to
select a “clean ticket,” repudiating the “Boodle” council and it current officeholders.
The Regulars prevailed upon Charles F. Buck, incumbent Congressman from the state's
Second Congressional District in New Orleans, and former City Attorney in the early
1880s. Buck, bom in Germany in 1841, appealed to the city's significant population of
German ancestry and provided the Regular ticket with a scandal-free leader.
33 Janvier was a prominent member o f the city's elite as a banker and insurance
executive. In the same year that he worked on behalf of Flower, Janvier reigned as Rex,
king of the city's annual Mardi Gras festivities. Administrations o f the Mayors o f New
Orleans, 1803-1936, 204-207; Daily Picayune, March 22,1896,4,11; Conrad, A
Dictionary o f Louisiana Biography, 309,431; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern
City, 50-51; Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 312, 314; Oscar Nussbaum,
“Progressive Politics in New Orleans,” 52-57; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 519.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42
Nevertheless, he was a member o f the Regulars and considered safe in matters of
patronage should he be victorious. Fitzpatrick and Ernest B. Kruttschnitt, chairman o f
the state's Democratic Central Committee, personally worked to secure Buck's
agreement to run.34
The city contest reflected the larger issues fought at the state level, but the
Citizens' League did not embrace the statewide insurgency. Content to challenge for
control of New Orleans, the League did not offer its endorsement to Pharr, fearing that
alliance with the Populists would weaken prospects in the city. In contrast, Pharr and
his supporters promised complete support to the League’s candidates. In one important
respect, League strategy mirrored that o f the Fusion effort: both made strenuous efforts
to secure votes o f the city's black population.
In New Orleans, black voters constituted slightly less than one-fourth of the total
registration, a smaller proportion than in the state as a whole. But the urban minority
vote tended to be independent, prepared to negotiate in its own interest, and less subject
to pressure than its rural counterpart. Regulars did not ignore the potential of black
support, and Ring candidates actively campaigned among black voters. The Republican
Protective League, an organization o f black voters under the leadership o f the Radical
Republican faction, sought to bargain between the two competing tickets. Ultimately,
the League succeeded in this competition. In April, 1896, blacks assembled at a mass
34 Daily Picayune, February 26, 1896, 1; April 3, 1896, 2, 8; April 8, 1896, 1, 4;
April 11, 1896, 7; April 12,1896, 3; Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 314-315;
Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in N ew Orleans,” 62-63; John F. Nau, The German
People o f New Orleans, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958), 129-130; Kendall, History o f New
Orleans, 2: 521-522.
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meeting agreed to support the city's reform ticket and, at the same time, pledged support
to Pharr. Behrman recalled later that:
I remember seeing John Fitzpatrick's office jammed with colored preachers one
day as the fight was getting h o t.. . everyone was dressed in black and most of
them wore long tailed coats. Their leaders conferred with Fitzpatrick again and
again but they were unable to make arrangements satisfactory to themselves and
they all went to the Citizens1League.
Although Behrman does not mention it, a labor dispute along the New Orleans docks
may have contributed to the loss of the black vote for the Regulars. It would be many
decades before the black vote in the city or the state once again had any substantial
affect on the outcome o f an election.35
Foster retained the governor's seat after a bitter fight. Throughout the state,
Regulars harnessed compliant or cowed black voters in an ironic effort to make the state
safe for white politics, while Fusionists fought to protect polling places from Regular
chicanery. By most accounts, Foster's victory resulted from a high degree o f vote
manipulation if not outright fraud. In six rural parishes, for example, the 1890 census
listed only 3,278 white males in the parishes, but over 16,000 votes were counted
overwhelmingly for the Democrats. Pharr, the Fusionist candidate, received only 139 of
these votes. In three other parishes, he received no votes and, in a fourth parish, only
one vote. George Reynolds's study o f New Orleans politics asserted that “the election

35 Daily Picayune, March 19, 1896, 13; April 3, 18896, 2; April 19, 1896, 12;
Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 190,261, 312; Kemp, Martin Behrman
o f New Orleans, 39-40. Eric Amesen asserted that black leaders supported Flower as a
reaction to Fitzpatrick’s support of white dock workers in an ugly inter-racial labor
conflict in 1895. See Eric Amesen, Waterfront Workers o f New Orleans: Race, Class,
and Politics, 1863-1923 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 146.
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was the most disorderly ever held in the state. There were charges o f fraud, coercion,
stuffing o f ballot boxes, in fact every known election crime.” Reynolds reported that
eyewitnesses to the election confirmed the extent of the vote manipulation.36
The Fusionists may have lost at the state level, but in New Orleans, Flower
defeated Buck by over 6,000 votes out o f 45,640 cast. The Citizens' League swept
almost all of the city council positions, losing only two to the Regulars, and elected a
total o f at least nineteen members of the state legislature as well. The results seemed a
complete defeat for the city machine, and local newspapers that supported the League
proclaimed the death o f the Ring. Regulars blamed their losses on the Republicans and,
especially, on the black vote. From the perspective o f the 1920s, Martin Behrman
would recall the election when “the negro vote elected the Citizens' League ticket in
New Orleans and came very near to electing the Republicans in the state.”37
Foster's victory, though, seriously diluted the League triumph. If he were
allowed to take office, New Orleans patronage would continue to flow to the Regulars,

36 The evidence in strong that the Regulars stole the state election from the
Fusion ticket made up o f Republicans and Populists. See Hair, Bourbonism and
Agrarian Protest, 248-267; Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1978), 195-196; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans,
27; Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana”, 261-275.
37 Daily Picayune, April 22, 1896, 1; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New
Orleans, 27-28; Kemp, ed., Mayor Behrman o f New Orleans, 35; Kendall, History o f
New Orleans, 2: 523. There is disagreement among the sources regarding the number of
League legislators. Reynolds gave the figure of nineteen; Hair stated that twenty-seven
of the new legislature were loyal to the League. Dethloff s figures agreed with Hair, i.e.,
“The league had eighteen in the House and nine in the Senate.” Dethloff, “Populism
and Reform in Louisiana,” 282. Haas set the figures at seventeen in the House and five
in the Senate. Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 51.
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whose support was crucial to Democratic control of the legislature. The League
members of that body served alongside thirteen Republicans, eighteen Populists, and
four Independents. The Fusionists disputed the election o f Foster and hoped that the
legislature would intervene. The Citizens' League members would be crucial in any
vote, and Pharr's supporters expected the cooperation of the city reformers. But the
fragile electoral coalition did not survive even the initial legislative session. Natural
divisions between the Fusion partners began to emerge, and, by the end o f the session,
the Populists had litde to show for their efforts.38
The legislature convened less than a month after the state and city elections
amidst rumors that the Fusionists would resort to violence. The League legislators
agonized over whether to align with Foster or pursue a more independent course.
Although a majority of the League initially voted to maintain its independence,
members quickly opted to prove their party loyalty rather than respond to the pleas of
their recent allies. The legislature's first task was to settle the disputed governor's
election. Pharr had continued his campaign and urged an inquiry into the suspicious
returns. The precarious Democratic majority in the legislature combined with the votes
o f many League members, and the legislature certified Foster’s election by eighty-six to
forty-eight. League members had a lengthy agenda for the remainder of the session, but
this initial issue did not bode well for the Fusion effort.39
38 Joy Jackson, “Murphy J. Foster,” 192.
39 New Orleans Times-Democrat, May 15,1896, 2, 4, 5; Schott, “John M.
Parker,” 77-79; Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Reform, 266-267; Nussbaum,
“Progressive Politics in New Orleans,” 79. Reynolds described Foster's victory margin
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The high point o f the Citizen's League influence in the state occurred over the
following two weeks. The legislature began to consider the election for a U.S. Senator,
and numerous candidates emerged, including Pharr, McEnery, the 1892 candidate for
governor, incumbent Newton Blanchard, and Walter D. Denegre, one o f the most
prominent members of the Citizens’ League. Behrman later characterized Denegre as
“what we called a 'silk stocking,' a term used to designate a man o f wealth and education
out o f touch with the average citizen.” In spite of the League's ill treatment o f the
Fusion members on the issue of Foster’s contested election, the Regulars’ opponents
coalesced around Denegre on successive ballots. Faced with an inability to elect
Blanchard, Foster swallowed his pride and negotiated an agreement to back his 1892
rival, McEnery, for the position. Blanchard played his role by withdrawing from the
race, and Denegre was narrowly defeated. Shortly thereafter, Foster appointed
Blanchard to the Supreme Court o f Louisiana. Having lost the prize of the Senate seat,
the League settled for smaller victories in the legislative session and changed their
expectations from reform of the state to the task of reforming the city. The Populist
experiment in Louisiana ail but ended with the election o f 1896, but the new League
administration in New Orleans and it allies in the state legislature began to introduce
their version of progressive reform into city government.40

as “a small majority,” but he may be referring to a previous procedural vote. See
Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 29.
40 Daily Picayune, May 29, 1896, 1; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans,
30-31; Dethloff, “Populism and Reform in Louisiana,” 293-296.
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In the state’s largest city, the Regular Democrats had been routed. Newspaper
headlines proclaimed that the “ring is smashed.” The cycle of reform and Regular
administrations swung once more toward reform, and the new government began the
task o f preparing New Orleans for the new century. National trends encouraged reform,
and the spirit of progressive change inspired the Flower administration. But for its
political success to become permanent, the reformers had to learn the lessons of
previous efforts to challenge Regular power. It would not be sufficient to bring
progressive policies to the city. The reformers had to develop the political skills, and
the level o f comfort with political power, that had made the Regulars so formidable in
the past and would once again in the not too distant future.
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CHAPTER II
ORIGINS OF THE PROGRESSIVE CITY:
STRUCTURE, SUFFRAGE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The political skills of Governor Foster and the strength o f regular Democracy
thwarted the statewide of ambitions o f the New Orleans Citizens League. The failure o f
the fusion movement to investigate the gubernatorial election and the defeat of Walter
D. Denegre in the contest for the U.S. Senate foreclosed any decisive role in state or
national politics. But the League held substantial power in the legislature and was
determined to use the state forum to effect change in the city. League members set out a
far-reaching agenda to revise the city charter, to reform election procedures, and to
establish governmental structures that would transform not only the means of
government but also the physical infrastructure of New Orleans. The legislative actions
promoted by the League set the conditions for the emergence of progressive New
Orleans and the shape of the city well into the twentieth century.
The actions of the Regulars produced similarly far-reaching effects. The
disputed gubernatorial race, and the close call for the Regular candidate for the United
States Senate, set the strategies of the Democratic leadership. In quick succession, the
Regulars solidified control of the legislature, agreed to call a constitutional convention,
limited the convention agenda to prevent most Populist reforms, and passed restrictive
48
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laws to control the electorate that would choose convention delegates. The explicit
purpose o f the planned new constitution was the disfranchisement o f Louisiana's black
voters. The Democratic leaders faced a dilemma. The disfranchisement of blacks
would reduce the majority that could be counted on in the many rural parishes; yet the
failure to disfranchise allowed the continued possibility o f a Populist-Black or
Reformer-Black alliance. Democratic fears o f such a combination increased after the
1896 Pharr candidacy, during which his platform condemned lynching, his campaign
remarks supported black voting, and the Fusion ticket recorded significant numbers of
black votes.1
New Orleans Democrats confronted a set of circumstances opposite from their
rural counterparts. Although Regular Democrats in the rural areas o f the state controlled
the majority o f the black vote, the New Orleans black electorate exercised considerable
independence.2 Disfranchisement would rid the Regulars o f the threat posed by the
city's independent black voters, but many o f the proposed schemes o f disfranchisement
risked a reduction of the votes o f poor whites—particularly the rapidly-growing Italian

1For accounts o f the politics of disfranchisement, see Hair, Bourbonism and
Agrarian Protest, 255-256, 274-279; Kousser, The Shaping o f Southern Politics,
152-165; Matthew J. Schott, "Progressives Against Democracy: Electoral Reform in
Louisiana, 1894-1921," Louisiana History 20 (Summer 1979): 247-260; Goodwyn, The
Populist Moment: A Short History o f the Agrarian Revolt in America, 195.
2 The independence o f the state's black vote depended on a number of factors:
the extent of intimidation, level of economic pressure, and the absence or presence o f an
alternative to the regular organization. Hair provided results for the 1896 election
which showed a fusionist win in East Baton Rouge parish. He explained the victory in
part because o f an independent black vote made possible by conflict between factions of
the regular Democrats. Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 263.
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immigrant population. The New Orleans Regulars backed Foster, the winning candidate
in the 1896 gubernatorial race, but lost the city elections to the Citizens' League. The
city results frightened the machine leadership at all levels in the state because the
Citizens' League's victory, based on an alliance of reformers, Republicans, and blacks,
was an object lesson o f the risks to Regular rule of fusion movements. Even though the
rural parishes’ heavily black population could be counted on to remain Democratic, the
prospect of losing the urban base of New Orleans helped move the legislature toward
disfranchisement.3
The Citizens' League had abandoned their Populist allies by supporting Foster's
claim to the governorship. The League thereby lost any chance of establishing a solid,
state-wide reform group in opposition to the Regulars. Such a combination was
unlikely from the start, given the vast economic differences between the two groups; yet
the ease with which the League broke ranks with their colleagues provided an indication
o f reform weakness that would affect the next municipal elections. What bound the
reformers together—antagonism toward the machine—broke down in the face of calls for
party and racial solidarity. The 1896 fusion with Populists and blacks had been tenuous
from the beginning (the League never formally endorsed the Fusion candidate for
governor), and within a few weeks after the election, the Citizens’ League’s loyalty to

3 The city's Italian population increased by more than 100 percent from 1890 to
1900. The 1890 total o f foreign-born Italians was 7,767; by 1900 that figure had grown
to 16,560. The Italian population in New Orleans tended to cluster into a limited
number o f distinct neighborhoods, which increased its political effectiveness at the ward
level. Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51
party proved stronger than Fusion politics. Moreover, the political performance o f the
League in the 1896 legislature suggested an amateurish inconsistency and insufficient
appreciation of the uses o f power.4
The black voters o f New Orleans, who had provided substantial electoral support
for reform efforts in the city, fared no better. When the state legislature moved toward
disfranchisement, ostensibly in the name o f reform, the League quickly abandoned its
meager efforts at biracial politics. Anxious to prove their credentials on the issue o f
race and to certify their loyalty to the Democratic Party, the reform bloc supported
disfranchisement. Blacks were left with no legislative support. Neither the rural nor
urban branch of the Regulars strayed from a commitment to disfranchisement. The
Populists resented the manipulation o f the rural black vote and did not sufficiently
appreciate the potential o f an electoral coalition based on economic class. And the
urban reformers cynically abandoned a group that helped bring them to power in New
Orleans.5

4 The breakdown o f the coalition continued on the issue of a constitutional
convention. Populists sought an unrestricted convention, but the Regulars rejected the
call and received League support for their more restrictive convention. New Orleans
Times-Democrat, May 30, 1896, 2; Nussbaum, 83-86.
5 Schott, "John M. Parker," 76-80; Schott, "Progressives Against Democracy:
Electoral Reform in Louisiana, 1894-1921," 253. In the latter work, Schott presents
evidence that the reformers were not reflexively anti-black, and that disfranchisement
was not part of the formal Citizens' League program. For an examination o f the
argument that disfranchisement constituted a progressive reform in the mind o f southern
reformers, see Jack Temple Kirby, Darkness at the Dawning: Race and Reform in the
Progressive South.
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The city contingent o f Regulars in the legislature wanted to reduce or eliminate
black voting, but took care to preserve the votes o f immigrants and other poor whites
who provided strong support at election time. Ironically, this concern aided the interests
o f one element of the Fusionists—the rural poor, stronghold of agrarian dissent. With
almost unanimous support from the city reformers, the legislation that called the
constitutional convention and restricted suffrage passed. Although white registration
declined in New Orleans as the result o f this action, the city Regulars managed to
preserve an important part of their base through protection for poor white voters.
Statewide, the Regular Democrats faced somewhat less o f a threat from the Populist
tendencies of poor whites, although the normally compliant rural black vote declined as
well. The legislation that proposed revision o f the constitution also stipulated a
referendum on whether or not to hold the convention. The election of delegates to the
proposed convention was scheduled at the same time, January, 1898. Assuming a
favorable vote, the constitutional convention would follow one month later. Legislators
placed certain limitations on the work of the convention, but examination o f suffrage
rights clearly held center stage.6
The call for the constitutional convention was the most important work o f the
1896 legislature, but other crucial pieces o f legislation followed. The same legislature
that called the constitutional convention also dealt with a backlog o f municipal
problems. The Citizens’ League vowed to reform the city charter, renew the registration
6 Schott, “Progressives Against Democracy: Electoral Reform in Louisiana,
1894-1921,” 247-260; Schott, "JohnM. Parker," 82;
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laws, revise the election laws in favor of a secret ballot, fight the abominable sanitary
conditions o f the city, and address the needs of city merchants, especially those
concerned with the conditions o f the city wharves. This agenda involved the state
legislature because the state exercised substantial power over the city’s finances and
possessed the ability to propose amendments to the state constitution. Although home
rule provisions guaranteed a measure of independence to New Orleans, the city’s
infrastructure needs constituted a degree of change that required participation o f the
state. In addition, governmental forms had evolved during the 1880s and 1890s to
include alternatives to direct control by city government. As progressive opinion
developed in local government, the trend toward utilizing boards and commissions
increased. The Citizens’ League controlled the New Orleans government and
maintained significant strength in the Louisiana legislature. Many League members,
drawn from the professional and commercial elite, harbored suspicion toward pure
democracy and, perhaps, anticipated a time when the Regulars might regain control of
the city. Insulating certain functions of govemment—and the associated revenue sources
—from the city council appealed to the League. Progressives often sought to balance a
professed belief in the efficacy of people with their attraction to expertise, if not elitism.7

7 Samuel P. Hays, “The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the
Progressive Era,”Pacific Northwest Quarterly 55 (October, 1964): 157-169. Daniel
Rogers wrote “the progressives appeal to ‘the people’ is a more complicated example of
the phenomenon [of language u se ]. . . but one o f the reasons for the triumph o f that
particularly elastic phrase .. .was that it allowed those who sincerely believed in a
government serving the needs of ‘the people’ to camouflage from voters the acute
distrust many o f those same persons harbored of political egalitarianism.” Rogers, “In
Search o f Progressivism,” 122.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54
The city and state had depended upon boards and commissions even before the
1890s. In the post-Reconstruction era, debt problems plagued both the city and the
state. A good credit rating proved impossible, and banks limited loans to government.
The city and state established the New Orleans Board of Liquidation in response and
gradually rebuilt confidence in city finances. But the city agreed to circumscribe its
fiscal independence severely. The Board enjoyed first rights to city revenue and pledged
the first proceeds to bond holders and other creditors. The city was unable to enter into
additional long-term debt without the permission of the Board. The most significant
Board power was in the area o f membership. After the initial members were named, the
Board enjoyed self-perpetuating power of appointment. Vacancies caused by
resignation or death were filled by the remaining Board members. Although city
government enjoyed representation on the Board of Liquidation, the elected members
were in a perpetual minority to the other members.8
The New Orleans Board o f Liquidation of City Debt proved an effective model
for the legislature and a precursor to progressive restructuring o f governmental
administrative units. Creating such agencies allowed the legislature to address
important governmental functions, but keep direct control out o f the hands o f the city
council-even one dominated by the Citizens’ League. Throughout its tenure, the
legislature elected in 1896 consistently approved changes to the constitution and passed
statutes in favor of a devolution o f authority from the council to other bodies. Two such

8 Carl E. Hyde, Jr, “The Origins of the New Orleans Board of Liquidation of the
City Debt, 1876-1882" (Unpublished seminar paper: University o f New Orleans, 1993).
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innovations occurred in the first session o f the legislature: the formation of a city
Drainage Commission and the establishment of the Board o f Commissioners of the Port
of New Orleans. At the end of its term, the legislature, in a special session o f 1899,
created another independent agency by passing the enabling legislation that established
the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans.9
Agitation for a state takeover of the city docks began with complaints from
shippers and merchants concerned about the conditions o f the river front. A city council
committee investigated the purchase of the private contract under which a corporation
administered the wharves, but concluded that the estimated price o f $450,000 was too
high. A committee of the city’s commercial exchanges considered legal action to
abrogate the contract, but no action took place. A port commission bill passed both
houses of the state legislature by the end o f June, 1896, with support from both the
reform and Regular factions, and the governor signed the legislation shortly thereafter.
A Daily Picayune editorial called the legislation “among the measures o f great
importance to the people of New Orleans.” The newspaper further claimed that the
legislation “promises to secure for this city a permanent lowering o f port charges as well
as an economic and businesslike administration of the docking facilities.” During the
same session, at the request of Citizens’ League members, the legislature passed laws
revising the city charter and instituting a system of civil service. But the success o f the
League at the legislature did not produce the normal patronage rewards. Governor

9 See Chapters VI and VII.
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Foster continued to favor the Regulars, and the “League was left out in the cold as
regards patronage.” 10
The League could take some comfort in its control of New Orleans. Its
impressive city victory over the Regulars secure, the Citizens' League sought to make its
power permanent. Members recognized that one of the failings of previous reform
efforts was a lack of formal structure. Groups of politically active opponents of the
Regulars formed organizations prior to elections, but rarely survived for more than a few
months. Reform groups attracted members o f the professions and businessmen, not all
o f whom were ambitious to serve in elective office. Nor were they willing to make the
financial sacrifices that election and service as public officials demanded. After
hard-fought elections, members returned to other interests, and political control could
not be sustained even in those instances when the reformers were victorious. To counter
this tendency, the League copied the machine’s organizational structure based on wards
and precincts, incorporated as a permanent association, and established a headquarters.
“Periodical revolutions are no longer to be endured,” asserted one League spokesman.
More important, the League moved to control patronage, its support for civil service
reform notwithstanding. In December, 1896, over two hundred persons signed the
charter and selected Charles Janvier as president.11
10 Daily Picayune, June 5, 1896,4, 12; July 2, 1896, 1; July 3, 1896, 3; July 7,
1896, 4.
11 Even before the election, Charles Janvier had attacked the Regulars and called
for permanent changes in the city charter and civil service. Daily Picayune, February
26, 1896. For the post-election organization changes, see Charles Janvier, "Municipal
Reform in New Orleans," Proceedings o f the Louisville Conference fo r Good City
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The organization o f the Citizens’ League attempted to duplicate the centralized
characteristics o f its political rival. In addition to Janvier, the group elected five vicepresidents, a secretary, and a treasurer. The president exercised considerable power in
appointing an executive committee, which included one member from each o f the city's
wards as well as ten at-laxge members. The charter granted the executive committee the
responsibility for “the entire control and management of the business of the League.”
However, the League's ambivalence to political power led to inherent contradictions. In
an organization ostensibly dedicated to the acquisition and exercise o f political and
governmental power, members tried to divorce governance o f the League from officeholding. Article V o f the charter specifically prohibited League officers and members
o f the Executive Committee from holding elective office. In the League, adherence to
an idealized view o f reform separated office-holding from the leadership o f the private
political organization. In its charter, the League adhered to its principles by specifically
legislating such a division, though there was no evidence that such exaggerated purity
influenced the electorate at large. Even as successful League members governed the
city and sought legislative change, the charter expressed the organization’s views on the
necessity of disinterested officials. In the Regular organization, power flowed from the
influence of the elected leadership and its day-to-day connection with the machinery o f
government. Most Regular leaders held government posts that kept them in touch with

Government and o f the Third Annual Meeting o f the National Municipal League
(Philadelphia: National Municipal League, 1897), 216-217; Daily Picayune, May 2,
1896,1; Edward Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 39-59. Haas's work
provides the best summary o f the characteristics o f League members.
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voters and provided a dynamic critique of policy. The League attempted to copy the
Regular organization, but in its zeal to demonstrate political purity, cut off its leadership
from the practical side of public administration. In its organization, the League fell far
short o f what was necessary for political permanence.12
Stung by the defeat o f their city ticket in 1896. the Regulars moved to reorganize
as soon as possible. The Crescent Democratic Club, formed in 1891, had provided the
political vehicle for the Regulars, but its usefulness disappeared along with the
Fitzpatrick scandals and Buck's defeat. In November, 1896, members of the club moved
to dissolve, but, within a month, a committee of Regulars convened to organize a
successor association. The initial meeting occurred only a few days after the official
formation of the Citizens’ League. The “new Democratic club” selected the name
"Choctaw" in imitation of the successful Tammany organization and drafted a charter
outlining three purposes: "to uphold and advance Democratic principles; to promote
harmony, enjoyment, and literary improvements; and to provide the conveniences o f a
Club House." Martin Behrman later acknowledged the New York antecedents o f the
use o f an Indian name, and recalled in his memoirs that club historians listed
Chicamauga, Houma, and Tensas~all Louisiana tribes—as other possibilities.13
Although contemporary accounts of the organizational meetings do not mention
the role o f the governor, Behrman later credited his influence. "Foster. . . combined the
12 For details of the League organization, see the New Orleans Daily States,
December 13-19, 1896; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 39-41.
13New Orleans Times-Democrat, December 30, 1896, 12; Kemp, Martin
Behrman o f New Orleans, 34-35; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 20-23.
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city organization and the parish politicians more completely into one faction than they
have ever been since then.”14 Specifically , Foster continued his patronage support o f the
Regulars, as he had after the 1892 elections. In appointing Regulars to state offices, he
ignored the League control o f the city administration. Behrman wrote:
Foster's appointment o f regulars to state offices in New Orleans after [their]
defeat by the Citizens' League was, in my opinion the beginning o f the “city
organization” known as the regulars. These appointments gave him a following
o f about half the leaders in New Orleans. When he came to New Orleans and
mixed in local politics, he did it openly. He did not send friends or agents but
came himself and the [New Orleans] Times-Democrat thought this was a very
wicked proceeding.
Behrman was not a neutral observer. Within a month, Foster named him and four o f his
Regular colleagues as tax assessors for the city, powerful offices often associated with
ward and city leadership. Any property owner displeased with an assessment could
make a personal appeal to the assessor, who often granted relief based on the political
inclinations o f the petitioner. Other Choctaw members received appointments to boards
and commissions, such as the Dock Board, crucial to a continuation of patronage for
loyal party members, the “very life blood for a machine struggling to be bom.”15
The governor's interests revealed the partisan nature o f the New Orleans rivalry
as well as the extent o f the influence the Choctaw Club might have in statewide

14 Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 33; Haas, Political Leadership in
a Southern City, 23-21; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 34-36,57, and
343-347. Kemp provided a copy of the charter of the Choctaw club in an appendix to
the Behrman memoirs. Officers filed the charter in March, 1897, but the essentials of
the new organization were in place by the end o f the previous year.
15 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 34; Haas, Political Leadership in a
Southern City, 27; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 33.
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contests. “The welfare o f the country,” the charter proclaimed, “shall be determined and
guided by the principles o f the Democratic Party.” This identification between the
Choctaws and the Democratic Party formed the basis o f Behrman's assertion that “In
those days, the Choctaws did not represent a faction. They represented the Democratic
Party.. . . The Choctaws were good Democrats who organized against a Republican
party in Louisiana and a combination o f Republicans and ‘reformer’ Democrats in New
Orleans.”16
Unlike the Citizens’ League, the Choctaw Club charter had no prohibition
against its leadership holding elective office. Club members embraced political life, not
only for the obvious patronage benefits, but also for the functional necessity o f politics
as a means to various ends. Behrman commented in his memoirs that “the theory that a
thing can be done because it is a good thing to do seems to run through a great deal of
what I have read about city government. That is not true.” He and his colleagues knew
that municipal action flowed from electoral power, not good intentions. Article 2 o f the
Choctaw Club charter asserted “that it is the duty of every good citizen to take not only a
deep interest, but also an active part in the political affairs o f the country.” Writing in
the 1930s, George Reynolds put it more bluntly: “Professional politicians organized the
Choctaw Club and have always dominated it.” The professional nature of the Choctaw
Club and the political practices of its members suggested that the progressive ideal of
expertise extended to electoral politics. The bureaucratization of American life at the
turn o f the century included not only governmental agencies, but also professional and
16Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 35-36.
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voluntary associations. The many examples o f urban political machines—especially
when viewed apart from the value questions o f patronage and corruption-constituted
further examples of society’s “search for order” and pursuit o f expertise.17
Attempts to characterize the differences between the League and the Choctaw
Club, and, more generally, between “reform” organizations and their “machine” rivals,
often depends on an analysis o f what the competing groups said about themselves and
each other. Representatives o f the two groups adopted stock rhetorical devices to
distinguish themselves from their political enemies, and this led historians to adopt
simplistic portrayals of the competing organizations. The upper and upper-middle class
reform rhetoric emphasized purity of motive, the disinterested nature of reformers’
actions, criticism of the political process (particularly voting procedures), the corrupt
nature of the opposition, and economy in government. By the end o f the 1890s, reform
rhetoric also emphasized the assumed virtues o f “business” and the “businessman,” who
would bring efficiency to a boss-ridden system. Citizens’ League President Charles
Janvier emphasized the honesty of League candidates and mocked the Regulars’ efforts
to construct a “clean ticket” in 1896. His colleague Charles Claiborne, candidate for
city council, told a League rally that there were no “issues in the election,” not “the
tariff nor protection,” but only “good government against bad.” League spokesman A.
G. Romain characterized the 1896 election as “the people against fraud, bribery, and
plunder;” H. Dickson Bruns called it “honesty against dishonesty.” Walter Denegre

17 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 344; Reynolds, Machine Politics in
New Orleans, 33.
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proclaimed a League victory necessary for the “honest and efficient management o f the
affairs of the city.” And Bernard McCloskey asked rhetorically, “Who shall be the
directors o f this great corporation known as the city of New Orleans?”18
In contrast, the oratory o f the Regulars highlighted achievements in government,
party loyalty, racial solidarity, references to southern history, especially Reconstruction,
and the amateurism and hypocrisy of the self-styled reformers. The Regulars’ selfidentification with the Democratic Party—the party of the Confederacy-provided the
theme most utilized in support of “Regular Democracy” and against opponents o f all
stripes. Regulars in the New Orleans elections o f 1896 and 1900 also played on public
fears o f monopoly and corporate power. In elections such as 1892 or 1896 when
specific issues such as the lottery or the recent municipal scandals dominated, speakers
integrated the traditional themes with those more timely issues. In fighting the Citizens’
League in 1896, Ernest B. Kruttschnitt called for racial solidarity and characterized the
members o f the League as “traitors to the Democratic Party.” Regular Democrat S. A.
Montgomery told a rally that “Citizens League members were Republicans,” and labor
leader James Leonard declared them “anti-labor.” In a later election, Regular candidates
continued to assert that “Democrats are the party o f the people,” and the leader of a city
ward claimed he was “proud to be a ward boss by the voice o f the people.” In
comparing reform and Regular platforms, one candidate noted that the Regulars

18 The illustrative remarks come from the 1896 campaign o f the Citizens’ League
in New Orleans, but are typical of reform campaigns throughout the period under study.
Daily Picayune, April 2, 1896, 1, 9.
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declared in favor o f “home white labor,” but the reformers had placed only the words
“home labor” in their platform. Captain Fitzpatrick connected the reform candidates to
the city’s prominent banks, insurance companies, and the leadership o f Tulane
University. Charles J. Theard, a supporter of the Citizens’ League in 1896, “came back”
to the Regulars in 1899 and charged that independent movements “not only threaten to
dismpt the party, but threaten you with a return to Republicanism. . . and tend to
degrade politics by setting a premium upon political dishonesty and disloyalty.”19
In Political Leadership in a Southern City: New Orleans in the Progressive Era,
1896-1902, Edward F. Haas provided a careful analysis o f the memberships o f the
League and the Choctaw Club. His statistics revealed information on age, education,
wealth, and other aspects of the participants. Haas’s analysis offered evidence about the
nature o f the groups beyond the assertions of campaign orators, but the data failed to
support the existence o f dramatic differences between the rival political factions. Haas’s
basic comparison relied primarily on memberships lists from the Citizens' League
charter in 1896 and, for the Choctaw Club, the charter membership in 1897 and a
subsequent list published in 1902. The different years from which the lists were drawn
raised questions about the significance o f the data, particularly given the movement of
Citizens' League members into the Choctaw Club at the end of the century. But the
distributions o f membership characteristics remained essentially the same whether or
not the analysis accounted for duplicated membership. The transfer of a segment of the

19 Daily Picayune, April 1,1896, 6; September 19, 1899, 8; September 27,1899,
7; October 1, 1899, Section I, 8, 9.
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Citizens' League membership into that of the Choctaw Club did not alter the differences
(or lack o f differences) between the two groups.20
What were those differences? Apart from patterns o f electoral speech, what
characteristics o f participants provided insight into policy decisions and electoral
choices? Place o f birth, indicative o f standing in the community or of association with
tradition, did not separate the groups. A higher percentage of Regulars were bom in
Louisiana; slightly more Citizen's League members were bom outside of Louisiana, but
most were bom in the South. In education, the two groups shared similarities:
approximately thirty-seven percent of members of both had college and/or professional
education, and distribution among other education categories did not vary significantly
between the Citizens’ League and the Choctaw Club. The data confirms the widespread
assertions that reform groups drew most heavily from business interests, but the
percentage of Regulars with backgrounds in business closely tracks that in the League.21
Closer examination of the data, however, reveals several interesting patterns.
One trend is the distribution o f membership within the city. Canal Street bifurcated
20 Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 105-120 (statistical tables) and
123-155 (a listing o f membership). Twenty-seven League members became Choctaw
Club members by 1902, approximately eleven percent of the original sample o f 235
League members identified by Haas. Specific membership listings allow isolation of
this group. A sample o f the original Haas figures were reworked to correct for the
duplication factor, but no significant variations emerged.
21 Haas reported that the business and professional members of the League
totaled 68.5 percent and 28.1 percent respectively. The corresponding figures for the
Choctaw Club were 60.2 percent and 29.6 percent. Only in the category of skilled labor
did the distribution vary significantly: 8.2 percent for the Regulars versus 3 percent for
the League, although the low number of skilled workers among League members (seven
out of 235) reduces the statistical level of confidence in comparing the two numbers.
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New Orleans on a course perpendicular to the Mississippi River. The areas o f the city
downriver from Canal Street included the French Quarter, the oldest section o f the city,
and the Fourth through the Ninth Wards. Algiers, part of the city but on the west bank
o f the Mississippi, made up the city's Fifteenth Ward. The remainder of the seventeen
wards were located upriver from Canal Street and included the wealthy, ante-bellum
neighborhood known as the Garden District. Over three-quarters o f League members
lived upriver o f Canal Street; nearly fifty-five percent inhabited the fashionable Tenth
through Fourteenth Wards. Approximately sixty-five percent o f the Regulars lived
uptown, but only thirty-two percent had homes in the most desirable wards.
The choice of residence reflected wealth differences most apparent at the upper
end of the economic spectrum: nearly forty-five percent o f the League member had
taxable wealth in excess of $10,000, while only twenty-four percent of the Regulars did.
Louis Grunewald and Orris McClelland, the two wealthiest Choctaw members in 1902,
were both members of the Citizen's League in 1896. An additional divergence between
the two groups lay in the area o f club memberships. Choctaw members joined the
volunteer fire companies at a rate o f over five times that o f the League members and
were more than twice as likely to join the Elks. On the other hand, League members
joined the exclusive Boston Club at four times the rate of their Choctaw counterparts,
and were fifty percent more likely to be members of the Pickwick Club.22

22 Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, Tables 7, 8, 12, 14 20, 21, 25
and 27. The wealth differential may have been even greater than Haas measured, since
most of his figures for the Citizens' League predated those of the Choctaw Club by five
years or more.
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Coupled with the information on wealth and residence, the club information
paints a picture o f the Citizens' League members distinguished from the Regulars by
social class rather than by ideology. Reformers, concentrated in exclusive
neighborhoods and sharing membership in even more exclusive clubs, complained
about taxes, inefficiency in government, and dishonesty, thereby reinforcing their innate
suspicions of the Regulars, most of whom did not come from the “better element.” The
Regulars returned the antagonism and held the reformers in contempt for being out o f
touch with the majority of the population. Behrman, for example, nurtured a healthy
skepticism toward the uptown Citizens’ League members, “the silk stocking element in
politics.”
In those days the words “silk stocking” were used to point out a type o f citizen
who knew all about municipal government because he read magazines and books
and the Life of Jefferson and did not know where to file his complaint if the
garbage man did not come around early enough to suit him. The high class silk
stocking always knew what led to the fall o f the Roman empire, but he did not
seem to know that the bulk of the voters were more interested in schools, police,
firemen, the charity hospital, the parks and squares and labor troubles than the
Roman empire.23
In addition to class distinctions, the data on occupational background revealed
differences between the two groups in patterns o f employment. The Haas compilation
emphasized the occupation of each member without regard to government employment;
no category accounts for those who held full time government positions, including those
elected or appointed. Thus, occupational listings for Citizens' League members during
23 In New Orleans, the geography and residential patterns led the terms
“upriver,” “uptown,” and “above Canal” to carry social as well as geographical
implications. For Behrman's comments, see Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans,
106-108. See also, Schott, “The New Orleans Machine and Progressivism,” 145.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67
1896-97 indicated that nearly twelve percent enjoyed government employment; the
figure rises to seventeen percent if elected council members are included. (Council
members were not considered full time government employees because they were able
to maintain other employment.) For the Choctaw Club, over twenty-seven percent held
government jobs in 1902, a figure that rises only slightly if council members are
included. Regardless of background, many Choctaw Club members viewed political
participation as either a means to obtain or keep government employment, or a by
product o f that employment. The difference between the two groups also reflected the
relationship with the governor enjoyed by the Regulars, which resulted in state positions
for many members o f the Choctaw club. Thus, in their contest for political supremacy,
the two groups shared many characteristics, but differed in social standing, wealth, and
attitude toward government employment. The similarities allowed a gradual
convergence of the two organizations; the differences persisted for decades, and arose in
bitterly fought campaigns.24
By the beginning o f 1897, the two factions dominated the city’s political
landscape and seemed to add a degree of stability, especially compared to previous
years. The Citizens' League had delivered on its promise to organize a permanent
opposition to the Regulars, and the Regular organization, reorganized under fresh
leadership, prepared to distance itself from the Fitzpatrick scandals. But 1898 would
upset the temporary tranquility, as the state's call for a constitutional convention came

24 Author's calculations, drawn from the detailed membership listings in Haas,
Political Leadership in a Southern City.
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before the voters, and political loyalties broke down. The product o f that convention
upset the political balance and provided the conditions to return the Regulars to power
for an unprecedented five terms. Throughout those terms, the basic political and
electoral conflicts between the Choctaw club and various reform groups played out in a
manner familiar to the New Orleans scene.
Revision of the state's basic law had occurred in 1864, 1868, and 1879 amidst
Reconstruction and its aftermath. If the voters agreed to a convention in 1898, the
delegates would revise the constitution created by the 1879 convention. That meeting
had considered the suffrage question, but declined to explicitly confront the Fifteenth
Amendment. Among the 134 delegates in 1879 were thirty Republicans and seven
blacks, enough o f a voice to lend support to the state's black voters. In addition, the
delegates were aware of the risk o f a declining labor pool caused by black departures
from the state, and, in the early days of their deliberations, passed a resolution to
reassure the state's black residents by specifically rejecting any diminution o f civil
rights. The convention eventually extended suffrage to all adult male citizens, though it
authorized a poll tax and tightened residency requirements. Attempts to extend the
suffrage to women failed.25

25 Ronald M. Labbe, “The Reign of Robbery Will Never Return to Louisiana:
The Constitution of 1879,” Warren G. Billings and Edward M. Haas, editors, In Search
o f Fundamental Law: Louisiana's Constitutions, 1812-1974 (Lafayette: Center for
Louisiana Studies, 1993), 86-87. See also, Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans,
20. Regarding the issue of women's suffrage, Labbe cites the New Orleans Times
defending the decision to withhold the right to vote for women on the basis that
Louisiana politics was too “dark and dismal” to include the work of women.
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In January, 1898, a state election affirmed the call for the constitutional
convention, and voters chose the delegates to rewrite the basic law. The vote for the
convention was 36,178 in favor and 7,578 opposed. In the delegate vote, Martin
Behrman won election from Algiers, a New Orleans neighborhood on the west side of
the Mississippi, somewhat isolated from the rest o f the city. He attributed the light
turnout to the inevitability' o f the convention since “when the results o f the election are
absolutely certain, the vote is not usually very heavy.” Later observers mentioned the
drop in registration due to suffrage restrictions imposed by the legislature and by the
confusion caused by a complicated ballot process. The strict requirements for voting
imposed by statute in 1896 had reduced total registration by over half. Black
registration fell by ninety percent.26
All accounts of the 1898 convention mention its domination by the Regular
Democrats, whose party controlled all but two of the 134 delegates, one Republican and
one Populist. Ernest Kruttschnitt o f New Orleans, chair o f the Democratic Party State
Central Committee, served as convention president. When the convention met on
February 8, 1898, he set the tone early in the proceedings by characterizing the
convention as “little more than a family meeting o f the Democratic Party o f the State of
Louisiana.” Two prominent New Orleanians—T. J. Semmes o f the Judiciary Committee
and former Mayor John Fitzpatrick of the Committee on New Orleans—became chairs
26 Report o f the Secretary o f State, 1898, 145, quoted in Reynolds, Machine
Politics in New Orleans, 35; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 40; Hair,
Bourbonism and Agrarian Reform, 275; Michael Lanza, “Little More than a Family
Matter: The Constitution o f 1898,” in Billings and Haas, Louisiana Constitutions, 98.
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o f important committees, but the primary work o f the convention lay in the hands o f the
Committee on Suffrage and Elections, chaired by T. F. Bell o f Caddo Parish, home to
the state's second largest city, Shreveport.27
In addition to his characterization of the convention as a “family meeting,”
Kruttschnitt's opening address to his colleagues delineated the purpose o f the gathering:
We are all aware that this convention has been called by the people of the state
of Louisiana principally to deal with one question, and we know that but for the
existence of that one question this assemblage would not be sitting here today...
to eliminate from the electorate the mass o f corrupt and illiterate voters who
have degraded our politics during the last quarter o f a century.
Behrman's recollections were less subtle: “The main purpose of that convention was to
put the negroes out of politics.” The delegates highlighted the importance of the
suffrage issue by making its settlement the first order of business; the convention took
no other actions until it appointed the Committee on Suffrage and Elections and then
settled on the method of disfranchisement.28
Delegates could choose from a range o f options in the disfranchisement process.
The 1896 changes in state registration laws proved efficacious, reducing black and poor
white suffrage. Various other tactics included refinement o f the poll tax, education or
property qualifications, and the understanding clause. But these changes posed a danger

27 Lanza, “The Constitution of 1898,” 98-99 in Billings and Haas, Louisiana
Constitutions', Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 34-35.
28 Kruttschnitt’s remarks can be found in the Official Journal, Louisiana
Constitutional Convention, 1898, 9. See also Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans,
39-41 and Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 35. Behrman had hoped to
serve the convention as a member of the committee on suffrage and elections, but was
appointed to the committee on New Orleans affairs.
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to various constituencies, particularly to the New Orleans Democrats. Broad brush
education and property qualifications threatened the votes o f poor whites. To counter
those effects, Frank. A. Monroe, judge and Regular stalwart from the city, proposed a
grandfather clause, providing the vote to descendants of voters eligible in 1868. The
clause covered mostly whites otherwise unable to qualify for suffrage under the new
rules. Special provisions were added to ease restrictions on recent immigrants.
Additionally, the city Regulars opposed the poll tax, but reached a compromise with tax
supporters that allowed its imposition after the elections o f 1900.29
The city Democrats emerged with the best o f both worlds: the elimination o f the
black vote, which in New Orleans was not subject to Regular control, and the
preservation of a large part o f their natural constituency. Members of the 1894 Ballot
Reform League and the Citizens' League that brought the reformers to power in 1896
could not afford to oppose the convention or the new constitution. Their political
history contained more than a few dalliances with Republicans, Populists, and blacks.
In the new electorate, the Democratic Party had achieved an enviable position in the
white popular imagination. Racial solidarity demanded a loyalty to the party, now seen
as the architect of the new constitution and preserver of white supremacy. As in
previous elections, the Regulars would remind voters of the role of the party in the
history of the South, but now an additional part of that history became available.

29 Daily Picayune, March 1, 1898,4,13; March 2, 1898, 1; March 3, 1898, 4;
March 4, 1898, 1,4; March 5, 1898,4, 9; Lanza, “The Constitution of 1898", 100-105;
Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, 80.
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Regulars presented themselves not only as Redeemers, but also as the authors o f the
state constitution that effectively eliminated the black vote. When New Orleans
elections occurred in 1899, the city Democratic organization would benefit from the
convention's work. And in the event that any lingering protest vote remained, the
Democrats in control of the state added one more provision to their handiwork: the new
constitution would go into effect without facing a referendum.30
The adoption of the 1898 constitution represented a watershed in the politics o f
the state. The results of disfranchisement marginalized the opponents to the Democratic
Party by assuring that dissident groups could not mobilize the black vote. For city
reformers, long suspected o f weak party loyalty to the Democrats, the constitution
drastically reduced opportunities for political maneuvering. The Citizens’ League
victories for mayor and the city council did not survive the political revolution. The
League had come to power in part because o f black voters in New Orleans. Those votes
were no longer available. The changes o f the 1898 constitution~and the political skill
o f the Regulars—led to the familiar pattern o f reform administrations: electoral victory
followed by vain attempts at permanence. But during the four years o f its tenure, with
the cooperation o f its colleagues in the state legislature, the League helped to initiate
municipal changes that would far outlast its electoral success.

30 Schott offers a brief discussion of J. Morgan Kousser's thesis on the politics o f
disfranchisement—namely, that the partisan dimension was paramount in the plans o f
the constitution—in "Progressives Against Democracy," 254-255. See also Schott's
comments regarding the disfranchising convention in the same article, 254.
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As the municipal elections o f 1899 approached, neither the League’s permanent
organization nor its record of achievement could overcome the changing political
environment. But the League’s contributions to the city would survive. Not only its
leadership but also its ideas would be absorbed by the Choctaw Club. The legislation
establishing independent boards and commissions would not be reversed, and the work
of those new entities would go on. The progressive reforms initiated by the League
combined with Regular Democratic implementation formed the basis for a long-term
consensus in favor o f progressive policies, civic involvement, and municipal
development.
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CHAPTER IH
THE REGULARS RETURN AS THE MORNING GLORIES FADE

"Capdevielle for Mayor," proclaimed the headline o f the Daily Picayune. The
convention o f New Orleans Regular Democrats met on September 11, 1899 to select the
ticket for the municipal elections scheduled for early November. Within another day the
convention selected the entire slate, and the campaign for control of the South's largest
city began. Within two months, the Regular Democrats would triumph, regaining city
offices they had lost in 1896. The election of 1899 proved crucial for the emerging
politics o f the twentieth century. Over the years since Reconstruction, the voters o f
New Orleans had alternately favored Regular and reform elements o f the city's leader
ship. The 1899 election completed this pattern of the previous two decades, alternating
city administrations led by Regular Democrats and then by a self-styled reform opposi
tion. It also marked the start of twenty years control by the Regular Democrats. Not
until 1920 would an anti-machine candidate again become mayor. A close examination
o f the 1899 nomination process and the subsequent election reveals important features
o f the city’s post-disfranchisement political environment.1

1 Daily Picayune, September 11, 1899, 1; Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded
Age, 28-54, especially Table 4, 38.
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As the 1899 election approached, the Citizens' League suffered defections.
Ambitious members looked to increase their chances for election, and it seemed
unlikely that the reform elements would triumph again. Disfranchisement eliminated
the possibility of mobilizing the black vote, and, although the Regulars lost potential
voters among the poor as well, the new constitutional limitations on suffrage damaged
the reformers' efforts to establish a permanent hold on city government. Ironically,
some of the restrictions on voting hampered the reformers in unexpected ways. The
Regulars took care that their supporters paid the poll tax on time, an example o f the
advantages o f a professional political organization. Behrman later commented that the
reformers calculated at the time of the convention that imposition of the tax would be to
their advantage and fought against a provision to delay the tax until after 1900. Instead,
weak rates of poll tax payment hampered many reforms efforts. In addition, the
identification of the Regular Democrats with white solidarity increased after the 1898
convention. Deviation from the Democratic line had been dangerous before
disfranchisement; after the convention, politicians risked almost certain defeat outside
the Democratic Party structure. Finally, the inducements o f patronage and the favor o f
the governor convinced many reformers from the League to reconsider their allegiance.
Charles Janvier, Citizens' League President, anticipated the problem in an 1897 essay in
which he wrote that many reformers would be tempted to alliances with the machine.2
2 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 50-51.; Charles Janvier, "Municipal
Reform in New Orleans," 214-215.
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Writing in 1904, Civil Service Commissioner J. Pemberton Baldwin looked back
at 1899 and assessed the political situation. The legislature had given the League a
victory in the form o f a new city charter which included provisions for civil service
under an independent board, "the first attempt in this State to separate patronage from
politics." Pemberton noticed "a development among certain members o f the better
element (to use an awkward term) who went into politics, and took a prominent part in
the reform movement o f 1896." The League had succeeded in defeating the Regulars in
the municipal contest o f that year, but its members discovered "before the term of that
administration had expired that it was necessary in order to carry the next election to
make some coalition with the ward leaders." Pemberton next posed the question
"whether it were wiser to risk defeat or to give the ward leader recognition, in return for
which he would join the better element in naming a high class of candidates for submis
sion to the people on the regular party ticket." The commissioner's analysis concluded
that compromise was the best policy, thereby constructing a virtue out o f necessity. Had
the reform movement persisted in sufficient strength, no coalition with the ward leaders
would have been necessary. The labeling o f what occurred as a coalition put the best
face on the situation from the League point of view, but the direction of the political
movement was largely one way.3
3 J. Pemberton Baldwin, “New Orleans Under a partisan Administration.”
Proceedings o f the Chicago Conference fo r Good City Government and the Tenth
Annual Meeting o f the National Municipal League (Philadelphia: National Municipal
League, 1904), 143-153.
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The rush of political realignments accelerated as the campaign of 1899 drew
near.4 Citizen League members abandoned their colleagues and sought out the Regulars
in the hope o f joining the Regular ticket or obtaining an appointment. By the time both
tickets took shape, Bernard McCIoskey, Samuel Gilmore, and others had shifted
allegiances from the League to the Regulars. For their part, the Regulars attempted at
least a symbolic break with the discredited past, and they accepted, if not embraced, the
change in loyalties offered by their former antagonists. Eager to avoid overt connection
with former Mayor Fitzpatrick's associates, the Regulars pledged a clean ticket and
promised to nominate a mayoral candidate above reproach.5 The incumbent Mayor
Flower tentatively tested the waters, but a rapprochement between the Regulars and the
candidate that had succeeded Fitzpatrick was apparently too much for both sides.
Earlier in the year Fitzpatrick had requested tickets for carnival seating at City Hall, but
was turned down by Mayor Flower, who expressed regret that "seating is limited . . .
and seems to be in demand this year." Fitzpatrick had requested the seats to

4 The constitutional convention of 1898 had separated the municipal and state
elections. Thus elections for city offices took place in late 1899; state elections would
follow in April, 1900. Some reformers hoped that the election timing would reduce the
influence of the Regulars that contemporaneous elections would allow. Behrman later
noted laconically that this proved not to be the case. Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New
Orleans, 55-56.
5 Unfortunately for Fitzpatrick, his escape from legal problems during his
mayoralty did not exempt him from guilt by association. He sought vindication by
putting himself forward as candidate for mayor in 1899, but was unsuccessful. Haas,
Political Leadership in a Southern City, 35; Daily Picayune, September 5, 1899, 4, 7.
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accommodate the Cook County Democratic Club, and the Mayor's snub indicated a
distinct lack o f political judgement.6
Subsequent consideration o f Charles Janvier for Mayor by the Regulars was
even more startling than the possible Flower defection. Janvier had been president of
the Citizens' League and had served as Rex, ruler of the city's Mardi Gras, during
carnival season, 1896. He was bom in New Orleans in 1857 and had participated as a
White League member in the Liberty Place battle~an experience that certified his
Democratic credentials—but had been no friend of the Regular organization. Janvier's
departure in mid-summer, 1899, signaled the end of the League; no clearer indication
could be found that it had fallen on hard times.7 There are conflicting accounts of
Janvier's switch to the Regulars. Schott asserts that Janvier "with the encouragement of
Governor Foster. . . joined with several individuals [to] organize the Choctaw Club o f
New Orleans," which would place his defection in late 1896. Haas describes Janvier's
"retirement" from politics in fall, 1899, and his reappearance as a member o f the
6 Office o f the Mayor, Outgoing Correspondence, Walter Flower to John
Fitzpatrick, February [date illegible], 1899, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana
Division (hereinafter cited as Mayor’s Correspondence). Kendall, History o f New
Orleans, 2: 533 provided an account o f the Regulars approach to Flower which failed,
among other reasons, because of Flower’s reluctance to be seen as “seeking” the
nomination.
7 The New Orleans carnival, or Mardi Gras, included a number o f marching
clubs and social organizations. Among the most prominent, the Rex organization
represented the city's elite citizens and families. As King o f Carnival, Janvier repre
sented the uptown social elite. For a capsule biography o f Janvier, see The Writers
Press Association, Advance Press Service, New York, June 7,1912, available in the
Janvier Family Papers, Historic New Orleans Collection.
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Choctaw Club in December. The dates are significant since the announced retirement
comes shortly after the Regulars rejected his bid to become their mayoral candidate.
The December emergence as a Choctaw member coincides with Janvier's selection as a
member of the Democratic Party State Central Committee.8
Citizen League members uncertain of their organization's efficacy, yet unwilling
to join the Regulars, had two other options available: remain with the Citizens' League
and face almost certain defeat or form yet another organization. From the ranks of
disaffected Citizens' League membership and occasional Regular defectors arose a new
organization to carry the reform banner—the Jackson Democratic Association.
Jacksonians refused to take part in the primary; victory in that process was unlikely and
would make subsequent challenge to the Party difficult. Yet establishing a presence
among voters proved even more difficult, since the Jacksonians organized only a few
months before the election.
Founders o f the Jackson Democratic Association took care in the choice o f a
name. Associating its name with the Democratic Party, the new organization sought to
reassure voters who valued the traditional label and white solidarity. The memories of
1896 angered the Regulars, who quickly reminded voters that Flower’s victory could be
attributed to the black vote. The Jacksonian Democrats quickly adopted standard anti-

8 Schott, "John M. Parker," 87; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City,
34; Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in New Orleans, 1896-1900,” 198; Daily City Item,
January 25, 1900, 10; Daily Picayune, December 31, 1899, 11.
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Ring rhetoric. Chairman W. B. Porter asserted the intention of the group to “further the
election o f such a city government and such offices for New Orleans as will secure to
the people” an honest government, safe from boss influence and illegal ballot practices.
The Jackson Democratic Association warned against ballot fraud, claiming that “all
reasons and excuses for fraud or even irregular methods in elections have . . .
disappeared” since the removal o f the black vote.9
Walter Denegre, the reform candidate for the United States Senate in 1896, came
back to the city in midsummer to help the Jackson Democratic Association effort,
though he regretted the return to the New Orleans summer heat and missed his
Massachusetts vacation spot. Denegre sought to reassure Democratic voters and to
shore up the party credentials o f the new organization:
[Denegre] thought that there would be no ticket of Republicans or Populists in
the state [election], but that they would see that the best thing to do was to
support the Jackson Democracy.. . . The Association was strongly Democratic
and was working inside of the party and that there was really only one party in
the state since the negroes were elim inated. Mr. Denegre indicates that there
would be some hustling in the association now but was sorry to miss the
remainder of his vacation.
The Jackson Democratic Association support soon included the usual line up of
reformers, including members o f the 1888 Young Men’s Democratic Association, many
of whose political backgrounds the Regulars suspected o f disloyalty, and members o f
the Citizens’ League still attracted to reform ideas. While organizing the Association,

9 Daily Picayune, July 14,1899, 4, 9; July 25,1899,10; August 6, 1899,4.
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the leadership thought it best to await the Regulars’ choice for Mayor before nam in g its
own ticket.10
The Regular Democrats chose a mayoral candidate through a primary election
system that selected delegates to a party convention. Control o f the party machinery,
influence in state elections, and designation o f lesser candidates for municipal and
parochial offices depended upon the outcome o f the primary. In effect, the Regulars’
primary consisted of seventeen separate ward elections wherein potential challengers to
the Regular establishment contested local power. Victory by one or more insurgents,
however, did not overthrow Regular rule. The challengers sought to be part of the
machine, not to subvert it. Although in some instances the Regulars avoided electoral
fights through negotiations, compromise, or timely retirements, primary conflicts were
not uncommon. The 1899 primary measured the effectiveness o f the Choctaw Club as
the newest incarnation of the Regular machine and the extent to which it could absorb
new actors at the ward and precinct level. Victors at the ward level entered the caucus
(also known as the Council of Seventeen) which governed the Regular organization. In
addition, the caucus members routinely held office on the Democratic State Central
Committee, thus providing a link between city and state politics.11
10 Daily Picayune, July 27, 1899, 3; Daily Picayune, July 29, 1899, 12. In a
speech to a Ninth Ward gathering of YMDA and JDA supporters, Denegre claimed that
the Citizens’ League should be given credit for “getting rid of negro suffrage.”
11 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 61; Reynolds, Machine Politics in
New Orleans, 122-126.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

82
The September 8, 1899, primary produced mixed results. Although the Regulars
returned most of its chosen leadership to the caucus, vigorous contests took place in
several wards and new leaders emerged in several others. In the First Ward, the
leadership o f Mike Fanning and C. Taylor Gauche faced a challenge from the TrauthDrown-Kohnke faction, associated with the reform elements in the ward. Businessman
E. F. Kohnke and his brother, Dr. Quitman Kohnke, were originally Citizens’ League
members; Quitman served on the 1896 city council. George Trauth was a saloon
keeper. In spite o f the challenge to the leadership, Trauth remained loyal to the
Choctaws. The Fanning-Gauche faction won easily and carried every precinct. Ward
Two was the stronghold o f Congressman Robert Davey; no opposition emerged. The
Third Ward was even stronger for the Regulars. It was home to former Mayor John
Fitzpatrick and Remy Klock, two o f the most entrenched o f the Democratic stalwarts.
In Ward Four, home o f the powerful boss Victor Mauberret, an intra-party challenge by
Samuel Gately ended in victory for Mauberret by a majority o f slightly less than two to
one, although Gately carried two precincts out of nine. Gately remained within the
Regulars; the 1902 Choctaw Club roster included his name. Fifth Ward leader
Alexander Pujol won reelection over the De Ranee faction by margin of 1,170 to 830.
Although De Ranee carried only one precinct, Pujol's margin of victory in four other
precincts was in single digits. The Daily Picayune noted that a number o f ballots were
disallowed, raising suspicions of voting irregularities. But more than two-thirds o f the
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rejected ballots named Pujol's faction. Wards One through Five included the oldest
parts of the city on either side o f Canal Street.12
The Sixth Ward was the site of a bitter contest between incumbent leader John
Brewster and James Demoruelle. Feelings ran high enough to include gunplay between
rivals at an earlier date. Although Brewster prevailed, the margin of 820 to 639 was not
great. Demoruelle carried two precincts and lost three others by less than twenty-five
votes in each. The returns showed a clear geographic pattern with Brewster strongest in
the lower end of the ward (those precincts near the river) and Demoruelle strongest in
the upper precincts, toward the north along fashionable Esplanade Avenue. Since the
river area precincts had the highest percentage o f immigrant voters, mainly Italians, the
Demoruelle faction accused Brewster of appealing to "that class of people commonly
known as Dagoes." The Regulars likewise triumphed in the Seventh through Ninth
Wards, where they faced only token opposition. The Sixth through the Ninth Wards
include the downriver, eastern part of New Orleans, consisting mostly o f working class
families.13
The most serious challenge to the Regulars came from uptown wards where the
Citizens' League had its greatest strength. In the Tenth Ward, Robert Ewing, a
politically ambitious newspaper manager, challenged the Regulars. Eager to join the

12Daily Picayune, September 9, 1899, 1; Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in
New Orleans, 1896-1900,” 199-200.
13Daily Picayune, July 27, 1899,6, 12; September 9, 1899, 1, 7.
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Council of Seventeen, Ewing and his supporters worked within the primary structure
while denouncing the Regular leadership. At a rally the day before the voting, one
speaker in support of the Ewing candidacy said that Fitzpatrick was “like the other
bosses—a barnacle and should be turned down by the people.” Ambrose A. Maginnis
argued for Ewing on the basis that the city needed “new men.” Maginnis admitted to
being a Republican, but excused the apostasy on the grounds that he voted that way “for
protection” in manufacturing. Another speaker characterized Ewing as a champion o f
small capital, opposed to the trusts, one o f which had just closed a plant in the city.
Ewing was simultaneously against the “Jackson group and bossism.” He reasoned that
with the threat of “Negro rule” gone, the bosses could safely be discarded, and he read a
letter from former Citizens' League leader Charles Janvier supporting the Ewing
candidacy. Janvier had recently moved out of the Tenth Ward but continued to have
influence in his former neighborhood. Perhaps the hardest fought contest of the
electoral season saw Ewing triumph over Peter Farrell by a margin o f 403. Out o f
eleven precincts, Ewing carried seven to his opponent’s four. Farrell was popular
among the Choctaw Club leadership, and his defeat weighed heavily upon the
supporters of former mayor John Fitzpatrick. Ewing would play an important role in
city politics for two decades as a Regular, but with an erratic record for loyalty to the
organization.14

14Daily Picayune, September 7,1899, 6; September 9,1899, 1, 7.
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In another uptown neighborhood, Ward Twelve, the former Citizen League
councilman W. J. Turner had challenged Assessor Henry McMurray for the leadership
prior to the primary. McMurray prevailed, but would face additional challenges in the
coming years. The Thirteenth Ward remained firm for the Regulars, but in the
prosperous Fourteenth Ward, lawyer Samuel Gilmore, formerly of the Citizens' League,
replicated Ewing's tactics, placing himself between the League and the bosses, but
willing to work within the Regular machinery. Gilmore had served as Assistant City
Attorney in the 1888 administration o f Mayor Shakspeare and had moved into the City
Attorney position under Mayor Walter Flower. Eager to explain his participation in the
Citizens' League movement, Gilmore said that joining the League in 1896 was the only
way to keep the new sewerage and water revenues out o f the hands o f Fitzpatrick's
“Boodle” council, and that the Regular leaders, “perhaps inadvertently,” had lost their
way in 1896. Gilmore claimed that he “didn't want to be a ward boss” but ran for office
to insure the city could “go forward in improvement forever.” Gilmore defeated his
opponent in every precinct for a majority o f 350. He joined the Council o f Seventeen,
took an important position on the Regular's municipal ticket, and served as city attorney
for another nine years.15 There was no contest in the Fifteenth Ward (the Algiers
neighborhood on the West Bank of the Mississippi), home to the emerging Regular
leader Martin Behrman, then thirty-five years of age. The Regulars faced light
15 Conrad, A Dictionary o f Louisiana Biography, 346; Daily Picayune,
September 7, 1899, 6; September 9, 1899, 1,7; January 2, 1909,2.
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opposition in the remaining uptown two wards, the Sixteenth and Seventeenth, where
ineffective challenges to the leadership fell short.
The results confirmed the strength of the new Regular organization. After only
three years, the Choctaw Club proved it could mobilize votes and maintain discipline.
But the primary also illustrated an important feature of the post-constitutional
convention political world. The Regulars had to find ways to absorb the defections
from the League and, at the same time, provide for upward mobility among the
ambitious members of its own organization. Particularly in the uptown wards, where
Gilmore and Ewing defeated Regular bosses, the Choctaw Club’s victory came at a
significant price, as newly elected leaders took their place on the Council o f Seventeen.
The Regulars did not make concessions only to those who successfully challenged them
at the polls. Citizens’ League member Bernard McCloskey defected to the Regulars,
but did not run for office. His legal skills, however, recommended him to the
Democratic organization, and he served as attorney to the new Dock Board. These
adjustments by the Regulars proved crucial to the emergence o f a citywide consensus in
favor of progressive civic development. There were no significant disagreements over
municipal policy between the two factions, and the Regular Democratic environment
proved comfortable to the numerous reform defectors.
The press considered the results o f the primary a victory for reform, to the extent
that it believed that reform could take place within the Choctaw Club. The citywide
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results certainly constituted a challenge to the Regular hegemony. Prior to the election,
the fear o f establishment newspapers, the Daily Picayune and the Times-Democrat,
involved the possible return o f Captain John Fitzpatrick. The former mayor held a
prominent position within the Regulars, and he hoped for a return to City Hall as well as
vindication for the scandals o f his administration. But even before the primary,
Fitzpatrick’s chances dimmed. The Daily Picayune commented that “the [Jackson
Democratic Association leaders] have recognized that their greatest hope o f success lies
in the probable mistake the ward leaders will make [in not naming a clean ticket].” But
the newspapers observed that “latterly, the Jacksonians began to appreciate that some
few of the ward leaders have been and are sincere in their determination to insist on the
nomination o f a clean ticket. . . and this determination has occasioned no inconsiderable
amount of alarm among” the Jacksonians.16
Before the selection o f the two tickets, local comment expressed amusement at
the high-toned Jackson Democratic Association rhetoric. An editorial titled “They Are
All on the Make” skewered the reformers’ claims of purity and reminded readers that
practical politics necessarily involved self-interest and the exercise o f power:
One o f the funny features of the [current] political cam paign. . . is the rising into
prominence o f . . . leaders who loudly proclaim that they do not want any office
16 Daily Picayune, September 3,1899,4, 10. On following days, the Daily
Picayune continued this theme in editorials explicitly opposed to Fitzpatrick, reminding
its readers of the 192 “Boodle” council. A more general condemnation of “bossism”
invoked the evils o f Tammany Hall. Daily Picayune, September 5, 1899,4 and
September 6, 1899,4.
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or any other reward, but are only working for the public good. The old ward
bosses are never caught making protestations of their patriotism and
disinterestedness . . . . They know by experience that no ward boss . . . can exert
any influence and gather and hold any following unless he proves his ability to
get office for himself and places for his . . . helpers. It will not do for politicians,
no matter on which side they might be, to boast too much o f their patriotism.
They deserve to be distrusted. They want something.17
As the Regulars counted votes on September 8, the local newspaper interpreted
the ward by ward results as either pro- or anti-Fitzpatrick. The Orleans Parish
Democratic Committee apportioned to each ward in the city a number o f convention
votes based on the size o f the ward. Ninety-six votes were available, and by the
calculations of the Daily Picayune, the new Regular leadership would oppose
Fitzpatrick's return by a margin o f fifty-six to forty. The Regulars had absorbed the
most ambitious remnants o f the Citizens' League, but lost their most prominent leader.
Fitzpatrick paid the price for the unification o f the Democratic Party under the all-white
banner. The balance of power shifted toward a caucus that would be more independent,
less susceptible to Captain John’s control. Any ambitions that Fitzpatrick had of
returning to the Mayor’s office died with the primary results, although he attempted to
secure the gubernatorial nomination in 1900. Several o f the Council o f Seventeen had
opposed his candidacy even prior to the primary; the addition of Ewing and Gilmore to
the caucus settled the issue. When the caucus convened to choose the municipal ticket,
the “old leaders” threatened a walkout on behalf o f Fitzpatrick, but, as accomplished

17Daily Picayune, August 4, 1899, 4.
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politicians, they knew that the former mayor could not carry the caucus and would
damage their chances in the election. The supporters of Fitzpatrick controlled fewer
votes at the convention, but represented the most powerful, and tightly controlled,
wards. Ever the realists, the Fitzpatrick loyalists accepted their champion’s defeat and
settled for a favorable division of municipal patronage.18
The elected ward representatives o f the New Orleans Regular Democrats met in
convention on September 11, 1899. Selection of the Mayor was the first order o f
business, and the choice for mayor served as a perfect symbol for the fusion of a
significant portion of the Citizens' League and new Regulars, represented by the
Choctaw Club. John Brewster, the leader o f the Sixth Ward, suggested a plan to divide
patronage but found himself in competition with the Fifth Ward, led by the formidable
Alex Pujol, for the comptroller position. To break the deadlock, the Sixth Ward leader
would forego lesser offices, but suggested Paul Capdevielle, resident o f the Sixth Ward,
for mayor. Charles J. Theard, a prominent banker, placed his friend’s name in
nomination on behalf of the Sixth Ward’s organization. Brewster’s promotion of the
Capdevielle candidacy did not come as a surprise. In July, an enthusiastic Sixth Ward
gathering had endorsed Brewster for ward leader and Capdevielle for mayor. Reporters
at a meeting o f the Orleans Parish Levee Board, on which Capdevielle served, asked the

18 Daily Picayune, September 9,1899, 1, 7; September 11, 1899,1,2,4; Haas,
Political Leadership in a Southern City, 35; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans,
65.
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potential candidate whether he would be a candidate, and he indicated a willingness to
run. A letter to the Daily Picayune confirmed his interest; he “would not decline the
honor.” Capdevielle was a Citizens’ League vice-president in 1896, but had followed
many of his colleagues into the Regular ranks.19
Capdevielle was an amiable man with a history of involvement in civic and
charitable causes. He was a product o f a Jesuit secondary education and a law graduate
o f Tulane University who had given up the law for business, though his efforts did not
put him the first rank o f the city's commercial elite. His record as a businessman was
not impressive. He acted as CEO for several companies that faced bankruptcy and
others that showed poor return on investment. During the campaign the opposition used
his lackluster business history as proof that the Regular mayoral candidate was ill suited
to the office. Capdevielle lived on Esplanade Avenue, the downtown equivalent (in
social terms) to uptown's grand boulevard, St. Charles Avenue. His brother, Armand
Capdevielle, edited a French language newspaper in the city. Paul Capdevielle was a
member of the Progressive Union, forerunner to the Chamber of Commerce, but his
name was not found among the leaders of the city's commercial exchanges or business
associations. His civic resume was more impressive: president pro tempore of the

19Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 532-533; Daily Picayune. September 12,
1899, 1,4; July 22, 1899, 3; Times-Democrat, September 11, 1899, 3, 4; September 12,
1899,1; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 532. Kendall provides an elaborate
account of the maneuvering over city positions, but gives the wrong date for the
convention.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91
Orleans Levee Board, former member o f the School Board, member and chairman o f the
Finance Committee o f the Drainage Commission, president of the Esplanade Avenue
Commission, and active in the Prison Reform Association. As President o f the City
Park Improvement Association, Capdevielle demonstrated political dexterity and the
ability to bring “divergent factions” together, playing a role between “old-line New
Orleans families” and professional politicians. This would be precisely the skills needed
in the Mayor’s office. He retained his interest in City Park and remained on the board
until his death. Thirty-four years after the Civil War, a Confederate war record still
added luster to a candidacy. Behrman's memoirs recounted Capdevielle's bravery and
noted that although he had been captured by the Northern forces and paroled, he risked
additional punishment by rejoining the Southern army.20
The caucus had “agreed upon a citizen o f the highest character. . . in the
business and social world.” A Daily Picayune editorial continued its praise of
Capdevielle and, significantly, related the nomination to the advancement o f public
works in New Orleans:
The city, under the benign influences of an honest city government, has reached
the point in its programs when it is about to enter on the construction o f public
works o f the greatest importance in the way o f municipal improvement and
sanitation, and, in order that these works may go on to their complete and perfect
level, a continuation o f honest and faithful city government is necessary.

20 Mayor’s Office, Administrations o f the Mayors o f New Orleans, 208-212;
Sally K. Evans Reeves and William D. Reeves, Historic City Park New Orleans (New
Orleans: Friends o f City Park, 1982), 20; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 6364.
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The Regulars recorded the selection as unanimous, although the press reported that one
member o f the caucus had walked out rather than accept the nominee. Rumors began to
spread that the nominee was no friend of the working man, and Capdevielle quickly
defended himself from the persistent charge that he had once proclaimed a dollar a day
to be a sufficient wage for the city's laboring classes.21
Within another day the convention selected the rest o f the ticket, and the
campaign for control o f N ew Orleans city began. With large numbers o f the working
class vote disfranchised, the Regulars moved toward the center o f the political spectrum,
attracting reform defectors along the way. Concessions to the former Citizens’ League
members could be seen in the nomination o f Samuel Gilmore for City Attorney and
George B. Penrose for Treasurer, in addition to Capdevielle at the top o f the ticket.22
The Jackson Democratic Association put forth its own ticket on September 25
after balancing the demands o f the several wards and the ambitions of political hopefuls.
After some hesitation, the leadership nominated Walter Flower for Mayor, hoping that
the voters would reward him with a second term. Flower’s prior interest in the Regular
nomination created some misgivings among the Jacksonians, but his residual support
among the reform community remained strong. Reformers, including veterans o f the

21 Daily Picayune, September 12,1899,1, 4, 9. Behrman also recalled the
controversy over the candidate’s alleged antagonism toward the working class. See
Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 63-64.
22 Daily Picayune, September 13,1899,1.
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YMDA victory in 1888, and the more recent Citizens’ League triumph o f 1896, filled
other positions on the ticket. Abraham Brittin, cotton broker and president o f the City
Council under Flower, stood for Comptroller and A.G. Ricks, merchant, ran for
Treasurer; both were charter members of the Citizens’ League. During the campaign,
Ricks stated that the Regulars had offered him a spot on the ticket, but he felt he should
stay with Flower out o f loyalty to the Mayor. The leadership also nominated
Councilman Sidney Story for the position o f Commissioner of Police and Public
Buildings. (During the Flower administration, Story had sponsored the ordinance
establishing the city’s red light district, thereafter nicknamed Storyville.) A few days
later, the few remaining members of the Citizens’ League also nominated Flower,
although the League divided places for lesser offices among both Jacksonian and
Regular hopefuls. The Regulars responded promptly by disavowing the nominations
and refusing to be listed on the League ballot. Nominee Gilmore wrote his former
colleagues suggesting that “independent political movements within the Democratic
party” were dangerous.23
Press reaction to the tickets followed predictable patterns. The Times-Democrat,
a virulently anti-Regular publication, assailed the boss-dominated Regular ticket and

23Daily Picayune, September 13, 1899, 1; September 24, 1899, 3, 4; September
26,1899, 1,4, 7, 8; October 1, 1899,4,10, 11, 12; Haas, Political Leadership in a
Southern City, 49; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 533.
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reminded readers of its “Boodle” antecedents. The somewhat less partisan Daily
Picayune opined that:
A careful comparison with the roster of the candidates on the Regular ticket
develops no superiority in the ability and quality o f the men put forth by the
Jacksonians. In fact, there is in many cases a positive inferiority in the
[Jacksonian] committee’s ticket. Comparisons o f individuals show in many
cases decided advantages on the side o f the Regulars.
The Daily Picayune attitude toward the Jacksonians represented a perceived difference
between the two tickets that the Regulars would exploit and the Jacksonians strive to
overcome. In the late 1890s, public attitudes toward corporate power reflected a
growing concern with monopoly, political corruption, and other effects upon the public.
A Third Ward political club—the Fitz[patrick] Invincibles—simultaneously declared
“against civil service [and] opposed to trusts and oppressive combinations.” In spite o f
the record o f the Flower council, which generally supported public ownership, the Daily
Picayune and the Regulars’ orators singled out Mayor Flower and Abraham Brittin as
“friends of corporations” not to be trusted with the emerging public utilities in the city.
The day after the Jacksonian announcements, the Daily Picayune condemned the actions
o f the Mayor and Brittin in their dealings with railroads, the Water Works Company, a
“defunct and defaulting sewerage corporation,” and the Electric Light company. The
paper questioned Flower’s candidacy, claiming his was “favorable to the demands of
corporations, too yielding to the efforts of railroad corporations,” and willing to give
away levee lands “to the permanent injury of the mercantile interests.” Ironically, the
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JDA had delayed its nomination o f Flower for Mayor in part because o f his attendance
at the convention of the League of American Municipalities. The Mayor delivered a
paper to the delegates explaining the work of New Orleans in establishing the publiclyowned water, sewerage, and drainage systems.24
Both tickets addressed the press and public’s concern with public works. Earlier
in the year the city had approved a constitutional amendment to fund the construction of
the Sewerage and Water Board and the Drainage Commission. The promise of public
improvements merged with a generalized anti-corporation movement and helped define
the issues for the election. The Jacksonians endorsed municipal ownership as part o f
their platform, but Flower was on record opposing a city-owned lighting system,
generating doubt in the sincerity o f his support for public utilities. Some Jacksonian
ward meetings drew only limited numbers of voters, leading one supporter to complain
about the lack of favorable press and to assert that his organization “was just as much
opposed to trusts as the regular Democrats.”25
Former Mayor John Fitzpatrick, a favorite Regular orator, constantly reminded
audiences of the corporate connections o f the p ro m inen t Jacksonians, and posed the
primary question of the election as “are we to allow a small coterie o f individuals
24 Times-Democrat, September 12, 1899, 4; September 13, 1899, 1, 4;
September 14, 1899,4; Daily Picayune, September 23,1899, 4; September 27, 1899,4.
The Regulars’ use of antimonopoly rhetoric echoes the point about language in Rogers,
“In Search o f Progressivism,” 123, in which he describes “three languages of
discontent.”
25 Daily Picayune, September 2, 1899, 6.
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interested directly in a certain few corporations to take unto themselves . . . the
government of our city?” Fitzpatrick’s rhetoric condemned the Jackson Democratic
Association connection to the city’s Board of Liquidation, whose members were closely
allied with the New Orleans banking industry. At one rally, Fitzpatrick condemned the
influence o f Charles Janvier, perhaps unaware that the former Citizens’ League member
and prominent banker would soon join ranks with the Regulars.26
Campaign rhetoric aside, neither ticket sought to undermine what had developed
in the late 1890s as a clear consensus in favor of a progressive civic development. The
freely-granted franchises of post-Reconstruction New Orleans had framed the city’s
development, sanitation, health, and transportation. The resulting urban conditions
appalled both Regular and reformer alike and led to the legislative underpinnings for
drastic change adopted in the period 1896-1899. When the legislature considered the
statutory prerequisites for that change, neither League nor Regular members of the
legislature objected to either the substance or the structure o f the new government
agencies. Similarly, in the municipal election of 1899, neither ticket sought to change
the direction of that change. City development and ownership of public improvements
and major utility systems became a firm belief of most Newr Orleanians.
The strongest evidence for the existence of an underlying consensus flowed from
the commonalities in the two tickets’ platforms. Both proudly announced for municipal

26 Daily Picayune, October 1, 1899, 10

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97
ownership and praised the recent vote in favor of establishment o f the Sewerage and
Water Board. Press opinions notwithstanding, the Flower administration had provided
ample support for the difficult early years of large-scale public improvements. By the
1899 election, neither aspirant for mayor would move counter to overwhelming public
opinion on the public improvements question. Although individual interests of various
parties would cause occasional dissent, the consensus was firm.27
The campaign rhetoric escalated as election day drew near, but political
conditions favored the Regulars. Voters associated the successful Constitutional
Convention with Regular leadership, the reform organization neglected grass roots
canvassing and considered itself above patronage, and wholesale defections of
businessmen and other reformers softened the public view o f the Choctaw Club.
Capdevielle triumphed easily, polling 19,559 to Flower’s 12,998. The regular ticket
swept the municipal and parochial offices as well. Walter Flower left politics and
retired to his country home. Shortly thereafter, he suffered a recurrence of tuberculosis
and died October 11, 1900. His family declined a City Hall funeral. Although the Daily
Picayune had not supported him in the recent election, the paper praised his devotion to
the cause of clean water and other public works projects for the city.28

27 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 56, quoting both the post-election
admissions of the Daily Picayune, November 9, 1899, and Norman Walker, “An
Attempt at Municipal Reform,” Harper’s Weekly, 40 (August 29, 1896): 854.
28 Daily Picayune, October 2, 1900, 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98
Three elements shaped the politics o f the new century: a new electorate,
constructed by disfranchisement and immigration, the resurgence o f the Regulars after
the 1896 defeat, and a non-partisan consensus on the importance of progressive civic
development, seen most clearly in the movement for municipal control of utilities. Paul
Capdevielle was the first beneficiary of these trends, and his four years in office
solidified the hold of the Regular Democrats on New Orleans government. His victory
symbolized the transition o f the city across the turn o f the century and into the modem
world. His style of governance and support o f civic development prepared the city for
an activist successor more firmly committed to the power of the Democratic
organization, but equally committed to a new concept of municipal progress and the role
o f the mayor in city government.
The victory of the Regulars vindicated their policy of flexibility, but also
reflected the rewards o f their persistence. George Washington Plunkitt, political sage o f
Tammany Hall, characterized the reformers as “morning glories [who] looked lovely in
the momin’ and withered up in a short time, while the regular machines went on
flourishin'.” In New Orleans, the “morning glories” had faded once again. If the
progressive policies o f the reformers were to survive, it would now be the work o f
machine politicians.29

29 William L. Riodan, Plunkitt o f Tammany Hall (New York: Bedford Books,
1994), 57.
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CHAPTER IV
PAUL CAPDEVIELLE: THE MAYORALTY IN TRANSITION

Paul Capdevielle entered the New Orleans mayor’s office via a curious political
route. As a leader in civic, not political affairs, he gravitated toward the Citizens’
League, and when the reform group organized as a permanent group in 1896, he became
its vice-president. He declined to run in the 1896 election and thus became an ideal
official for a political group whose leadership felt honor-bound not to seek office for
itself. When the changing electorate, altered by disfranchisement, encouraged a
convergence o f political interests between the defectors from the Citizens’ League and
the Regular Democrats, Capdevielle found himself in a serendipitous situation. His
selection as the Regulars’ candidate for mayor provided the reformers with an excuse to
come home to Regular Democracy, while providing the machine politicians with a
ceremonial leader, if not figurehead, to polish its credentials on honesty and businessoriented issues. Capdevielle also bore an pronounced resemblance to financier J. P.
Morgan.
Capdevielle served as a transitional figure in several ways. He represented the
change from the nineteenth to the twentieth century political style. He eased the way for
a more loyal machine advocate to convince the business community that Regular
Democracy and business interests coincided on most material issues. And the new
99

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

100
mayor helped prepare the city government for a more activist mayor in matters of public
administration and public interest. At the national level of politics, the country
witnessed an abrupt transition from William McKinley to Theodore Roosevelt during
the same years, hastened, of course, by the assassination o f the Republican President.
Though the city’s transition was without violence, it was no less dramatic. By the end
o f Capdevielle’s term in office, his staid performance helped lead to a new mayor and a
new energy. To describe Capdevielle as transitional and as a man o f the nineteenth
century is not to disparage his service to the city. His record reflected the courtly honor
o f his attitude toward service and the responsibility o f his position. Capdevielle
accepted the duties o f the mayoralty with gravity, if not cheerfulness.1
The mayoralty of Paul Capdevielle also played a crucial part in the effectiveness
o f the consensus for progressive civic development. Capdevielle was the candidate of
the Choctaw Club, but, as a former officer in the Citizens’ League, reassured the
business community and commercial elite. Capdevielle favored municipal ownership,
but appreciated the complexities inherent in government takeover of utilities. Had the
Regulars chosen a more traditional machine candidate, political tensions between the
reform and Regular factions might have prevented progress toward civic development.
Capdevielle took office in May, 1900, succeeding Walter C. Flower. Within
two months he endured the most serious crisis of his term, the mayhem occasioned by
the actions of Robert Charles and the subsequent race riots. Charles was a rural-born

1Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 532; Administrations o f the Mayor o f New
Orleans, 1803-1936,208-212.
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black from Mississippi who had come to New Orleans, perhaps to escape trouble arising
from an incident in Jackson. In late July, 1900, he wounded a policeman in a minor
confrontation, but then shot and killed two other policemen who tried to arrest him for
the original incident. He then eluded capture for several days, creating a crisis
atmosphere in the city. Fear and racial hatred combined into generalized riots against
blacks throughout the city.2
At the time of the initial murders and riots, Mayor Capdevielle was absent from
the city. The Mayor enjoyed a second home in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, about sixty
miles from New Orleans. He used the residence as a frequent retreat, but also as a place
to convalesce after several illnesses which he suffered during his term in office.
Newspaper reports offered the latter explanation for the Mayor’s absence, although he
was well enough to return to the city immediately after hearing the news o f the racial
troubles. In his absence, Acting Mayor William Mehle, in an attempt to reduce
violence, issued a proclamation asking “persons not to assemble and discuss events,”
but deaths and injuries from white mobs continued. Within a day of the police deaths,
three blacks had been killed and over fifty beaten, some seriously. Regarding one
victim of mob violence, the Daily Picayune reported that “nobody tried to identify the
poor fellow and his name is unknown.” The paper recommended better training for

2 William Ivy Hair, Carnival o f Fury; Robert Charles and the New Orleans Race
Riot o f 1900 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976) provides the most
complete account of Charles’s background and the riots. Extensive coverage appeared
in all local papers, July 26 to August 1, 1900. See also Parkash Kaur Bains, “The New
Orleans Race Riot of 1900" (M.A. thesis: Louisiana State University in New Orleans,
1970).
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police so they might shoot better and not leave the community dependent upon “the
Negro [being] hunted by boys.” At the funeral for a murdered policemen, the
officiating Catholic priest, Father Coughlin of St. Michael’s, used the occasion to
denounce opponents to capital punishment. In an attempt to promote peacefulness,
Former Mayor Fitzpatrick addressed a mob, called for calm, and asked the assembled
group to return hom e/
Capdevielle’s return on July 26 brought decisive action. Arriving at 9:00 A.M.,
the Mayor announced that “I am here to stay until I have the situation met and
conquered.” He issued declarations to close all saloons in the city, arrest rioters, and
hold lawbreakers without parole. Capdevielle’s order to the superintendent o f police
was unequivocal: “You are hereby commanded to immediately cause to be arrested the
persons who participated in the unlawful disturbances which occurred in the city last
night.” He issued a call for a force o f five hundred special officers and requested that
the governor assemble the state militia. To equip the special force, he directed a local
hardware supplier “to please deliver. . . 500 revolvers along with ammunition,” and
added the instructions to “please charge to the account o f the City o f New Orleans.”
When a call for transportation did not produce the required vehicles on a voluntary
basis, he “impressed” what he needed from livery companies. The city’s street railways
offered their services as well. The response to his call for volunteers exceeded the

3 Hair, Carnival o f Fury, 146; Dale A. Somers, “Black and White in New
Orleans: A Study in Urban Race Relations, 1865-1900.” Journal o f Southern History,
XL (February, 1974): 42; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 539; Daily Picayune,
July 26, 1900,1.
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Mayor’s initial request; the special force grew to over fifteen hundred, and order slowly
returned to the city. On the next day, the Mayor added another proclamation asking
citizens to obey the law and remain in their homes. Concerned that liquor had added to
the unlawful behavior, he directed that if any barkeepers refused to obey the order to
close bar rooms, the police were to put them under arrest.4
An informant revealed the hiding place of Robert Charles, and police, joined by
an unsafe number of supporters and onlookers, quickly surrounded the residence. A fire
drove him out of hiding to his death at the hands of the volunteers, but not before
Charles shot and killed several other policemen and civilians. Blacks in the
neighborhood came under suspicion of harboring the fugitive, and at least one was
killed. Police arrested the occupants of the house where Charles had taken refuge on
suspicion of complicity, but after some threats to their safety, the authorities gained
control of the situation. Capdevielle issued another proclamation, removing restrictions
on the population and thanking the militia for its assistance. Under the Mayor’s picture
in the Daily Picayune read the caption “to whose prompt and courageous action the
speedy restoration o f order was due.” Praise for the Mayor continued in the city council,
which passed a resolution thanking him for his management of the crisis. A discussion
o f the food bills for feeding the special officers led one council member—a hotel owner—
4 Letter to D. S. Gaster, Superintendent of Police, July 26, 1900, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Two Proclamations from Mayor Capdevielle, July 26, 1900, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Letter to A. Baldwin & Co., July 26, 1900 Mayor’s Correspondence;
Letter to Colonel Wood, Commander of Special Force, July 26, 1900, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Letter to American Express Company, July 26, 1900, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Proclamation from Mayor Capdevielle, July 27, 1900, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Daily Picayune, July 27, 1900, 1; Hair, Carnival o f Fury, 154-155.
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to donate the food he had provided and offer an additional $25.00 toward the effort.
Several days later, Capdevielle appeared at a benefit concert and received a standing
ovation. The city collected a fund for the widows and orphans of the slain policemen.
The Mayor personally thanked prominent contributors and convened a committee to
distribute the proceeds.5
Less edifying results also followed the resolution of the violence. Two police
commissioners resigned over the performance of the force. One of the police officers
present at the original attempt to arrest Charles was tried for cowardice, convicted, and
removed from the force. Several other policemen were punished for various
deficiencies in conduct during the course o f the riots and the search. The city
prosecuted eight bar owners who, in defiance of the Mayor’s proclamation ordering
them to close, remained in business during the riots. To provide a legal basis for the
Mayor’s actions should a similar situation develop, the city council passed an ordinance
providing the Mayor the authority to close the city’s saloons in case o f riot or other civil
disturbance. Claims for damages resulting from the riots included one store owner’s
lawsuit for $4,404.25. The district assessor derided the claim and reported that the
assessment o f the store’s goods only six months before “was sworn [by the store owner]
to be $500.” And the owner o f the hardware store which loaned weapons to the special
s Letter to Charles Janvier, August 3, 1900, Mayor’s Correspondence; Letter to
Charles F. Claiborne, August 3, 1900, Mayor’s Correspondence; Letter to Robert M.
Walmsley, September 18, 1900, Mayor’s Correspondence; Letter to JohnM . Parker,
September 18, 1900, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, July 30-31, 1900;
August 1, 1900, 1; August 12, 1900, 1; Hair, Carnival o f Fury, 156-200; Bains, “The
New Orleans Race Riot o f 1900,” 33-45. The black man who informed police o f the
hideout location was subsequently murdered.
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police complained that a number o f weapons had not been returned by the volunteers.
The city paid for the firearms and for the ammunition provided as well. Eager to
distance themselves from Charles, a group of Tenth Ward blacks offered “support to
suppress lawlessness among our people.” The city’s press, already sensitive to regional
differences on the matter of race, highlighted race troubles in the North and made
explicit comparisons with the Charles riots. The Daily Picayune focused on New
York’s race disturbances in its August 17,1900 issue. The following day, the headlines
read “The North Has a Black Problem As Well As the South.”6
In August o f 1900, with the memories of the Charles riots receding, the city
council turned to other matters. A new Civil Service Commission took office, replacing
the one created by the Citizens’ League under the 1896 revision o f the city charter. The
Choctaws did not attempt to dismantle Civil Service in its entirety. The new
commission resulted from legislation introduced by the Regulars in 1900, designed both
to weaken the 1896 reform legislation and to correct its defects. Act 89 o f the
legislative session o f 1900 was the result. Like other developments under Capdevielle,
the new commission combined reform and machine characteristics. City officials—the
mayor, the comptroller, and the treasurer—served on the commission, preserving direct
representation and, presumably, political influence. Two citizen members, nominated
by the mayor and subject to council approval, completed the commission’s membership.
Capdevielle chose two non-political businessmen: one was an elderly Civil War veteran

6 Bains, “The New Orleans Race Riot o f 1900,” 42,44-45; Daily Picayune, July
31, 1900,3; August 1, 1900,3; August 2,1900; August 17,1900,4.
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and president of the Red Cross society; the other a real estate agent, manufacturer’s
representative, and bicycling enthusiast. Capdevielle did not belong to the Choctaw
Council o f Seventeen, though he was a member of the Club. The ward leaders may
have advised the Mayor on appointments, but evidence does not suggest that he blindly
followed that direction. Capdevielle’s former Citizens’ League colleague Charles
Fenner filed suit against the new commission, but the legal challenge failed.7
Capdevielle demonstrated a measure of independence from Democratic powers
in his politics. He defended the choice o f W. B. Sommerville for a judicial vacancy
even in the face of objections from State Democratic Chairman E. B. Kruttschnitt that
the candidate “was not a good enough Democrat.” Sommerville was a former Citizens’
League member, who had served Mayor Flower as assistant city attorney. He ran for
District Attorney in 1899 on the Jackson Democratic Association ticket. Perhaps worse,
at least in the opinion o f Kruttschnitt, he admitted voting for President McKinley. A
letter by a number of prominent former Citizens’ League members, including Charles
Janvier and Samuel Gilmore, supported Sommerville, and the Council of Seventeen
eventually endorsed the nomination with only one dissent. The episode indicated that
Capdevielle would not be content as a figurehead, and that the combination of former
League members and the Regulars was not yet stable. The Daily Picayune observer
“Mr. McDonogh” commented:
7 Daily Picayune, August 14,1900, 6; August 21, 1900,4; Reynolds, Machine
Politics in New Orleans, 58-60; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 536. Mayoral
appointee Harry Hodgson served only three months and resigned in November, 1900.
His replacement was not prominent in political activities. See Capdevielle to Harry
Hodgson, November 10,1900, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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The power in the regular party was as good as sworn to the mayor and his policy
. . . for bringing the regular Democratic party to such a standard that the
representative men o f business and the professions would attach to i t . . . .That is
saying a happy thing for the mayor. It has been told [to] me that the regulars
have found the man they have sought for so long. The mayor has the respect of
the entire community.. . . He is calm, deliberative, determined, fearless and will
dare assert himself when right.8
The Mayor asserted himself on other occasions as well. The increased traffic
along the city’s main thoroughfare, Canal Street, and its deplorable condition led to a
plan for redesign and paving. Several street railroads enjoyed franchises along the street
and could not agree on responsibility for the improvements. The redesign would also
necessitate the removal of the Henry Clay statue at Canal and St. Charles, a traditional
meeting place utilized by generations of New Orleanians and equivalent to Lee Circle
and Liberty Place in their hearts. But the Mayor pushed forward at a meeting o f street
railroad managers. “Gentlemen, as mayor o f this city I represent 300,000 people,” the
Mayor said, “ and I do not propose to allow this matter to drag any further. This
ordinance will be introduced in the council at the next meeting. It will be passed and go
into effect. That is my decision.” The meeting with the managers took place on Friday,
August 24,1900. By that afternoon the Mayor had once more left the city for his Bay
St. Louis home where he would remain for the weekend. The council fought over a new
location for the Clay statue, eventually moving it to Lafayette Square in front o f City
Hall. In order to pay the cost o f the relocation, the Mayor informally assessed each
street railroad company. The Mayor’s secretary informed Robert Walmsley, prominent
8 Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, Appendices I and H; Daily
Picayune, August 19,1900,4. Choctaw club records list Sommerville as a member by
1902.
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banker and president of the New Orleans City Railroad company, that “$300 has been
fixed as your company’s proportion o f the amount needed” to beautify the statue in its
new location.
The Mayor was wrong in his estimate of the New Orleans population; that same
weekend the 1900 census count put the figure at 287,104, a gain o f approximately
45,000 over the 1890 population. The city remained the largest in the South; only New
Orleans, Louisville (204,731), and Memphis (102,320) exceeded 100,000 among
southern cities. In spite of the comparative advantage, the new figures distressed some
observers; though the city had grown over eighteen percent, the rate o f increase trailed
other fast-growing cities of the nation and of the South. The Daily Picayune bemoaned
the lack of manufacturing base and called for a Lake Borgne canal to connect interior
waterways with the Gulf of Mexico, shipyards, maintenance of a forty-foot river depth,
and “possibly a river crossing” to accelerate the city’s growth.9
City development, prosperity, and New Orleans’s reputation in the nation were
constant concerns o f the Mayor and the city’s commercial and civic establishments. The
epidemics of the 1890s had damaged that reputation, but the new public works promised
to improve the situation. Real estate businessmen predicted an increase in property
values, and in its annual commercial review, the Daily Picayune proudly proclaimed
“New Orleans is the Healthiest City.” The paper reported municipal mortality rates and

9 Daily Picayune, August 25, 1900, 3; August 26, 1900, 1. August 30, 1900, 3;
September 2, 1900,4. Capdevielle to Robert Walmsley, November 20, 1900, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Twelfth Census o f the United States, P a rti (Washington, D.C., 1901),
lxix-lxx, quoted in Grantham, Southern Progressivism, Table 11,277.
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found “the true white m ortality. . . is unquestionably low and compares favorably with
most cities of the world.” The rate among the city’s blacks was much higher, but the
Board o f Health released figures for each race to highlight the differential. The issue o f
health arose again the following month. The Shreveport Times defended New Orleans
from “the attitudes of other cities.” The Daily Picayune saw the issue in terms of
economic competition. “The Times is quite correct in stating that false reports have
been circulated about the health of New Orleans by commercial rivals . . . and such
reports have been put forth for commercial purposes without any foundation.” The
Louisiana Board of Health mortality rates for whites per 1000 were 18.4 in July, 14.05
in August, and 16.57 in September, “on a plane with the most favored cities in the
union.”10
An important role for the Mayor involved the promotion o f the city’s economy
and, particularly, the convention business. The New Orleans Progressive Union
organized local businessmen to promote the city and to attract conventions that would
generate visitors and their expenditures. In this effort, the Progressive Union received
the assistance of the city’s commercial exchanges and the city administration.
Immediately after taking office, the Mayor had agreed to serve on a committee that
welcomed Professor Emory Johnson, Chairman of the Committee on Industrial and
Commercial Value o f an Inter-Oceanic Canal. This was only one of numerous efforts
involving the personal intervention of the Mayor. The Progressive Union succeeded in
attracting the Southern Industrial Convention to the city in 1900 and began raising funds
10Daily Picayune, September 1, 1900; October 17,1900,4.
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to entertain the attendees. Voluntary groups such as the Progressive Union depended
upon contributions from their members. Hospitality funds and the costs of temporary
construction projects for convention visitors required fund raising drives led by the
exchanges or local newspapers. The Progressive Union, for example, suffered from
financial problems due to an unsuccessful trade fair in 1899 that led to operating
deficits. The organization resorted to the raffle of a horse to raise funds. Even the
Mayor was solicited to sell tickets. At the end o f the year, the Progressive Union, with
only $100 on hand, dissolved its Board of Directors and reorganized as a more broadlybased association. The city’s eagerness to promote the convention business did not
extend to direct municipal subsidies to voluntary associations.11
The Mayor also faced questions regarding municipal ownership of utilities early
in his term. Although the legislature had acted to establish the Dock Board and the
Sewerage and Water Board, the city faced decisions over how quickly to pursue
implementation o f the public system. In an effort to replace the private water company
with the new public body, for example, the city filed suit claiming the franchise was null
and void because o f gross violations of the private company’s franchise agreement.
Though the city would eventually prevail, the initial decision went against the public
argument, leaving New Orleans “at the mercy o f the monopoly.” The Daily Picayune, a

11 Letter to Udolpho Wolfe, President, Board of Trade, May 15, 1900, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Letter from Progressive Union to Mayor Paul Capdevielle, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Daily Picayune, September 7, 1900, 3; November 9, 1900, 3. As o f
early September, 1900, the winner had not yet claimed his prize in the horse raffle. An
attorney advised the group to sell the horse and hold the proceeds in escrow for six
months.
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staunch advocate of public ownership, published a bitter editorial after the setback in the
water case. “About the only satisfaction that the city and its people have gained from a
judicial examination of their relations with private companies is that they incur extreme
risks o f suffering irremediable evils when they delegate their municipal powers,
franchises and privileges to private corporations.” Electric utilities were on the city’s
agenda as well. Early franchisees found it difficult to make money and petitioned the
city to transfer rights to other companies. The Merchants Electric Light and Power
Company sought to combine with another electric power company for advantages o f
scale. The city council debated the merits o f competition versus the protection o f the
investors. Although fear o f corporate combinations was widespread, the council agreed
to allow the merger. In the midst of the discussion, the issue o f municipal ownership of
the electric franchise arose and would come before Capdevielle and the council again.12
In November of 1900, the national election received the attention o f the New
Orleans political establishment, although there were no local races in serious contention.
Conservative Democrats preferred other candidates, but went along with the party’s
choice o f William Jennings Bryan. As the election approached, the national debate
turned briefly to consideration of disfranchisement, and Republicans suggested a
reduction in the number o f representatives allocated to the South. Local press reaction
was swift. “Those young men who think [Republicans are different now] are simply
shutting their eyes to the present conditions. It is the same old party stripped o f the

12 Daily Picayune, October 20, 1900, Section 1,4 and Section H, 1. See Chapter
VI for an investigation of the early years of the Sewerage and Water Board.
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arbitrary power it once exercised, the Daily Picayune warned. “The Republican Party
was the one which put black heels on white necks in the southern states.” When
McKinley won easily, the Daily Picayune petulantly declared that “the people o f the
United States have unmistakably declared for McKinley and Roosevelt. This means that
they are in favor of trusts; they want a large standing army; they believe in the conquest
and annexation of foreign countries.” Not all New Orleanians shared the newspaper’s
view. At Thanksgiving, 1900, J. C. Murphy, president of the Louisiana Sugar and Rice
Exchange, gave thanks to the “American people for sending Mr. Bryan to the ‘scrap
pile’” as well as “for a splendid grinding season.” He added a compliment to the Mayor
“for his admirable handling o f the ‘Charles’ incident.”13
The Mayor’s City Hall colleagues honored him in early November, the first
anniversary o f his election victory. City Attorney Samuel Gilmore gave a florid speech
praising Capdevielle’s leadership, and the press echoed his judgements. The memory o f
the Charles riots continued to affect journalistic assessments of the Mayor. “Many who
knew him but slightly mistook his personal courtesy for weakness and his modesty for
timidity,” wrote the Daily Picayune, “but in less than a year his great courage and
calmness [and] his self possession and resourcefulness in a great emergency . . . have
stamped Mayor Capdevielle [as] one of the greatest mayors New Orleans every had.” 14

13 Daily Picayune, November 2, 1900, 4; November 7, 1900, 4; November 29,
1900, 3.
14Daily Picayune, November 8,1900,4. The Daily Picayune remained a
supporter of the Mayor, but in the next three years did not offer any assessment o f the
Mayor which put him in the first rank o f New Orleans mayors.
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The enthusiasm o f the new century and the constant emphasis on commercial
improvement set the stage for the Southern Industrial Conference in the city. Delegates
heard Capdevielle’s welcome to New Orleans as well as promotions for a Nicaraguan
Canal. In early 1901, James S. Zacherie, “the progressive and public-spirited
councilman,” put forth a vision o f the city reaching northward to the lake, with grand
boulevards and municipal ownership of electricity and water. At the Progressive
Union’s annual meeting, President Andrew Blakely, proprietor of the St. Charles Hotel,
predicted that “New Orleans would be the country’s second city before another decade
will have passed.” Businessman and recent Choctaw convert Charles Janvier echoed the
remarks two weeks later, though he allowed more time for the city’s expansion. “By
2001,” Janvier wrote, “New Orleans will have 2,000,000 people, second only to New
York.”15
The New Year also brought renewed discussion regarding the public’s role in the
provision of utilities. Mayor Capdevielle had run on a platform of municipal ownership,
though the city’s resources would not support absorption of all utilities. Encouraged by
the Board of Trade, the lessees of markets in the city reached a compromise with the city
government, and public markets became another function of the municipal government.
The status of electrical service, however, posed a more difficult problem. The city’s
debt load was already large. Out of twenty-two mills property tax, ten mills supported
debt service, and that proportion of operating to capital funds would increase as

15Daily Picayune, December 5,1900,2; January 2, 1901, 3; January 14,1901, 3;
January 26,1901, Section II, 1.
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construction started on the new sewerage, water, and drainage systems. Purchase of
existing franchises and capital assets would require yet more borrowing. Capdevielle
also seemed reluctant for the city to absorb electric service because electric franchises
were intertwined with electric street railroad service, the business base of more than a
few prominent citizens, including Board o f Liquidation President Robert Walmsley and
Dock Board President Hugh McCloskey.16
A middle path, however, was possible. The city’s plans for a modem drainage
system anticipated the construction of an electric generating station to provide power to
the various drainage pumping stations. Since the capacity o f the generating plant would
exceed the requirements o f the pumping stations, which would be in use intermittently
depending on rainfall rate and amount, members of the council proposed to build the
generating station with sufficient capacity to provide not only for drainage, but also for
street lights and other municipal purposes. But this plan placed the city’s Drainage
Commission in the middle o f the issue. Frequent problems with city drainage had hurt
the credibility o f the commission, and the prospect o f it absorbing another major
function discouraged implementation of the plan. Although the Daily Picayune
continually pressed for municipal ownership, the city’s other morning newspaper, the
Times-Democrat, opposed it, clearly doubting the ability o f the Regular-led
administration to manage electric power successfully. The paper also feared expansion

16Daily Picayune, January 13,1901, Section 1,4; January 16, 1901, 3; Kendall,
History o f New Orleans, 2: 537.
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o f the Regular patronage base and constantly demanded investigation of the payrolls in
city departments.17
At the end o f March, 1901, the Daily Picayune reported on a lecture by Mayor
Capdevielle at Tulane University in which he took the position that “modem progress
and the advancement of public interests in cities demand municipal ownership and
operation o f public utilities.” The newspaper noted the Mayor’s speech and answered
anticipated objections concerning graft in public ownership by turning the argument on
its head. “Graft [was] easier to hide when in private hands.” The Daily Picayune saw
the danger in the awarding o f franchises, a process wherein “bosses derive power from
arrangements with private owners.” Quoting from a contemporary article in the Atlantic
magazine, the newspaper noted that given the protection o f a civil service system, public
ownership would be administered by non-political managers to the benefit o f the public
interest. The newspaper also attempted to delineate services subject to public
ownership—police, fire, sewer, drainage, parks, and street lighting—from other services
that would remain private—street railroads, gas, telephones, and electric power. There
was no such distinction in Europe, where “public ownership had prospered . [But]
whether or not [complete ownership] will be the answer in the cities o f the American
republic remains to be seen.” Crucial to the management of public utilities were “non-

17Daily Picayune, March 13, 1901,4; April 12, 1901,3. See Chapter VI for a
discussion o f the city’s difficulties with drainage. Although characterization o f the
editorial positions o f the two newspapers can be hazardous, it is clear that the Daily
Picayune more closely followed national developments and attitudes towards municipal
ownership. The Times-Democrat was reflexively, if not bitterly, anti-Regular in its
politics and a more likely defender o f private enterprise in almost all circumstances.
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political boards for the non-political public business,” an important feature of the
progressive era theory of governance. The Daily Picayune reflected the ambivalent
feelings of the city’s leadership. The emerging consensus for progressive civic
development easily covered the basic utilities—sewer service, water, and drainage.
However, New Orleans was not a wealthy city, and its needs were great. The
anticipated financial burden of a takeover of the electric services, street lighting, and
streetcar transportation caused even enthusiastic supporters of public ownership to
reconsider.18
Not all municipal developments carried so much weight. During the spring
months, Mayor Capdevielle and the city council fought over the efficacy of an anti
spitting ordinance, vetoed by the Mayor but passed over his objections, in part at the
urging o f various women’s organizations. On a more pleasant note, the city prepared for
the visit of President McKinley, the first sitting chief executive to visit New Orleans.
The President’s agenda included a parade, an elaborate reception, and a tour of the port
to impress the visitor and his party with the importance of the city in national and
international trade. School children enjoyed a holiday and enthusiastic crowds greeted
the Republican chief executive.19
During late spring, 1901, the press of business kept the Mayor busy. He declined
an invitation to attend the National Municipal League annual convention and held

18 Daily Picayune, March 28, 1901,4; March 29, 1901, 4; May 14, 1901,4.
19 Daily Picayune, April 10, 1901. 3; April 17, 1901, 4; April 13, 1901, 8; April
29 - May 4,1901; Capdevielle to McKinley Reception Committee, April 24,1901,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 538.
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extensive talks with the managers of the street railroads to complete plans for a
redesigned Canal Street. City council members requested a meeting to discuss the
Public Belt Railroad, a project neglected during the previous year. And the anticipated
arrival in the city of a large Navy dry dock facility brought forth another round o f
committees, fund raising, and planning. In early June, Capdevielle “was on the sick list
. . . exhausted from meetings.” In the middle o f the month, he wrote former councilman
Sidney Story and declined an opportunity to head the city’s delegation to the Trans
Mississippi Commission Congress. The following month, the Mayor’s secretary
requested the rescheduling o f a Drainage Commission meeting so the Mayor “can leave
for his home over the lake the same evening.” For much of the summer, the Mayor
spent time in Bay St. Louis, and in early August, he left for Montreal “for reasons o f
health.” In his absence, council president William Mehle served as Acting Mayor.20
During the Mayor’s absence, Commissioner Moulin o f Public Works admitted to
a scheme with Louis Knop, a Regular ward leader. In exchange for the organization’s
support, Moulin had agreed to a detailed procedure (for some reason committed to
writing) for sharing his salary or obtaining a position for Knop equal to one-half o f the
Commissioner’s salary. When informed o f the scandal, Mayor Capdevielle directed
Mehle to suspend Moulin and the grand jury began an investigation. After hearings, the
20 Capdevielle to National Municipal League, April 30, 1901, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Capdevielle to Robert Walmsley, May 4, 1901, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Capdevielle to Hugh McCloskey, Dock Board President, June 7, 1901,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Members, New Orleans City Council to Mayor Capdevielle,
June 7,1901, Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle to Sidney Story, June 16,1901,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle to Robert Walmsley, President Drainage Board,
July 10, 1901, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, June 6, 1901, 3.
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council recommended Moulin be fired, but a technical deficiency in the state law under
which he was charged saved his position. In another scandal, city councilman P. J.
McMahon informed the Mayor of a bribery scheme involving council members. The
Mayor assumed the scheme involved the current city council. Pressed for an
explanation, McMahon admitted the matter involved a prior administration, but would
reveal no more. The council required him to apologize and, when he refused, expelled
him. A subsequent court decision reinstated McMahon to the council in May, 1902.21
Returning to the issue o f public utilities, the council assigned the issue of
municipal lighting to its Lighting Committee and requested that the group study a city
engineer’s report recommending municipal ownership. The committee did not act
promptly, generating a stem Daily Picayune editorial reminding the council that the
current franchise for city lighting would expire December 31, 1902. If the city were to
take over the franchise, immediate action would be required. Dogged by the newspaper,
the committee asked the Sewerage and Water Board engineer for assistance. By early
October, the pace of action picked up and the committee held hearings on the possible
assumption o f lighting responsibilities by the city. The threat of city action affected the
current franchisee. Representatives o f the private company appeared at the hearing and
promised to offer new rates that were “very much lower.” A letter from the company
claimed “it has yet to be demonstrated that municipal ownership [of] electric lighting
21 Daily Picayune, August 16, 1901, 3; August 30, 1901, 7; September 13, 1901,
3; October 9, 1901; October 11, 1901, 6; October 12, 1901, 3; October 15,1901,4-5;
October 25, 1901, 3; October 27,1901, 10; November 6, 1901,3; November 9, 1901;
April 15, 1902,10; April 26,1902, 3; Capdevielle to City Council, October 15, 1901,
Mayor’s Correspondence.
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has been much of a success.” The letter continued, “Every large city . . . has
investigated [such ownership, and] only two or three have constructed their own plants.”
In spite of the company’s opposition, the Mayor asked the council to continue its
investigations. Although City Attorney Gilmore reminded council members that
“municipal ownership was the platform on which the present administration was
elected,” members remained reluctant to take the expensive steps required toward
complete public ownership. Uncertain about a firm course o f action, the council
approved specifications for a municipal plant, but also advertised for bids from
companies to provide lighting. The threat o f municipal power forced the franchisee to
offer the city increasingly better rates, and the council settled for that victory. Lighting
remained in private hands.22
A measure of the city’s progress was provided by former resident o f New
Orleans, who returned for a visit in February, 1902, and gave an interview to the Daily
Picayune. St. B. McConnico praised the city for the “ new spirit” and “advances” he
noticed, including new Illinois Central tracks, the Sewerage and Water Board, advances
in drainage, and the reorganization o f the Progressive Union, the city’s predecessor to
the Chamber of Commerce. His mention of the Progressive Union coincided with a
new effort to revitalize that voluntary organization. To assist the effort, the Daily
Picayune announced it would annually donate a loving cup for the Progressive Union to
award to a New Orleans resident. The first award went to Frank T. Howard, who

22 Daily Picayune, September 11, 1901, Section II, 1; September 26, 1901, 4;
October 4,1901, 3; October 10,1901, 7; October 11, 1901, 3; November 11, 1901, 3.
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merited the cup for his donation o f an elementary school to the children at the northern
edge o f the Third Ward. Subsequent awards provided a important indication of the
charitable and civic work valued by the community.23
Capdevielle continued to face numerous issues o f public ownership and
operation. To acquire the assets o f the private sewerage company, now out o f business,
the Sewerage and Water Board offered $295,000. The proposed amount included
forgiveness of back taxes and required the approval o f the city council. The council did
not move rapidly on the proposal and became reluctant to agree after testimony that
questioned the quality o f the company’s pipes. Controversy grew after an editorial in
the Daily States severely criticized the council. Outraged members forced Capdevielle
to convene a special session at which a resolution condemning Robert Ewing, manager
o f the Daily-States, passed easily. Council anger was undoubtedly increased by the fact
that the Daily-States held the official printing contract for the city. Ewing was a ward
leader and member o f the Choctaw club, but exhibited a high degree o f independence
and feistiness. Not content with a council resolution, members prevailed upon the grand
jury, which issued indictments for libel against Ewing. Nothing came o f the libel
charges, and additional litigation opposing the sewer settlement delayed further action
for months.24

23 Daily Picayune, February 14, 1902,3; March 13, 1902.
24 Daily Picayune, February 15, 1902, 3 ,4 ; March 12, 1902,15; March 15, 1902,
9; March 18, 1902, 4,10; March 21, 1902, 3; March 25, 1902, 3; April 4, 1902, 7; City
Council to Capdevielle, March 20,1902, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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The Louisiana legislature met in regular session during 1902, and the city had an
interest in several crucial pieces o f legislation. At the request o f the Drainage
Commission, the legislature passed a bill to merge the commission with the Sewerage
and Water Board. O f greater interest in the political realm, the legislature changed the
city’s election from November, 1903, to the following year. Capdevielle and his
administration would serve an extra six months. In addition, the legislation altered the
charter of the city by increasing the membership o f the council and by making elective
previously appointed positions in the administration, such as city engineer. The
governor would not have proposed such changes in the absence o f agreement from the
city’s ward leaders. At a conference on May 19,1902, the Regular leadership agreed to
the changes and, at the same time, assured the governor the New Orleans delegation
would not oppose a movement to repeal the poll tax.25
In May, 1902, the Mayor became ill once more. A severe abscess required
hospitalization and surgery. Although public information assured citizens that the
Mayor would recover, the Daily Picayune openly commented on the issue o f succession
should Capdevielle not survive the ordeal. The legislature was still in session, and
members quickly introduced a vacancy and succession bill. The M ayor’s recovery made
the issue moot, but Capdevielle did not regain full strength for several months. He
retreated to his Bay St. Louis residence, and William Mehle served a Acting Mayor once
again, though Capdevielle kept up correspondence through his secretary. From
25 Daily Picayune, May 17, 1902, 9; May 20, 1902, 9; Kendall, History o f New
Orleans, 2: 542-543. See Chapter VI for details on the merger bill. The legislature did
not repeal the poll tax.
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Mississippi, the Mayor accepted the presidency o f a new city group dedicated to
building an auditorium that would serve the growing convention business. Capdevielle
appointed a committee to assist him in the auditorium effort and later announced a
replacement for the membership o f a committee appointed to find a site for a new
federal post office in the city. In late July, the city council journeyed to the Mayor’s
home to receive his policy recommendations. The next day, the Mayor felt well enough
to journey halfway to New Orleans from his Mississippi home, where he was met by a
messenger from the city with important papers for his signature.26
The Mayor returned to New Orleans in mid-August to sign bonds, but remained
on a limited schedule. He left town intermittently in early September, but returned full
time by September 18 because Acting Mayor Mehle departed on an extended vacation.
Events tested his health once again when a strike o f street car workers shut down the
city’s transportation system for several weeks. The contending parties rejected offers of
mediation from the Progressive Union. Capdevielle ordered the street railroads to
operate, but violent demonstrations prevented even token service. Only intervention by
the governor brought the two sides together. Within one week o f announcing the
settlement, Capdevielle left New Orleans “to rest and recuperate” in part from the stress
associated with the “Carmen strike.” On November 4, 1902, the Daily Picayune
reported that William Mehle returned from his vacation, resumed Acting Mayor status,
26 Daily Picayune, May 29, 1902, 10; May 30, 1902, 4; May 31, 1902, 13; July
6, 1902, 3; July 28, 1902, 7; July 29, 1902, 6; Acting Mayor William Mehle to the City
Council, July 1,1902, Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle’s secretary to Bernard
McCloskey, July 14,1902, Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle to James Porch, July
30,1902, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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and received a letter from Capdevielle recuperating in New York. The public did not
comment on the Mayor’s health and frequent absences from his office. Municipal
management did not depend upon his daily presence, and Capdevielle’s view of his
duties and obligations did not include a high level of initiative.27
Toward the end o f 1902, the city enjoyed several conventions that highlighted its
role as a center of corporate, voluntary, and professional association meetings. In
November, New Orleans played host to the American Federation o f Labor, an
association of bankers, and the United Daughters of the Confederacy. (Nearly forty
years after the Civil War, the Daily Picayune still printed a weekly column on the
history of the Confederacy.) In 1903 the city would host an even more important
meeting—the reunion of the United Confederate Veterans. But financing for visitor
facilities lagged. The movement to build an auditorium stalled for lack o f funds. The
estimated cost o f the structure exceeded $250,000, but only $27,000 in stock
subscriptions had been received by December. Additionally, estimates o f the hospitality
funds needed for the U.C.V. reunion approached $100,000. The city abandoned plans
for the auditorium, and funds for the reunion fell short of expectations.28

27 Capdevielle to M. J. Sanders, President, New Orleans Progressive Union,
October 3,1902, Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle to City Council, October 7,
1902, Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle to City Council, October 14, 1902,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, October 21, 1902, 4; Kendall, History o f
New Orleans, 2: 540-42. Kendall’s account provides significant detail, but errs by
placing the date of the strike in 1901, not 1902.
28 Daily Picayune, November 14, 1902,4; November 30, 1902, Section IV, 2;
December 7, 1902,4.
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Capdevielle's inactivity on at least one major issue became an issue late in 1902.
Stung by lack of movement on the public belt system, the Mayor agreed to call the
commission together in January, 1903. Nothing came o f the effort in spite o f numerous
requests from New Orleans commercial interests. Capdevielle lacked the leadership or
the energy to assess such an opportunity and to appreciate its political and economic
dimensions. But railroad issues dominated the Mayor’s agenda in the new year and
highlighted his passive, if not ambivalent, attitude toward issues that demanded a clear
vision o f the public interest.29
The New Orleans Progressive Union held its annual meeting on January 12,
1903. Assessor Martin Behrman joined the board o f Directors. The organization
reviewed the previous year’s successes and looked forward to 1903. One theme of the
Progressive Union’s work was the improvement of railroad service to New Orleans.
Within two weeks, another railroad would petition to serve the city, initiating a
controversy that lasted for several years. In an age of suspicion toward corporate power,
railroads held a special place in the public mind. Cities needed transportation
development, yet feared domination by companies controlled by Harriman and Morgan.
In January, 1903, the Daily Picayune reported that a city council committee had been
“railroaded” by the Frisco, popular shorthand for the St. Louis and San Francisco
Railroad. The committee granted to the company a large corridor running roughly

29 Daily Picayune, December 16, 1902, 12; Capdevielle to Members, Public Belt
Railroad Commission, January 5, 1903, Mayor’s Correspondence; Capdevielle to
Members, Public Belt Railroad Commission, January 17, 1903, Mayor’s
Correspondence.
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north-south, east of and parallel to Canal Street. In addition, the Frisco received
permission to bring tracks to the riverfront, upriver from Canal Street, to provide access
to the lucrative Mississippi River trade. The Frisco lawyer was E. H. Farrar, partner o f
E. B. Kruttschnitt, and nationally prominent attorney.30
At the end o f January, the council's Streets and Landings committee took up the
Frisco ordinance as well as a second request for track privileges. The additional request
came from the Shreveport and Red River Valley Railroad, anxious to obtain access to
the city’s water front. The next day, a conference of the city’s commercial exchanges
met to sort out the varying requests and suggested a compromise. The exchanges feared
monopoly railroad power and wanted the city to complete its plans for a public belt
railroad along the river. Exclusive rights to the Frisco threatened those aims. The
council did not take the advice of the exchanges and voted the Frisco most of what it
requested. Capdevielle vetoed the ordinance, but was overridden. Only five
councilmen voted with the Mayor.31
Suspicions about the ordinance arose immediately. The Board o f Trade objected
to the actions of the council, and the Daily Picayune raised the issue o f conflict of
interest. Answering the letter of a Frisco proponent, the newspaper pointed out that
Councilman Cucullu, “one of the honestest men alive,” was nonetheless president o f a

30 Daily Picayune, January 13, 1903, 5; January, 24, 1903,1, 6. Farrar also
represented the defunct water company in its various suits against the city, even though
Farrar has assisted in drafting the original Sewerage and Water Board legislation.
31 Daily Picayune, January 31, 1903, 3; February 1, 1903,4; February 3, 1903, 5;
February 4,1903, 1,5; February 11, 1903. For a full discussion of the public belt
railroad, see Chapter VIII.
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bank that the Frisco had favored with $1,000,000 o f deposits being held for the purchase
o f property. On February 20, the Mayor took the matter to the local civil district court
and asked the judge to enjoin execution of the ordinance. City Attorney Samuel
Gilmore argued the case. On February 26, local press accounts mentioned that the
Frisco had joined the J. P. Morgan railroad interests, but that news was quickly
overshadowed by a Daily Picayune expose.32
Curious about the corporate background o f the Frisco, the Daily Picayune
investigated the railroad’s incorporation and discovered that a widespread assumption
about the its ownership was incorrect. The franchise had been granted to a local
corporation—the New Orleans and San Francisco Railroad-not to the national railroad
line assumed to be in charge. Moreover, the local corporation was a “paper” entity with
no operations. The owners o f the local Frisco included E. H. Farrar and E. B.
Kruttschnitt, whose political connections surpassed even the most prominent New
Orleanians among Regulars and reformers alike. Kruttschnitt was President of the
School Board as well as chairman o f the State Democratic Central Committee. His
brother was a prominent official with the Harriman railroad interests. The paper called
for more investigation and urged the courts to overturn the council’s actions.33
To the disappointment of the Frisco opponents, the ordinance survived its first
court challenge as Civil Court District Judge King ruled the council had not exceeded its

32 Daily Picayune, February 11, 1903, 5; February 12, 1903, 6; February 21,
1903, 4; February 26, 1903,1.
33 Daily Picayune, February 28, 1903, 6.
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authority, although he placed some limitations on the right o f the railroad to close
streets. An appeals court upheld the district court in May, and one month later the state
Supreme Court affirmed the council’s powers to grant the franchise. Safeguards to the
public interest were at “the discretion o f the council,” which, the Daily Picayune
claimed, “has already given everything away.” But the Frisco did not win everything.
Its franchise to the river front brought a challenge from the Dock Board, established by
the state to organize the river front. The Board prevailed, setting the important
precedent for public control of the areas adjacent to the docks.34
During the Frisco fight, the attention o f most New Orleanians was on the reunion
o f the United Confederate Veterans. The hospitality fund did not reach its goal of
$100,000, but citizens contributed nearly $60,000, including a donation o f $12.00 from
a civil jury hearing the probate case of a departed veteran. Although the city’s drive for
a permanent auditorium had failed, organizers built a temporary auditorium and
hospitality areas at a local race track in order to host the reunion crowds. City officials
and reunion committees pressed the railroads to offer preferential rates to visitors, and
thousands of veterans and their families came to the city. The event proved such a
success that the Progressive Union began a drive to have the city declared the permanent
reunion site. (Although the U.C.V. declined the offer, the group returned to the city in
1906.) The U.C.V. reunion was not the only prominent meeting in the city in 1903.
Earlier in the year, the Mayor helped to plan the convention for the National Association

34 Daily Picayune, March 31,1903, 4; May 28,1903; June 2,1903, 6, 8. For a
discussion o f the Dock Board and its power, see Chapter VII.
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o f Manufacturers, o f which prominent New Orleanian James Porch was VicePresident.35
In early August, Capdevielle once again left the city for Bay St. Louis, planning
to return “when healthy and when [council President William] Mehle leaves for a six
week vacation.” At an early August council meeting, members agreed to adjourn “for
two or three weeks during the oppressive days of August.” When the Mayor and
council members returned to work, the political season began. Although the municipal
elections had been moved to the fall o f 1904, the state election contests would take place
in spring. By the end o f September, the candidates for the Democratic primary began
lining up support. A solid, Regular Democratic ticket emerged—Newton Blanchard for
Governor, Jared Sanders for Lieutenant Governor, and former Governor Murphy Foster
for the U.S. Senate. But the potential state ticket lacked sufficient presence from New
Orleans. Martin Behrman, President o f the Board of Assessors and Regular ward leader
from the Fifteenth Ward, filled the gap. “Algiers Endorses Martin Behrman” announced
the Daily Picayune headline. “The people of Algiers last night [presented] Martin
Behrman . . . who is now before the people o f the state for the nomination as Auditor.”
The election also saw the electoral debut of Charles Janvier, who ran for the Senate
from uptown New Orleans.36

35 Daily Picayune, April 17, 1903, 15; May 17-21, 1903; May 29, 1903,4;
Capdevielle to James Porch, April 6, 1903, Mayor’s Correspondence.
36 Daily Picayune, August 1, 1903, 4; August 5, 1903, 5; September 30, 1903,4;
Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 71-78.
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The state election monopolized the attention of the city leaders through the end
o f 1903 and the first month o f 1904. On January 20, Blanchard won election and carried
most of the Regular ticket to victory. Behrman barely missed a majority and faced a
runoff, but rather than face a second primary, Behrman’s opponent withdrew, making
the New Orleanian the State Auditor. With the state elections completed, city issues
returned to the top of the agenda. But city elections would take place in early
November, and Capdevielle’s administration showed no great energy or initiative to
affect substantial change in the interim.37
In early February, the city prepared for the annual Mardi Gras celebration.
Mayor Capdevielle asked Council President William Mehle to take responsibility for the
entertainment of official City Hall guests. The Choctaw Club offered its own hospitality
to a delegation of 150 Democrats “with a band o f fifty pieces” from Cook County,
visiting the city “as has been their custom for the past several years.” A group of
Choctaw Club members, led by former Mayor Fitzpatrick, went to Chicago to escort the
quests to New Orleans, and the Choctaw club house was headquarters for the visitors.
Serious matters intruded upon the festivities, and the council once again dealt with a
proposal for municipal lighting. Uncertain over the direction the city should take, the
council called for bids for the construction of a city plant. But the city simultaneously
received proposals from local companies for the provision of lighting. In April, the
council abandoned plans for a municipally-owned system and awarded the lighting

37Daily Picayune, January 10,1904,6; January 20,1904,1; February 9,1904,
11 .
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franchise to the local street railroad company. Although the Mayor had recommended a
municipal lighting system for more than four years, the council did not follow his
advice. Capdevielle’s position, however, was more in the nature o f a sincerely offered
opinion, rather than a serious advocacy. The Mayor fought for elements o f progressive
civic development, but did not offer a comprehensive program for council adoption.38
The months prior to a municipal election were often marked by a flurry o f press
interest in possible areas of conflict. In late April, evidence o f widespread gambling and
the complicity of the Police Department in the vice became front page news.
Capdevielle asked for the resignation o f the Police Board, but the members refused. A
group o f citizens quickly organized a Civic League and approached the commercial
exchanges for support. Only the Sugar Exchange seemed interested; the others
“suddenly decided they must keep out o f politics.” Exchange members expressed
reluctance for good reasons. The municipal elections were approaching, and alignment
behind the Civic League could constrain their ability to maneuver. In early June the
Civic League met in the offices o f Regular (and former mayoral candidate) Charles
Buck to condemn gambling and the spread of saloons. Although the daily papers did
not lend strong backing to the League, the Daily Picayune reminded readers o f the
responsibilities of voters. The paper cited the commission government o f Galveston as
a model. “The success of the experiment [i.e., Galveston’s government] depended on

38 Daily Picayune, February 3, 1904, 4; February 6, 1904, 5; February 10, 1904,
10; April 19, 1904, 4.
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two important facts. There was honest and intelligent administration and it was free
from politics. Here is the entire key to proper municipal government.”39
The Capdevielle administration had not proved that lack o f politics promoted
proper municipal government. In the years following his election, Capdevielle
steadfastly adhered to his concept o f mayoral duty. He acceded to Progressive Union
requests to attract conventions to the city. He responded forcefully to threats to the
public order. He gave of his time to charitable and civic causes, even to the point of
maintaining the presidency o f his high school alumni association and presidency o f the
City Park Improvement Association. Capdevielle’s campaign co m m itm e n t to public
ownership o f utilities shaped his attitudes toward the Sewerage and Water Board and to
the possibility o f municipal lighting owned by the city. Mayor Capdevielle, however,
did not transcend the gilded age era in which he had become a man of prominence. He
acted as the chairman of the board o f the municipal corporation, not as a chief executive
officer. He showed no particular enthusiasm for active government and certainly
exhibited no great personal energy on behalf of progressive causes. The Mayor spent a
great deal o f time outside o f the city, and frequent illnesses contributed to his absences.
At the end o f Capdevielle’s term, his name was not prominently mentioned as a
mayoral candidate. Speculation in July, 1904, centered around Captain (and member o f
Congress) Robert Davey, Charles Janvier, former Council President Abraham Brittin,
and businessman W. G. Tebault. The Daily Picayune praised the Mayor’s record in the
39 Daily Picayune, May 23,1904,4; June 2, 1904, 5. The Daily Picayune was
more skeptical about commission government in 1911 and 1912 when it was under
consideration by the city’s reform elements. See Chapter X for details.
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Charles riots and the streetcar strike, and speculated about the absence of a move to
renominate him. The paper suggested that Capdevielle had offended “powers” in his
handling o f the Frisco grant, and that his efforts to enforce anti-gambling laws
frightened those with a more casual attitude toward the practice. But there is no
apparent evidence that Capdevielle wanted another term. The political en v ironm ent and
the Mayor’s record pointed to the thanks of the city and a pleasant retirement to his
Mississippi home.40
But events did not run according to script. Capdevielle’s service earned him
consideration on the part of the Regular organization, and developments in the city
elections created an opportunity for his continued service. He assumed state office and
served the public for nearly sixteen years. It would be his successor who brought
together a firm consensus on behalf o f progressive civic development in New Orleans.
By 1904, however, many of the requirements for that success were in place. New
boards and commissions had taken over functions o f government previously held by the
city. The business community, although never monolithic, united behind public works
initiatives. Most important, through the Mayor’s service, the Regulars had consolidated
their municipal political power. In 1899, the Choctaws had chosen Capdevielle to
reassure the public. In the next city election, the Regulars would return to a nominee of
their own ranks. Southern progressivism in New Orleans would be led by a Regular,
who, to the surprise of many, found a way to stay loyal to this political colleagues and to
promote the progressive civic development o f New Orleans at the same time.
40 Daily Picayune, July 23,1904, 5; August 25, 1904, 6.
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CHAPTER V
MARTIN BEHRMAN, 1904-1908:
POLITICAL BOSS AS COMMUNITY BUILDER

In July. 1904, New Orleans political and journalistic circles began to speculate
about a successor to Mayor Capdevielle. Regular Democrats had every reason to
assume an easy election for the Choctaw-anointed candidate. The Citizens’ League no
longer existed, many o f its most prominent members having defected to the Regular
opposition. Capdevielle’s tenure had raised no fundamental issues o f governance. The
recent gambling scandal generated little response, and the Civic League’s call to action
failed to produce significant opposition to the entrenched Regulars. Within two months,
however, the political landscape changed. Governor Newton Blanchard, easily elected
in January, 1904, with significant Regular assistance, provided the opposition with an
issue that threatened to return New Orleans to the pattern of alternating reform and
Regular administrations. But the Regulars survived the challenge, elected their
candidate, and initiated the most stable period in New Orleans mayoral history.
Underlying the political controversy, and eventually overshadowing its impact,
was the continued progress of the city toward acquisition of a modem infrastructure. By
the 1904 election, the legislature, the city council, and Mayor Capdevielle, with the
cooperation of the both the city reformers and the Regular organization, had established

133

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

134
three significant programs o f public works. The Dock Board was a state agency,
appointed by the Governor. The Public Belt Railroad Commission consisted mostly of
businessmen chosen by the commercial exchanges. And the Sewerage and Water
Board, although subject to mayoral appointment, consisted o f long-term members not
subject to immediate removal. The voting public could enter the municipal elections
secure in the knowledge that, regardless o f the outcome, the transforming efforts in
public works would continue without interruption. The consensus in New Orleans on
behalf o f progressive civic development benefitted from political stability and from the
remarkable career of Martin Behrman.
Events moved quickly in the summer of 1904 as the Regulars searched for a
candidate. At the end o f July, State Auditor and leader o f the Fifteenth Ward, Martin
Behrman, returned from an Elks Convention and the Louisiana Purchase exhibit at St.
Louis and answered reporters questions about New Orleans politics. Professing to be
“rusty on the city situation,” Behrman would not discuss possible candidates. He did
say that he opposed a primary to choose a Democratic candidate and recommended
instead the traditional process of party election and subsequent convention, wherein,
Behrman claimed, “every businessman and every man [could] participate.” The
Orleans Parish Democratic Party Executive Committee met soon thereafter to decide
whether to retain the convention nominating procedure. The Daily Picayune reported
that when the roll was called “thirty-three out of thirty-four members [i.e., two from
each o f the city’s seventeen wards] were present. The absent one was dead.” The
committee reaffirmed the convention process a week later, apportioned delegates to the
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various wards, and arranged for elections in those wards where opposition to the
Regular leadership had arisen. The Regulars anticipated no difficulties in electing a full
ticket.1
In the first of a series o f political missteps, Governor Blanchard angered Walter
Denegre, former Citizen’s League member, 1896 candidate for the U.S. Senate, and
prominent reform faction attorney. In a Shreveport speech, Blanchard recalled the 1896
fight and referred to Denegre’s candidacy, and the reformer’s party status at the time,
using the words “not a Democrat.” Denegre took issue, and an exchange of letters
raised the temperature of the dispute. The charge o f disloyalty to the party was a
common theme o f Regular electoral tactics, but Denegre took the occasion not only to
dispute the charge, but also to defend the reform movement in New Orleans. He “had
always voted Democratic,” Denegre argued, suggesting that Blanchard “had imperfect
knowledge of local political conditions in New Orleans.” Denegre defended the record
of the Citizens’ League and claimed reform credit for the “Dock Board, the Drainage
and Sewerage Ac t , . . . [and] the Constitutional convention.” His spirited defense o f the
reformers revealed latent support for opposition to the Regulars and may have provoked
the reformers to action.2

1Daily Picayune, July 23, 1904, 5; July 31, 1904, 9; August 18, 1904, 5; August
23, 1904, 4; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 65-66; Reynolds, Machine
Politics in New Orleans, 82-83.
2 Daily Picayune, August 19, 1904, 1. Walter Denegre did not stand as a
candidate after his narrow 1896 defeat for the U.S. Senate. He and his brother George
Denegre, however, remained active in the various reform movements. Their law firm
represented many important clients including the L&N Railroad, the defunct water
company, and Tulane University. Behrman identified Walter Denegre as one of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

136
The memory o f the political scandals of the mid-1890s had faded, but in its
search for a mayoral candidate, the organization turned first to a prominent businessman
and politician whose credentials attracted reformer and Regular alike—Charles Janvier,
ex-Citizens’ League President, newly elected State Senator from uptown New Orleans,
and confidante to Governor Blanchard. Blanchard personally requested that Janvier
accept the call. Janvier did not disdain politics. In 1903, correspondence between
Janvier and John Parker revealed different views on office holding. Parker believed that
businessmen “should only ‘preach’ reform.” Janvier though that the businessmen’s lack
of direct involvement resulted in laws “inimical to public interest.” Janvier’s political
ambitions, however, collided with his economic aspirations. He had recently been given
a position as an officer in the Canal Bank and Trust Company and, after a period o f
deliberation, turned down the opportunity to run for mayor. After Janvier declined, a
gathering of party stalwarts then turned to a surprise choice-newly-elected State
Auditor Martin Behrman.3
Behrman was thirty-nine when the organization chose him to run for mayor.
Bom in New York, he moved to New Orleans before his first birthday. The family
background was German and Jewish, but Martin became a Catholic. Having been
orphaned at the age o f twelve, his education was minimal. He later recalled that while

prime backers of the 1899 “Jacksonian Democracy” movement which opposed
Capdevielle. Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 33.
3 Charles Janvier to John Parker, October 20,1903, Parker Papers, University of
North Carolina, quoted in Schott, “John M. Parker,” 98-99. Parker eventually overcame
his qualms about reformers running for office. He successfully ran for governor of
Louisiana in 1920.
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at school he was called upon to help teach the newcomers, “Italians, Slavs, Greeks and
Bohemians and a few Austrians.” After his mother’s death, he supported himself as a
cashier and continued his education at a night school. He then moved to Algiers to work
in a grocery store and his formal education ended. He later wrote, “I have always had
the feeling that I would have been fortunate to have been able to spend more o f my
boyhood at school. If my mother had lived, I would have been kept at school, and I feel
quite sure she would have wanted me to have a college education.” Though the lack of
higher education did not constrain Behrman’s career, he retained some insecurity about
his education. For many years, Behrman considered himself a poor speaker, and it was
not until the passage o f a number of years in public service that he developed a flair for
public speaking.4
Behrman married in 1887 and held a series of jobs in the retail and wholesale
grocery business. “I had always taken an interest in politics and . . . I usually had work
that brought me in contact with many persons,” he later observed. “I suppose it was my
rather wide acquaintance for a young man that suggested to the active politicians that
they choose me as secretary of the fifteenth ward campaign committee . . . in 1888.”

4 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 3-5; Kendall, History o f New
Orleans, 2: 803; Conrad, A Dictionary o f Louisiana Biography, 58. There is no
biography o f Behrman. Kemp’s valuable editing of Behrman’s 1922-1923 newspaper
columns provide the only memoirs by the ex-mayor. Harold Zink, City Bosses in the
United States: A Study o f Twenty Municipal Bosses (New York: AMS Press, 1968,
reprinted from the 1930 edition), contains a chapter on Behrman, but most o f the
biographical details are taken from the Behrman newspapers columns or from obituaries
at the time o f his death. Zink refers to interviews with Behrman’s son Stanley and
“twenty-nine large scrapbooks” kept by the Mayor, but efforts to discover whether the
materials still exist were unsuccessful. See Zink, City Bosses, 317-319.
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Soon afterward, the assessor of the New Orleans Fifth District offered Behrman the job
o f Deputy Assessor. He accepted and, by 1892, led the Algiers delegation to the parish
nominating convention that chose John Fitzpatrick as mayoral candidate. In his
memoirs Behrman recalled:
I had taken the position of deputy assessor because it appeared to be a generally
better job than that o f traveling salesman and Mrs. Behrman preferred to have
me more at h om e.. . . I did not feel like I was a politician at the at time. Even
when I quickly organized a new faction in Algiers and beat the two older
factions, I was not yet fully conscious of the fact that I had become a politician.
But when I sat in the caucus with the mayor-elect, John Fitzpatrick, and
discussed the apportionment o f the patronage . . . well, I realized that Martin
Behrman had become a politician.
When the new Mayor divided the City Hall patronage, the clerkship of the city council
budget committee--a perfect training ground in the workings of municipal government-went to Behrman. “I have read many books on municipal government and hundreds of
magazine articles,” Behrman wrote. The authors “would have done better if they had
actually engaged in such work as I had as a clerk.” Behrman later added service on the
school board to his resume.s
In 1896, Behrman ran for the state legislature but lost in the midst of the
Citizens’ League municipal victory. He was active in the founding of the Choctaw Club
and never wavered in his loyalty to the Regulars. In the election for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention o f 1898, Behrman won the right to represent Algiers. He
5 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 8-9, 20-26. In addition to being
divided into seventeen wards, New Orleans also consisted of seven municipal districts,
each with its own assessor and tax collector. Although the tax collector positions were
eventually merged into one office, New Orleans still retains the seven assessor districts.
District Five consists o f Algiers, the portion of New Orleans on the west bank of the
Mississippi River.
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moved up to assessor for the Fifth District through a gubernatorial appointment and
eventually became President of the Board of Assessors. From that position, he was
tapped to run for State Auditor and won election in January, 1904. Behrman had the
benefit of powerful patrons, such as Ernest Kruttschnitt, but his long-term success can
only be explained by his considerable skills. He spoke several languages, served in
volunteer fire departments, joined the Knights o f Columbus, participated as a director o f
the New Orleans Progressive Union, and helped take the census counts in 1890 and
1900. He was gregarious, conscientious, generous, attentive to detail, and incredibly
energetic. In short, he followed the sensible social and governmental routes to become
well-known, well-liked, and respected in political circles.6
Faced with its inability to convince Charles Janvier to run for mayor, a highpowered Regular delegation summoned Martin Behrman to a meeting at the offices of
the Daily Picayune. Members included: Robert Ewing, newspaperman and Tenth Ward
leader, Samuel Gilmore, city attorney, former member of the Citizens’ League, and
Twelfth Ward leader, former governor and Senate hopeful Murphy Foster, and Charles
Janvier. After some hesitation (Behrman was reluctant to give up his new position as
State Auditor), Regular loyalty won out, and Behrman officially announced his
candidacy on August 24, 1904. The day before, Behrman had received the approval o f
the governor to make the race, and press accounts indicated the Regulars had done their
homework. A majority of the convention participants immediately declared for

6 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 8, 38-41; Daily Picayune, August 25,
1904, 3.
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Behrman, and his support grew to unanimity with a few days. The Daily Picayune
noted only one negative reaction. A local, unidentified law firm “told Mr. Behrman that
he would not do; that a businessman was wanted.”7
The anonymous judgement did not reflect the thinking o f most in the business
community. Behrman’s political apprenticeship had not neglected business interests.
As president of the Board of Assessors, he often assisted the assessor o f the business
district in the evaluation of property and, in the process, made the acquaintance of many
businessmen. In addition, his service as a Director in the Progressive Union gave him
several years experience in both promoting the city and absorbing the opinions o f the
business community. Though there was some natural opposition to the nomination o f “a
boss,” many business leaders announced approval of the Behrman candidacy. “Around
the Board o f Trade in particular, many o f the best and most substantial businessmen of
the city who know Behrman [agreed with] Albert Baldwin, Jr., that Behrman was good
enough for them and they would vote for him.” A member o f the Progressive Union
added that Behrman “was one of the most active men; he was a worker” and “always
willing either with work or with means.” He added that “we do not all agree as to the
manner of his selection. . . but we are for him for mayor.” Behrman encouraged this
benevolent view in the announcement o f his candidacy by pledging “a clean business

7 Daily Picayune, August 24, 1904; 3; August 25, 1904, 3; Kemp, Martin
Behrman o f New Orleans, 78-81.
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administration” and a “new method [and] business-like approach” to government,
including an emphasis on clean streets.8
All seemed in place for an uneventful Behrman nomination and victory, but
Governor Blanchard intervened once again. In opposition to the plans o f the New
Orleans Regulars, he insisted that Porter Parker be place on the ticket as candidate for
District Attorney. It was not uncommon for the state’ chief executive to influence a city
ticket, but Blanchard’s replacement of a popular and universally-accepted candidate,
Chandler C. Luzenberg, put the Regulars in an awkward position. Bowing to the
Governor’s political and patronage power, the Regulars surrendered, creating a firestorm
o f reform and press opposition to Blanchard’s methods and to the craven agreement of
the bosses. “Blanchard: Boss o f All Bosses” and “City Delivered to Blanchard” were
the Daily Picayune headlines, and the reformers awoke to the convenient issue at hand.
Behrman’s election was no longer a certainty.9
Within a matter of days, opposition to Blanchard’s actions and the Behrman
candidacy coalesced into the Home Rule Movement, led by long-time reformer William
S. Parkerson. The reform leadership would normally have supported Porter Parker,
brother to John M. Parker, prominent cotton broker. And their new-found affection for
Luzenberg hid their previous resentment as his appointment as District Attorney at the
behest of the Regulars. As Behrman astutely noted at a later date, the controversy over

8Daily Picayune, August 25,1904, 3; August 26,1904, 4; August 27, 1904,4;
August 21, 1904, 8; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 9, 12, 81.
9 Daily Picayune, September II, 1904, 12; September 20, 1904, 1; September
22, 1904, 1; September 23, 1904, 1; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 83-87.
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the governor’s actions was a convenient cover to “the main idea of the opposition. That
idea was that a ward leader, which is what we call what they call a ‘ward boss,’ was not
fit to be mayor. The impression they conveyed was that a professional politician was
unfit for an office of honor because he was a professional politician.” The observation
neatly summarized the ambivalence of the reformers, who wanted a professional
administration but distrusted professional politicians. The Home Rule ticket that
eventually opposed Behrman did not include Luzenberg, giving weight to Behrman’s
argument that the alleged central issue o f the Home Rule campaign hid the
organization’s true motives.10
By October 3,1904, the Home Rule organization announced its own municipal
ticket, led by former mayoral candidate and Choctaw member Charles F. Buck. In an
echo of the Citizens’ League efforts, Buck called for a “permanent reform organization
to protect the great city’s vital interests.” Both the Daily Picayune and the TimesDemocrat supported Buck, although the election coverage in the Daily Picayune was
fairly balanced. Detectives hired by the Home Rule organization brought to light some
irregularities in the city’s voter registration records in the days before the election, but
the numbers involved could not alter the outcome of the election. Parkerson charged
Behrman with financial irregularities in the operation of his assessor’s office, and the
Regulars responded with an attack upon Buck’s record in the Civil War, but most
campaign rhetoric centered on the Home Rule issue, the power o f the governor, and the

10Daily Picayune, September 25, 1904,12; October 1, 1904, 8; October 2, 1904,
2; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 88-93..
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efficacy o f boss rule. No candidate raised the question o f municipal ownership nor the
state o f public works, a clear sign o f the city’s basic consensus on progressive civic
development. The Regulars pointed to a good record from the previous term, but issues
o f substance found no audience. A typical editorial from the Daily Picayune read:
A vote [for the regular ticket] is a vote to vindicate the governor in his tyrannical
invasion o f the rights of the people o f the city . . . to declare approval and
endorsement o f his hateful despotism and to support the slavish bosses in their
inexcusable combination and conspiracy with the Governor to perpetuate a
wanton outrage upon the people o f New Orleans.11
By the end of October, the Home Rule leadership was certain o f victory
“express [ing] the opinion that the fight is already practically won.” The TimesDemocrat published an analysis o f the projected vote demonstrating a Buck victory was
inevitable. But the Regulars maintained their poise and reminded voters o f the history
o f Regular Democracy. The “names o f opposition parties had gone into oblivion,”
proclaimed Regular orators, and “the [Independents] change their name after every
election because they are afraid to stand before the people with the same name.” The
day before the election, the Daily Picayune editorial apocalyptically claimed that “today
New Orleans is on trial before the world.” Mayor Capdevielle called out special police
to suppress possible election day violence. In spite of confident Home Rule predictions
to the contrary, Behrman won not only the election, but also “a lot o f money. There was

11 Daily Picayune, October 3, 1904, 1; October 11, 1904, 1; October 20, 1904, 1;
October 21, 1904, 6; October 27,1904, 6; November 3, 1904,4; November 4, 1904,
1,3; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 93-95. Robert W. Williams, Jr., “Martin
Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss o f New Orleans, 1904-1926," 11. Williams makes
the claim for irregularities “to a marked degree” but does not provide evidence for the
claim beyond the assertions of the partisan press.
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a great deal o f betting done on that election. I had a smali share in a big pool and we
w o n .. . . The [Home Rulers] accepted the bets, knowing that their failure to do so would
show a lack o f confidence in the Home Rule movement.” The mayoral count showed
Behrman with 13,962 to Buck’s 10,047. Behrman’s willingness to wager on his own
election was due in part to his analysis of registration figures. In spite o f the reformers’
expressed interest in voting restrictions, many o f their natural followers had failed to pay
the poll tax. The various changes in voting law had reduced the electorate steadily since
the 1896 municipal election. In that contest over 45, 000 New Orleanians cast ballots.
The turnout fell to approximately 32,000 in 1899 and to 24,000 in 1904. Behrman
enjoyed the irony that the reform elements—long in favor of a poll tax—now suffered as
the result o f its passage. In Behrman’s words, the reformers “had more followers than
voters.” In the dejected words of the Daily Picayune, “Blanchard’s Bosses Seem
Safe.” 12
In spite o f Behrman’s margin of victory citywide, three Home Rule council
candidates won office. Home Rulers seemed encouraged by their showing and “insisted
that a permanent organization will be maintained and a constant campaign carried on to
keep civic vigilance active in the interest of good government.” Post-election analysis
by the Regulars drew several lessons from the vote. More than ever, the organization

12Daily Picayune, October 22, 1904, 1; November 8, 1904, 8; November 9,
1904, 1; Capdevielle to Fitzpatrick, November 5, 1904, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Capdevielle to Brigadier General S. P. Walmsley, November 8, 1904, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 101-102; Mayor’ Office,
Administrations o f the Mayors o f New Orleans, 213-223; Reynolds, Machine Politics in
New Orleans, 200-202.
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felt that without the black vote, reformers could not win. The Regulars admitted that
“fresh blood was needed in some wards,” and that “the day was past when the Party can
put up a yellow dog and elect him .” Behrman resigned as State Auditor two days after
the election, and, in a surprise to most observers, the governor named Paul Capdevielle
as his successor. The Mayor resigned several weeks before the official end o f his term
in order to begin work in Baton Rouge and turned over his post to Acting Mayor
William Mehle.13
The election had been difficult, but Behrman did not bear grudges. Within a
short time, he later recalled, he was friends with the Home Rule leaders--with the
exception of Parkerson, who has raised the ethical charges against Behrman during the
campaign. The Daily Picayune reported that Buck’s “large and imposing” picture still
hung in the Choctaw Club in recognition of his 1896 candidacy. The Club displayed a
“long row o f honored Democratic leaders” in its club house. “Although defeated, his
photograph will continue to occupy its honored placed on the wall o f Choctaw Fame.”
Politics was not personal to the Regulars. It was business.14
Behrman’s election was a surprise to the commercial leadership of New Orleans
loyal to the Home Rule cause. The new Mayor was worlds apart from the educated,
socially prominent Capdevielle and was a business neophyte compared to both
Capdevielle and former Mayor Flower. Behrman later remembered that his enemies

13 Daily Picayune, November 10,1904,1,4, 5; November 16, 1904, 5;
Capdevielle to City Council, November 15,1904, Mayor’s Correspondence.
14 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 90; Daily Picayune, November 13,
1904,4.
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considered him “uncouth,” but over the years he would grow in stature and social skills.
Eventually, he earned the respect, if not the friendship, o f many reformers. The harsh
anti-boss rhetoric o f campaigns and editorials often masked the recognition that
Behrman “gave New Orleans a responsible, constructive, and businesslike
administration.”15
Behrman took office on December 5, 1904. His first message to the city council
set a tone for his administration—pragmatic, business-like, and down to earth. The
business and governmental positions he had held prior to becoming Mayor required a
keen sense o f finance and organization, and he put those qualities into his call to action.
He reminded council members that their primary duty lay in “organizing the various
departments of the city government for practical operation o f the municipal purposes.”
He pointed out the low level of public revenue and urged “efficient organization.
Whether or not there have been sinecures in the city government o f the past, there
should be none in the government which has just been installed.” The council examined
staffing in the Mayor’s and the city’s attorney’s office, but “both [were] deemed to have
no sinecures.” Behrman called for “cutbacks in the list o f city employees,. . . clean
streets, and a healthful city.” The Progressive Union enthusiastically offered its help in
working for clean streets and the removal of filth from the gutters.16

15 Schott, “John M. Parker, 102-103; Williams, “Martin Behrman,”, 4-5; Kemp,
Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 89; Zink, City Bosses, 330.
16 Behrman to City Council, December 6,1904, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily
Picayune, December 6, 1904,3; December 9,1904, 5; January 11,1904,4.
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The new Mayor moved quickly to put his mark on city government. He presided
over a Civil Service Commission meeting and asked the members to utilize “practical
instead of theoretical questions in civil service exams for public works superintendents.”
He urged the Finance Committee to move on acquisition of a city asphalt repair plant to
reduce the dependence on private contractors. To fulfill a campaign promise for cleaner
streets, he recommended the purchase o f a street cleaning machine. He began a plan for
personally inspecting street conditions and often wrote the heads of city departments
with directions for correcting particular situations. He forwarded to the council a letter
from the Progressive Union urging enforcement o f sanitation ordinances. By the end o f
February, the council considered a new ordinance regulating garbage collection. The
Mayor wrote urging its passage. On occasion, he brought the Commissioner o f Public
Works with him on street inspections. When the Fire Board issued purchase orders for
hoses without public bidding, Behrman went to court and enjoined the action. Viewed
without reference to Behrman’s political affiliation, the actions corresponded to what
any “reform” administration might have attempted. Behrman’s pragmatic orientation
and auditor’s frugality combined with a clear confidence in the legitimacy o f public
activity. These characteristics would shape all o f Behrman’s service as mayor.17
Behrman first months in office also set a pattern for his attention to the role of
mayor as dispenser of patronage and an important state Democrat with connections to
17Daily Picayune, January 27, 1904, 7; January 31, 1905, 4; February 4, 1904, 4;
February 28,1905, 7; March 15, 1905. 4; Behrman to City Council, January 31, 1905,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to James Mayo, Secretary, Progressive Union,
February (date illegible), 1905, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City Council,
February 28,1905, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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the Congressional delegation. Less than two weeks after taking office, his secretary
responded to a constituent’s request. “Mayor Behrman has directed me to inform you
that it is impossible for him to comply with your request to give your husband
employment.. . . There are thousands of just such applications before him for
consideration. Enclosed herewith you will find the sum of five dollars to aid you.” On
another occasion, he intervened on behalf of a job seeker, writing to Louis Johnson,
chairman of the Executive Committee o f tire Sewerage and Water Board. “John
Blessing, son of a late porter for the Sewerage and Water Board,” sought to take his
father’s place. Behrman urged Johnson to arrange for his hire. The Mayor took such
requests seriously, and he expected public agencies and private companies he
approached to do the same. As leader of the Regulars in New Orleans, Behrman also
took seriously his role as conduit to the city’s congressional representatives. In response
to a request from Shreveport, Louisiana, leaders, he wrote to Congressman Robert
Davey urging his assistance in obtaining an appropriation to dredge the Red River at the
northern Louisiana city. The Mayor’s frugality coexisted with an assumption that public
jobs should be at his disposal and that public funds should be dispensed to those in need.
Years later, Behrman’s defended his use of patronage. He argued that “you do not
appoint men . . . because you can get control of their votes but because they are already
with you.”18

18Behrman’s Secretary W.P. Ball to Mrs. P. Schoen, December 16, 1904,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Louis Johnson, February 20, 1905, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Behrman to Congressman Davey, January 11, 1905, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 300.
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The council received an indication o f the level o f detail under the Mayor’s
scrutiny in March, 1905. The administration examined the bills received for municipal
lighting and the terms of the contract to the lighting company. The city was to be
credited a certain amount to compensate for lights burned out or inoperable during the
billing period. The Mayor and Commissioner of Police and Public Buildings Alex Pujol
began to monitor the outages. When the council passed a routine ordinance to pay the
bill, the Mayor pointedly vetoed it and brought the discrepancies to the council’s
attention. Another veto message overturned the council’s permission to operate a
stockyard in a residential area. The Mayor wrote, “I have personally visited the site”
and “the schools and public institutions nearby” and, somewhat grandly, reminded the
council of the effect on “taxpayers, whose sacred rights must be regarded and
respected.”19
In the same way that Capdevielle had been tested early in his administration by
the Charles riots, Behrman faced a public health crisis in his first year in office. After a
decade of sparing New Orleans, yellow fever broke out in the summer of 1905. The
essential facts about yellow fever had been discovered by U.S. Army physicians
working in Cuba. The yellow fever resulted from a particular type o f mosquito, Aedes
aegypti (Stegomyia), an “urban domestic mosquito . . . breeding in small collections of
water.” New Orleans provided a plethora of breeding places, including residential
cisterns, undrained gutters, privy vaults, and even cemetery vases. The city health
19Behrman to City Council, March 21, 1905, Mayor’s’s Correspondence; Daily
Picayune, March 17, 1905, 8; Behrman to City Council, March 7, 1905, Mayor’s
Correspondence.
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officials had previously attempted to regulate such potential hazards, but had been
rebuffed by a skeptical council and the complaints of homeowners.20
The first cases o f the fever came to the attention o f the city in late July. Notice
of the disease rapidly circulated to other southern cities and nearby states. In an ironic
and embarrassing development, Havana served notice on the Crescent City that it would
be quarantined. (Cuba had been considered a source of yellow fever until U.S. Armyled sanitary procedures eliminated the disease in 1901.) No goods or persons from New
Orleans would be allowed into the Cuban city. It would not be the only city to act
against New Orleans; Mobile joined in the next day. The New Orleans Board o f Health,
led by Dr. Quitman Kohnke, urged the Mayor to act, and on July 25 Behrman issued a
detailed proclamation to the citizens. It called for emptying water containers, sleeping
with mosquito nets, screening cisterns, and treating cesspools with oil. By July 26,
1905, the Board reported 154 cases and thirty-four deaths. The figure appeared in the
Daily Picayune and other local papers “so that the exaggerated reports which have been
in circulation can be discontinued.”21

20 For a history o f the yellow fever and the discovery o f its etiology, see Robert
S. Desowitz, Who Gave Pinta to the Santa Maria: Torrid Diseases in a Temperate
World (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 120-143; Daily Picayune, July 26, 1905, 6.
21 Daily Picayune, July 23,1905, 1; July 24,1905, 6; July 25, 1905, 1; July 26,
1905, 5; Kemp Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 133. Kohnke, originally a Citizens’
League member, had served the Board o f Health, formed after an outbreak o f yellow
fever in 1897, in the Flower and Capdevielle administrations. His brother served as
President o f the Board o f Trade. Dr. Kohnke was also a mejnber o f the Board o f Trade
as well as the Knights o f Columbus and the St. Vincent de Paul Society. He died in
June 1909. Daily Picayune, June 27, 1909, 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151
The crisis required large-scale public action. The Mayor asked Charles Janvier
to manage a business committee for the “sanitary war.” Janvier agreed and began
collecting contributions to fund the effort. The city council reversed earlier policy and
passed ordinances regulating the storage of water. Public education accelerated to
convince citizens of the efficacy of the new measures. “The clinging to antiquated
notions concerning the propagation and transmission of diseases is a great obstacle to
the thorough and successful application o f the mosquito doctrine of the causation of
malarial and yellow fever.” As the number o f cases accelerated, the city faced increased
hostility from nearby areas, especially Gulf of Mexico cities in commercial competition.
Assuming that the disease could spread by contact or through contaminated goods,
additional cities began to quarantine New Orleans. Bay St. Loins and other G ulf Coast
cities considered a quarantine o f all of Louisiana. A dispute broke out in Baton Rouge
between politicians urging a quarantine of New Orleans and doctors “unwilling to be
influenced by a quarantine that we believe to be unscientific and impracticable, and
based upon commercial and political interests.” Other cities expressed sympathy, and a
hotel manager in Atlanta even “welcomed citizens and travelers from New Orleans.”
By the end o f the month the number of cases increased to 283; deaths stood at fiftyseven.22

22 Daily Picayune, July 26, 1905, 5, 6, 15; July 27, 1905, 6; July 28, 1905, 4.
Quarantines were not unique to the 1905 outbreak. One author estimates that New
Orleans lost investment o f $ 10.5 million a year during the period 1846 to 1851. See
Desowitz, Who Gave Pinto to the Santa Maria, 104-108. Behrman had no doubt that
commercial motives entered into the quarantine orders. See Kemp, Martin Behrman o f
New Orleans, 132-135.
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The distribution o f cases varied across the city. African-American
neighborhoods had lower rates of the disease. Some observers assumed a natural
immunity, but mobilized the community nonetheless. To fight the disease “colored men
organize[d] for sanitation’s sake.” On the other hand, the new Italian neighborhoods in
the vicinity of the French Quarter suffered disproportionately. The city successfully
enlisted “Italian colony leaders” to assist in the sanitation efforts. Arturo Dell’Orto of
Comitato di Soccorso wrote Mayor Behrman in August noting that the city had received
a donation of twenty-five cases of Mumm Champagne “for the purposes o f supplying
the sick. As we have a large number o f such under our care, we would like to know
whether we can get some cases to be used for the purpose for which they were donated.”
In suburban St. Bernard Parish officials “met violent resistance when they attempted to
investigate a sick woman.” The parish Sheriff and a local doctor were met by “ several
Sicilians, mean-tempered and refractory by nature,” who “defied the representatives of
the law.” Newspaper accounts of the incident, however, indicated that nothing more
than a language barrier may have led to the confrontation.23
In the most antagonistic and strangest of the quarantine confrontations,
Mississippi Governor James K. Vardaman called on armed ships to patrol the waters of
the Mississippi Sound. Governor Blanchard protested the “violation o f Louisiana
waters” and appealed to the federal courts. The president o f the New Orleans National
23 Desowitz refers to “partial resistance” to yellow fever among AfricanAmericans, a condition that led to the assumption in some quarters that they were
actually carriers o f the disease. Desowitz, Who Gave Pinta to the Santa Maria, 108;
Arturo DelFOrto to Behrman, August 1, 1907, Behrman Papers, New Orleans Public
Library, Louisiana Division; Daily Picayune, July 28, 1905,4; July 29, 1905, 4.
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Bank, Albert Baldwin, had a vacation home at Pearl River, near the LouisianaMississippi border. Mississippi troops seized the home in their determination to
quarantine the border from the disease. The courts sided with Louisiana, and the border
panic subsided. But the conflict illustrated the city’s weakness in deaiing with multiple
jurisdictions and public health demands with limited resources and authority. On
August 4, 1905, the city appealed to the federal government for help, assuming that U.S.
authority would at least lessen the commercial impact o f hostile quarantines. The
“newly created Public Health Service . . . responded to the emergency by declaring that
it was broke and could do nothing.” Private bankers guaranteed the $250,000
demanded by the federal government to fund the program, and local surgeon J. H. White
o f the U.S. Marine Hospital in New Orleans took charge of the fight.24
Public efforts, led by Behrman, accelerated. The city put up $50,000 and asked
the state government for another $100,000, a figure that a majority of the legislature
agreed to within a matter of days. As cases o f the disease increased, the council
increased the city share to $60,000. Ex-govemor Heard, vacationing in Asheville, North
Carolina, prevailed upon the mayor o f that city to offer hospitality to New Orleanians, a
gesture gratefully received by Behrman especially when “the gates o f other places were

24 Daily Picayune, August 3, 1905, 1; August 5, 1905, 1, 3; Kemp, Martin
Behrman o f New Orleans, 143. Trouble between Mississippi and Louisiana flowed
from confusion over the exact boundary between the two states at the mouth of the Pearl
River. The River split into three branches before it reached the Mississippi Sound. In
early 1906, Louisiana received a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court and won
most o f the disputed area. Its 1906 value lay in its prolific oyster beds. Later the value
increased dues to discovery o f offshore oil and gas deposits. Daily Picayune, March 6,
1906, 4.
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closed.” Citizen committees organized self-help crews ward by ward to search out
breeding places and to assist in screening cisterns and treating privies. Behrman wrote
to his political adversary George Denegre assuring him that the Mayor would call out
the police if cemetery crews refused “to admit sanitary forces to empty vases.”25
Donations for the volunteer effort multiplied, including $250 from Lodge #30 o f the
Elks and an identical amount from Captain Fitzpatrick, safely on vacation in
Massachusetts. By August 18, the council enacted a law calling for imprisonment for
homeowners that neglected to screen cisterns. The Mayor personally sent a list of
possible offenders to the Inspector of Police. The Gulf Refining company offered to
donate “ten tank cars o f petroleum for disinfecting gutters.” But by the end o f August,
total cases had grown to 1,878; deaths had reached 271.26
In the annual commercial review issue of the Daily Picayune on September 1,
1905, the Mayor put the best face possible on the situation and claimed that “the
visitation o f the fever has only served to develop a spirit o f civic pride.” Health officials
looked back to the epidemic of 1878, in which almost 4,000 persons died, and saw the

25 Behrman to W. Heard at Asheville, North Carolina, August 10, 1905, Mayor’s
Correspondence. George Denegre was related to William Crawford Gorgas o f Mobile,
who served as the Army’s sanitarian in Cuba. Desowitz, Who Gave Pinta to the Santa
Maria, 139-140; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 133-134.
26 Daily Picayune, August 9, 1905, 2; August 10, 1905, 8; August 11, 1905, 4;
August 16, 1905, 5; August 31, 1905, 2; Behrman to George Denegre, August 5, 1905,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Charles Janvier, August 11,1905, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Behrman to Captain John Fitzpatrick in North Cambridge,
Massachusetts, August 14, 1905, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Inspector of
Police, August 14, 1905, Mayor’s Correspondence; H. James, Gulf Refining Company
to Behrman, August 28, 1905, Behrman Papers.
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current crisis as “less of a threat.” Governor Blanchard wrote to Behrman, confiding
that his son, “Dr. Blanchard, would be in New Orleans at the St. Charles hotel to study
the yellow fever.” He asked Behrman to visit his son and offer help. Charles Janvier
announced the formation of a permanent citizens’ group—the New Orleans Health
Association—to propose legislation required to continue the efforts at improving
sanitation. (The new association offered auxiliary status to the Women’s League, but
was turned down on the basis that “nothing but equal standing will be accepted.”) The
Elks organized a festival in mid-September to raise funds to fight the disease, but also to
raise the spirits of New Orleanians. The group held a parade of “about seven hundred
Elks,” including Mayor Behrman, “dressed in suits of cheese cloth and wearing hats
made in good imitations of screened cisterns.” City officials expressed concern that the
epidemic might prevent a visit by President Roosevelt scheduled for the end of October,
but by mid-September the White House agreed that the President would come. The
local papers praised Roosevelt’s courage. (Certainly cancellation of the trip would have
been prudent.) Behrman later, in a letter of congratulations to Alice Roosevelt on the
occasion of her marriage, mentioned the “kindness shown to the city by your father.” In
his memoirs, Behrman acknowledged had Roosevelt “remained away from New
Orleans, it would have done us a great deal of harm. The fact that he came did us a
great deal of good.” Not until the end of October (and after the President’s visit) did
new cases decline and the death rate stabilize. Years later, Behrman also recounted
meeting a man on the local ferry who confided that he had placed a bet on the number o f
cases increasing. The local press printed statistics on the epidemic daily, providing the
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source of data for the macabre numbers game. The final count was 3,403 cases and 437
deaths.27
Behrman’s stature increased as a result of the epidemic. The crisis tested the
Mayor’s administrative abilities, the resources of the city, and the ability o f New
Orleans to project a public image consistent with economic progress. The epidemic also
strengthened the position o f those in the city advocating various public policies as
solutions to public health problems. The city suffered commercially from not only the
injurious publicity but also from the actions o f other jurisdictions which, sincerely or
not, feared spread o f the disease. Behrman’s energy and enthusiasm never flagged, and
he revealed an effective talent for working with a wide spectrum o f society. His
temperament and work habits fit well with the interests o f the city’s leadership, almost
desperate to maintain the momentum of commercial expansion. Even before the end of
the crisis, the New Orleans Board o f Health published statistics to show the city’s white
population had a death rate below the average of the rest o f the county, “in spite of the
fact that yellow fever has existed here.” By Thanksgiving, the Mayor’s annual message
acknowledged “deliverance from yellow fever,” a building boom, and “the spirit o f the
people.” Concern over public health led to increased support for the sewerage, water,
and draining systems under construction by the Sewerage and Water Board. The
27 The estimated cases and “certified” deaths are reported in Biennial Reports o f
the Board o f Health o f the City o f New Orleans, 1904-1905, New Orleans Public
Library, Louisiana Division. Desowitz, Who Gave Pinta to the Santa Maria, 141, put
the death total at 452. Daily Picayune, September 1, 1905, Section IV, 1, 13, 16;
September 17, 1905, 6; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 131-149; Behrman to
Alice Roosevelt, February 17, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Blanchard to Behrman,
September 23, 1905, Behrman Papers.
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Board’s projects promised to eliminate the greatest sources of the disease-open cisterns,
privies, and inadequately-drained gutters.28
Behrman’s energy carried over to other projects. As President of the Public Belt
Railroad Commission, he regularly presided at commission meetings and promoted the
railroad to the city council. The Mayor also took an active role in the Sewerage and
Water Board, as well as the Board o f Liquidation o f City Debt, the School Board, the
Fire Board, and the Police Board. In some instances the Mayor held an official post; in
other cases, the Mayor’s appointment power provided direct input to the workings of
various municipal functions. Within the city administration, Behrman took particular
notice o f the Department of Public Works and constantly forwarded letters of
complaints or recommendations he had collected from citizens or his own
investigations. In March, 1906, the Mayor received a threat from the Post Office that
street and sidewalk conditions in some sections o f the city were so poor that its mail
carriers would refuse to attempt delivery. The Mayor brought the news to the city
council to reinforce his arguments for improved draining and street paving. When an
unexpected windfall of revenue accrued to the city in 1906, the Mayor urged that it be
used for street cleaning “for visitors but also our own health.”29

28 Daily Picayune, October 24, 1905, 4; November 30, 1905, 10. See Chapter VI
for a discussion o f the Sewerage and Water Board.
29 Behrman to City Council, March 20, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Behrman to City Council, December 11, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence. An
investigation o f the Mayor’s outgoing correspondence show that Commissioner of
Public Works Smith received a communication from the Mayor at the rate o f more than
one every working day. Although Behrman pressured the Commissioner for action, he
also argued strenuously for additional resources and supplemental appropriations. See
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Adequate funding for the city was central to the Mayor’s concerns. As an
assessor, Behrman had taken pride in seeing the additional revenue for the city inherent
in increases in property value. As Mayor, he directed the city attorney to research
payments owed by franchise holders that may have not been collected. Many street
railroads were in default of franchise provisions that required the upkeep of streets
where the railroads operated. Behrman insisted on enforcement of the franchises, which
generated additional city revenue and better upkeep o f the streets. Behrman also
took an interest in how the city handled deposits of idle funds and the policies for
collecting interest on municipal bank balances. In a message to the city council, the
Mayor demanded collection of interest due to the city. A canvass of the various boards
and commissions receiving city funds revealed that most drew the funds in anticipation
o f expenses and deposited the proceeds in accounts that drew no interest. The city
consolidated the funds and demanded interest payments. City Attorney Gilmore
estimated the annual savings at $33,000 a year.30
Shortly afterward, the Mayor began a year-long campaign to force banks to pay
interest on public funds on deposit with the Board o f Liquidation. In the process,
Behrman took on the most powerful of the city’s bankers and businessmen. Though his
first efforts met with failure, he refused to drop the issue. The city had no direct control
over the Board o f Liquidation, a post-Reconstruction era entity founded to guarantee

Behrman to City Council, April 3, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence.
30 Behrman to City Council, November 28,1905, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Behrman to City Council, January 30, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune,
January 26, 1906, 6; January 31,1906.
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bondholders that the city would pay its debts. Established by the state legislature in
1880, the Board o f Liquidation had direct control over twelve o f twenty-two mill?;
collected by the city on the value of property. Ten mills paid off interests and principal
on long term general obligation bonds. Two mills serviced the Sewerage and Water
Board Debt. The Board split funds in excess o f those requirements between the School
Board and the Sewerage and Water Board. The composition o f Board o f Liquidation
was peculiar even in an era which prized expertise, elite administration, and nonpartisanship. The core of the membership was six private citizens. The original
appointees could fill vacancies without approval by city or state government, thus
perpetuating a tight network of prominent bankers and businessmen isolated from
normal state and municipal politics. Three members of the city administration also sat
on this Board, but the private members could easily outvote their public colleagues. In
January, 1906, the private members prevailed six to three in a vote to deposit funds in
the Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust Company at no interest. The Daily Picayune
reported that five of the private members had connections to the bank, either as directors
or stockholders.31
Behrman’s fight continued in the state legislature, which passed a law
demanding members vote for interest bearing accounts. But the governor vetoed the law
as unconstitutional. Board members took the position that requiring bids for deposits
31 Carl E. Hyde, Jr, “The Origins of the New Orleans Board o f Liquidation o f the
City Debt, 1876-1882," 1, 17-19\ Acts Passed by the General Assembly, 1880, Act No.
133,180; Daily Picayune, January 26, 1906, 6; February 16, 1906, 12; Robert W.
Williams, “Martin Behrman and New Orleans Civic Development, 1904-1920,”
Louisiana History 2 (Fall 1961): 376-378.
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based on the level of interest offered would encourage an unhealthy level of competition
and put the bondholders’ funds at risk. The Mayor took the Board to court, but lost at
every level. However, Behrman’s persistence and the weight of public opinion
eventually prevailed. Although they declined to solicit bids, the majority voted in 1907
to place the Board’s funds in five banks, each o f which agreed to pay interest at three
and one-half percent. As members voted, each declared that he had no financial interest
in the banks chosen or recused himself when necessary. Behrman’s insistence on
upholding the right o f the public to earn money on its funds provided an interesting case
o f a “machine” mayor adhering to progressive principles, while the progressive,
independent board acted to sustain private advantage.32
In 1906, Behrman faced another issue with public and private implications. The
local “Frisco” railroad had obtained concessions from the New Orleans City Council in
a contentious dispute during Mayor Capdevielle’s term. The railroad, now reconstituted
as the New Orleans Terminal Company, requested land from the city along Basin Street
be provided to the company “as a free gift.” The original franchise allowed the railroad
access to Canal Street, the city’s central business thoroughfare, via Basin Street, but the
width of the corridor was insufficient for the company’s new plans~the construction of

32 Daily Picayune, March 14 1906, 4; June 9, 1906, 4; June 12, 1906, 5; July 1
1906, 5; December 21, 1906, 6; December 24, 1906, 6; Williams, “Martin Behrman and
New Orleans Civic Development,” 377-378. Williams cites the Behrman memoirs
which mention three banks receiving funds, but newspaper accounts list five recipients.
Daily Picayune, March 13, 1907,4. See also Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans,
169-172.
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a grand terminal on Canal Street- Once again, the city debated the business advantage o f
the railroad facility versus the value of the land requested-33
Louis Berg, the company president, must have wondered whether or not he
would get a fair hearing from the Mayor. Earlier in the year he received an angry letter
from Behrman:
I wish to take this opportunity to say to you. . . that it seems to me that my
sending notes to you with requests for employment for deserving people seems
to be treated as a huge joke; perhaps not by yourself, but by those to whom you
refer the applicants. O f course you know that I have sent a good many to you
with letters, but there has been no results. This [letter] for your information.
Berg was fortunate that the city council, not the Mayor, had the first opportunity to
decide on the request. The company promised an investment of $1,000,000 in a
terminal and a consolidation o f passenger service in the new facility. The number o f
tracks required and provision o f service for the Public Belt as well as street railroads
made the additional space necessary, Berg argued. The council’s Streets and Landings
Committee agreed to the request, but placed several restrictions on the grant. Only
passenger service would be allowed, expansion of the terminal to the east, along Basin
Street, would be limited, and the company would be required to pay the city $100,000
for the privileges. Berg resisted at first, perhaps for show, but agreed to the limiting
provisions. The full council approved the measure the following week. Further action
was the responsibility o f the Mayor.34

33 Daily Picayune, March 23, 1906, 3. See Chapter IV for information on the
original Frisco controversy.
34 Daily Picayune, March 23, 1906, 3; March 24,1906,4; March 28, 1906, 3, 6;
March 29,1906, 5.
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Representatives o f the city’s financial and commercial leadership urged Behrman
to sign the ordinance. Members o f the Board o f Liquidation, Charles Janvier, Abraham
Brittin, and Board of Trade Vice-President Pearl Wight argued that the economic effects
o f the terminal activity justified the grant. But the Mayor vetoed the council action.
After paying respects to the attorney for the railroad (E. H. Farrar, who was also a part
owner of the terminal company), Behrman told the council that no plans for the
terminal had been submitted nor had the railroad consulted the city engineer on track
placement. The Basin Canal property to the east o f the terminal would revert to the state
in 1907, and the city should protect the state’s interests. Finally, Behrman found the
figure of $100,000 “ridiculous and not worthy o f consideration” and suggested a
minimum o f $350,000 compensation. The city council upheld the veto by one vote.
Three of the six votes to sustain came from uptown Home Rule councilmen. Most of
the Regulars on the council sided with the railroad. Dire predictions that the company
would abandon New Orleans disappeared when the Daily Picayune revealed that the
Southern Railroad had taken a one-half interest in the terminal company and assured the
city that it wished to stay in the city.35
Behrman’s defiance o f the city’s financial and business establishment had its
limits, and on most issues the Regular Mayor found no reason to dispute business
policies. The Mayor shared membership with Charles, J. Theard, for example, on the
Sewerage and Water Board. Theard, first appointed by Capdevielle, was prominent in
banking circles. He and the Mayor worked together with no apparent hostility. But
35Daily Picayune, April 1, 1906, 4; April 1906, 3, 3; April 8, 1906, 8.
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Theard supported the Home Rule movement in the 1904 election, and his appointment
to the Sewerage and Water Board expired in 1906. Behrman nominated Joseph Voegtle
to replace Theard, much to the displeasure o f the local newspapers, especially the
reform-minded Times-Democrat. Behrman defended his choice as a “conservative,
sensible, reliable, public-spirited gentleman... not a lawyer, but a lawyer was not
necessary.” The Times-Democrat had criticized Voegtle as a politician, but that label,
Behrman argued, was “less applicable to Voegtle than to Theard.” Voegtle was,
however, a loyal member o f the Choctaw Club and, as the proprietor o f a French Quarter
hotel, had provided Behrman with private offices during the campaign o f 1904.36
Theard’s interest in serving on the Sewerage and Water Board remained strong,
and his colleagues intervened. Charles Janvier resigned from the Board o f Liquidation
and its members appointed Theard to the vacancy. The Board of Liquidation had
reserved membership on the Sewerage and Water board, and one month later, the Board
of Liquidation appointed Theard to fill one o f its slots. Behrman showed no antagonism
to Theard’s somewhat contrived return and worked with him to pass crucial
constitutional amendments in the November, 1906, election. In the years to come,
Behrman and Theard cooperated in a strong defense o f the Sewerage and Water Board
practice o f using its own construction crews to drive down the cost o f the systems.37

36 Daily Picayune, May 2, 1906, 5; May 5, 1906, 6, 8; Times-Democrat, May 3,
1906.
37 Daily Picayune, June 7, 1906,4; September 14,1906,4. See Chapter VT for a
discussion of the construction practices o f the Sewerage and Water Board.
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The importance of municipal action in the face o f urban problems remained a
theme o f Behrman’s administration. He urged the council to move quickly on the
completion of the city’s asphalt plant, designed to avoid the expense o f private
contractors. The plant opened in August, 1907, at a cost of over $77,000, with a speech
by City Engineer Hardee, who declared “it must be kept out of politics.” Mindful that
the hot summer months contained a threat of yellow fever, he urged a $10,000
supplemental appropriation for the Board of Health “for mosquito work.” Council
member and physician William O’Reilly became the new director o f the Board of
Health, but delayed taking office until “after the summer fight [against the mosquitos].”
Behrman worked with the legislature to clarify the ownership o f the city’s West End
recreational area and then pressed the city council to arrange a lease for its development.
As increased government activity led to tight quarters in City Hall, the Mayor urged to
council to accelerate the construction of an annex for City Hall. And to avoid delaying
the construction of the water purification plant, he called the council into special session
to approve the specifications.38
On January 1, 1907, a state law and constitutional amendment controlling child
labor and providing for factory inspectors went into effect. The legislation held a
special interest for Jean and Kate Gordon, uptown New Orleans sisters active in the Era

38 Daily Picayune, June 13, 1906, 5; August 22, 1906,4; July 4,1906, 3;
Behrman to City Council, March 6,1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City
Council, April 17, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City Council, August 7,
1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City Council, September 14, 1906,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Williams, “Martin Behrman and New Orleans Civic
Development,” 380, 393.
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Club and a variety o f causes. (When the legislation considered the factory inspection
bill in June, 1906, Behrman had responded to a request of Jean Gordon and sent a copy
o f the act to her.) The Gordons had no use for ring politicians, but they had cooperated
with the Regulars in the campaign for clean water and in the efforts to clean up the city
during the yellow fever epidemic. In November, 1906, Behrman announced that he
would forward to the governor the name of Jean Gordon to be appointed Factory
Inspector. When she returned from an overseas vacation, the Era Club honored her
appointment, and Behrman spoke at the club’s gathering. The Mayor also continued his
efforts to get jobs for friends or constituents in need. In a letter to Hugh McCloskey,
President of the Dock Board, Behrman urged the hiring of “a Southern Pacific worker
with a large family. He now needs work” because of a strike.39
Mayor Behrman, starting his third year in office, faced a host o f recurring
problems, but his commitment to public authority and activist government persisted.
Not every problem was equally important. Many items of detail came to the Mayor’s
attention from citizens moved to action by his accessibility. He reported to the city
council, for example, on a complaint received “that a merchant at Poydras and Fulton
was leasing out the sidewalk for a chicken coop.” On another occasion, the Mayor
referred a claim for damages to the city attorney from a man who sought reimbursement
of$125.00~the value of a mule killed by falling through a defective city bridge at
39 Behrman to Jean Gordon, June 29, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman
to Hugh McCloskey, November 7, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune,
November 23, 1906, 5; January 27, 1907, 5. The Behrman papers contain a copy o f
Jean Gordon’s oath o f office taken in the Mayor’s office and signed by the Mayor. Jean
Gordon Oath, March 5, 1907, Behrman papers.
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Decatur and St. Louis streets. O f greater concern to the Mayor were problems
associated with the completion o f the Public Belt Railroad and the enormous public
works o f the Sewerage and Water Board. Mardi Gras and the annual visit o f the “Cook
County Democracy . . . with a band of forty pieces” provided some respite from the
municipal problems. Faced with a railroad request for the extension of a franchise, the
Daily Picayune reported that “the matter would be discussed after carnival.”40
In March, the Mayor took on another long-standing municipal problem—garbage
disposal. For many years, disposal had been simple, if less than hygienic. Garbage
collected in carts from throughout the city was dumped onto garbage boats at a dock at
Hospital Street, downriver from the business district. The boats transported the refuse
to the middle o f the river some distance from the city and dumped their cargo into the
current. Unfortunately, the garbage boats did not always travel the requisite distance.
And when the river front wharves expanded in the first decade of the century,
complaints about the stench and inadequate disposal multiplied. As early as May, 1905,
the Dock Board had asked the city to make other arrangements, but Behrman put off the
request since the city did not have sufficient time to develop an alternative. By 1907,
the Dock Board set a time limit of six months for the city to remove the garbage docks.
The development of the Public Belt Railroad provided a means to haul the garbage and
the city abandoned the river method. Specially built railroad cars hauled the garbage to

40 Daily Picayune, January 19,1907, 11; June 7,1907,4; February 8, 1907, 5.
See Chapters VI and VIII for details of the Sewerage and Water Board and Public Belt
Railroad issues.
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a swamp east o f the French Quarter which served as the city landfill, and the refuse
would be deodorized as the cars emptied their contents.41
In March, 1907, the New Orleans T erm in al company revived its plan for a Canal
Street terminal. The company had been unable to convince all passenger lines serving
the city to consolidate in one depot, and the organizers reduced their $1,000,000 plan to
$200,000. The smaller project did not required additional concessions by the city, and
Behrman agreed to the new plan. The Frisco, Rock Island, and Southern lines
eventually signed with the terminal company, raising the project cost to one-half
million. Unfortunately, the north side of Basin Street, along which trains would enter
the terminal, served as the southern border o f Storyville. For years thereafter the city
found itself in controversies over the alleged effects on passengers exposed to the seamy
side of New Orleans life42
By mid-year, the city formulated ambitious plans to host a Panama Canal
Exposition in 1915, the projected opening of the canal. Many businessmen remembered
the 1884 World Cotton Exposition, held in uptown New Orleans, and wished to repeat
the impact o f the fair on city development, even though the operations of the fair itself
lost money. Behrman asked prominent citizens, such as Charles Janvier, to serve on a
committee to plan the exposition. One replied that Behrman “was entitled to great

41 Behrman to Hugh McCloskey, President, Dock Board, May 18, 1905,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City Council, November 11, 1907, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Daily Picayune, March 13, 1907, 12; Williams, “Martin Behrman and
New Orleans Civic Development,” 393-395.
42 Daily Picayune, March 16, 1907, 8; May 12,1907, 5.
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credit for starting this movement.” The wrote to President Roosevelt seeking his
support for the city, agreeing to keep his answer “in sacred confidence.” Although the
city had not received official sanction from the federal government, the vision of the
exposition affected municipal policy. Heavy rains in April and May o f 1907 exceeded
the average of the previous ten years by fifteen inches, for example, leading to serious
damage. The city leadership worried that the drainage system would not be completed
in time for the exposition and used the example of the rains as justification for increased
efforts in public works. Planners chose site for the fair only after assurances from
experts that the area could be drained.43
By fall of 1907, the state election cycle demanded the attention o f city
politicians. Capdevielle announced that he would seek reelection as state auditor, but
the most important race to the New Orleans regulars was for the governor’s office.
Jared Sanders, Lieutenant Governor under Blanchard, announced his candidacy in April,
1907, and Behrman committed to support him shortly thereafter. By October, in spite o f
some dissent among the Regulars, the had successfully rallied the Choctaw Club to the
Sanders candidacy. The city’s reform elements backed Colonel Theodore Wilkinson,
who had been prominent in the Anti-Lottery League. Home Rule Councilman William
Bisso organized the Fourteenth Ward for Wilkinson and declared “the Fourteenth Ward
43 Behrman to Charles Janvier, May 8,1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman
to City Council, May 7, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Theodore
Roosevelt, May 21, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Charles Janvier to Behrman, May
8, 1907, Behrman Papers; George Dunbar to Behrman, May 9,1907, Behrman Papers;
A. Aschaffenburg to Behrman, May 6, 1907, Behrman Papers; Isidore Newman to
Behrman, May 8, 1907, Behrman Papers; Daily Picayune, June 12,1907, 7; July 13,
1907, 8. See Chapter X for additional details about the planned exposition.
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is always to first to get in line for good government.” The “Wilkinsonites promptly
raise[d] the anti-boss slogan.” A third candidate, General Leon Jastremski, who had
been defeated by Blanchard in the 1904 race, died during the campaign.44
The year had been a difficult one for the Regulars. Behrman and Governor
Blanchard had sparred over state lands to be used for an immigration station and over
levee protection. The boss o f the Ninth Ward, Frederick Dudenhefer, died, and his son
took over political leadership and the position o f state tax collector for the district.
Within months, he embezzled over $60,000 o f state funds and spent the money on
cotton speculation, automobiles, the race track, and a chorus girl. Faced with arrest, the
young Dudenhefer fled to Honduras. Later in the year, Captain Fitzpatrick’s tax
collection office discovered a larger theft. A clerk confessed to taking over $100,000
over the course o f several years. Most of the funds went to a “Negro mistress,” accused
in the press o f “mesmerizing” the perpetrator, who was sentenced to seven years for the
crime. Fitzpatrick repaid the state for losses not covered by the clerk’s bond.
Dudenhefer later returned to the city and was arrested at his family’s home in 1908. He
went to prison, and while serving his sentence occasionally received small gifts o f
money from Behrman. Fitzpatrick sued Virginia Reed, the mistress of his larcenous
clerk, in Civil Court to recover the money. The courts eventually found in favor o f
Reed, holding that Fitzpatrick could not prove that money had been given to her, and
that property in her possession predated the embezzlement. Behrman had no personal
44 Behrman to J. Y. Sanders, May 1, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Kemp,
Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 193-205; Daily Picayune, July 14, 1907, Section I, 4;
October 11, 1907, 5.
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connection to the thefts, and no one accused the Choctaw Club o f complicity. But the
thefts involved state funds and highlighted the system of patronage in New Orleans,
which had seven municipal districts, each with an assessor and a tax collector.45
Changes in that system became the focus of a special session of the Louisiana
legislature called for December 11, 1907. Governor Blanchard opposed the Sanders
candidacy and used the session, Behrman later charged, to “take Sanders off the stump
at the hottest period of the fight.” The call included plans for legislation to reduce the
number o f state-appointed officials, to increase protection “against defalcation by public
officers,” revise the primary law, and investigate the port o f New Orleans. The
Governor left Louisiana after issuing the call, and Lieutenant Governor Sanders, chief
executive in the absence of Blanchard, added to the legislature’s agenda the
consideration o f regulation o f railroads and “other. . . public service corporations.”
Sanders hoped this would boost his campaign.46
Before the election, Behrman faced a series of controversies that illustrated the
moralistic aspect o f progressive thought. The general consensus among the New
Orleans leadership in favor o f a civic, pro-business progressivism broke down on issues
o f personal morality. In December, 1907, the Mayor received complaints that the
Greenwald Theater exhibited immoral performances. Behrman wrote to the proprietor

45 Daily Picayune, April 19, 1907,4; September 12, 1907, 1; September 13,
1907; July 1, 1908; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 144-115; Kendall, History
o f New Orleans, 2: 516.
46 Daily Picayune, November 2, 1907; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans,
205-206.
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that “many complaints have come to me about the character of the performances which
are put on in your play-house.” The Mayor threatened to close the theater “unless there
is some improvement.” “By ordinance,” the Daily Picayune reminded its readers, “the
managers of all public exhibitions must reserve for every performance a free seat for the
mayor and the chief of police (in the front row).” The paper concluded that it was “the
Mayor’s duty to judge the presence of immoral and corrupting exhibition.” Within a
week, Councilman Kelly introduced an ordinance to hold both “person and manager”
responsible for “immoral and indecent exhibitions.” Proprietor Greenwald protested
that he offered “clean shows” and had stopped one performance when its immoral
content came to his attention. The Council declined to act, in part because the ordinance
constrained public performance so severely that a ballet would have been outlawed due
to the performers’ tights. There was a danger, warned the Daily Picayune, of
“puritanizing the population.”47
The puritan spirit came to the city in human form the same month. On
December 29, 1907, Carrie Nation, “of Saloon Smashing Fame,” paid a visit to the
Crescent City, a somewhat unlikely location from which to argue prohibition. Mayor
Behrman asked her “not to use her hatchet here,” but the famous crusader against drink
had a ready response. “Would you be so audacious,” she asked, “as to refuse the Lord
the right to smash?” She would give the Mayor no assurance because “she was
absolutely in the hands of providence.” Saloons were not her only target. She spoke
47 Behrman to Henry Greenwald, Greenwald Theater, December 10,1907,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, December 13,1907, 4; December 18, 1907,
8; December 19, 1907, 6.
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against the use o f corsets, claiming that they weakened women’s organs and unborn
infants. “Mothers, warn you daughters . . . I always advise young men never to marry a
girl who ruins her health by wearing tight corsets.” She later spoke to a male-only
gathering, where she preached sexual purity and the avoidance o f disease.48
In what would prove far worse to New Orleans than bawdy exhibitions or drink,
the ongoing campaign for governor raised the issue of gambling, specifically, betting on
horse races. With two functioning race tracks and a thriving book-making business,
New Orleans backed Sanders in part because he seemed the more tolerant o f gambling
o f the two candidates. Wilkinson raised the question o f gambling early in the campaign,
and sought votes in the Protestant areas of the state by reminding voters o f the New
Orleans vices. Behrman declined to suppress the city’s gambling, and~perhaps to his
later regret-asserted that “it [was] a state matter.” The Mayor agreed to address the
complaints of citizens on moral issues, but held strong beliefs on the intractability of
human nature. His enforcement o f blue laws betrayed a reluctance to meddle in private
behavior, although he did not ignore the law when called upon for more vigorous
actions. The state elections o f 1908 highlighted his (and the city’s) easygoing attitudes,
and the issues o f the campaign led to state action that Behrman could not control.49
The legislature had separated the state elections from those in the city in an
attempt to cut down the influences that one had on the other. The city election would
not take place until fall, 1908. But as early as December, 1907, in the middle o f the

48 Daily Picayune, December 20, 1907,11; December 21, 1907, 12.
49 Daily Picayune, December 11, 1907,4.
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gubernatorial race, the Times-Democrat began an attack upon Behrman and “bossism.”
The Mayor had contempt for the newspaper’s position. The Times-Democrat had been
active in the fight to keep city and state elections separate. Now “it insisted that city
affairs and city candidates and politics should be discussed in the state campaign . . . in
order that the people should be prepared for the city campaign and not give ‘the bosses’
the opportunity they had in the city campaign o f 1904.” Page Baker, editor o f the
Times-Democrat vigorously attacked the city administration in a December 19,1907
editorial titled “The Need for City Reform.” Behrman immediately responded, and in a
series o f letters and editorials over the next several days, familiar lines o f battle
emerged.50
The Mayor acknowledged the basic position of the Times-Democrat and its
editor. Baker “has always been and will ever remain in opposition to ‘ward-bossism.’”
But the editorial called for “men who would lop off all superfluities, wipe out all
deadheadism . . . and suppress all graft.” Behrman demanded proof of the alleged
wrongs and, in his response to Baker, seemed frustrated that after three years in office he
had not been able to convince his opponents o f the efficacy o f his administration.
“Since I have assumed the office of chief executive,” the Mayor wrote, “I have given my
whole time and attention to administration on a clean, honest, and business like basis.”
He called upon Baker to provide “facts in substantiation of your charges.” Two days
later, Behrman continued his counter-attack. “I challenge the comparison of the present

50 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 210-211; Times-Democrat,
December 19, 1907; Daily Picayune, December 20, 1907, 6.
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with any reform administration you may see fit to single out.” When Baker published a
picture of city workers “loafing” at public expense, Behrman noted that one worker sat
next to his “dinner pail” and charged the picture had been taken during the meal break.SI
Behrman picked up an unlikely ally in this dispute. The Daily Picayune,
normally as anti-ring as the Times-Democrat, defended the Mayor at once. “It can be
confidently declared that the city has not had [a more honest] or more faithful and
public-spirited government since it was rescued from the hands of the carpetbaggers and
Republican self-seekers.” Shortly thereafter, the Daily Picayune added an editorial
analyzing the history o f municipal of reform.
The Picayune had engaged in not a few of these movements for reform, but it has
in every instance found that all o f the glitter. . . was too often disappointing in
the extreme. For instance,. . . [Mayor] Flower opened a harvest to the private
corporations that preyed upon the public franchises and property of this city.
The so-called reform administration proved to be one of the most costly and
disappointing to the people.
The Daily Picayune had revealed the key to Behrman’s success, and, perhaps, the
hypocrisy of the opposition. If “reform” administrations could be “costly and
disappointing,” it was but a small logical step to conclude that “boss” administrations
could be frugal, honest, and progressive.52
With a strong vote from New Orleans, Sanders prevailed in the Democratic
primary on January 28, 1908. O f his statewide majority of approximately 13,500, nearly

51 Behrman to Page Baker, editor, Times-Democrat, December 19, 1907,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Page Baker, December 21, 1907, Mayor’s
Correspondence.
52 Daily Picayune, December 20,1907, 6; December 22,1907, 8.
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10,000 came from the city. There was a general election scheduled for the Spring, but
Democrats felt sufficiently confident to begin planning the inauguration. Behrman felt
trium phant- Choctaw Club candidates won election, including former Mayor Paul

Capdevielle, who received a huge majority from New Orleans. Regular patronage was
safe, and a close friend o f the Mayor would be governor. Construction began on the
long-awaited City Hall annex, a visible sign of the new functions and scope o f the
public sector. The often reactionary Cotton Exchange promised new cooperation.
William Mason Smith, who had clashed with the Mayor or numerous occasions, was
succeeded by William B. Thompson. The Mayor promptly answered Thompson’s
request about the construction of approaches to the docks and wrote “I assure you . . .
that it is my purpose to do everything in my power to facilitate the business o f the Port.”
Even the constant criticism of the Times-Democrat faded for a time as Behrman initiated
his own investigations into city finances and administration. Behrman and the Regulars
clearly held the upper hand.53
No one anticipated the surprise that Sanders revealed in his inauguration day
speech, May 18, 1908. For reasons that escaped the Mayor, Sanders announced state
initiatives to increase the regulation of bar rooms and to suppress gambling at race
tracks. The Regulars firmly controlled the city delegation to the state legislature. The
Speaker of the House, H. Garland Dupre, for example, was also assistant City Attorney.

S3 Behrman to City Council, January 21, 1908, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Behrman to W. B. Thompson, President, Cotton Exchange, January 24, 1908, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Daily Picayune, February 2, 1908,4; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New
Orleans, 214.
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But the governor’s recommendations had sufficient support in the rest o f the state to
overcome the efforts of Behrman’s colleagues. In one bizarre incident, the Daily
Picayune printed a story accusing pro-gambling forces o f trying to poison an anti
gambling senator. The senator recovered and explained that his illness resulted from an
excess o f “ipecac, taken to relieve indigestion.” The bill passed by one vote and the
governor signed the anti-gambling legislation on June 24,1908. The new laws--GayShattuck to control the bar rooms and the Locke Law against race track gamblingcaused the Mayor problems with enforcement and opened potential issues that might
threaten his re-election. In spite of the governor’s position, he and Behrman remained
close. The Mayor used his relationship with the governor to distribute patronage. Even
during the gambling controversy, the Mayor wrote to ask that a local doctor be retained
with the State Board o f Health. “He is a good regular, a Behrman man as well as a
Sanders man. In addition to that, he is thoroughly competent.”54
The legislative session brought disappointment to the Regulars, but events in
New Orleans held great promise. Behrman’s solid record in municipal ownership,
construction of utilities, paving, and finance established a basis for a second consecutive
term, something no mayor had accomplished since Reconstruction. His election as
mayor had broken the cycle o f alternating reform and regular administrations. The
Mayor’s interest and participation in the independent boards and commissions that
governed the new development solidified the city’s commitment to progressive reforms,
54 Daily Picayune, May 19,1908, 1; June 23,1908, 1; June 24, 1908,1; June 25,
1908, 1; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 220-228; Behrman to Governor Jared
Sanders, June 1, 1908, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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although his overt use o f patronage put him outside of the typical reformer. Behrman
forged a strong relationship with the New Orleans business community by the end of his
term, in spite of his credentials as a loyal Regular. Only those committed to
comprehensive regulation o f moral behavior had reason to object to the Mayor’s record.
The Mayor had agreed to police theater performances and cooperated with efforts to
suppress child labor. But he showed no enthusiasm for suppression of gambling or
liquor. Although the New Orleans reform element represented a latent political threat,
Behrman entered the municipal political season in the summer of 1908 confident of his
achievements and eager to serve again.
The years 1900 to 1908 also represented a success for the New Orleans effort to
confront the new century. Behrman’s first term came to a close as three great public
works project neared completion. The Sewerage and Water Board, first organized as the
Regulars recaptured the Mayor’s office, promised a clean water supply, modem
sewerage, and an improvement in the city’s drainage system. By 1908, those promises
had largely been kept. Although work on drainage needed completion, the essential
challenges had been met. Similarly, the city’s wharves, taken into public ownership and
operation by 1896 legislation, entered an important era o f expansion and development.
Finally, the Public Belt Railroad, reorganized under Capdevielle in 1904, began full
operations toward the end of the decade. These three initiatives illustrates the
overwhelming public support each enjoyed from all points along the political spectrum.
And the fact of their development during eight years of “boss” and “machine” rule
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makes clear that political and social pedigrees were not essential to the effective public
development and administration o f progressive civic development.
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CHAPTER VI
THE NEW ORLEANS SEWERAGE AND WATER BOARD:
PUBLIC WORKS AND PUBLIC HEALTH

From its earliest days, New Orleans faced the reality o f its improbable location.
The first settlers located the city among numerous bodies o f water, wetlands, and
swamps. To the north was Lake Pontchartrain, actually a large shallow bay connected
to the G ulf o f Mexico by salt-water passes and other bays. The Mississippi River
bisected the city into two unequal parts. The bulk o f the city lay on the “East Bank;” the
“W est Bank” consisted o f Algiers, which was part o f the incorporated city, and the
suburban parishes. The location brought commerce and status as a world port, but also
problems o f access, weather and health.
Topography exacerbated the unfavorable location. The city existed in a natural,
saucer-shaped depression that placed substantial parts of the municipality below sea
level. The natural levees of the Mississippi river, interior ridges along placid bayous
(once parts o f the river itself), and the surrounding swamps constrained the growth o f
N ew Orleans. Early settlers found relatively dry land only along the river, and the
expansion o f the city followed the natural levees in both directions. Residents dug
crude drainage canals along the property lines, perpendicular to the river, in attempts to
dry their land, but the resulting transfer of water to the rear of the city made conditions
179
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there even worse. The crescent of the river created a circumferential and radial system
o f streets instead of a grid system, and the radial streets converged in a section known
simply as the “backswamp.”1
The pre-Civil War growth of New Orleans followed the dictates o f topography.
The influx of Anglos into a previously French and Spanish colonial landscape, created a
tripartite city—an upriver American sector, the French Quarter at the city’s center, and a
downriver melange o f working class immigrants. Toward the backswamp lived free
blacks and those without the means to live elsewhere. Residents in the backswamp built
homes on makeshift pilings, dug drainage canals around properties, and placed boards
across ditches for safe passage. In the more desirable sections, the wealthy built large
homes on spacious lots, but constraints on available land increased population density,
especially in the poorer areas. The quality o f the land available added to the list of
difficulties. Even in relatively well-drained parts o f the city, buildings of any type
rested upon a soil that had a high content o f organic matter and a water table that could
1George G. Earl, Sewerage, Water and Drainage System o f New Orleans,
University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection, Vertical File,
n.d.; Peirce Lewis, New Orleans: The Making o f an Urban Landscape, 17-30, 42;
Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 565; The Sewerage and Water Board o f New
Orleans: How It Began, the Problems It Faces, The Way It Works, The Job It Does,
University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans,
1959), 5. Lewis’s work provides an excellent description o f the city from the point o f
view of a geographer: “the cross-section rather resembles a shallow clay saucer filled
with layer upon layer of warm jello.” See also Albert E. Cowdry, “Land’s End,”
excerpts from Albert Cowdry, Land’s End (U.S. Army Corps of engineers, 1977)
reprinted in Thomas A. Becnel, editor, Agriculture and Economic Development in
Louisiana) Volume 16 in Glenn R. Conrad, General Editor, The Louisiana Purchase
Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History (Lafayette: Center for Louisiana Studies,
1997), 22-26.
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be reached by anyone with a shovel and energy sufficient to dig several feet.
Construction required pilings for stability, but subsequent settling and soil subsidence
left buildings with eccentric tilts and angles. Perversely, progress in drainage meant a
lowering of the water table, a consequent drying o f the organic material, shrinkage in
the soil as water evaporated, and a resulting drop in the city’s elevation.2
Any water which entered the city~by rainfall, river levee crevasse, or,
occasionally, flood—could be removed only if it could flow to an even lower section of
the city or if it evaporated over time. At the end o f the nineteenth century, New Orleans
challenged the laws of hydrology by introducing mechanical means of removing the
water and keeping the city dry. And as the city removed more and more water from
within its boundaries, the extent of inhabitable land grew, property values increased, and
the not inconsiderable threat of frequent floods declined. Two other benefits grew out
of the ambitious plan to drain the city: disposal o f sewerage and distribution o f pure
water. The vaults o f privies in New Orleans were shallow and subject to overflowing.
Sewerage and other liquid municipal waste obeyed the same laws o f physics as the less
noxious rain water. As the city contemplated pumping rain water out o f its boundaries,
2 New Orleans: A History o f Three Great Public Utilities—Sewerage, Water and
Drainage—and Their Influence upon the Health and Progress o f a Big City, a paper read
by Hon. Martin Behrman, Mayor of New Orleans, before convention of League of
American Municipalities, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, September 29, 1914, University o f
New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 1914), 1. In
John McPhee, The Control o f Nature (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1989), 61, the
author describes the relative positions of the river and the Louisiana Superdome by
imagining ships on the river with the ability to turn inland and maintain elevation above
sea level. By the time they reached the football stadium’s playing field, “they would
hover above the playing field like blimps.”
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a system of collecting and removing sewerage seemed logical as well. And if drainage
were sufficient to stabilize the city’s soils, a water distribution system could be installed.
The annual rainfall in New Orleans was among the highest of all cities on the continent.
Citizens collected a portion in cisterns for drinking water, unaware o f the health hazards
o f uncovered cisterns.
The interconnectedness of the three systems—drainage, sewerage and w aterposed management, engineering, and political challenges. The sewerage system could
not work effectively in the absence o f a water supply to flush the pipes and allow pumps
to lift the outflow. A household water supply, if sufficiently purified, could provide
drinking water as well as supply the medium to carry sewerage. And the large complex
o f pipes necessary to both systems could only be constructed in a stable, drained
environment. All three would require development according to a carefully phased
plan. Construction would start in the built up areas o f the city and be expanded as the
city grew. The completion of all three systems demanded a consistent source of
funding, a high degree o f professional competence, and patience on the part o f the
electorate. Further, the success of projects required a long term public commitment
sustained by the voters and by the political, civic, and commercial establishments. That
commitment rested on a widespread certainty among the city’s leadership that drainage,
water, and sewer systems would not only improve sanitation and health, but also
stimulate prosperity and commercial development. For large numbers o f New
Orleanians, progressive government was synonymous with these ostensibly mundane
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public works and public services. The consensus in favor of progressive civic
development was first apparent in the support for a new sewerage, water, and drainage
system.
The municipal development of the utility systems formally began under the state
legislature elected in 1896, but local attempts at acquiring the systems started some
years before. Efforts to establish drainage districts supported by taxes failed in the late
1880s, though a city flood in 1890 provoked new interest in governmental action. In
that year, the legislature created the Orleans Levee Board which, although it did not
directly address drainage, repaired interior levees and improved protection of the city
from the overflows of canals. Several years later, the Fitzpatrick administration, which
“showed an enlightened interest. . . in drainage,” contracted for a topographical survey
o f New Orleans, the first step toward a comprehensive plan. (According to a WPAcompiled biography o f Fitzpatrick, his interest earned him the nickname “Father o f the
Sewerage and Water System.”) Although consulting engineers formulated a plan
complete with specifications, Fitzpatrick declined to adopt it, citing financial
difficulties. N ot until 1896 did the legislature create a drainage board for the city year
and provide modest financing. In later years, the reform and Regular factions fought to
claim credit for the new system, but Fitzpatrick’s actions gave the Regulars grounds to
assert paternity.3
3 Report on the Drainage o f the City o f New Orleans by the Advisory Board
(Appointed by Ordinance No. 8327, Adopted by the City Council, November 24, 1893)
(New Orleans, 1894), 51-52 quoted in Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 95-103;
Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f Three Great Public Utilities, 3; Mayor’s Office,
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Drainage was not the only public works challenge for which the city looked to
the state for assistance. The city granted franchises to two private companies in
attempts to acquire a modem sewer system, but both companies underestimated the
engineering challenge inherent to the New Orleans topography. Similarly, the city
depended upon a private water company for a distribution system under a franchise
granted in 1878. Widespread dissatisfaction with service o f the Water Works Company
led to a movement favoring municipal ownership. The city sued the private company,
and the courts declared the franchise void due to nonperformance. The Municipal
Improvement Association, formed in 1897, began an extensive campaign o f public
education and political lobbying to establish a property tax and a special board for
sewerage and water system development. Abraham Brittin, a prominent councilman,
echoed the association’s suggestion and called for a special election. On June 6,1899,
city residents agreed by a margin of 6,272 to 394 to adopt a fifty-year tax o f two mills.
The new Board also received one-half of the surplus generated by a 10-mill city debt tax
passed in 1890 and administered by the Board of Liquidation o f City Debt. Act 6 o f the
legislature’s extra session o f 1899 and a constitutional amendment affirmed the
establishment o f the independent board, which began operation in late 1899.4

Administrations o f the Mayors o f New Orleans, 201-203; Conrad, A Dictionary o f
Louisiana Biography, 303; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 507, 574-575.
Members of the 1896 commission included Robert Walmsley, Abraham Brittin, Paxil
Capdevielle, Mayor Flower and others.
4 Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f Three Great Public Utilities, 3; First
Semi-Annual Report o f the Sewerage and Water Board o f the City o f New Orleans, New
Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division, cited hereinafter as [Number] Semi-Annual
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The timing of the election allowed Mayor Flower to appoint the initial members
o f the Sewerage and Water Board, even though he would leave office within a few
months. Members immediately faced the enormity of their duties, including the
possible acquisition of the private company, the establishment o f plans for the water and
sewerage systems, and the negotiation of a revenue-sharing agreement with the
Drainage Commission. In order to obtain the funds necessary for large capital projects,
the Board sought authorization for a bond issue from the voters in April, 1900, which
passed easily. By the end o f the first six months of operations, the Board directed its
Superintendent, George Earl, to draw up preliminary plans for the water and sewerage
systems. Earl warned the members that the large land area of the city relative to
population reduced the efficiency o f the sewer system, and he suggested limiting its
initial coverage to approximately 500 out of the city’s 700 miles o f streets. He also
reviewed comparative consumption figures with the Board and demonstrated the need
for a metering system and a program to reduce waste.s

Report', Program o f the Inauguration o f Active Construction o f the Sewerage System o f
the City o f New Orleans, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New
Orleans, 1903), listed members o f the city council and citizens’ committees which
worked on the special election. Section 32 of Act #6 , required periodic reports from the
Sewerage and Water Board to the city council. See also By-Laws: Sewerage and Water
Board o f New Orleans, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans,
1904), for a capsule history o f the special district, especially 14-21; The Waterworks,
Sewerage and Drainage System o f New Orleans, University of New Orleans, Earl K.
Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 1940), [no pagination]; Kendall,
History o f New Orleans, 2: 525-528, 578-579; Daily Picayune, June 7, 1899, 1; and
Nussbaum, “Progressive Politics in New Orleans,” 135-145.
5First Semi-Annual Report, 1, 3, 4, 12-13, 16-17; Report o f General
Superintendent George G. Earl to Sewerage and Water Board, at Regular Meeting,
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In July, 1900, the Board considered a proposal to contract for water from a
private company that promised to construct a pipeline to bring water into the city. The
company did not reveal the source of this water, but contrasted its quality with river
water and assured the Board that “no filtering [would be] necessary.” The proposal
received a respectful hearing in part because the company’s attorney was the ubiquitous
State Democratic Chair, E. B. Kruttschnitt, a Regular stalwart and Choctaw Club
member. The Sewerage and Water Board Superintendent disputed the cost estimates o f
the proposal and promised the Board that pure river water was possible. In need of
expert assistance, the Board retained prominent engineers George Fuller and Rudolph
Hering o f New York, though “both gentlemen were [temporarily] in Europe,” to form a
committee of consulting engineers and local experts. The committee’s first assignm ent
required a recommendation on the issue of filtration o f river water. The engineering
committee firmly recommended the use o f river water for the city. By using a multi
stage process of settling and treatment, pure water could be delivered, although the
Board o f Advisory Engineers admitted that the intake from the Mississippi River would
be “more difficult to purify than the water supplying any other large city in the world.”
The Board agreed with engineers’ recommendation, but took the precaution of
establishing an experimental purification station to test the process. It authorized a site

April 19, 1900, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1900),
3, 11; By Laws: Sewerage and Water Board, 17, 37; De-watering and Re-watering the
City o f New Orleans, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana
Collection (New Orleans, 1950?), [no pagination],
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in Audubon Park, adjacent to the Mississippi River, and rapidly accepted bids for its
construction.6
The Board also considered a proposal to purchase the existing private water
works, but the initial offer of the company at $110 per share far exceeded a fair price as
determined by Board consultants, in part because the city’s legal attack on the company
franchise had lowered the market value of the stock. Having successfully established
the principle of public ownership of the water utility, the Board decided to let the private
company assets remain on the market and to proceed with plans for construction o f a
new system. In order to finance the new system, the Board quickly moved to sell the
bonds secured by the proceeds o f the property tax. Advertisements for the bond issue
set the sale date for December 15, 1900.7

6 Earl, Sewerage, Water and Drainage System o f New Orleans', First SemiAnnual Report, 28.; Reports o f General Superintendent on Possible Supply o f Water
North o f Lake Pontchartrain with Estimated Cost o f Making Necessary Investigation
and Status o f Water Purification Elsewhere and approximate Cost and Method o f
Conducting Investigation Proposed and Final Report o f Executive Committee on
Preliminary Report o f Board o f Advisory Engineers and Recommendations on Above
Reports, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1900), 1-4;
By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f New Orleans, 17; Daily Picayune, July 25,
1900, 10; Report o f Board ofAdvisory Engineers o f Preliminary Meeting and Report o f
General Superintendent to the Sewerage and Water Board, New Orleans Public
Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1900), 7; Kendall, History o f New Orleans,
2: 581.
7Report o f Counsel on the Morrill Proposal to Purchase the New Orleans Water
Works Company, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1900),
1,7; Daily Picayune, August 17, 1900, 3; August 25,1900, 4; August 30, 1900, 3;
September 13, 1900, 4; First Semi-Annual Report, 5, 16-17; Second Semi-Annual
R eport; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 582; De-watering and Re-watering the
City o f New Orleans', Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f Three Great Public Utilities,
8-9. The Daily Picayune suggested that since settling would produce large residues of
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Excitement over the public improvements permeated public discussion. Real
estate agents and developers, identified in the Daily Picayune as the “class o f people in
the city [most interested in] progressive movements,” looked forward to an increase in
property values. Harry Hodgson, President of the New Orleans Real Estate Exchange,
declared “paving, draining and sewerage . . . has already increased the value o f property
from ten to fifteen percent,” and that he had already received communications from New
York informing him that “ now that drainage, paving and sewerage is an assured fact in
New Orleans we wish to open a correspondence with you with a view of placing loans
in your city.” Hoping to capitalize on the new interest, a local plumber placed an ad
reminding residents that “Progressive New Orleans Demand Progressive Plumbing.”
And the Progressive Union hosted a sanitary expert from Chattanooga who lectured on
the topic “Health is Wealth—Sanitation as a Civic Factor.” All hoped that the new
works would help to eliminate the “unsanitary reputation” that burdened the city.
Martin Behrman later recalled that commercial expansion o f the city began with the
passage o f the tax because “the outside world” had previously tended “to avoid New
Orleans as an undesirable place, either for residence or investment.”8
From the beginning, residents treated the project as more than just an
engineering project or another instance o f public construction. The rhetoric o f the

mud, the city should utilize rail cars to dump the mud in the rear o f the city, thereby
filling in swamp lands.
8 Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f Three Great Public Utilities, 4; Earl,
Sewerage, Water and Drainage System o f New Orleans,; Daily Picayune, September 1,
1899, Section II, 6, Section III, 2, 7; September 8, 1899, 6.
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Municipal Improvement Association emphasized the connection between the sanitation
project and commercial success. The Louisville Courier-Journal predicted that “New
Orleans . . . must inevitably become one o f the great cities o f the world” given a clean
bill of health. The Daily Picayune echoed that judgment, claiming that “the greatest
need to the progress of [the] city is . . . public sanitation.” At Thanksgiving, A. F.
Theard gave thanks “that the citizens have ratified the sewerage and drainage tax . . .
[that] will help New Orleans to regain its rank as one o f the healthiest and greatest
commercial cities o f the world.” The holiday message o f Superintendent of the
Sewerage and Water Board, George Earl, praised the work o f the citizens on the Board
and found virtue even in the numerous unpaved streets o f New Orleans “where it is
easier to build sewerage lines.” The consensus for new utility systems transcended city
politics. Regardless of electoral squabbles to come, the Board and its works remained
sacrosanct, immune from challenge by any of the city’s political factions or
organizations.9
Sales o f the Sewerage and Water Board bonds offered another occasion for
linking the project to the city’s prosperity. All municipal bond sales went through the
city’s Board o f Liquidation. Although members expressed disappointment that banks
demanded four percent interest on the issue, thereby lowering the amount available for
construction, the Board of Liquidation approved the sale. Member Isidore Newman,
President of the New Orleans Stock Exchange, urged acceptance o f the bid and a rapid
9 Earl, Sewerage, Water and Drainage System o f New Orleans', Daily Picayune,
September 4, 1900, 4; November 29, 1900, 3; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 538.
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start to construction. “It is my opinion [that] the sooner the work is completed,” he
said, “ the [sooner] city will enter on a new era o f prosperity such as we have never
known before.” On December 2, 1900, a Daily Picayune editorial predicted future New
Orleans railroad expansion, population growth, and great manufacturing operations
attributable to the sanitary improvements. Anxious to promote the sale o f the bonds, the
newspaper continued the theme, suggesting that “the future welfare and prosperity o f the
city are dependent upon the success of the improvements.” Mindful o f conflict of
interest difficulties, four Board o f Liquidation members, including President Robert
Walmsley, recused themselves due to connections with the banks purchasing the
bonds.10
Mayor Capdevielle met with the foil Board on December 16, shortly after a
group of banks bid on the bond issue. After interest charges and fees, the Board
anticipated $12,000,000 for construction. With the funds imminent, the Mayor wanted
to know how soon construction would start. The staff explained that engineering work
was slow; specifications would take at least sixty days to complete. In addition,
continuing litigation with the Water Works Company might add to the delay. Board
member Charles Janvier asked whether the city would allow excavations during the
summer months, the period o f greatest risk for disease, especially yellow fever. But the
Mayor assured all that the city was “perfectly healthy now.” Enthusiasm continued into
the new year. At the annual meeting of the Municipal Improvement Association,
10 Second Semi-Annual Report, 3-6; Daily Picayune, December 2, 1900, 4,
December 16,1900,4; December 18, 1900,1.
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officers reminded the membership of the group’s pioneering work on behalf of public
ownership of the sewerage and water systems and offered their congratulations to the
city on the occasion of the bond sale. Later, Councilman Zacherie addressed a church
group and repeated the connection between the project and prosperity: “We cannot live
in an unhealthy place and if this city is to grow in population it must be thoroughly
sanitized, which is to us more than half the battle for commercial success and
supremacy.” The councilman predicted a city that would grow “from the present city
clear back to the lake.”11
In March, 1901, the Sewerage and Water Board staff announced a plan to divide
the proceeds o f the bond sale. The Drainage Commission, granted a portion of the
funds by the state legislature, would receive $3,900,000 The water works would get
$1,600,000 and the sewerage project the remainder. Progress on water purification
encouraged the members. Superintendent Earl announced the experimental station at
Audubon Park produced pure water at less than $.03 per gallon; within a month that
figure fell to $.025. But the Drainage Commission faced severe criticism from residents
upset at a flood produced by torrential spring rains. The press reported that “Canal
Street was a lake, Common and Tulane a river, and the rest o f the central portion o f the
city from Camp and St. Charles back, an ocean. As to the outskirts o f the city and the

11 Daily Picayune, December 16,1900, 12; December 18, 1900, 1; January 9,
1901, 1; March 5, 1901, 3; Second Semi-Annual Report, 3-6. The councilman’s
predictions of lakeward expansion came to pass within a few years. See below
regarding the help provided by the Board to the New Orleans Land Company to drain
the wetlands toward the lake.
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suburbs, the water was from two to five feet deep.” The Commission blamed a
negligent contractor and faulted itself only for “being too patient in dealing with
contractors.” Not long after, however, the Commission announced a reorganization of
the drainage operation to improve service. The Commission planned to sue one o f the
contractors for negligence, but relented when the attorney for the contractor threatened
“to expose” the Drainage Commission. The attorney was Edgar Farrar, law partner to E.
B. Kruttschnitt, Chairman o f the Democratic State Central Committee. Farrar had been
active in drafting the original state legislation enabling the Sewerage and Water Board.12
Concern over the effectiveness o f the Drainage Com m ission became a theme in
subsequent press coverage. In a new round o f bids, the commission awarded a large
contract to the very company it had earlier blamed for the city flooding. In addition to
its disputes with contractors, the Drainage Commission competed with the sewerage and
water functions for tax revenues. Linus Brown, a local engineer, criticized the level of
spending on drainage as inefficient. The Chair of the City Board o f Health defended the
level o f drainage expenditure, but criticized both utility boards for being composed of
financiers and engineers, not sanitarians or hygienists, confirming once again the
identification o f the project with city health.13

12 Third Semi-Annual Report, 4; By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f New
Orleans, 17; Daily Picayune, March 14, 1901, 3; April 19, 1901, 5; April 20, 1901, 6;
April 24, 1901,4; May 16, 1901; May 19, 1901,4.
13 Daily Picayune, July 25, 1901, 3; July 31, 1901, 3; August 6, 1901, 3.
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In August, 1901 Superintendent Earl returned from a trip to the Northeast during
which he visited a number o f cities and investigated water purification and sewerage
treatment plants. Earlier he had advocated disposal o f sewerage waste in the Mississippi
River. After his visits, he reported to the Board:
Because a discharge into the Mississippi River is the cheapest method, because
every city above us has given us the example, because we can do it without harm
to ourselves (as there are no cities below us to take exception to our course),
because of the almost infinite and immediate dilution and disposal which such a
discharge, properly placed, offers, I can see no grounds to look elsewhere.
Earl’s visit confirmed his recommendations. He noted the complicated sewerage
treatment procedures necessary in most cities and remarked that “the cost. . . o f such a
system is very great and after seeing it I could but feel thankful that New Orleans has a
turbid river with a continuous and large discharge of water into which the sewerage will
be discharged with perfect impunity.” The Board agreed. New Orleans saved money
on sewerage treatment at the cost of its downriver neighbors, but those lands were
scarcely populated.14
The Louisiana Supreme Court handed the city an important victory on
November 6, 1901, when it declared the franchise of the private water company void.
The Board immediately moved to begin construction o f the public system. A search

14 The Waterworks, Sewerage and Drainage System o f New Orleans', First SemiAnnual Report, 20-21; By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f New Orleans, 17; Daily
Picayune, August 24, 1901, 3; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 580. Forgetful of
Earl’s cavalier attitude, public comment later criticized the city o f Chicago for altering
the flow of the Chicago River in a manner that ultimately dumped that city’s sewerage
into the Mississippi. In 1940, the Sewerage and Water Board continued to insist that the
discharge “was lost in the immensity of flow” in the Mississippi.”
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began for a suitable site for the water purification system, and the Board authorized its
attorneys to use expropriation in any case in which an agreement for compensation
could not be reached. The engineering staff quickly located sites, but later complained
that the owners wanted “high prices.” The Board also moved to take advantage of its
favorable legal position by entering into negotiations with the private water and sewer
companies to acquire their assets at what the Board hoped would be advantageous
terms. The water company, having lost its franchise as a result of the court decision,
still possessed a substantial distribution system. And an investigation of existing sewer
lines concluded that the pipes “were in not bad shape” and suggested an acquisition
price o f between $170,000 and $229,000.15
During early 1902, the Sewerage and Water Board faced increasing criticism
regarding the slow pace o f progress. Bonds had been sold more than a year ago, yet no
work had begun. The Board’s President Pro Tern, Charles Janvier, responded by
detailing the difficulties faced in “one o f the largest public works o f this character ever
undertaken in the U.S.” He defended the Board by pointing out the problems of
protracted litigation, the limited funds, and the requirements o f complicated
engineering. But the contradictions inherent in the separate governance o f drainage
from sewerage and water also began to emerge. As early as January 10, 1902, the
Drainage Board suggested a plan by which it would voluntarily dissolve and ask the
legislature to merge its functions with the Sewerage and Water Board. Public opinion
15 Fourth Semi-Annual Report, 3; Daily Picayune, September 27, 1901, 7;
November 7,1901, 3; January 7,1902, 3 .
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turned against the Drainage Commission as the result of flooding, but also because of
events that suggested financial incompetence and weak planning. The commission’s
chief engineer resigned under fire, and talks o f merging the two boards grew more
frequent.16
The regular state legislative session o f 1902 considered a bill to merge the
systems under the Sewerage and Water Board. Local bankers expressed concern that
the merger would invite yet more litigation, and the city’s commercial exchanges
opposed the merger as well, but the legislature approved the bill. After a governor’s
veto “for technical deficiencies,” the legislature proposed a new version, somewhat
quieting the opponents. The logic o f a merged board proved decisive. The governor
signed the new bill, and members o f both boards met as one on August 22, 1902.
Though litigation followed and a court decision eventually reduced its membership, the
new Board assumed the expanded duties with little difficulty.17

16 Fifth Semi-Annual Report, 6-10; Daily Picayune, January 10, 1902, 7; January
26,1902, 4; February 4,1902, 3,4; February 14, 1902,4; February 21, 1902, 3, 4. The
engineer allowed the substitution of one grade o f cement for a cheaper variety resulting
in excess profits to a contractor. The Board initially won a suit against the company, but
the courts later decided that no harm had come to the city as a result of the substitution.
See Daily Picayune, May 22, 1904, 4.
17The merger took place subsequent to Act 111, July 8, 1902. Sixth Semi-Annual
Report, By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f New Orleans, 17-18, 26-28; Daily
Picayune, May 27, 1902,11; June 8,1902, 3,4; June 13, 1902, 6, 7; June 26, 1902, 1;
August 15,1902, 3; August 22, 1902, 3, 9; Mayor Capdevielle to Sewerage and Water
Board, August 13, 1902, Mayor’s Correspondence; “Drainage in New Orleans” (n.d.),
unpublished summary of drainage legislation, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long
Library, Louisiana Collection, Vertical File; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 538.
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During the time the legislature debated merger, the Sewerage and Water board
showed signs of progress in initiating construction. Its staff prepared detailed
specifications for construction bids and announced that work on a series of sewer pipe
contracts would begin “before the year is out.” By mid-year, the Board’s semi-annual
publication detailed the work o f the previous two and one-half years and looked forward
to construction. But the bids received exceeded estimates by a wide margin.
Acceptance would result in a reduction in capital projects and lead to an incomplete
system or the necessity for additional taxes. In spite of public pressure to begin
construction work at all costs, the Board delayed the awards, reorganized the potential
contracts into smaller segments, and requested that the construction companies resubmit
bids. The Board also announced its intention to start construction with its own crews if
necessary. By year’s end the Board advertised the newly reorganized contracts and
anticipated substantial savings.18
New Year’s greetings published in the Daily Picayune prominently mentioned
the public works projects. Tom Richardson, Secretary-Manager o f the Progressive
Union, hoped “that all difficulties concerning municipal improvements of every
character will be removed and that a complete sewer and drainage system may be a
reality.” J. Watts Kearney, the city’s postmaster, wished “that the Sewerage and Water

18 For a sample contract, see Specifications for Pumping, Steam and Electrical
Equipment: Contract “D ”, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New
Orleans, 1902); Daily Picayune, May 27, 1902, 11; August 22, 1902, 9; August 26,
1902, 3; August 27,1902; October 24, 1902, 6; November 14, 1902, 11; Fifth SemiAnnual Report', Sixth Semi-Annual Report.
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Board be enabled to start their great works.” Kearney was more realistic. The Board
started construction in 1903, but it would be a number o f years before a system began
operations. Board members faced revenue allocation decisions now that drainage
responsibilities had become part of its budget, but an increase in assessed valuation o f
properly' generated income in excess of bond issue requirements, and the resulting
surplus could be appropriated.19
The Daily Picayune reported on February 3, 1903 that the Board opened the new
bids. It would take several weeks to compile the responses, but the new bids “[did] not
seem lower that the rejected bids.” The newspaper’s information was incorrect. In a
vindication of the decision to delay the project, six o f the eight bids corresponded
closely to the estimates of the Board’s engineers. The savings from the new bid process
totaled between $200,000 and $500,000. Recommended contractors provided the
necessary bonds, the city council concurred in the award o f the contracts, and work
finally began. In the midst of the bid process, a court decision on the merger upheld the
joining of the two boards, but altered the composition o f the membership, which
consisted of the mayor, seven district representatives, three city council committee
chairmen, and the President and one other member o f the city’s powerful Board of
Liquidation.20

19Seventh Semi-Annual Report', Daily Picayune, January 1, 1903, 5; January 22,
1903, 4; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 538.
20 Seventh Semi-Annual Report'. By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f New
Orleans, 18-19; Daily Picayune, February 3,1903,4; February 13, 1903, 8; February
18, 1903, 8 ; March 13, 1903,4; March 20,1903; March 27,1903.
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Sewer system construction began on June 25, 1903 with a special event at Canal
and Robertson Street. Principals wielded ceremonial shovels, and the assembly listened
to speeches by the Mayor, attorney Bernard McCloskey, and E. B. Kruttschnitt. The
Mayor called the project “unquestionably the greatest public improvement the city had
ever undertaken.” Other speakers estimated the cost of the sewer project at $5,000,000;
the initial seven contracts totaled approximately $1,500,000. Some observers later
complained that the ceremony did not give “sufficient credit to former Mayor Flower,
Abraham Brittin, Edgar Farrar nor to the Women’s League,” all early proponents of the
project and the property tax to provide revenue. However, the program for the event
clearly listed the early supporters and thanked “numerous citizens . . . [who assisted in]
this great stride in the advance o f the city to the front rank among cities o f the world.”
Special mention was made o f Miss Kate Gordon, President o f the Woman’s League
“who took an active part in the voting” that established the projects.21
Difficult engineering problems faced the contractors who started the
construction. The city’s almost featureless topography provided very slight gravity
assistance to a sewer system, and what declination existed brought the sewerage toward
the lake—exactly the opposite o f what the engineering plans intended. To compensate,
contractors dug deeper and deeper trenches in which to place pipe. At intervals, electric
lift stations pumped the liquid waste to a higher elevation, and the process began again.
21 Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f Three Great Utilities, 7; Program o f the
Inauguration ofActive Construction o f the Sewerage System o f the City o f New Orleans,
Sewerage and Water Board Plan-, By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f New
Orleans, 20; Daily Picayune, June 26,1903, 1; June 30, 1903, 6.
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Increasing sizes o f pipe connected homes to secondary lines and, in turn, to primary
lines twenty-four inches in diameter. Ultimately, the sewerage o f the entire city was
pumped over the levee well down river of the central business district and, more
importantly, well down river from the anticipated intake for the city’s water purification
plant.22
Superintendent George Earl provided a review of Sewerage and Water Board
activities in the annual business issue of the Daily Picayune, September 1, 1903. Earl
admitted the tardy start to the sewerage system but blamed court cases. He noted that
the Board had started over $1,700,000 in sewer projects. Also underway were drainage
projects began under the previous commission. Construction had not yet started on the
water works, but the Board had acquired property and completed specifications for a
purification plant with a capacity o f 40,000,000 gallons per day. Earl went on the
explain that the expense of the systems resulted from the large area o f the city in relation
to population, the level character of the area, and the great amount o f local rainfall.23
In 1904, the Board remained active through two political contests: state
elections early in the year and municipal elections in the fall. Neither contest obstructed
the progress o f the Board, nor did any of the various political platforms suggest a
change in direction of the utility. The Board staff advertised additional requests for bids

22 Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f Three Great Utilities, 6; Semi-Annual
Report, Numbers 1-6; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 579-580.
23 Daily Picayune, September 1, 1903, Section IV, 4. See also Earl’s subsequent
analysis o f the engineering difficulties in Earl, Sewerage, Water and Drainage System o f
New Orleans.
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on sixty-six miles of sewer line, cast iron pipe, and, for the first time, two miles of water
mains. Having learned from the first experience with letting bids, the Board divided the
sewer work into six contracts in anticipation of promoting competition and lower costs.
When bids arrived, there were thirty-six proposals. The work attracted to the city
contractors “skilled in sewerage construction,” and several firms based outside of New
Orleans received contracts. The use o f outside contractors raised questions in the
community regarding the source of their labor, and the Board noted the obligation of the
construction crews to give preference to “home labor.” The next year, the new Mayor,
Martin Behrman, would again question contractors, noting rumors that “Negro workers
from Memphis were being imported to the detriment o f local labor.” 24
As construction progressed, estimates of completion dates began to circulate.
For the first time, Superintendent Earl provided assurance that, in spite of earlier
setbacks, the systems would be completed by the end of 1908--more than four years
away. In addition to the complexities o f construction and litigation, the Board faced a
the problem of constantly adjusting its plans to an expanding city. As the public
systems improved, the city grew, requiring extension o f the system into areas
increasingly distant from the center of the city. The Metairie ridge, a slight rise in
elevation o f only a few feet, marked the rear, or northern, boundary of New Orleans
development. To the north o f that ridge lay undeveloped, undrained lands for several
miles toward Lake Pontchartrain. Acting on a request from the New Orleans Land
24 Daily Picayune, December 11,1903,4; January 21,1904,13; February 3,
1904,4; October 6, 1905, 8.
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Company, the Board agreed to assist the company in draining the northern area, called
“Lakeview.” Several years later, under the pressure of declining budgets, the Board
required extensions of the water and sewerage systems to be partly financed by the land
companies requesting the new facilities.25
On April 1, 1904 the Board celebrated a milestone: the completion o f the first
contract let by the Board for sewer work, in this case the laying o f sewer pipe along the
river front near Audubon Park. The demonstration o f progress did not quell
complaints, however, and Earl had to defend the Board once again. He reiterated the
1908 goal for completion of the systems and denied that the Board delayed projects to
accumulate funds otherwise available to construction. Three more contracts reached
completion by mid-May, 1904, and the Board provided statistics to demonstrate the
extent o f the works in progress: thirty-nine construction gangs at work, 1,200 men
employed, and fourteen active contracts. The scale o f the public works attracted
nationwide attention. In June, Mayor Capdevielle “had a visitor in Richard Wayne
Wilson . . . the representative o f the New York Tribune, to write o f the sewerage, water
and drainage systems, the industriousness of the South, and the new progress in this
section of the country.” The Board awarded additional contracts in July totaling over
$500,000 of work and noted the “ample and wholesale competition” on the bids.26

25 Eighth Semi-Annual Report', Daily Picayune, December 24, 1903, 5; February
19, 1904,4.
26 Ninth Semi-Annual Report, By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f New
Orleans, 21; Daily Picayune, May 13, 1904, 5; May 14, 1904, 5; June 7, 1904, 5; July 8,
1904, 5.
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When the regular session o f the Louisiana legislature convened in summer.
1904, the Board faced only routine matters, although there was some concern over a bill
that would limit the work day o f Sewerage and Water Board employees to eight hours.
Lewis Johnson, Chair of the Board’s legislative committee, later reported that the
offending legislation “was happily killed.” More important to the works project was the
announcement in August that the Board planned to begin construction on the enormous
water works that would provide the city with 40,000,000 gallons o f filtered Mississippi
River water per day. Although the New Orleans summer saw little progress (at one
point the Daily Picayune headline read “Sewerage and Water Board Managed to Get a
Quorum”), the staff and consulting engineers worked on specifications for the giant
pumps, filtering devices, and storage tanks. The board received initial bids in
November, though a dispute over specifications delayed the awards until the following
year. The bid dispute involved the attorney for one manufacturer questioning the
quality of the ostensible winner’s product. Once again, the Board showed considerable
deference to attorney E. H. Farrar. The machinery went to bid a second time, but,
ultimately, neither company received the award.27
Although work on the water and sewerage system proceeded well, the drainage
system continued to bedevil the Board. In December, 1904, the Board responded to
27 Specifications fo r Water Works Pumping Machinery: Contract “1-W", New
Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1904); Tenth Semi-Annual
Report', Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f Three Great Utilities, 10; also By-Laws:
Sewerage and Water Board o f New Orleans, 21; Daily Picayune, July 16, 1904, 4; July
29, 1904, 6,11; August 13, 1904, 4; November 9, 1904, 10; November 10,1904, 5;
December 24, 1904, 10; December 28, 1904, 15; February 7, 1905, 6.
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residents’ complaints about the drainage canals and frequent flooding by establishing
rules for use of the drainage system. Henceforth, the Board forbid the discharge o f
industrial waste and domestic outhouses into the canals and required specific permission
for anyone to connect to any part of the new system. Nature did not cooperate,
however, and 1905 brought even heavier rain than usual, highlighting drainage
deficiencies during every downpour.28
At a lecture to Tulane University students, Superintendent Earl reminded
listeners of the scope o f the work in progress: a land area o f 15,000 acres, population of
over 200,000, more than ninety percent o f the population dependent on cisterns for
water supply, approximately 66,000 structures, and 400 miles o f streets. He argued that
the drainage system showed progress. Prior to 1900 drainage could remove only 1,300
cubic feet of water per second, although in recent rainstorms water fell on the city at
rates exceeding 15,000 cubic feet per second. In a perverse way, city progress added to
the strain on the system. Not only was there more land to be drained as the city grew,
but the city’s extensive street paving program reduced the surface area available to
absorb rain water. By the end of 1905, the allocation o f revenue for drainage projects
ran out. In the absences o f additional construction funds, the Board limited drainage

28 By-Laws: Sewerage and Water Board o f New Orleans, 21; Rules o f the
Sewerage and Water Board o f New Orleans, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana
Division (New Orleans, 1908), 3. The Sewerage and Water Board Pamphlet, published
in 1908, included a listing of the 1904 rules as well as subsequent regulations regarding
fire hydrants and house plumbing.
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work to maintenance, and began planning for a new bond issue to finish the drainage
works.29
Meanwhile, the sewerage and water functions drew upon the remainder o f the
original $16,000,000 bond issue. The Board awarded contracts for pumping machinery
and extensive supplies o f pipe. The largest o f the sewer mains became the city’s
property as contractors completed work. The Daily Picayune humorist “McDonogh”
praised the Board in a column comparing their activities to a stage production. “The
Lucky Thirteen [Sewerage and Water Board Members],” he wrote, “are steady, if at
times slow, performers . . . running three [acts] alone and at the same time.”30
The outbreak of yellow fever in the city in the summer, 1905, made everyone
aware that public health and sanitation measures were deadly serious. The connection
between the epidemic and the work o f the Sewerage and Water Board became apparent
as soon as yellow fever cases and deaths began to increase. Drainage and water
functions directly affected the spread of the disease because a particular breed of
mosquito provided the vector for yellow fever. Ineffective drainage allowed standing
water, a potential breeding place for the pest. Likewise, for the ninety percent o f New
Orleanians that depended upon cisterns, the household water supply served as a source

29 Twelfth Semi-Annual Report, Daily Picayune, January 19, 1905, 6. In the
previous year, the Board’s Tenth Semi-Annual Report had identified trash in the canals
as a major cause of drainage system failure. Average annual rainfall during 1896 to
1905 was approximately 51.5 inches; the 1905 total exceeded seventy-four inches.
30 Twelfth Semi-Annual Report, Daily Picayune, April 19, 1905, 5; May 3, 1905,
10; May 23, 1905, 5; June 9,1905, 7; July 23, 1905, Section HI, 14.
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o f the disease. By July, 1905, Councilmen Zacharie proposed an ordinance outlawing
the manufacture o f ice from “impure” water. Superintendent Earl reiterated the promise
that the systems would be completed by 1908, but that schedule now seemed more
important in an atmosphere of panic over the number o f new cases and deaths. The
New Orleans Taxpayers Protective Association demanded prompt completion o f the
water system even if it meant slowing work on the other parts o f the system. The
Sewerage and Water Board patiently answered the letter. As the new President o f the
Board, Mayor Behrman reminded the association that only by stretching out the work
had the Board been able to accomplish its goals, and that a completed water system, in
the absence of the other systems, would be counterproductive. Engineers planned the
sewerage system to carry household water waste in addition to sewerage. A domestic
water supply with no means of sewerage disposal would lead to additional standing
water, not less. And the standing water would remain i f there were no drainage system
that would carry it away. Controversy did not subside until fall, when cool weather and
energetic public health measures brought the mosquito population, and the rate of
infection, under control.31

31 Letter of Mayor Martin Behrman, President o f the Sewerage and Water Board
to the New Orleans Taxpayers’ Protective Association, August 16, 1905, in Sewerage
and Water Board: Miscellaneous Correspondence, N ew Orleans Public Library,
Louisiana Collection; Daily Picayune, July 29, 1905,4; August 1,1905,4; August 18,
1905, 8. Superintendent Earl claimed the next year that improvements in drainage also
contributed to the reduction in death rates. See Earl, Sewerage, Water and Drainage
System o f New Orleans.
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In late 1905, a letter to the Sewerage and Water Board from a disgruntled
contractor claimed that the sewer lines deteriorated rapidly due to deficient plans drawn
by the Board’s staff engineers. The Superintendent claimed the contractor was “simply
extortionate,” but the Board suspended all work until an assessment o f the charges could
be arranged. The consulting engineers assembled quickly and began a thorough review
o f work completed to date. Their report found no widespread problems and affirmed the
engineering principles behind the system. Out of over 118 miles o f pipe, defects
appeared in only 317 feet. The Board affirmed the work o f its engineers. To reassure
the public even more, the Board invited the American Association for the Advancement
o f Science, which met in the city at the end of the year, to examine the sewerage, water
and drainage plans.32
Early in 1906, the Board faced the unpleasant reality o f its financial situation.
Completion o f all three systems demanded additional capital, but additional taxes would
not be popular. Fortunately, the rapid growth o f the city since the beginning of the
project in 1899 provided a solution. The growth in property values increased the yield
o f the Board’s dedicated 2 mill tax; only a portion was necessary to service the original
bond issues. The remaining revenue could be combined with the Board’s share o f the
so-called debt tax o f 10 mills which provided a second income stream. The resulting
funds would be able to service a new bond issue, yielding up to $8,000,000 in

32 Twelfth Semi-Annual Report, Daily Picayune, October 24, 1905, 10;
November 1, 1905,4; November 12,1905, 5; December 15,1905, 12; January 5,1906,
5; January 12, 1906,4.
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construction. Attorney Edgar Farrar, author of the 1899 legislation, agreed with the plan
and offered his assistance to the Board. The Progressive Union joined in the effort to
approach the legislature for an enabling act at the next regular session.33
Board projections for completion now depended upon the new funding.
Drainage improvements became a secondary priority. By the end of 1908 the central
infrastructure of sewerage and water projects would be in place, but household
connections would take one to two years more, assuming that the legislature approved
the additional bond issue and the Board o f Liquidation could sell the bonds. The
Sewerage and Water Board also planned to ask the legislature for increased regulatory
powers, including the authority to remove cisterns once connection to the central system
became possible, but, fearful of public opposition at a time when the bond issue was at
stake, the Board withdrew its request for the cistern legislation.34
The connection of Farrar to the Board’s activities highlighted the non-partisan
nature o f the activities. Farrar started as a Regular, but drifted toward the reform
elements of the city, even while maintaining his law practice with E. B. Kruttschnitt.
Board members appointed by the Mayor worked in concert with members from the

33 Assessed value of city property subject to taxation grew from $132 million in
1890 to $140 million in 1900. After the start o f Board operations, during the next
fourteen years, values grew to $250 million. Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f three
Great Utilities, 11; Twelfth Semi-Annual Report, Daily Picayune, February 15, 1906, 7.
Farrar represented the investors of the private water works, now in receivership. If the
sewerage and Water Board were in better financial condition, it might see fit to increase
its offer to buy certain assets of the private company.
34 Daily Picayune, April 6, 1906, 6; April 10, 1906, 4; April 21, 1906, 12.
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Board o f Liquidation; rarely did political issues intervene. On early May, 1906.
however, the term o f member Charles Theard expired; Behrman replaced him with
Joseph Voegtle, a member of the legislature and a Regular stalwart. The TimesDemocrat immediately objected. Theard’s connections with the commercial
establishment were impeccable; Voegtle managed a French Quarter hotel. Behrman
defended his actions by reminding his opponents that his other Sewerage and Water
Board appointments were favorable to the silk-stocking element. The underlying
dispute involved more than a comparison of occupations and the class-consciousness o f
the Times-Democrat. Theard, though a friend of Mayor Capdevielle and a Regular in
the 1899 elections, had opposed Behrman in the mayoral election of 1904. Voegtle not
only supported the Regulars; he had provided rooms in his hotel for Behrman to use as
his private offices during the 1904 campaign.35
In this instance, the commercial elite saved Theard’s membership, but not by
dissuading the Mayor. Within a month, members of the Board of Liquidation
engineered Theard’s reappointment. Charles Janvier resigned from the Board of
Liquidation and the private members selected Theard as his replacement. Subsequently,
Abraham Brittin, member of the Sewerage and Water Board by virtue o f a Board o f
Liquidation appointment, resigned from the Sewerage and Water Board, creating an
opening for Theard. Behrman could not prevent the maneuver. Ever the pragmatist, he
accepted Theard’s presence, and the two worked well together. In spite of
3S Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 97; Daily Picayune, May 2, 1906, 5;
Times-Democrat, May 3, 1906,4; Daily Picayune, May 5, 1906, 6.
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disagreements with the Board o f Liquidation on other matters, the pending bond issue
required the two boards to cooperate, and Behrman helped organize the joint efforts.36
Several important events converged in fall, 1906. An immense water
purification plant served as the heart of the water system, and plans for its construction
approached completion. The Board took special care with the plant, inviting the
consulting engineers to review the plans before a call for bids began. The firm o f Black
and Laird offered the successful bid, totaling $1,840,727.20. The executive committee
and full Board agreed to the proposal, the city council concurred, and the parties signed
the contract at the end o f September. A reminder to the new contractor to hire local
labor followed closely behind. The legislature approved the new bond issue, but the
Board needed voter approval. State officials cooperated with the Mayor, and the
proposition enjoyed the favored first place on the November ballot. The measure passed
by a large margin.37
After years of plans, tom-up streets, and litigation, concrete manifestations o f
the new systems reached the public. The first connection to the sewerage system

36 Daily Picayune, May 9, 1906, 4; June 7, 1906,4; September 14, 1906, 4.
37 Earl, Sewerage, Water and Drainage System in New Orleans', Thirteenth SemiAnnual Report', Fourteenth Semi-Annual Report, 24-25; Daily Picayune, July 6, 1906,
4; August 7, 1906, 5; September 12, 1906, 7; October 12, 1906, 4; Behrman to General
Leon Jastremski, October 24, 1906, Mayor’s Correspondence. For sample contract for
various parts o f the systems, see Special Specifications fo r Sewers: Contract “X ”, New
Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1906), and Special
Specifications fo r Laying Water Pipe: Contract “9-W”, New Orleans Public Library,
Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1906). The latter document is an original submission
by a contractor, “M. O’Herren Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa..”
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occurred October 11. 1906, at the firm of C. C. Hartwell, 213 Baronne Street, in the
heart of the city’s business district. After an inspection by the Board, plumbers
completed the connection amid a small celebration. When the system reached the
offices of the Progressive Union, another celebration took place. Involvement o f the
Progressive Union highlighted the non-partisan nature of the triumph. The Union’s
membership, though heavily representative of the city’s commercial interests, crossed
factional lines between Regular and reformer. Mayor Behrman served on the
organization’s Board of Directors. Members of the City Board of Health and members
of the Sewerage and Water Board also attended the festivities at the Progressive Union.
Though the organizers of the celebration hoped the governor would attend, they settled
for the state Director of Health, who reminded the assembled dignitaries that the system
would reduce the chance of yellow fever. (The honor o f the first residence to be
connected went to Major Harrod, former engineer to the Drainage Commission and
consulting engineer to the Panama Canal Commission.) At its annual meeting early the
next year, the Progressive Union celebrated the success of the system. President
Godchaux made the commercial argument for the construction. “A few years ago the
people of the city arose in their might and said ‘Let us have sanitary water and sewerage
facilities, and lo! and behold! These are being constructed. Drainage, sewerage,
wholesome water and clean streets is a city’s best investment, giving greatest, strongest
and surest returns.”38
38 Daily Picayune, October 12, 1906, 4; October 21, 1906, 6; November 6, 1906,
5; January 8, 1907, 4.
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By March, 1907, the sewer system covered 230 miles o f streets; 153 miles were
ready for residential connections, but those connections did not materialize rapidly.
Short o f funds, the Board required the cost of connections to be borne by residents on
the promise of repayment when the new bond issue produced funds. In spite o f a few
high profile connections, large numbers o f residents remained skeptical and chose not to
pay for a connection. The Board also faced renewed drainage difficulties. A downpour
o f 8.57 inches in late April, 1907, reminded residents of their precarious site. “Drain,
Not Explain” served as the protest slogan for Third Ward residents, but the Board could
offer no immediate solution. The Era Club joined the dispute and formed a committee
“to propose some persistent questions to the Sewerage and Water Board.” Board of
Liquidation and Sewerage and Water Board member Theard worried about the city’s bid
to hold an exposition in 1915 to celebrate the opening o f the Panama Canal if the
drainage system were not complete. He suggested to the Board o f Liquidation president
that the bankers o f the city be organized “to take the $8,000,000 issue at four percent.”
Yet the boom years of the decade did not continue. By 1907 uncertainty clouded
national financial conditions and the public bonds became difficult to sell. Foreign
investors withdrew funds from the United States, and large public bond issues could
find no purchasers. Later in the year, the Board diverted a portion of operating funds—
$240,000—into additional drainage construction, but only the sale of the bonds could
provide funds to complete the system.39
39 Fifteenth Semi-Annual Report; Sixteenth Semi-Annual Report; Daily Picayune,
March 4, 1907, 5; April 27,1907,4; May 14, 1907,11; May 25, 1907, 3; June 7, 1907,
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By September 1, 1907, the annual commercial review of the Daily Picayune
hailed the progress on “the Trinity o f Civic Salvation” and looked forward to its
completion in 1908. The main sewers began operation with unfiltered river water and
over 2 7 7 miles of pipe passed all tests. Over 150 miles o f the water distribution system
were complete, and work continued on the main purification station. The purchase,
earlier in the year, of the assets of a private water company in Algiers hastened progress
on the west bank of the river. Even the cash-poor drainage system was forty percent
complete. Mindful of the financial squeeze, the Board rejected a series o f private bids,
estimated at $300,000 in excess of what was reasonable, in favor of perform in g the
work with Sewerage and Water Board employees. Behrman later claimed that the use
of city employees saved the Sewerage and Water Board from $562,000 to $ 895,000
during the period 1907-1913. But the issue of public versus private labor did not go
away. Behrman and Earl stoutly defended the use o f public labor. By 1913, the use of
Board labor became a source of dispute between the Board and local contractors, and
the state legislature refused to endorse the use of public labor for original construction,
although maintenance work could be performed by Board employees.40

4; June 12, 1907, 7; November 24, 1907, 5. The Era Club later confirmed the
judgement o f the Sewerage and Water Board staff that refuse clogging drains led to
street flooding. The Club recommended “cleaning culverts, reducing street circulars and
picking up garbage carefully.” Daily Picayune, December 29, 1907, 6. For an account
of the 1907 financial panic and the intervention of J.P. Morgan, see Jean Strouse, “The
Brilliant Bailout,” New Yorker, November 23, 1998, 62-77.
40 Eighteenth Semi-Annual Report; Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f Three
Great Utilities, 12-13; Correspondence and Papers Relating to the Board's
Negotiations with the Algiers Water Works and Electric Company fo r the Purchase o f
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Early in 1908, the Board reached another milestone when the sewerage system in
Algiers began operation. The first residence workers connected was Mayor Behrman?s
home. The Board, however, faced new challenges from the water system. A large fire
in the Third Ward spread out o f control as insufficient pressure at the new hydrants
hampered firemen. The superintendent explained that not all hydrants had been
connected. Concerns over fire protection continued when, in June, conflagrations
threatened the business district, still served by the private water company. Sewerage
and Water Board officials hastened to connect the new city system to the old pipes in
order the increase the pressure at the hydrants. By the end of the year, the Mayor staged
a demonstration o f the new system, using fire trucks to spray water down Elks Place.
The Daily Picayune declared “The City’s New Water System Makes a Splendid
Showing.”41
The Board also dealt with less momentous matters. In early February, 1908, the
Board received a report that an employee had been “garnished” by a woman in the red
light district who claimed he “had pledged Sewerage and Water Board plans for wine
drunk in her house.” And citizens along the new Melpomene drainage canal petitioned

Its Waterworks Systems, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New
Orleans, 1907); Behrman to City Council, April 30, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Daily Picayune, September 1, 1907, Section III, 3; September 17, 1907,4; October 11,
1907, 13. The Board plan received a setback when a local judge granted an injunction
against Sewerage and Water Board labor on projects and ordered contracts awarded to
the low bidder(s). The Board appealed and the ruling was later overturned, but the issue
remained contentious for at least a decade. Daily Picayune, March 17, 1908, 15.
41 Daily Picayune, January 10, 1908,4, 11; February 12, 1908,13; February 14,
1908; June 16, 1908; June 25, 1908, 5; November 16,1908, 4.
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the Sewerage and Water Board to build bridges over the canal to make travel easier and
to build “fences along the canal to prevent cows” from falling into the water. The Board
agreed to the bridges, but did not have sufficient funds to protect local livestock.42
Anticipating completion o f the system, the Board revisited the issue o f
household connections and the use of cisterns. At the Board’s request, the legislature
considered a bill to require all premises to connect to the system and to outlaw the use
o f both cisterns and privy vaults. Not all citizens agreed. The New Orleans Taxpayers’
Protective Association rallied against the legislation, claiming that “personal liberty is
being attacked.” One member “advanced the argument that river water does not agree
with some people; that a man knows his own stomach better t han. . . state legislation on
the Water Board knows it.” Another member blamed the Regular organization,
“seventeen inferior men,” though that comment “brought [another] member to his feet
saying that if party politics were to be dragged into a meeting at which ladies were
present, there would be trouble.” Though the Board got its bill, it would be years before
all homes joined the new system.43
The pace o f construction picked up as the end o f 1908, the Board’s self-imposed
deadline, approached. By September, 1908, Earl reported the successful installation of
411 miles of water pipe with most under pressure. Anticipating the start o f distribution
operations, the Superintendent studied water rates across the country to arrive at a

41Daily Picayune, February 12, 1908, 13; March 24, 1908, 5; April 10, 1908, 4.
43 Daily Picayune, June 24, 1908, 4; September 9, 1908, 8; December 11, 1908,
4.
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schedule for New Orleans. Charges would “be sufficient to cover maintenance and
operation of the system” but would not exceed the average for cities having municipal
systems. Board members agreed with Earl, but put off formal adoption of rates until
after the municipal election. A pro-Behrman election pamphlet later boasted that an
investigation o f water rates by a committee o f the Progressive Union found the “rates
satisfactory . . . [and] the department was wonderfully well conducted.” The Board also
considered an orderly method for establishing sewer and water connections; applications
had increased and created a backlog for Sewerage and Water board crews. Complete
operations awaited only the completion of the water works and implementation o f the
filtering process.44
Those works attracted considerable national and international attention. Dr.
Albert Chalmette, Director of the Institute of Lille, member of the Supreme Council of
Public Hygiene o f France and bacteriologist, visited New Orleans and “declared himself
highly pleased with [the] water works.” George K. Rider, Board o f Trustees of
Sacramento, echoed the French visitor’s comments and paid the highest compliment:
“New Orleans is a progressive and rapidly growing city and it couldn’t make a better
investment than [the water works.]” Later in the year, the Louisiana Section o f the
American Chemical Society visited the works, examined the method of purification, and
44 Eighteenth Semi-Annual Report, Daily Picayune, September 11, 1908, 4;
September 18, 1908,4; The Behrman Administration: Work Accomplished During the
Eight Years o f the Honorable Martin Behrman as Mayor o f the City o f New Orleans
Compiled and Condensedfrom the Records and Official Reports in the Various
Departments o f the City Government, University o f New' Orleans, Earl K. Long Library,
Louisiana Collection, Vertical File (New Orleans, 1912), 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

216
“were impressed.” Mayor Behrman, asked for a Thanksgiving message by a New York
newspaper, wrote “New Orleans rejoices today over the completion of our modem
system o f sewerage, water and drainage and water purification which will be in full
operation by the dawn o f the new year.” His message to the newly installed city council
in December boasted o f progress toward completion of the sewerage, water and
drainage system, adding that street paving would be made easier once the contracts for
pipe-laying were completed.45
The Board missed the December, 1908, deadline by only a few months. By
January 1, 1909, the Superintendent estimated that ninety percent o f the sewerage
system and ninety-nine percent o f the water distribution system were complete. Testing
on the water purification plant proved successful, and, in February, 1909, workers
pressurized the distribution system and pure water flowed through the more than 500
miles of pipes along New Orleans streets, including over 5,000 fire hydrants. Shortly
thereafter, the city joined the remnants of the old, private system to the new by means of
“a great reducing valve.” Consulting engineers from New York supervised the
connection which “waited for the close of carnival” before completion. By 1910, the
city had spent a total o f $8.5 million on the water system alone and over $5 million each
on the sewerage and drainage systems. Not everyone felt gratitude towards the Board.
Disputes over water rates arose immediately and bedeviled the Board for months. When
the Era Club met in May, 1909, Jean Gordon, who had fought for adoption o f the
45 Daily Picayune, October 16,1908,6; October 28, 1908; November 26, 1908,
5; December 8, 1908, 5; December 11,1908,4.
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systems in 1899, suggested “that a special thanksgiving be held for the splendid clear
water now being supplied to the city.” But “there was some opposition to this motion,
one member holding that she saw no reason to give thanks for what one had to pay for.”
In spite of the advice o f the City Board o f Health, the Taxpayers Protective Association
persisted in its fight to preserve the right to maintain cisterns. Only a Louisiana
Supreme Court decision to the contrary ended the use o f cisterns to provide water to
homes.46
The start of operations o f the system did not mark the end o f the capital funding
crisis. The 1906 authorization for an additional $8,000,000 bond issue remained in
place, but bonds could not be sold, even after a 1908 amendment providing for a
premium of up to six percent for the purchasers. In February, 1909, the Mayor
assembled the representatives o f local banks to urge purchase o f the bonds. Charles
Theard, Chairman of the Sewerage and Water Board Finance Committee, and former
adversary of Behrman, echoed the Mayor’s pleas. Bankers blamed the national
financial crisis, but also reminded the Mayor of his insistence upon interest payments
for public funds. Bank executive Sol Wexler suggested that public deposits “without
interest would be a greater inducement to take” the bonds. Wexler also pointedly
complained about the city’s assessments on bank property. Not until May, 1909, after
suspension of construction and dismissal o f 400 employees, was the Board able to sell
46 Behrman, New Orleans: A History o f Three Great Utilities, 10; Nineteenth
Semi-Annual Report; The Behrman Administration: Work Accomplished During the
Eight Years. . . , 4; Daily Picayune, February 25, 1909, 4; May 24, 1909, 5; March 10,
1910,4; March 14, 1910, 6.
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bonds, and then only $1,000,000 of the issue was taken in spite o f the premium
available to purchasers. The Mayor intervened once again late in 1910, bringing
together the commercial exchanges in the hopes that their leadership would impress
local banks. After promising that unexpended funds would be deposited in the banks
that would purchase the issue, a local syndicate purchased the remaining $7 million in
1911. A full construction schedule resumed, and the systems were substantially
completed by 1917.47
What Behrman apologists called “the three great public utilities” embodied the
principles o f southern urban progressivism: limitations on direct democratic input, the
use of experts, and the assumption that a public interest could be defined and served.
The Sewerage and Water Board, for example, included both political appointments and
representatives from the Board of Liquidation of City Debt. The city establishment
justified support for the systems in recognizable progressive terms: commercial success
as well as improvements in health and efficiency, especially as the result o f the epidemic
o f 1905. In New Orleans, the progressive impulse toward municipal reform existed
across political and social lines, and lasted through numerous elections and changes in
governmental structure. The underlying consensus in favor o f progressive civic

47 The Louisiana legislature granted permission for the premium in Act 111,
regular session o f 1908. Senator Voegtle, member of the Sewerage Water Board
handled the legislation. Charles Theard, whom Behrman had replaced on the Sewerage
and Water Board with Voegtle, later commended his adversary on his management of
the legislation. Eighteenth Semi-Annual Report, 11; Daily Picayune, July 12, 1908, 4;
February 27, 1909, 5; Nineteenth Semi-Annual Report, Twentieth Semi-Annual Report,
Twenty-Second Semi-Annual Report, Twenty-Third Semi-Annual Report.
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development transcended, or overcame, corporate interests. New Orleans underwent a
transformation as the result of these public utilities: a decrease in death rates,
distribution o f pure water, and expansion of habitable space due to drained lands. Such
progress enjoyed the widest possible support and illuminates the turn o f the century
view of politics, progressivism, and the public interest.
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CHAPTER VII
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE PORT OF
NEW ORLEANS: PUBLIC WORKS AND TRADE EXPANSION

Along the bends o f the Mississippi River below New Orleans, vessels of all
types traveled to and from the Crescent City. Between the city and the open water o f
the Gulf of Mexico was one hundred and ten miles of winding river, currents, narrow
passes, and sand bars. Ship captains picked up bar pilots to navigate through the
confusing passes at the mouth o f the river, shaped by centuries of silt, and switched to
river pilots to complete the trip upriver to New Orleans. Once at the port, ships clung to
the city’s docks, fighting the currents that were always difficult and especially
treacherous at high water times. The location of the Port of New Orleans overcame
these and other obstacles through the transcending advantages of its location on the
continent’s greatest river. The Mississippi provided access to a large percentage o f the
United States interior, to the Missouri and Ohio Rivers, and beyond.
Although the leadership of the city feared a decline of trade after the Civil War,
the river trade revived quickly. The federal government sponsored improvements at the
mouth of the river, and the products o f new commercial agriculture developing in the
Midwest and Plains became available for export. A large percentage of the nation’s
grain output, coal production, cotton crop, and, in the twentieth century, petroleum
220
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products found an outlet to the world through New Orleans. The port also provided the
Latin American world an entry to the United States market, particularly for the raw
materials and agricultural products o f Central and South America.1
A closeup view o f the New Orleans port in the aftermath o f the Civil War
revealed an unplanned mix of levees, batture lands, wharves, and landings. City streets
converged at the river, adding to the congestion and confusion. The city council
exercised authority over the river front, but had no clear vision o f the port’s future.
Unable to finance necessary improvements, the city contracted with a private firm to
administer the port. After the expiration o f the contract in 1881, a second lease granted
rights o f administration to Joseph A. Aiken & Company for ten years. The company
agreed to spend a minimum amount on annual repairs and improvements, but the port’s
infrastructure requirements quickly exceeded the specified investments. When the lease
expired in 1891, the council drew up a more elaborate contract binding the successor
company to a higher level of improvements, especially for the period 1891 to 1893.
Moreover, the council specified wharf charges and license fees for steamships, flatboats,
and barges. An elaborate, though arbitrary, allocation of space divided the river front
area into zones for steamships, sailing vessels, salt carrying vessels, coal ships,
1Lewis, New Orleans: The Making o f an Urban Landscape, 48-51; Kendall,
History o f New Orleans, 2: 599; Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 6; Port
Handbook o f New Orleans, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana
Collection (New Orleans, 1928), 9; Port and Terminal Facilities, Port o f New Orleans,
Louisiana, University o f New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection
(New Orleans, 1919), 12; Frank T. Cass, Facts o f Interest about the Port o f New
Orleans, University o f New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New
Orleans, 1922), 6-7.
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steamboats, and luggers. Conditions improved for a time, but by mid-decade the river
front area was in disarray.2
New transportation technologies complicated the port’s future. In the post-Civil
War period, railroads came into the city in spite of formidable natural barriers.
Attracted by the business o f the port, railroads competed for scarce river front space.
Once a railroad received a franchise or privilege, granted by the city council, that
portion o f available land came under the control o f the railroad and the shipping lines
with which it negotiated agreements. The river front became increasingly crowded as
competing interests and modes o f transport filled the available space, and the port grew
beyond the boundaries of the city proper. In 1888, Congress had recognized the
growth and expanded the jurisdiction of the port into Jefferson Parish, upriver from New
Orleans. The multi-parish nature o f the operation changed the political climate, and in
the crucial legislative session o f 1896, business, state, and municipal interests converged
to radically restructure the a d m in istration o f the river front.
At the time, the legislature included a number of business-oriented municipal
reformers from the Citizens’ League. Mayor Flower, and most o f the city
administration, belonged to the Citizens’ League as well. The Regular organization,
although temporarily out o f office in the city, maintained considerable strength at the
state level and could challenge initiatives o f the League. But this was not an issue about

2Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 6; Kendall, History o f New Orleans,
2: 603-605. For a comprehensive history o f the port, see Harold Sinclair, The Port o f
New Orleans (New York: Garden City, 1942).
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which the two factions disagreed. Both agreed that the contracting o f port
administration should be replaced with a comprehensive, state-level public structure.
When the city council received a report from a committee of the city’s merchants, no
dissent was recorded. The legislature passed a bill to reorganize the port without
significant opposition, and Governor Foster, a friend of the New Orleans Regular
organization, signed the legislation. Act Number 70 o f 1896 took the river front out o f
the control o f private contractors and placed it under a new organization—the Board o f
Commissioners of the Port o f New Orleans. The new governance o f the port took its
place alongside other progressive-era reforms and public works projects in New
Orleans. The widespread support given the Dock Board, as it was popularly called,
reinforced the existence of a city consensus in favor of progressive civic development.
The structure of the new board eliminated direct control by elected officials.
The governor appointed members o f the board from among the residents o f Orleans,
Jefferson, and St. Bernard parishes. Members were required to “be prominently
identified with the commerce or business interests o f the port.” Thus the new structure
followed the progressive ideal o f expert governance. But Regular Democrats
maintained a measure of control through the governor’s appointment process as long as
the state’s chief executive remained sympathetic to the Regulars’ wishes. Appointees to
the Dock Board had considerable influence. The Dock Board possessed significant
power to:
regulate the commerce and traffic of the Harbor of New Orleans . . . to
administer the public wharves; to construct new wharves.. . and erect sheds
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thereupon; to protect merchandise in transit; to place and keep the wharves,
sheds, levees and approaches in good condition; to maintain sufficient depth of
water and provide for lighting and policing such wharves and sheds.3
At its first meeting, the Board selected Robert Bleakley as President and Hugh
McCloskey as Vice-President. Other members included Thomas Henderson, Sidney
March and W. A. Kemaghan. Hugh McCloskey’s brother Bernard served as attorney
to the commissioners. Board members and staff were political appointees; all had
significant connections to the city’s political or economic establishments. The
McCloskey brothers were charter members of the Citizens’ League, although Bernard
McCloskey joined the Choctaws by 1902, as did Board member Sidney March.
William Kemaghan was a charter member of the Choctaw Club. The Board’s Assistant
Secretary, Clark Steen, had served as secretary to John Fitzpatrick during his mayoralty.
In September, the Board wrote to Acting Mayor Abraham Brittin of New Orleans to
announce their readiness to assume authority over the wharves and landings. To their
disappointment, the Louisiana Construction Company, contractor for the docks,
implicitly questioned the Board’s authority. Correspondence from the company came
not to the Dock Board but to the city administration. The Mayor forwarded the
communications, but the Board refused to received the letters. Before long, members

3 Arthur McGuirk, Laws Constitutional and Statutory Relating to the Board o f
Commissioners o f the Port o f New Orleans Up to and Including the Year 1920,
University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans,
1920), 2; Port Handbook o f New Orleans, 13-14; Daily Picayune, June 5, 1896,4, 12;
July 7,1896,4; July 9, 1896,1; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 605; Sinclair, The
Port o f New Orleans, 298-301. St. Bernard Parish occupies the east side o f the
Mississippi River below New Orleans.
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discussed the advisability o f seeking an annulment o f the contractor’s lease in order to
take over the docks immediately.4
Awaiting developments regarding the lease, the Board addressed other matters.
The system of assigning dock space and the casual attitude o f wharf officials had led to
abuses. In April, 1897, the Board held special hearings to investigate charges that
employees o f the commission took bribes in exchange for allowing goods to sit on the
wharves at no charge. Nothing emerged from the investigation, and a local grand jury
took over the probe. In early September, 1897, Board President Bleakly became
seriously ill and died after just one year’s service. Hugh McCloskey took over as
president and Branch M. King, a cotton factor, took Bleakly’s place on the commission.
McCloskey quickly showed interest and energy in his new position. He wrote the
contractor urging repairs to wharves and landings and, within a month of taking office,
organized the commission agenda and drafted a set o f rules for the superintendent and
other port employees. The commission prepared a report o f its first-year activities and
forwarded the results to Governor Foster. The Governor wrote the members and
thanked them for their efforts. Though he “had not yet read the report,” he wrote that
“time, I feel confident, will show the wisdom of my selections in the personnel of the
board as its record will be one of honest and intelligent administration of the port’s
affairs.” The members approved by-laws in mid-November, 1897, committing
4 Minute Books, Board of Commissioners o f the Port o f New Orleans, New
Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Collection, August 24, September 8, November 4,
November 18, 1896, hereinafter cited as Dock Board Minute Books; Port Handbook o f
New Orleans, 8; Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern City, Appendices I and II.
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themselves to twice-monthly meetings from September to April and once-a-month
meetings in the warmer months.5
The commissioners adopted a list o f port regulations in November as well. The
specificity o f the new rules revealed areas o f concern; for example, ships were not
allowed to heat tar, pitch, or resin while in port because o f the fire danger. The
regulations sought to impose a measure o f order to berth assignments, assigned
responsibility for enforcement, and forbade “throwing ballast, rubbish, or anything that
will sink into the river.” In addition to its administrative role, the Board also became a
promoter and defender o f the port facilities. In answering a report in the New Orleans
Times Democrat wherein a captain complained about wharf charges, the commissioners
ordered the staff to research comparative charges at Baltimore, Mobile, New York and
Galveston. The New Orleans charges were lower than all others, even under contractor
rates. When the new public rates went into effect, the New Orleans port would be an
even better bargain.6
By early 1899, port commissioners showed impatience with their situation. The
city administration continued to grant privileges along the river front to various
railroads, though state law seemed to give such authority to the Dock Board.
Commissioner King requested an opinion from the Board’s attorney to investigate the
situation, but only future litigation would clarify the respective roles of the city and the

5 Dock Board Minute Books, September 1, 15,23, October 20, November 17,
1897.
6 Dock Board Minute Books, November 17,1897, March 2,1898.
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Board. The Board also directed the attorney to investigate expropriation o f the private
lease. Bernard McCloskey brought unwelcome news to the frustrated members. The
Board had the authority to expropriate, but such a course was unwise. Protracted
litigation would last until the lease’s expiration date, and legislation obligated the city o f
New Orleans to pay liquidation costs in the case of a takeover. The attorney’s
“conversation with city officials” indicated that the municipal government had no funds
for that purpose. Unwilling to give up its investment and income, the company
remained in operation until the expiration o f its lease, and the Dock Board members
waited until the wharves would finally pass to their control.7
Commissioner King again raised the question of Board authority in December,
1900, six months prior to the lease expiration. He provided a list of suggestions to his
fellow members, asking them to notify the New Orleans City Council and “ask their
cooperation. . . [that] no more franchises or privileges be granted by them without
consultation.” He also suggested gathering data concerning operations from the
contractor and negotiating a lighting contract along the wharves, adding “we must first
work in harmony and let our efforts be earnest but economical, our aim always being to
foster our port and harbor and increase our commerce.”8
In 1899, Board President Hugh McCloskey had promised the “wharfage system
would be ideal as soon as all the private profit is eliminated.” Neither McCloskey nor
any other Board member opposed private profit. All members enjoyed private business
7 Dock Board Minute Books, March 1, May 10,1899.
8 Dock Board Minute Books, December 5, 1900.
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interests of their own, but the ethic o f public ownership and operation prevailed- Private
interests gave way when a clear public purpose arose. More to the point, the
commercial establishment preferred (or tolerated) public ownership when the project
served the larger concept of commercial progress. The Dock Board did not, in the eyes
o f the commissioners, supplant private enterprise. The operation o f the wharves under
public control made an expansion o f private enterprise possible. The consensus held
that progress depended upon an expansion o f harbor activities that would be possible
only under public rule. The state legislature confirmed the Board’s authority by Act
Number 36 in 1900 and adjusted the rates that could be charged.9
Expectations ran high as the takeover o f the river front drew near. “W harf
reforms to wait a while,” proclaimed one headline, “until the control. . . passes into
Dock Board’s enterprising hands.” In a letter to the editor o f the Daily Picayune,
former Council member Sidney Story praised the position of the newspaper in favor of
public utilities and counted the Dock Board as “the first victory. . . [in] the campaign
for building a greater city.” New Year’s greetings in 1901 from Mayor Capdevielle
looked forward to wharves under the Dock Board control and vowed “to educate our
people . . . that they have the finest city on the continent.” The Mayor may have wished
the Dock Board well, but this did not prevent him from trying to collect funds he felt
were due the city for services rendered to the new commission. In May, 1901, the

9 Daily Picayune, September 1, 1899, Section Id, 12; McGuirk, Laws
Constitutional and Statutory, 3-6; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 605-606 .
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Mayor wrote the Dock Board demanding $17,500, the cost of police protection provided
to the harbor district.10
The lease of the Louisiana Construction and Improvement Company finally
expired May 29,1901. The commissioners compensated the Louisiana Construction
Company for the residual value of property left behind. Board appraisers placed the
amount due at $ 15,317.92, even though the company considered the price
“confiscatory.” But the Board did not relent and the funds were paid. The Dock Board
moved quickly to assert its leadership. Members visited the wharves and published a
schedule of charges that lowered rates on certain sized vessels to encourage use o f the
wharves. Within a week o f the takeover, McCloskey appeared before the city’s
Progressive Union. He noted the reduction in rates under public control and detailed a
comparison for seven ships in port. Under the old rates, the vessels would have paid
$728.88 in port charges. The new schedule of fees lowered that amount to $242.96.
Such comparisons enabled McCloskey to justify the public involvement. The money
saved, after all, was returned to private hands.11
Before long, the Board faced the consequences o f jurisdictional ambiguities
along the river front. Years of ad hoc, even contradictory, actions on the part of the city

10 Daily Picayune, November 8, 1900, 5; January 1, 1901, 3; April 1, 1901, 9.
11 Dock Board Minute Books, May 14,28,29, 1901; Kendall, History o f New
Orleans, 2: 605; Daily Picayune, June 4, 1901, 3; Martin Behrman, New Orleans: What
It Is Doing to Facilitate Transportation Both by Rail and River, address delivered by
Martin Behrman, Mayor of New Orleans, Twelfth Annual Session of the National
Rivers and Harbors Congress, Washington, D.C., December 8,1915, University o f New
Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 1915), 8.
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council left the area a jumble o f franchises and special privileges. Speculation about the
intrusion of railroad franchises on Dock Board land began before the expiration o f the
primary lease. By mid-July, 1901, the Board confronted the dilemma by asserting its
full rights to the river front land, vowing to go to court to enforce its jurisdiction over
the Illinois Central tracks. The Board of Trade backed the Dock Board position, which
assured the commercial organization of its intention “to build all wharves . . . necessary
to the handling of export and import business.” Similarly, in August, 1901, a seemingly
minor conflict over the placement of a fence, on property the ownership of which was a
matter of dispute, escalated into a confrontation between the Dock Board and the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad (L&N). McCloskey and City Attorney Samuel
Gilmore defended the public position, while attorney George Denegre represented the
railroad. A court decision favorable to the Dock Board helped settle the dispute.12
By early September, port operations enjoyed increased success and received
corresponding praise. August statistics showed the largest volume of business for the
port in its history, and Board members approved ambitious plans for construction. By
October the Daily Picayune wrote approvingly o f the simultaneous lowering o f rates
and increased improvements:
When one reflects that a few month have elapsed since the Dock Commission
came into complete possession of the wharves . . . the reputation of the port has
been enhanced and more ships are now coming here.. . . The Dock Board is
12Dock Board Minute Books, July 2,9, 24, August 27, September 3, 1901;
Daily Picayune, February 12, 1901, Section II, 1; July 26, 1901, 4; July 31, 1901, 4;
August 1,1901, 3,4; August 29,1901, 3; August 30, 1901, 3; August 31,1901, 4;
September 6,1901, 3.
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entitled to the warm commendation o f the business community for the intelligent
and public-spirited manner in which the w ork. . . has been carried on.13
The Board began to take a leadership position among government agencies. In
October, the Dock Board joined with the commissioners o f the New Orleans Public Belt
Railroad, recently established by the city council, to oppose Illinois Central claims to
the waterfront. A month later, the Board convened a meeting with the Orleans Levee
Board for the same purpose. Board authority increased dramatically when a court
decided that only the Dock Board had authority over batture lands. The future o f the
river front lay in the Board’s hands. Port charges declined again in December as the
Board completed an effective six months in control of the wharves. The governor and
various local dignitaries, including Mayor Capdevielle and former Mayor Fitzpatrick,
took a tour of the new facilities at the end o f the year, viewing “the great benefits that
have resulted since the control. . . passed from the hands of a private corporation.”
Capdevielle’s tour did not suppress all controversy between the city and the Dock
Board. In November, the Mayor reminded the port of the $17,500 owed for the cost o f
policing the “harbor precinct” for the previous seven months. Dock Board records
indicate that “no action was taken” on the city’s request.14

13 Dock Board Minute Books, October 15, November 5,1901; Daily Picayune
September 4,1901, 3; October 3, 1901, 7; December 4, 1901, 3,4.
14 Dock Board Minute Books, October 15, November 19, December 3, 1901;
Daily Picayune, October 3, 1901, 7; November 16, 1901,3; December 4, 1901, 3,4;
December 14,1901, 3; Capdevielle to Port Commission, November 27,1901, Mayor’s
Correspondence. The New Orleans Public Belt Railroad was organized at the turn o f
the century to provide a public, common carrier railroad for the wharves and docks of
N ew Orleans. See Chapter V m for the history o f the public belt’s development.
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Progress continued during 1902 as the port business increased. The U.S. Navy
brought a dry dock to Algiers to use for the repair and refurbishing of large ships. A
successftd test was completed early in the year using the battleship Illinois. Within a
short time, the use o f the facility exceeded expectations. The Board continued its
building program, expanding the capacity o f the port while improving existing facilities.
Prior to the Board’s administration, most freight passing through the port lay exposed to
the elements. Only a limited number of wharves had sheds to protect goods; tented
tarpaulins provided only minimal protection for the remainder. Under the Dock
Board’s leadership, contractors built sheds and wharves at a rapid rate at Henderson,
Market, Toledano, Clouet and Orange Streets and provided facilities for an oil refinery
in Chalmette, located in St. Bernard Parish. New facilities brought additional revenue,
and funds in excess o f operating expenses capitalized additional improvements. Not all
projects involved contractors. When faced with higher-than-expected bids, the Board
rejected the private option and directed its staff to perform the work. When rates for
private dredges exceeded expectations, the Board contracted to purchase and operate its
own. Nor were the Board’s promotional functions overlooked. Members received the
pleas o f the New Orleans Progressive Union and cooperated in a program to bring
additional railroads to the city. One Progressive Union publication urged railroad
investment in the city by detailing progress along the river. “City wharves . . . are now
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in the hands of the Port commission. . . [which is] reconstructing the wharves with
substantial structures and sheds.”15
By the end of the board’s first year o f full operation, members looked back on
significant progress from the conditions extant under the private contractor. The
governor reappointed Hugh McCloskey upon the expiration of his term, and his
colleagues immediately reelected him President. Board interest in the progress o f the
Public Belt railroad added to an increasingly lengthy agenda, as did the operation o f a
harbor patrol and the constant stream of requests for wharf space from steamship lines
and railroads. Tonnage handled by the port had. increased significantly from 1900
through 1901, from under 3,000,000 tons to over 4,000,000. In spite of the by-laws
specifications of one meeting per month in late spring and summer, the Board held
numerous special meetings in 1902 as the demands of business increased: four in May,
one in June, two in July and three in August. By November, the rapid construction
schedule required a line of credit and the Board negotiated a loan from the Hibernia
Bank and Trust Company.16

15 Dock Board Minute Books, January 7, February 4, 15, May 13,16, 22;
Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 607; Daily Picayune, January 7, 1902,4, 11;
February 23, 1902, 3; July 9, 1902, 3; New Railroads fo r New Orleans: Valuable Facts
and Reliable Statistics About the Metropolis o f the South, published by Associated
Committee of Commercial Bodies of New Orleans for the Increase o f Railroad Facilities
Called Together by the New Orleans Progressive Union, University o f New Orleans,
Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 1902), 8.
16 Dock Board Minute Books, May-September, October 21, November 18, and
December 2,1902; Port Handbook o f New Orleans, 8,11.
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The next year marked a replay of earlier court fights. Even in the middle o f
important litigation over river front control, a local railroad company requested
additional privileges along the wharves. Dock Board members declined “to act upon the
request until the suit is settled.” Mayor Capdevielle attempted to restrain the council’s
tendency to award franchises along the river, questioning whether or not the council had
the right to give property if the Dock Board had control. Throughout the process, the
Board counted on the support o f the Board o f Trade, a stalwart defender o f the notion
that river front commerce should be administered by public bodies. As the Dock
Board’s building program slowed because of lack of funds, steamship companies and
railroads suggested a plan to advance funds to the port for the construction of additional
steel sheds. Mindful of the public interest in the river activities, Board members briefly
considered a recreational platform or pier. But safety considerations prevailed, and the
plans died a quiet death.17
In August, 1903, the Board announced plans to spend $250,000 on new steel
sheds. Board president McCloskey proudly reviewed the year’s progress, including the
decline in ton-costs from twelve cents under the old system to less than seven cents. In
1900, forty-eight percent of port business came across public wharves; the 1903 figure
was seventy percent. The coffee trade from Central and South America grew from
17 The conflict between commercial and recreational access to the river
continues. A collision in 1996 between a large freighter and a wharf refitted as a
shopping center caused concern about the large number o f tourist and hotel facilities
built close to the river, including the New Orleans Aquarium. Dock Board Minute
Books, March 6, April 7, April 25, June 9, 1903; Daily Picayune, January 20, 1903,6;
January 21, 1903, 8; February 3, 1903, 9; March 10, 1903, 3; June 10, 1903, 3.
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200,000 sacks in 1896 to 1,000,000 in 1902. To keep up with demand for facilities, the
Board accepted an advance from a railroad line and contracted for even more shed
construction at the Julia and Celeste Street facilities.18
New construction at the river near Girod Street placed more demands on the
Dock Board budget. By May, 1904, as the regular session o f the legislature approached,
the Board prepared legislation authorizing $2,000,000 in revenue bonds for port
construction and other improvements. The city’s political and commercial
establishments immediately united behind the plan. Charles Janvier, member o f the
city’s Board of Liquidation, issued a statement of support, the Board o f Trade agreed by
formal resolution, and the Daily Picayune lent its editorial voice to the effort. A vision
of the new river front was presented to the public. “Commerce to Have a Grand River
Front,” read the Daily Picayune headline to an article that described paved roads and
approaches, sheds with public utilities, and lower shipping rates—all to be completed
within two to three years. In the midst o f the plans came word that the Dock Board had
won its case against a railroad granted land by the city council, affirming the power of
the state agency. Mayor Capdevielle agreed not to appeal, marking the acquiescence of
the city in the Dock Board’s power. The Mayor, who had won his position through the
political power of the Choctaw Club, defied the wishes o f his city council when he
decided not to appeal the case. But there was no clear Regulars versus reformer
18 Dock Board Minute Books, July 14, August 11, September 1,15; New
Railroads fo r New Orleans, 6-7; Daily Picayune, August 12, 1903, 5; September 1,
1903, Section III, 10; September 2, 1903, 8; September 16, 1903, 5; September 29,
1903,4.
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controversy on this issue. Most of the Dock Board, with the exception o f President
Hugh McCloskey, had ties to the Regulars and owed their positions to governors
similarly connected to the Choctaw Club. The dividing line between the two sides was
not factional, but rather reflected two different, although largely unarticulated,
ideologies. Both groups wanted an expansion of city commerce, but those is favor of
the railroad position saw economic development as a function o f private investment,
especially investment by large railroads. Those who argued in favor of the Dock Board
position also craved commercial expansion. But the latter group assumed a major role
for government investment, operation, and even ownership o f crucial elements of the
transportation infrastructure.19
After personal lobbying of Governor Blanchard by Board members, the bond
authorization passed the legislature in Act Number 44 of the 1904 legislature. In midJuly consulting engineers placed “the magnificent plan” before the port commission and
the long-range vision o f the port was in place. In the midst o f the 1904 mayoral
campaign, the changes along the river front received no great notice. Even though the
campaign divided the city along traditional Regular-reformer lines, Martin Behrman and
Charles Buck, the contending mayoral candidates, did not make the governance o f the

19 Dock Board Minute Books, February 20, May 24,1904; Daily Picayune,
February 19, 1904, 5; May 26,1904,1; May 28,1904, 5; June 25,1904, 5. The
differences in the two groups may also reflect what William Link called the “paradox”
of southern progressivism. In this case, those arguing for private investment represent
the individualistic, republican South; those arguing on behalf o f the Dock Board
represent the centralizing influences of progressivism. Link, The Paradox o f Southern
Progressivism, 1-5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

237
wharves an issue. The civic consensus in favor o f changes in the port was firm and not
subject to the vagaries of election. Once again, President McCloskey set out the vision:
“The Cheapest Port Charges with the Best Facilities.” Routine business continued as
well. The Illinois Central offered an advance to keep construction on schedule as the
Board planned for an early 1905 bond sale. The Dock Board firmly supported city
efforts to serve the wharves with an efficient railroad belt system. December tonnage
figures set another record as the Board struggled to expand facilities to meet demand.
And the completed bond sale provided necessary funds for four years of construction.20
In February, 1905, an enormous fire broke out on the Stuyvesant Docks, the
portion o f the wharves leased to the Illinois Central Railroad. Damage to the cargo,
freight handling facilities, nearby homes, and an ice plant was estimated to be as high as
$3,000,000. The railroad immediately announced plans to rebuild, and the Board turned
its attention to prevention and fire fighting. Within a week, plans emerged for a water
main that would run along the river and serve the docks with sufficient pressure to fight
fires. In addition, the Board planned for the purchase of a fire boat. By the end of
March, the port acquired a tug to be converted into such a boat. Later actions o f the
Board recommended the use o f spark arresters on locomotives and the use o f fuel less
likely to cause a fire hazard.21
20 McGuirk, Laws Constitutional and Statutory, 6; Dock Board Minute Books,
July 26, 1904; Daily Picayune, July 13, 1904, 9; September 1, 1904, Section m , 10;
October 5, 1904,4; December 21,1904, 7; January 4,1905, 4; February 8, 1905, 5;
March 2, 1905, 5. For a full discussion o f the public belt railroad, see Chapter VIII.
21 Daily Picayune, February 27, 1905, 1; February 28, 1905, 1; March 2, 1905, 5;
March 10, 1905,4; March 31, 1905, 5.
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In May, 1905, the Board looked back on its four years o f active control o f the
port with, pride. Among other achievements, Superintendent Cope reported on the
“Dock Board’s fine showing” after the port’s own crews built sections o f wharves for
“less than the lowest [private company] bids and much quicker” than the private
estimate o f construction time. The emphasis on savings realized from the use of public
labor echoed the attitude of the city’s Sewerage and Water Board, which went to similar
pains to justify public labor supplanting private contractors. But the substitution of
public labor for private enterprise was not a permanent change. The Board would use
the option o f its own labor when private bids were too high. As long as those bids were
within reason, the Board utilized private contractors. By the end o f May, 1905, the
Board announced award of a contract for one o f the largest projects to date, the
construction o f the Julia Street Wharf. And to prevent further fire calamities, the Board
completed arrangements for a water main along the length o f the river front, although
the Sewerage and Water Board did not complete the project until 1908. The activity did
not go unnoticed. Daily Picayune columnist “McDonogh” called the Board “the
Sensational Five . . . doing the building along the riverfront.” He added that “ they have
earned the title by neat, clean and consistent work” and “every day represents something
done for the public welfare.”22
The next few months proved difficult for the port and the city as the yellow fever
epidemic undermined the city’s commercial reputation. Monthly tonnage figures began
22 Daily Picayune, May 3, 1905,10; May 10, 1905, 4; May 31, 1905, 7; July 11,
1905,4; July 23, 1905, Section HI, 14; May 9,1906, 5.
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to fall as the fever spread, although the port management announced only “very slight
decreases from the previous year in spite o f the yellow fever.” Wharf construction
proceeded even during the months o f the epidemic; $500,000 refurbished or built
wharves at Toledano, Market, Erato, Eighth, Toulouse, Hospital, and Mandeville
Streets. As a fire prevention measure, the Board asked riverfront railroads to use fuel
that would reduce the danger of stray sparks. The tug-tumed-fire boat, re-christened
“Sampson,” proved its worth by the end of the year, when, after a fire broke out on a
cotton ship, it extinguished the blaze in three hours.23
The success of the port led to the Board’s involvement in a wider range o f civic
endeavors. In addition to its contributions to the public belt system, the Board provided
an important mediating influence among river front interests. At the request o f the
Progressive Union, which wished “to make New Orleans the distribution point for the
immigration business,” the Board agreed to investigate the building of an immigration
station. New Orleans was an important port o f entry for immigrants and state policy
sought to increase the flow of potential rural labor. The Board identified a potential site
but needed railroad cooperation in rearranging tracks, and the project stalled.24
Board policy also transformed the port administration into an active agent for
promoting specific market segments in the import/export business. Latin American
23 Daily Picayune, August 9, 1905, 14; September 6, 1905, 4; September 15,
1905, 5; November 14, 1905, 7.
24 Daily Picayune, December 20, 1905, 4; April 4, 1906, 11. For one view of
Louisiana’s efforts to increase immigration, see Charles Shanabruch, “The Louisiana
Immigration Movement, 1891-1907: An Analysis of Efforts, Attitudes, and
Opportunities,” Louisiana History 18 ( Spring 1977): 203-226.
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exports of fruit to the United States expanded rapidly during the first decade o f the
century, and New Orleans was a natural point o f entry. The Board responded by
erecting special facilities for the fruit trade. When the contractor experienced
difficulties in delivering the completed sheds, the Board threatened to take over the
project rather than risk the loss o f the trade. Business was so good that St. Bernard
interests proposed an extension o f port jurisdiction to the mouth o f Lake Borgne east of
New Orleans. But the city council and press condemned the move as detrimental to the
interests of the port, since it would dilute the economic effects o f commerce over too
large an area.25
Throughout 1906, the Board’s construction program continued: acquisition of
steel doors for sheds, roofing contracts, new shed construction, and paving projects.
Cooperation with the belt road led to an extension o f the time limit set for the belt’s
completion, a project necessary for the most efficient movement o f goods along the
river front. But for the first time since the organization of the new commission,
questions arose over the port’s schedule of fees. The state legislature voted for an
investigation o f “excessive charges” at the port, and McCloskey was forced to defend
his policies. Cotton brokers in particular complained that the New Orleans port suffered
in comparison with Galveston, causing a loss in cotton trade to the Texas competitor.
The controversy accelerated, and the Progressive Union asked Mayor Behrman to
intervene, claiming that “the net cost for handling [cargo in New Orleans] is
25 Port Handbook o f New Orleans, 11; Daily Picayune, February 21, 1906, 5;
March 7, 1906, 5; April 4, 1906, 11.
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prohibitory.” Behrman declined, but the Board o f Trade announced an investigation o f
the port charges.26
The controversy over fees at the port persisted for two years. In response to the
concerns o f the Cotton Exchange, the Dock Board began an inquiry into labor costs at
the New Orleans docks and the methods of cotton compression and inspection that
might put the city at a disadvantage. In February, 1907, the Board agreed with the
Exchange that inspection policies put the city in a weak competitive situation and urged
a conference between the Board o f Trade and the Cotton Exchange. When the situation
had not improved by summer, the Progressive Union intervened and again urged a
resolution o f the issue. Throughout the controversy, the Dock Board continued its
program o f improvements. Bids were opened for a paved roadway along the wharves,
the first phase of which would run from Bienville Street to Barracks Street, roughly the
east-west boundaries of the French Quarter. A long wharf was planned for the stretch
o f the river from Jackson Avenue to St. Mary Street, a distance o f 1,600 feet. And the
Board held a conference with lumber interests from the Board o f Trade to consider
construction of a wharf designed to promote the export of lumber from the port.
Governor Blanchard recognized the contributions o f Board President McCloskey by
appointing him to an additional five-year term in September, 1907.27
26 Daily Picayune, September 1, 1906, Section III, 3; September 29, 1906, 5;
October 11, 1906,4.
27 Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 607-608; Daily Picayune, January 4,
1907, 4; January 19, 1907, 12; February 20, 1907, 8; March 6,1907, 4; April 3, 1907, 5;
June 28, 1907, Section II, 1; July 3,1907, 5; September 26,1907,15. See also Donald
J. Millet, “The Lumber Industry o f ‘Imperial’ Calcasieu: 1865-1900,” Louisiana
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The latter half o f 1907 proved difficult for the port as total tonnage declined
from 1906 levels. In 1908 the port would handle 1,000,000 fewer tons than the peak of
5,000,000 in 1906. Longshoremen struck the river front, and even Mayor Behrman,
viewed as sympathetic to labor, was unable to coax them back to work. Behrman
suggested former Mayor Capdevielle as an “umpire” for the strike, but management
rejected him because he would be standing for reelection as state auditor early in 1908.
In addition, racial tensions among the workers arose over representation on an
investigating committee. Although black screwmen welcomed the investigation and
nominated participants, white workers refused to accept African-American
representation. In addition to labor troubles, the port continued to receive criticism and
unfavorable comparisons with other ports. In November, after numerous attempts at
mediation, the strike ended. At the same time, Governor Blanchard’s message to a
special session of the legislation called for an investigation o f the New Orleans port,
emphasizing its status as a state, not a city, agency. The Progressive Union sided with
the governor’s call for investigation. In the group’s annual report for 1907, initiation of
the investigation is claimed as a signal accomplishment.28

History 7 (Winter 1966): 51-69 and Anna C. Bums, “The Gulf Lumber Company,
Fullerton: A View of Lumbering During Louisiana’s Golden Era,” Louisiana History 20
(Spring 1979): 197-207.
28 Port Handbook o f New Orleans, 11; Behrman to William M. Smith, President,
New Orleans Cotton Exchange, November 2, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily
Picayune, September 29, 1907,1; October 8, 1907, 13; October 9,1907, 13; October 22,
1907, 1; October 31,1907, 12; November 1, 1907, 10; November 5, 1907, 8; January 8,
1908,2; Colored Screwmen Benevolent Association Number 1 o f Louisiana to
Behrman, October 31,1907, Behrman papers.
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For the first part of 1908, the Dock Board faced the recently-appointed
legislative investigating committee, whose work took five months to complete.
Members o f the investigative committee visited Savannah, Pensacola, and Mobile to
examine operations and gather suggestions for improving the N ew Orleans port. Upon
convening back in New Orleans, the committee received information from the Dock
Board, and attention quickly returned to the question of cotton handling. Inconsistent
inspection and a myriad of compression standards harmed the cotton trade, and the
President of the Cotton Exchange, William B. Thompson, called for “a central
warehouse to cut out unnecessary labor and handling [and equipped] with a compression
machine.” The Cotton Exchange and the Board of Trade entered into a rare public
disagreement, each appealing to the investigating committee. Dock Board President
McCloskey claimed that the “diversion of cotton” to Galveston could be traced to
“transportation discrimination” not to the shortcomings of the port. He blamed both the
railroads and the shipping lines, since preferential agreements between railroads and
shippers discriminated against “tramp steamers.”29
The idea of an injurious combination of railroad and shipper resonated with a
public suspicious of monopoly and alert to anti-trust actions. Federal power had been
brought to bear against nefarious combinations; should not local and state power be
exercised as well? The Daily Picayune editorialized against the “combinations” that
restricted the cotton “free market.” Resentments aimed against the railroads increased
29Daily Picayune, February 8,1908, 1; February 19,1908, 11; February 20,
1908, 11; May 1, 1908,4; May 3, 1908, 4.
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when President J. T. Harahan and local General Agent Hunter C. Leake of the Illinois
Central publicly suggested shipping cotton through Birmingham to Savannah. Leake
later claimed that the simultaneous statements were “co-incidence” and that the railroad
was not engaged in threatening the New Orleans port. Local observers remained
unconvinced.30
The completion o f the investigating committee’s work brought good news to the
city and the port administration. The final report emphasized the quality of the port’s
facilities and the “natural advantage” o f its location, but pointed out that additional
construction—especially for much-needed lumber facilities—required more funds.
“Facilities and natural advantage equal trade” was the recommended formula, and the
committee advised the upcoming session o f the legislature to approve another bond
issue first proposed by the Board in April “to complete the great wharf system.” The
committee criticized the Leyland and Harrison shipping lines for “combining” with the
railroads to “secure practically a monopoly” and shut out tramp steamers, thus reducing
competition. Mindful o f the controversy over the cotton trade, the report endorsed
efforts to regulate cotton handling and compression. Finally, the committee confidently
predicted labor peace “for five years” due to its benevolent intervention. (In spite o f the
investigating committee’s prediction, labor peace did not come to the docks. Strikes
broke out in July, 1908, and the governor appointed an arbitration commission, assuring
the community that “the arbitrators [would] be all white men.”). Additional good news

30 Daily Picayune, March 27, 1908, 5, 6; March 28, 1908, 5.
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came from a city council resolution. First introduced in the beginning of 1908, the
resolution, backed by the Mayor, sought to dedicate the naturally scarce land along the
river front for “public use . . . forever.” The city council resisted, but the weight of
public opinion—including support from the Board o f Trade—moved the ordinance in the
spring of that year.31
The proposed bond issue received widespread support after the recommendation
o f the investigating committee. The commercial exchanges and civic groups joined in
urging the legislation, including the Cotton, Sugar and Rice, Livestock, Stock, and
Contractors and Dealers Exchanges, as well as the Board o f Trade. The state legislature
agreed, and Act 180 o f 1908, approved on July 3, provided $3,500,000 for new
construction. The act pledged Dock Board revenues from operations to pay the bonds.
Obviously confident in the profitability o f the docks, the legislature also required the
Board to stand behind a bond issue granted to the Public Belt Railroad.32
The bond issue allowed the Board to continue its construction work at a crucial
time, but final approval awaited a statewide vote in November. In April, the Board had
agreed to expand the wharves by 4,000 feet in the area above Napoleon Avenue. During
summer, shipping lines requested expanded facilities as overseas trade boomed. The
31 Henry Schreiber, President, Board of Trade to Behrman, February 3, 1908,
Behrman Papers; Daily Picayune, February 19, 1908, 4; March 26, 1908, 6; April 29,
1908,4; May 29, 1908, 12; June 9, 1908, 6; July 7,1908, 1. The arbitration
commission successfully ended the strike. In February, 1908 the Wholesale Grocers
Association; felt the land dedication issue important enough to issue a statement of
support to the city council. Daily Picayune, February 14, 1908.
32 McGuirk, Laws Constitutional and Statutory, 10-12; Daily Picayune, June 17,
1908, 12; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 608.
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United Fruit Company petitioned the Board for additional wharf space to add to its
2,100 feet. Company representative C. H. Ellis announced that United Fruit had ordered
three new ships for the Latin American trade and planned to order three more, the
largest o f which would be 400 feet long. The company anticipated an increase in the
banana trade from 4,000,000 bunches per year to 8,000,000. In August, the Board
hosted a visit from Governor Sanders and thanked him for supporting the bond issue.
The Governor returned the compliment, calling the Dock Board “a model o f finest
public service.” By November, additional requests for expansion came from coffee
shippers. “Coffee the new king and the Dock Board will crown him” announced the
Daily Picayune. The shippers estimated a volume of 2,000,000 bags, and the Board
agreed to build a 1,500 foot shed and install automated handling equipment as soon as
possible.33
As 1909 began and the bond issue went to market, the Board juggled space
requests from competing interests, asserted its authority vis-a-vis the city council once
again, and confronted safety issues. Steamboats constituted a declining percentage of
port business and a nuisance to other users of the docks. Bowing to the steamship lines,
the Board rearranged wharf space, moved the steamboats, and assigned new facilities to

33 McGuirk, Laws Constitutional and Statutory, 12; Daily Picayune, April 10,
1908,4; July 15, 1908,10; August 10,1908, 5; October 24, 1908, 5; November 18,
1908,4. The New Orleans port remained an important part o f the banana trade until
Gulfport, Mississippi, constructed special facilities and diverted a large portion o f the
business. By 1920, the coffee trade at New Orleans exceeded 380,000,000 pounds,
approximately thirty per cent o f all imports o f coffee into the United States. Cass, Facts
o f Interest about the Port o f New Orleans, 19.
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them from Canal Street to Lafayette. But the Board resisted a new council initiative to
grant land at Canal Street and the river to the Texas Pacific Railroad. The city council
passed an ordinance at the request of the railroad, which wanted to use the Louisville
and Nashville passenger depot on the downriver side o f Canal Street. Secure in its legal
status after a decade of court decisions, the Board refused. Alert to the continuing threat
o f fires along the docks, the Board recommended to the railroads that spark arresters be
installed on all locomotives and required wharf operators to acquire fire-fighting
equipment that would connect to the new water mains.34
Matters of commerce and the business climate united the commercial and
political establishment beyond the routine matters of port administration. In March,
1909, Mayor Behrman, John Parker and James W. Porch traveled to the northeastern
United States to promote the port’s facilities. Although the Mayor and Porch had
worked together on the public belt railroad, Parker—prominent member o f the Cotton
Exchange—was a constant enemy of the Regulars. (Parker once called professional
politicians “socially useless.”) Nevertheless, any political antagonism remained in the
background during the promotional trip. At a banquet in Philadelphia, the Mayor spoke
in praise of the river front facilities and emphasized the public nature o f the operations.
He assured the audience that all steamship and railroad lines enjoyed “parity” at the
docks and recommended to his hosts “the evolution of a public policy which has had in
view the preservation of a large part of our water front and its dedication under public
34 Daily Picayune, January 20, 1909,4; February 2, 1909, 12; February 18, 1909,
5; March 12, 1909, 4.
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control to the needs of our commerce.” In May, 1909, Philadelphia officials visited
New Orleans, and regular steamship service began between the two ports. President F.
S. Groves o f the Philadelphia and G ulf Steamship Line inspected the New Orleans
harbor facilities and supported the notion o f public ownership by commenting:
This is the most wonderful harbor I have ever seen; the best system in the county
is in operation here... the docks are splendidly constructed and much better than
the slip system. The public ownership of the docks, I think, solves the problem.
In Philadelphia, ninety percent o f the river front is owned by the railroads and
this tends to cripple any port.35
Behrman had occasion to repeat his arguments in favor o f public port facilities in
May when the battleship Mississippi paid a call on the port o f New Orleans. Port
officials felt that the U.S. Navy discriminated against the city and that competing ports
spread false information about the navigability of the river. The federal government had
only recently financed the opening of the Southwest Pass from the Mississippi River to
the Gulf o f Mexico, and city officials used the battleship’s visit to publicize the port’s
facilities. At a grand banquet for the officers of the Mississippi, Mayor Behrman
mentioned the city’s campaign to sell “the rest of the country” on the river’s ease of
navigation. Congressman Ransdell o f Louisiana called the visit “a splendid argument
for deep waterways” and added that “New Orleans is especially fortunate in having

35 Behrman to James W. Porch, June 2,1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily
Picayune, March 11, 1909, 1; March 12, 1909, 5; May 8, 1909, 7; June 13, 1909, 4.
According to Schott, “John M. Parker and the Varieties o f American Progressivism,”
151-153, Parker helped organize the Southern Commercial Congress and was a
prominent participant in the Rivers and Harbors Congress. The lobbying groups
emphasized improvements to waterways, especially the Mississippi River. For the
comment regarding professional politicians, see Schott, 117.
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retained control o f its riverfront instead o f transferring [it] to railroads.” When the
Mississippi subsequently traveled upriver as far as Natchez and then returned down the
river in record time, the city viewed the exercise as further proof that the river and port
were established in the first ranks of American waterways and harbors.36
Throughout the decade, the Dock Board took an expansive view o f its authority,
and its role in the promotion of commerce continued to grow. A joint committee o f the
Cotton Exchange and the National Farmers’ Union had studied the issue o f cotton
warehousing, and Chairman W. B. Thompson approached the Dock Board with a
request for a radical departure from private enterprise. The business slump o f 1906 to
1908 was over, and the port hoped to capture a larger share o f the cotton market. In
July, 1909, the President o f the Cotton Exchange (and Public Belt commission member)
called for the construction and operation of a public warehouse for the storage and
handling of cotton for export. This was not the first occasion on which a central
warehouse had been recommended, but Thompson emphasized the difference between
the old and the new plans. The new plan involved a public facility, owned and operated
by the people o f the state.. . . It is a public enterprise which m u s t . . . be
successfully inaugurated and operated only by the power of the people.
Individuals or private corporations cannot accomplish the object o f the design.
[It would be] foolhardy to give to such individuals or private corporations so
large a grant o f arbitrary power.”

36 Monthly Report of Secretary/Manager, Minutes, Reports, and Related
Miscellany of the Progressive Union Board and Its Various Committees and
Subcommittees, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Special Collections
(hereinafter cited as Progressive Union Minutes), May, 1909: Daily Picayune, May 10,
1909,4; May 11, 1909, 6, 12; May 13, 1909,1; May 26, 1909,1.
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Thompson enumerated three dangers inherent in private ownership-high charges,
monopolistic tendencies, and potential domination by the railroads—and argued that a
public operation placed “under the Dock Board would avoid” all three. A Daily
Picayune editorial quickly echoed Thompson’s arguments for expanded Dock Board
power:
While under ordinary circumstances, the facilities for the handling o f cotton
would and should be provided by private enterprise, the powerful combination
composed of American railroads and foreign shippers and foreign buyers renders
it imperatively necessary that our cotton growers, our manufacturers . . . should
make some counter movement to obtain some hold on the traffic o f one of our
great staples. We must therefore adopt some such methods in handling and
storing of cotton as are used and operated against us.37
The warehouse project faced a significant challenge from the private sector. A
member of John M. Parker’s brokerage firm announced in early 1910 that investors
planned a private warehouse to service the cotton trade. John Airy enumerated several
reasons for a private facility, including liability, superior administration, and better
cooperation from railroads. W. B. Thompson, Cotton Exchange President, took the lead
in refuting Airy’s contentions. The Exchange declined to endorse a particular plan, but
agreed that the facility—whether public or private—should stay within the city. Mayor
Behrman opposed the private project, recalling later that “whenever government wants
to do something some private interest always says it is unjustly injured.” The Dock
Board vowed to fight the scheme, especially because its proposed location would
remove business from the city. A steamship line joined opponents of the “outside site,”

37 Port Handbook o f New Orleans, 11; Daily Picayune, July 11, 1909, 8.
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and Mayor Behrman began a search for a city location. The Daily Picayune
editorialized on behalf of a public warehouse, citing fear o f domination of trade by one
railroad, the effectiveness of the Dock Board, and the access to the Public Belt Railroad
that a city location would provide.38
The warehouse project took several years to implement. The Board received
legislative authorization in 1910. Later that year, a constitutional amendment added to
the Board’s authority. But litigation delayed the project, and the ability of the Board to
construct the facility remained uncertain until 1913, when a new constitution for the
state clarified the issue. Construction began the next year after a review o f the plans by
the city’s Cotton Exchange and the first stage o f the warehouse was completed with an
annual capacity o f two million bales. In later years, a public grain elevator took its
place among the expanded facilities along the river front.39
Mayor Behrman praised the operation o f the river front and considered its
improvement an important achievement for the city. Even though the Dock Board was
a state agency, city support was essential in obtaining legislative support. In return,
Dock Board patronage flowed to the Regular organization. In its operation, the Board
38 Hugh McCloskey to Behrman, January 3,1910, Behrman Papers; Daily
Picayune, January 1,1910,6, 12; January 5, 1910, 6; January 13, 1910, 5; January 21,
1910, 7; February 10,1910, 8; February 18, 1910, 5, 8; Reynolds, Machine Politics in
New Orleans, 152-153.
39 The WPA Guide to New Orleans, the Federal Writers’ Project of the Works
Progress Administration for the City of New Orleans (Pantheon Books, New York:
1983), 276-277; Kendall, The History o f New Orleans, 2: 609-611; McGuirk, Laws
Constitutional and Statutory, 13-14; Port Handbook o f New Orleans, 25; Port and
Terminal Facilities, 25-26; Facts o f Interest about the Port o f New Orleans, 18;
Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 152.
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thus represented an interesting combination of progressive ideals—expertise and
governance insulated from direct democracy—and the political functionality o f the
Regulars—patronage and direct service to clients. The two supposed opposites came
together in the public ownership and operations o f the docks. Mayor Behrman’s
pragmatism led him to support the Dock Board and public projects such as the cotton
warehouse, easily rejecting arguments to the contrary. Perhaps his lack of intellectual
rigor, as opposed to native intelligence, made the Mayor the ideal leader for such
ostensibly contradictory arrangements. Behrman claimed that public attitudes were
pragmatic as well. “Things change. The people’s ideas change from time to tim e .. . .
Once upon a time you could easily condemn anything by saying it was ‘Socialistic.’
When it was decided in 1910 to build the public cotton warehouse, The Times-Democrat
said it was ‘Socialistic.’ Nobody paid the least attention to that.” In an address to the
National Rivers and Harbors Congress in 1915, the Mayor claimed “in the policy and
practice of public ownership, control and operation of its water-front facilities, New
Orleans is far in advance of any other American port.” In that year, the jurisdiction of
the Dock Board extended over forty-one miles of river front and five miles o f wharves.
In 1914, Behrman reported, the public facilities of the port served 1,529 vessels. The
port ranked second in the United States in volume o f cargo—over 6,000,000 tons—and
had attracted $20,000,000 in federal funds helped to dredge the Mississippi River
channels.40
40 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 83; Behrman, New Orleans: What It
Is Doing to Facilitate Transportation, 5-7; Port Handbook o f New Orleans, 11.
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The construction and development program along the river front demonstrated a
consistent purpose and an adherence to the principles under which the Board operated.
Once the city and state turned away from private enterprise as a solution to the public
organization of the docks, the Board steadfastly pursued the socialization of costs and
benefits. Starting with the original legislation, the Board supplanted the private
contractor and began infrastructure improvements, but its role grew almost immediately.
Within a decade, the Board built wharves and sheds, assisted in the development o f the
belt railroad, promoted the export and import trade through the construction of
specialized facilities, and, eventually, built large warehouse and grain elevator sites.
This public orientation did not flow from a well-constructed ideology or political
agenda. Much as public opinion supported the socialization of the sewerage, water and
drainage systems, the public supported the operations o f the Dock Board—first, as a
logical response to the threat of monopoly power, and, second, as a method of
promoting private industry and commerce. To the tum-of-the-century businessman,
progressive meant progress—the expansion o f business and the well-being of citizens.
To the professional politician of the era, progressive civic development also meant the
well-being o f citizens, with the by product o f satisfied voters and a smoothly
functioning political organization.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE PUBLIC BELT RAILROAD COMMISSION:
PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT

In New Orleans, geography was destiny to a greater extent than most cities. If
the city’s location was improbable from a drainage and sanitation point o f view, the
consequences to transportation and economic development were not much better. The
enormous advantage New Orleans enjoyed as a major port city on the continent’s
greatest river could not be denied. As cotton production moved south and west in the
nineteenth century, the city’s wharves attracted higher volumes o f trade and the
financial services that supported the cotton trade. But as the Mississippi River
approaches New Orleans from the northwest it begins an enormous counter-clockwise
loop, forming the crescent that gives the city its nickname. After completing the
crescent, the river turns abruptly southward, forming Algiers point on the west bank
across from the French Quarter, and then continues on its way to the difficult river
passes that empty into the Gulf of Mexico. The river’s twists and turns somewhat
devalued the locational advantage. Commerce along the river was always difficult as
ships fought varying water levels, swift currents, and congested access.
The development of land transportation, particularly railroads, came slowly to
New Orleans because of its geographical constraints. The river formed a highway for
254

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

255
trade but a nearly insurmountable barrier as well. Any access to the river—whether from
east or west—confronted other bodies of water that tested the limits o f engineering as
well as financing. To the north and east lay Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne,
actually shallow bays of the G ulf of Mexico. In every direction, wetlands, swamps, and
estuaries surrounded the city, justifying its colonial designation as the “Isle” o f New
Orleans. The Illinois Central Railroad approached from the north, connecting New
Orleans to the lower Mississippi valley and to Chicago. From the northwest and west
came the Texas Pacific and Southern Pacific, and from the Northeast came the
Louisville and Nashville, the Northeastern, and the Southern.1
The wharf activity along the river front developed adjacent to the New Orleans
Vieux Carre (French Quarter) and gradually expanded up and down the river from
central New Orleans. The legislature eliminated the ad hoc system o f contract
administration of the wharves by establishing the Board of Commissioners for the Port
o f New Orleans, and the new Dock Board reconstructed the river front wharves. But the
problem o f access to those wharves remained. The Franchise Committee and the Streets
and Landings Committee o f the City Council heard frequent requests from railroads
seeking wrharf access, but granted privileges on a case-by-case basis that brought tracks
from important trunk lines, such as the Illinois Central, up to the riverfront. These
company-owned spurs provided connections to various points along the river or to a
1Peirce Lewis, New Orleans: The Making o f an Urban Landscape, 10-16. Some
background material on New Orleans railroads can be found in Donald J. Millet,
“Southwest Louisiana Enters the Railroad Age: 1880-1900,” Louisiana History 24
(Spring 1983): 165-83.
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stretch o f the river front wharves; however, they did not solve the problem. Railroads
first provided switching to their own cars and serviced wharves where steamship lines
with whom they had favorable agreements would berth. Rival carriers would receive
service—for a price—only after the line’s own cars had been moved. Under these
conditions, cargo interchange for goods leaving and coming into New Orleans was
haphazard at best. Even on those occasions when interchange worked, railroads charged
excessive fees.2
As early as 1879, during the improvements that dredged the river passes below
New Orleans, businessmen began to promote the idea o f a publicly-owned belt railroad
that would encircle the developed areas o f the east bank o f the city and provide low-cost
interchange o f goods among carriers. In 1889, the Municipal Affairs Association
suggested that the belt line become a priority for the city. Private railroads gave lip
service to the idea of a public belt, but often opposed its development. In 1894, the
Illinois Central convinced the city council to grant rights to the company for the
construction o f a belt railroad under its control. Construction plans called for one
section o f the belt to run down State Street, a fashionable neighborhood adjacent to the
city’s Audubon Park. Residents objected and the council repealed the ordinance. At a
later date, the Illinois Central successfully obtained access to its Stuyvesant Docks by
agreeing to the construction at railroad expense of four miles of double track along the

2 Behrman, New Orleans: What It Is Doing to Facilitate Transportation, 3;
Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 151.
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river levee in uptown New Orleans. The track would became part of a larger public belt
system.3
Official city action on the belt began early in 1900. In his annual address to the
Municipal Improvement Association, William B. Bloomfield, its president, proposed the
protection o f the land side o f the river levee for public use and the construction o f a
public belt.4 Within two weeks, encouraged by a favorable civil court decision
regarding the city’s rights along the river front, New Orleans Councilman Lafaye
echoed Bloomfield’s comments and offered an ordinance to create the public railroad,
citing the necessity for “free and untrammeled use of the levee front” and the prospect
o f its misuse “if it passes into the hands o f any railroad corporation even under the most
stringent restrictions.” The ordinance contained the essential features o f the system that
would eventually be built: public ownership and operation, freedom from corporation
subordination, modest switching charges, and the construction o f a double track along
the length o f the river front. The draft ordinance also provided for a commission to
govern the belt railroad, composed of the mayor, various city commissioners, and the
chairs of essential council committees such as finance and budget. A Daily Picayune
editorial praised the ordinance and asserted the great need for the belt line, the “greatest
importance . .. next to the reduction of wharfage and other port charges.” The new
commission not only fit the progressive ideal of a independent government entity with

3 John Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 40-41; Kendall,
History o f New Orleans, 2: 509-510.
4Daily Picayune, January 10,1900, 4.
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access to expert advice, it also fit within the emerging New Orleans consensus in favor
o f progressive civic development.5
The new city council under Mayor Capdevielle took up the ordinance, and the
streets and landing committee approved it on July 30, 1900. Shortly thereafter, the full
council added its support and adopted Ordinance Number 147 on August 7,1900,
naming a commission and appropriating $40,000 over four years for construction o f the
tracks. The council emphasized the business purpose o f the belt and the public nature o f
the levee which “belongs to the people f o r. . . commerce,” and upon which the “export
and import commerce of New Orleans” depended. The ordinance also required a swift
start to construction, and the Mayor signed it on August 11, 1900.6
Under the terms of the ordinance, the governing commission consisted of
various public officials. In early September, the council selected three of its members to
serve along with the Mayor, Comptroller, Commissioner o f Police and Public Buildings,
and the City Engineer. During Thanksgiving greetings to the city some months later,
City Engineer W. J. Hardee gave thanks “for the municipal problems solved during the
year” and cited the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad as a signal achievement. At its
annual meeting on January 9, 1901, the Municipal Improvement Association officers
reminded the membership that the group had advocated “for the last three years . . . the
5 Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 8; Daily Picayune,
January 16,1900,4; January 24, 1900,4, 8. For a brief biographical sketch of William
Bloomfield, see Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 879.
6 Ordinance o f the City o f New Orleans Providingfo r a Belt Railroadfor the
City o f New Orleans and a Public Belt Railroad System, New Orleans Public Library,
Louisiana Division (New Orleans, 1900).
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building of the public belt. The present city administration deserves credit for
recognizing and appreciating the great benefits to commerce of a belt railroad.”7
Hardee’s enthusiasm notwithstanding, the initial years of the New Orleans
Public Belt showed little progress. Many problems faced the new commission,
including the composition of the governing body. The ordinance specified the
membership of the commission, but restricting the group to members o f the
administration and the city council diminished the authority o f the commission to speak
to and for the commercial interests in the city. More to the point, the council members
o f the commission suffered from an inherent conflict in upholding the duties of their two
positions. The council heard requests from a variety o f interests seeking privileges and
franchises, particularly railroads. There was a business and community inclination to
support the railway business. Some o f the same organizations in favor o f the belt
railroad were also advertising the benefits of New Orleans to railroad companies in the
hopes of increasing service to the city. It was difficult for the council to simultaneously
give a fair hearing to railroad petitions while at the same time upholding the interests o f
the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad. Additionally, the council’s appropriation to the
commission to begin work on the belt was insufficient to the task at hand.8
These problems paled, however, before the central dilemma: private railroads
that enjoyed preferential access to the wharves resisted the construction and operation of
7 Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 43; Daily Picayune,
August 8, 1900, 4; September 6, 1900,4; November 29,1900, Section II, 1; January 9,
1901,1.
8New Railroads fo r New Orleans, 9-12.
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the belt at every turn. Access resulted from agreements with the city council, an arena
in which the railroads operated with confidence and considerable success. From the
first, the belt railroad found it necessary to fight for a clearly defined concept o f public
interest over private interests. In this conflict, the belt administration drew upon the
lessons that the Dock Board and the Sewerage and Water Board had learned and
articulated a consistent policy that resisted compromising the public belt ideal. Support
for the belt came from a variety of sources: machine politicians committed to public
ownership, other governmental agencies, such as the Dock Board, commercial interests
eager for lower shipping charges, and associations dedicated to efficiency in
government.9
The first years of the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission, as the
governing body was formally known, saw only halting progress toward the construction
o f the line. The council made an attempt to reform the process of granting privileges to
railroads along the river front by making such grants revocable, but deferred the
ordinance without further action. The council ordered City Engineer Hardee to prepare
a map of the belt route and to survey the available land. His report in June, 1901,
concluded that with “some current encroachments” excepted, there was sufficient room
for a two-way track. Councilman Cucullu asserted that “the Belt Railroad project was
o f the greatest importance to the city ... [and] required prompt action.”10 But the
9 Private associations included the Progressive Union and the Municipal
Improvement Association. The wide range o f support given to the Public Belt Railroad
provides one look at the various sources o f southern commercial progressivism.
10Daily Picayune, June 12,1901, 1.
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council soon learned that the available land identified by Hardee was the subject o f a
myriad of competing claims.
Of all the railroads serving the city, the Illinois Central was the most powerful.
In late June, IC officials asked the council for a grant o f six blocks along the river front.
At the hearing by the council’s Streets and Landings Committee, the proposal drew
opposition, particularly by the New Orleans Board o f Trade, an association of merchants
and shippers. The railroad resisted attempts to amend the ordinance and withdrew the
request. Several weeks later, the city received “a curt letter” from Stuyvesant Fish of
the Illinois Central accusing the city o f being ungrateful for the benefits brought by the
railroad. Mayor Capdevielle responded and defended city policy. By the end o f the
month, the controversy attracted the attention of the dock board, which asserted its own
rights to the land in question.11 The Illinois Central returned to the council one month
later with a new proposal which, in spite of the Board o f Trade’s and the Dock Board’s
opposition, the council approved. The Daily Picayune editorialized in vain against
giving “the city to the railroads,” although two other city dailies accused the Board of
Trade and the Municipal Improvement Association o f standing in the way of progress.12
The controversy neatly captured the countervailing forces at work. The Dock
Board, newly active along the river front, sought to preserve its rights, supported by the

11 Daily Picayune, June 25, 1901, 3,4; June 26, 1901,4; July 1, 1901, 4; July 17,
1901; July 26, 1901,11.
12Daily Picayune, July 31, 1901, 3; August 1,1901, 3; August 3, 1901,4, 7;
August 4, 1901, 4; August 5, 1901, 4; August 6, 1901, 4; August 7, 1901, 3,4; Wilds,
John W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 46-47.
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prominent Board of Trade. The railroad sought increased access to the wharves,
asserting its commercial contributions for which the city should be grateful. And the
city council found it difficult to choose among competing interests, often succumbing to
the political power of the large trunk lines. When the IC ordinance reached Mayor
Capdevielle, he concurred with the council’s judgement, citing the provision in the new
ordinance requiring the railroad to provide land to the Public Belt Commission when
belt construction began. In spite o f ardent pro-business feelings, the Daily Picayune
consistently backed the concept of a public river front. A disappointed editorial
acknowledged the Mayor’s honesty but disagreed with his conclusion.13
The Louisville and Nashville Railroad (L&N) next tested the public resolve by
erecting a fence on disputed property near the river front at Canal Street, the central
business district’s main street. George Denegre, corporate lawyer and a brother o f the
Citizens’ League Senate candidate in 1896, represented the railroad. As the dispute
reached the level of threats of force from both sides, the Board of Trade weighed in
again, reminding the parties that the Public Belt Railroad had an interest in the land as
well. Ironically, the principals in the controversy—including William Bloomfield—had
been colleagues in the Citizens’ League efforts and had shared membership in the
Municipal Improvement Association. But the former political associations did not
lessen the economic conflict. The railroad relented when confronted with its lease
payments of prior years, which undermined its claims to ownership. The fight ended

13 Daily Picayune, August 8, 1901, 4; August 10, 1901, 3, 4.
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with the belt railroad’s interests protected. The Board o f Trade used the occasion to
“agitate for public railroad construction as soon as possible.”14
By fall, 1901, more than a year had elapsed since the passage o f the enabling
ordinance, but no belt construction had begun. Mayor Capdevielle called a meeting of
the Public Belt Commission to consider the lack of progress. As the group examined
the issues, the primacy o f the Dock Board along the river front emerged. Specifically,
the potential route o f the railroad inevitably passed over ground in the hands o f the
Dock Board. The Mayor appointed a subcommittee “to wait upon [the Dock Board] and
ask that such space be dedicated for the uses of a belt road.” At the September 28
Public Belt Commission meeting, City Engineer Hardee shared with the membership his
assessment that although an agreement between the city and the Southern Pacific
Railroad was likely, a compromise with the Texas and Pacific line would be difficult.
Attempts to cross the right o f way of the T & P would likely end in litigation. At the
same meeting the commission clarified its leadership by choosing, over his objections,
Mayor Capdevielle as president. The meeting with the Dock Board went well as the
Public Belt Commission elicited a promise of cooperation and the assurance that the
port governors would take up the needs o f the belt road as soon as possible. And in

14 Daily Picayune, August 29, 1901, 3 ,4 ; August 30, 1901, 3, 4; August 31,
1901, 3; September 4, 1901, 3. The paper referred to the contest between the Dock
Board and “Ellen N.,” a play on L&N. Mayor Capdevielle did not participate in this
dispute. The Mayor sought to escape the city’s oppressive summer heat at various
vacation sites. On this occasion, the he visited Montreal “for reasons o f health.” Daily
Picayune, August 10, 1901, 3.
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spite o f widespread skepticism, the Illinois Central lived up to its agreement with the
city by starting construction of a portion of the belt tracks.15
The attention given by the Public Belt Railroad Commission to the Dock Board
grew in importance as the result o f a state supreme court decision upholding the
authority of the Dock Board over river front lands. But clarification o f authority did not
lead to swift construction of the belt. In late July, 1902 the New Orleans Cold Storage
Plant complained that the Illinois Central refused to provide switching services to the
railroad cars of opposition lines. This prevented the plant from efficiently receiving and
shipping goods. The city pressured the Illinois Central to change its policy, pointing to
the terms under which the city allowed the railroad to use public streets. But the
incident reinforced the view that, in the absence o f a fully-developed common carrier
doctrine, only a public agency could move goods fairly. The state legislature added its
weight to the commission’s authority enacting a law recognizing the New Orleans
Public Belt Railroad operation. In response to an L&N request to extend its tracks
closer to the river, editorial comment asserted that the belt “should be regarded as a
sacred undertaking, and for any man to lay hands lawlessly [on lands needed by the belt]
. . . should be regarded as an infamous crime.” Yet even then the Public Belt
Commission failed to act decisively and begin construction.16

15 Dock Board Minutes, October 1,1901; Daily Picayune, September 29, 1901,
4; September 28, 1901, 12; October 3,1901, 7.
16Daily Picayune, March 4, 1902,4; March 5, 1902, 4; July 31, 1902, 3; August,
24, 1902, 3; August 2, 1902, 3; August 3,1902,4.
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At the end o f 1902, Capdevielle called a meeting o f the Commission “to suggest
some sort o f work be started,” but it was not held until the new year. Assembled in the
Mayor’s parlor, the group heard Capdevielle urge activity because “new railroads were
entering . . . the city and there should be some way o f letting them in and giving them
entry to the river front.” After some discussion regarding the status o f land dedication
along the river, the Mayor agreed to send an ordinance to the council addressing once
again the subject o f jurisdiction over the choice lands. The impetus for the Mayor’s
actions lay in the increasing interest on the part of a growing number of railroads in the
city and its river trade. Sorting through the requests burdened the council and the
administration; perhaps the belt construction would relieve the problem. Within two
days, the Daily Picayune took the Commission to task for its delay. “The remarkable
neglect with which the Public Belt Road has been treated. . . is astonishing. Years have
passed aw ay.. . . This is a poor showing, a poor commentary on the outcome o f the
gallant fight made by the people of this city to secure their own public belt.17
The confidence o f the editorial writers in their assessment of public opinion
never wavered; the city council was not so certain. Railroads served as catalysts for and
symbols o f economic progress. An offer to bring a railroad into the city could not be
taken lightly, and the council faced a difficult balancing act in both upholding the public
belt concept and granting privileges to attract and keep major trunk lines. As the Frisco
controversy demonstrated, a politically well-connected railroad company wielded
17Daily Picayune, December 16, 1902, 12; January 7, 1903, 4; January 9, 1903,
6.
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substantial influence. Grants from the council during the early part of the century tried
to finesse the inherent tension by giving land and access to the railroads, but requiring
the companies to assist in the building of the belt. This effort merely complicated the
situation, both legally and operationally. Lengths of track built by the railroads
inevitably came under private operation, opening new controversies.
In the midst o f efforts by the Frisco railroad to obtain a foothold in the city, a
conference o f the city’s’s commercial exchanges attempted to craft a compromise.
Under the auspices o f the Board o f Trade, the group established a model ordinance
under which the railroads would build sections o f the belt tracks. The tracks would
serve all carriers with a fee set for switching cars, but the proceeds of the fees collected
would be reinvested into extension o f the belt system. Neither the railroads nor the city
council accepted the compromise, which led to protracted litigation and more
construction delays.18 For six months, the Public Belt Commission suspended active
operations and awaited the outcome of litigation. When the Commission gathered on
July 17, 1903 to consider plans, the Daily Picayune sarcastically reported on “the
alleged Public Belt Railroad . . . [whose] commissioners had a meeting yesterday. This
body has not been heard o f for so long a time that few citizens knew of its existence,
but, nevertheless, there is such a body.” The request of another railroad energized the
Commission. The Shreveport and Red River Railroad sought access to the city and
offered to build a portion of the belt tracks as well as to donate $50,000 to the city for

18Daily Picayune, February 1, 1903,4; February 6, 1903, 11.
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belt expenses. Additionally, the Commission had accumulated a like amount from
several years of modest city appropriations.19
By the end o f the month, the plan gained momentum as a alternative to a cityconstructed and operated belt line. Council grants to the railroads would be used as
leverage to obtain track construction and revenue. Council members served on the
Public Belt Commission, but did not control a majority o f its votes. The city council
considered the Commission to be dominated by the administration and did not
appreciate the commissioners crafting the terms of council franchises. In the m idst of
negotiations with the Shreveport and Red River Railroad, the council considered an
ordinance to change the composition o f the Commission by eliminating all
administration members except the mayor and replacing them with additional council
members. Nothing came o f the effort, but the structure o f commission membership
remained controversial for over a year. The proposed agreement with the Shreveport
and Red River Railroad continued to gain support, including messages from the
commercial exchanges. The Progressive Union added its endorsement, pointing out
desirability o f securing additional railroad connections to the northern part of the state.
On September 1, 1903, the grant passed the council unanimously.20
By spring of the following year, access to the river front had increased, but
interchange of cars was no more rational than before. The public belt consisted o f

19 Daily Picayune, July 18, 1903, 6; July 29, 1903, 4, 5..
20 Daily Picayune, July 31, 1903,4; August 5, 1903, 5; August 7, 1903, 5;
August 28, 1903,4; September 1,1903, 5.
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disconnected pieces o f track constructed by various railroads. Among the competing
actors—the railroads, the Dock Board, the Public Belt Commission, the city council, and,
occasionally, the Orleans Parish Levee Board—there existed no comprehensive plan for
construction or operation. The state supreme court, however, brought some clarity to
the situation in May, 1904, with its decision in the Frisco case. It upheld the authority
o f the Dock Board over river front land and thereby removed the council from the
business of granting privileges and franchises in that area of the city.
Decisions regarding railroad access became the responsibility o f Dock Board
members appointed for the purpose o f improving the development and efficiency of
trade along the wharves. Although the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission
had been given powers by the legislature and the city council, the decision established
the supremacy o f the Dock Board in deciding not only the placement o f public belt
tracks, but also the expropriation o f property for Dock Board mandated construction.
Although the Public Belt Commission remained in existence, its focus changed to
construction and operation. Only the Dock Board would have power over track
locations in the future.21
The new developments moved the Commission to action. Mayor Capdevielle
met with an early belt railroad supporter, J. E. Auvray, and assured him that pending
sufficient funds “the Belt Road will be built.” Possibly because o f the impending

21 Daily Picayune, May 24, 1904,4, 6. A Daily Picayune editorial the next day
suggested the abolition of the belt commission in favor of a takeover o f the operation by
the Dock Board. Daily Picayune, May 25, 1904, 6.
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municipal elections, the pace of action increased and the Dock Board reiterated its
support for the belt operation, noting that it was the “council’s fault if nothing has been
done in this matter.” In mid-July Mayor Capdevielle met with a committee o f the Board
of Trade, one o f whose officers, James W. Porch, showed considerable interest in the
future o f the belt. Porch lobbied the Mayor to change the composition of the
Commission to increase representation from the city’s commercial exchanges, including
the Board o f Trade. City Attorney Samuel Gilmore drafted an ordinance to restructure
the Commission and presented it to the council on August 30, 1904.22
This election eve restructuring continued a progressive era trend toward isolation
of governmental functions from the effects o f direct democratic representation. The
governor appointed Dock Board members. The Board of Liquidation of City Debt was
a self-perpetuating body, although representatives of the city ad m in istration served in a
minority capacity. The Sewerage and Water Board included the city administration and
mayoral appointees, but Board of Liquidation members had rights to membership as
well. The plan for the new Public Belt Commission followed this trend. The mayor
remained on the governing board, but other public officials would be replaced by
representative chosen from the city’s commercial exchanges—the Board of Trade,
Cotton Exchange, Sugar Exchange, Progressive Union, and Mechanics, Dealers and
Lumber Exchange—and by five at-large members. The mayor appointed the members
from lists submitted by the exchanges subject to council approval, provided the
22 Daily Picayune, July 7, 1904,4; July 13, 1904, 5; August 17, 1904,4; Wilds,
James W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 43-44.
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nominees were taxpayers and had lived in the city at least five years. The ordinance set
the term o f office for members at sixteen years to further isolate the membership from
the trends o f city politics.23
The timing of the organizational change, immediately prior to the mayoral
election, could hardly have been accidental. Both Gilmore and Capdevielle joined the
Regulars after service to the Citizens’ League in 1896. Gilmore resided in uptown, silkstocking New Orleans; Capdevielle was part o f the social elite along Esplanade Avenue.
Certainly the entreaties of the Board of Trade found both sympathetic to the notion o f
increased commercial representation on the Com m ission. By late summer, 1904,
Capdevielle knew the Regulars would look elsewhere for their mayoral candidate. The
absorption o f Citizens’ League members by the Regulars had not completely altered the
attitudes o f the reformers. By acceding to the Board of Trade lobbying, Capdevielle
transformed the Public Belt Commission into an arm of the exchanges and assured its
governance by the city’s commercial elite, with only a minimal level of formal input
from the city administration. Although the next city administration might attempt to re
establish direct political control o f the Commission, the exchanges could be expected to
resist any such action, especially at the hand of a new mayor sensitive to charges o f
“bossism.”
Within a few days of the introduction of the ordinance, Board o f Trade member
Porch compared it favorably to efforts in Chicago and Indianapolis and assured the
23 Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 44; Daily Picayune,
August 31, 1904, 4.
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public that such a commission would have the ability to build the tracks. The Daily
Picayune reminded the city council that “if the present council wants credit [for the
restructuring], they (sic) should pass it immediately.” The council concurred and passed
Ordinance #2683, N.C.S. (New Council Series), and the Mayor, for whom “it was
im portant. . . to pass the ordinance during his administration,” signed it on October 8,
1904. Appointments followed quickly and included William Bloomfield, supporter o f
the belt system since his days as president of the Municipal Improvement Association,
Board o f Trade member James W. Porch, bankers Sol Wexler and Louis Cucullu, and
other members of the city’s commercial establishment.24
At the first meeting of the reorganized Commission, the membership elected
Porch President Pro Tern. Fellow member J. D. Hill called him “the sturdiest champion
o f the Belt project the city has ever had.” According to the C om m iss io n ’s by laws,
Porch served as de facto executive director. Mayor Capdevielle administered the oath
o f office to the new members, and the Commission agreed to meet with the Dock Board
to pursue vigorously the construction o f the tracks. Prior to the official end of his
mayoral term, Capdevielle resigned to accept an appointment as state auditor, but, as his
final act in office, issued formal commissions to members of the new board. At the end
24 Capdevielle to City Council, October 13,1904, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 44; Daily Picayune, September 2,
1904, 5; September 30, 1904, 4; October 7, 1904, 4; Capdevielle to the City Council,
Mayor’s Correspondence, October 13, 1904; By Laws—Public Belt Railroad
Commission o f the City o f New Orleans; Ordinance #2683, N.C.S., Creating the Present
Commission, University o f New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection
(New Orleans, 1905). Reynolds, in Machine Politics in New Orleans, 151, confuses the
ordinance for restructuring the Commission with the start of the Public Belt.
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of December, Porch requested a meeting with the new mayor, Martin Behrman,
suggesting that it was “about time for the appointment o f the several committees” to
carry out belt operations. Behrman agreed, presided at the Commission meeting, and
began to take an active role in the business of the public belt.25
Behrman’s assumption of office, clarification o f authority over the river front,
and the reorganization of the Public Belt Commission marked important turning points
in the development of the project. The pace of activity quickened in part because of
Behrman’s energy and leadership and in part because business support followed the lead
of the commercial exchanges now represented on the Commission. The new members
attended the first Dock Board meeting of 1905 to appeal for assistance. Porch presented
a plan for a twenty-one mile track system that would require eighteen months to
construct. He left the meeting with assurances that the Dock Board would assist. Two
weeks later, the Dock Board approved the belt plans, granted space for the tracks,
required the Commission to begin construction within three months, and insisted that
the belt road must remain the property of the city in perpetuity. Both the Dock Board
and the Public Belt Commission now consisted o f business men, many o f whom worked
with each other in their private endeavors. They certainly shared a common visions of
commercial expansion. But they also shared a vision o f public development in the

25 Daily Picayune, November 3, 1904, 10; November 16, 1904, 5; December 22,
1904, 5; Minutes, Public Belt Railroad Commission, November 2,1904; Wilds, James
W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 44; By-Laws—Public Belt Railroad
Commission, 5-10. Behrman and Porch knew each other well, having served together
on committees and as directors of the Progressive Union.
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service o f that expansion, and their subsequent policies did not waver from a
commitment to public action.26
Mindful of its new deadline, the Commission met the next day to hear the report
of City Engineer Hardee reviewing the route the tracks would take along the river. The
city appropriations had accumulated over several years and payments from railroads
added to the belt treasury. A total o f $160,000 was available, enough to begin work but
far short o f the total that would be necessary to complete the project. In additional to its
financial problems, the Commission faced the legal difficulties of building a belt route
that traversed a river front with numerous railroad crossing, switch tracks, and sidings.
Porch decided to convene a conference o f all presidents o f rail lines operating in the city
“to clarify the Public Belt route and to stay out of court.” An unexpected claim by the
New Orleans and Northwestern Railroad that threatened to delay the start of
construction would be only one of the controversies faced by the Public Belt
Commission in its attempt to finish its work. At the conference, the belt staff reported
on the results of a preliminary survey; thirty tracks would have to be crossed by the belt,
each track representing a construction and legal challenge. Conference participants
reached no general agreement, and the Commission decided to move ahead and
negotiate with each railroad one at a time.27
26 Daily Picayune, January 4, 1905,4; January 18, 1905, 5; By Laws—Public Belt
Railroad Commission: Resolution o f the Board o f Commissioners o f the Port o f New
Orleans, 15. The Board resolution reaffirmed the dedication of space to the New
Orleans Public Belt Railroad that the Dock Board passed on August 12,1902.
27 Daily Picayune, January 20, 1905, 6; February 3, 1905, 4; February 17, 1905,
5.
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The Commission’s activity did not put an end to the city council’s attempts to
dictate railroad policy. Seeking the privilege of a switch track, the Southern Pacific
Railroad appealed to the council, and an ordinance favoring the line reached the Streets
and Landings Committee. Council members ignored an amendment requested by the
Public Belt Commission, in spite o f the argument that other railroads had paid for
privileges and the Southern Pacific ought to contribute as well. For several weeks the
controversy continued until Mayor Behrman intervened and invited the antagonists to
his office. At the gathering, support for the belt came from the commercial exchanges,
including the wholesale grocers who registered their opposition to the Southern Pacific.
Under pressure by the Mayor and his business allies, the Southern Pacific officials
relented, but informed the council that they expected some consideration when another
o f their franchises came up for extension in a few months. Meanwhile, the Dock Board
added to the argument in favor o f a public belt when it presented a finding that showed
one particular rail car of lumber destined for wharf construction took five days “to
belt.”28
During May and June, 1905, the Commission’s engineering staff continued the
survey work preparatory to construction. By the end o f June, it completed surveys on
eighteen out of twenty-one miles o f the route. Noting the encouraging progress, the
Orleans Parish Levee Board offered land to the Commission to extend the tracks to the
rear of the city, a location that would fulfill the plan to circle the developed area o f the
28 Daily Picayune, March 11, 1905, 4; March 23, 1905, 6; March 30, 1905, 5;
March 31,1905,4; April 1,1905,4, 6.
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city. The Commission felt sufficiently confident to approve the specifications for the
purchase o f the operation’s first locomotive and to announce plans for a July 1
celebration of the start o f construction, complete with speeches by city officials and the
governor. Anticipating the festivities, the Daily Picayune lent its congratulations: “The
New Orleans Public Belt Railroad, which was for a long time a mere figment of the
imagination and was for a term of years a fragmentary affair. . . become [s] at last a
valuable factor in the city’s commercial facilities.”29
The celebration was memorable. Guests included not only politicians, but also
representatives of the city’s commercial associations. Speakers paid tribute to J. E.
Auvray, “the father of the Public Belt,” as well as to the contributions of the
commission, the city administration, and the Dock Board. President Pro Tern Porch
gave the keynote address, estimating the cost of the tracks and equipment would be
$1,500,000, but proclaiming that the value of the operation on the private market would
be $10,000,000. Porch cited twenty-six ports around the world which operated public
belt tracks; New Orleans was the only city in the United States with such an asset.
“With a publicly owned system of wharves and with a public-controlled system of
levees coupled with a perfect publicly owned belt line service we have the implements .
. . that will enable us to defy the commercial and manufacturing world.” Governor
Blanchard said “your belt line, in short, means progress. It will demonstrate to the
outside w orld... that New Orleans has caught the spirit of progress.” Mayor Behrman

29 Daily Picayune, May 19, 1905, 7; June 20, 1905, 12; July 1, 1905,6.
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reminded the audience “that the river front and its vast opportunities o f commerce
belong to the people and should be owned by them.” The highlight of the ceremony
featured the Mayor enthusiastically driving a golden spike, though event organizers later
admitted that workers had pre-drilled the hole and filled it with cork.30
On July 12,1905, the city council accepted the bid o f the Southern Iron and
Equipment Company of Atlanta to provide a locomotive to the Public Belt Railroad.
But the line could not begin operation until construction crews finished the tracks. In
spite o f a cash flow crisis, work continued. The enthusiasm o f new Commission
members extended to financial assistance when board member Henry Schreiber
personally loaned funds to the Commission to avoid a delay in preparing for
construction. To conserve funds, the management agreed to reduce the double-track
plan to a single line, anticipating that revenue could be raised from one track and then
applied to additional construction. Railroads friendly to the belt offered to advance
money toward its construction, but the City Attorney ruled out subordinating the
authority of the belt road.31

30 The Key to the Commercial Situation: A Publicly Owned and Publicly
Operated Belt Railroad, New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division (New Orleans,
1904). This Public Belt Railroad pamphlet contains the speeches of dignitaries from the
opening ceremony and newspaper comment from that event and later. The pamphlet
carries the date 1904, but the date is in error. There is no pagination in the document,
although hand-written page numbers can be found at various places. See also Wilds,
James W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 44-46; Daily Picayune, July 1, 1905, 6;
Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 152.
31 Wilds, John W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 44-45; Daily Picayune,
July 24, 1905, 5; July 27, 1905, 6; August 9,1905, 5.
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Claims o f success began long before the completion of the track. Secretary
Mayo of the Progressive Union announced that two flour mills would locate along the
tracks; additional reports of industrial expansion surfaced, which seemed to confirm
Porch’s judgment regarding the benefits of the belt in attracting manufacturing. “There
is not a progressive city in the United States today but that is a great manufacturing
center, and the Belt commission realizes that we m ust. . . be in a position to handle our
own production. We must become a manufacturing city, the creator o f wealth.” But
amid the optimism, track construction came up against another obstacle. As the
Commission’s work gangs approached land claimed by the Illinois Central, fights broke
out with railroad employees. A crowd o f between 450 and 1,000 Illinois Central
employees (contemporary estimates varied) blocked construction and overturned rail
cars. The police arrested a number o f workers for interfering with belt operations, but
paroled them on assurances that the protest would end. The Mayor criticized the
railroad and urged a peaceful solution, which Porch achieved after lengthy negotiations
with IC officials. The controversy overshadowed the steady progress underway. In an
annual review of the city’s business climate, the Daily Picayune printed a lengthy article
by Porch detailing belt achievements including cooperation with the Dock and Levee
Boards, the adoption of sound business practices within public ownership, and a sincere
wish for “accord” with all the railroads. Later in the month, Porch returned to the city
from a vacation and expressed the hope “that now that cooler weather is on and
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members of the commission are returning home, it is intended to push belt line
construction.”32
A truce with the Illinois Central persisted, the antagonists arranged a conference,
and progress resumed. In early October, 1905, various railroads, including the Illinois
Central, entered into agreements with the belt management. By mid-month construction
reached a milestone when tracks proceeding toward the central business district from
both directions along the river met at Canal Street. Amid celebration, construction
crews joined the uptown and downtown sections. The Public Belt Commission
announced that the first engine and cars would move over the newly constructed tracks.
Progress was “rapid and satisfactory,” and the press recounted reports of more firms and
industries eager for locations along the belt facilities. The Dock Board cooperated in
finding additional room for tracks and for rail yards to hold an estimated 110 cars the
belt would be obliged to store. By the end of November, the Daily Picayune asserted
that “all tracks [were] clear now for the Public Beit” and, with an agreement in hand
with the Illinois Central, “all opposition on the levee front has been removed.”
Relations with the railroads, nevertheless, caused constant barriers to the belt project.
Private and public interests continued to conflict, but the belt management persisted in
its belief that its public organization would prevail against the private railroads. At the
end of the year, Porch wrote that one of the benefits o f the belt operation was that “in
32 The Key to the Commercial Situation, 6-7; Daily Picayune, August 2, 1905, 5;
August 9, 1905, 5; August 21,1905, 1-2; September 1, 1905, section 4,1; September
24, 1905, 3; September 29, 1905, 4; Wilds, John W. Porch and the Port o f New
Orleans, 48-50.
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the age of combinations... a publicly owned [railroad] would forestall monopoly.” In a
belt pamphlet commemorating the open of belt construction, a series o f aphorisms in
support o f public ownership included “Our local safeguards protect us against
combinations from the outside.”33
In February, 1906, the Public Belt Commission, faced with a shortage o f funds,
negotiated a $100,000 loan from the council. The council, consisting largely of
members elected by the Regular organization, saw no contradiction in funding an
autonomous commission whose members were drawn almost exclusively from the ranks
of business. Admitting the limitations o f its finances, the Commission announced its
intention to put off construction in the rear of the city, dedicating “funds and energy. . .
to completing a continuous track along the city’s wharves.” In a reversal o f earlier
policy, the council began to examine all o f the switch track privileges granted to
railroads in order to test the legality o f revoking them if the Public Belt Railroad needed
the tracks for its own operations.34
With routine matters apparently under control, James Porch expanded his view
of the belt’s possibilities. As the council wrestled with where to place a railroad
passenger terminal, for example, Porch suggested that the terminal company be required
to reserve two tracks for the belt railroad. Anticipating development along the river, he
also suggested that the belt build and operate a grain elevator “for everyone’s use.” He
33 Dock Board Minutes, November 7, 1905; The Key to the Commercial
Situation, 7; Daily Picayune, October 6, 1905,3; October 18,1905, 4; October 25,
1905,4; November 8, 1905, 5; November 29,1905,12; November 30, 1905, 5..
34 Daily Picayune, February 16, 1906, 7; March 1, 1906, 4.
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encouraged the transfer o f surplus city sugar sheds along the river to the belt’s
jurisdiction. In his capacity at the Board of Trade, Porch encouraged dissemination of
pro-belt information. In a discussion with steamship officials. Porch noted the excess
costs to the shipping lines caused by shifting berths. In the absence of a completely
functioning belt railroad, cargo could not easily be shifted on land. By completing the
railroad, the shipping lines would avoid those costs.35
Expansion of the belt activities awaited resolution o f more basic problems. The
Shreveport and Red River Railroad, now known as the Louisiana Railway and
Navigation Company, filed a dispute over river front land in extreme uptown New
Orleans, adjacent to Jefferson Parish. By its actions, the railroad challenged the
Louisiana Supreme Court and claimed that the court’s decision in the case between the
Frisco Railroad and the Dock Board did not apply to the claim o f the Louisiana Railway
and Navigation Company. The actions o f the company were the first in a number o f
nuisance controversies faced by the belt in 1906. The Southern Pacific, Texas Pacific
and L&N lines raised additional roadblocks and forced the belt line to delay the start of
its full operations. In each instance, the Mayor and the Commission remained steadfast;
they permitted no compromises with public ownership and control. And through it all
Porch remained confident, ordering work “in dead earnest” on an uptown section o f
tracks so that revenue could be earned and asserting that the belt seemed “as near a state
o f perfection in the method o f transportation as can be devised.” Porch followed his

35 Daily Picayune, March 16,1906, 5; March 17,1906,4; March 22,1906,2-3.
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claim with a request to the city council for a continuing appropriation of $25,000 per
year, a figure that the council increased twice before final passage of the city’s 1907
budget.36
In his New Year’s wishes for 1907, City Engineer Hardee hoped for the
completion and operation of the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad, now more than a
year behind schedule. Behrman wished the community “health, prosperity and
happiness” but called a conference the next day to investigate the construction delays.
No one accepted blame, but the Dock Board offered to “take the lead” in pushing for
completion. New appropriations from the city helped the belt to purchase needed
equipment and supplies. By mid-month, the belt and the Texas Pacific finally reached a
tentative agreement, and the Illinois Central once more promised cooperation. But the
Southern Pacific remained adamant that if it conceded transit to the belt, the city must
reciprocate by extending its franchise for thirty years. The Commission, speaking
through Porch, made its position clear: the belt would negotiate track rights of way, but
the franchise was a council matter. “The Public Belt Railroad Commission . . . is
advised that it has a legal right.. .to construct and operate a double track along the

36 Daily Picayune, April 3, 1906, 4; April 4, 1906, 3; April 9, 1906, 12; April 14,
1906, 4; May 16, 1906, 7; May 18, 1906, 4; June 22, 1906, 15; July 11, 1906, 5; August
17, 1906,4; August 22, 1906,4; August 31, 1906,4; September 1,1906, Section II, 16;
September 16, 1906, 7; October 19, 1906,4, 5; November 3, 1906, 5, 6; November 9,
1906.
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entire river front.” All parties agreed to meet to seek a resolution to the Southern Pacific
conflict, but delayed discussions until after the city’s annual carnival celebration.37
When negotiations resumed in March, Mayor Behrman learned of executive
sessions between belt management and Southern Pacific officials and demanded a
public hearing. The Mayor criticized his fellow commissioners for the secret sessions
and forced through an agreement in principle for the belt to obtain track rights in the
Southern Pacific area along the river. Not until another month went by, however, did
the Dock Board, the belt, and the railroad reach “a three-cornered peace on the river
front” that allow the belt to proceed. The pace o f construction resumed and the belt
anticipated the start of operations by June 1, 1907. The belt could not meet that date,
however, and rescheduled the opening for October.38
Before the city could celebrate the opening o f the belt line, another conflict with
the Southern Pacific arose. In a replay of earlier violence, railroad employees, under
instructions from their management, overturned rail cars to prevent belt construction.
Railroad officials objected to the quality of materials used by the belt in crossing the
Southern Pacific lines and resorted to force to make the point. Behrman went to the site
and negotiated a truce. He later solicited reports from witnesses to the controversy,
including Public Belt employees. In the first open break between the Mayor and
President Pro Tern Porch, Behrman argued that the railroad should have some voice in
37 Daily Picayune, January 1, 1907, 6; January 18, 1907, 5; February 7, 1907, 5;
February 9, 1907, 5.
38 Daily Picayune, March 21, 1907, 5; March 27,1907, 5; April 13, 1907, 5;
April 19,1907, 4; May 8, 1907,4.
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quality control because it would be responsible for track maintenance at the crossing.
Weary of all the belt’s troubles and the demands on his time, the Mayor publicly
suggested that it might be necessary to increase the Mayor’s authority over belt
governance.39
In September, 1907, the Civil Service Commission informed the belt
management that, as a city agency, the public railroad must follow civil service rules.
The Civil Service Commission would examine potential employees o f the belt, from the
superintendent to common laborers, and certify applicants. The Regulars had adapted to
various civil service restrictions and did not seek to overturn this decision. The
selection process delayed operations yet again. Examinations for the position o f
superintendent began on September 24, 1907, but the Civil Service Commission did not
complete the process for two months. On November 27, Augustus Phelps was named
superintendent for the operation, but did not begin work until well into the following
year. The belt had completed over seventy miles of track, including twenty miles of
double track along the busiest sections o f the river front. Even at this point, the private
railroads did not give in. A new set of negotiations began that would set the conditions
o f interchange and the rates the public line would charge.40
39 Behrman to James Porch, May 23, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; H.
Reynolds, Assistant Engineer, New Orleans Public Belt Railroad to Behrman, July 8,
1907, Behrman Papers; Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 50-51;
Daily States, July 8, 1907; Daily Picayune, July 9,1907,4; Times-Democrat, July 19,
1907, 5; Daily Picayune, July 19, 1907, 5.
40 Behrman to James Porch, August 16, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Behrman to James Porch, August 22,1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City
Council, November 27,1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Public Belt
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The belt announced rules in late December, submitted the draft of them to the
railroads, and awaited comment. The Commission set a basic change of $2.00 per car
for interchange service, a figure well below the $8.00 to $10.00 common among private
lines. The commercial railroads adhered to a regional operating manual, and the belt
agree to join the common rules that had rationalized inter-line operations, especially
Rule 10 o f the Southern Car Service Association as its associated guidelines. But the
belt attempted to limit its liability while handling the rail cars, and the private lines
balked.41
City Engineer Hardee, who had given thanks for the belt in 1900, issued a New
Year’s wish that the project be completed in 1908. The Public Belt Commission finally
prevailed that year and presided over the official opening of the public line. The newlyhired superintendent filled staff positions and drew up an operating budget. Although
the railroads did not accept the proposed Commission rules, the management o f the belt
line announced unilateral adoption o f its draft pending further negotiations. The city
council drafted a comprehensive ordinance to dedicate, in cooperation with the Dock
Board, all river front lands to public use. A council resolution proclaimed that
henceforth switch track privileges, the source of numerous controversies between the
belt line and the railroads, would be granted only to connect with belt tracks. A
proposal to the state legislature to allow the issuance o f bonds promised to end cash
Commissioner, November 27,1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune,
September 1, 1907, Section III, 4; September 20, 1907, 5; September 25, 1907, 4;
November 28, 1907, 2.
41 Daily Picayune, December 21, 1907, 12.
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flow problems and financial uncertainties. The Progressive Union recognized the
impending milestone by awarding its annual Loving Cup to William Bloomfield, who
helped bring the belt to the attention o f the public ten years before. The Daily Picayune
donated the cup each year and approvingly noted the contributions of Bloomfield and all
other who assisted in the success of the belt railroad.42
Members of the state legislature raised temporary objections to the
Commission’s plans to issue bonds. Complaints reached the members regarding the
“seizure of private property” during construction of the railroad, but the legislature
relented and allowed the bond issue after intense lobbying by the Mayor Behrman, Dock
Board president, the Board of Trade ,and other commercial interests. The legislative act
inserted a clause requiring compensation for private land taken. The opponents to the
belt declared victory but allowed the operation to go forward. Act 179 of the 1908
legislation provided authority for the bond issue, but contained a provision designed to
protect the bondholders. If the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad were unable to
properly service the bonds, the responsibility for repayment to the bondholders would
pass to the Dock Board.43
A last minute barrier arose from an unexpected source: the Interstate Commerce
Commission declared the Public Belt Railroad a common carrier, subject to federal
42 Behrman to City Council, January 7, 1908, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Behrman to City Council, February 4,1908, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune,
January 1, 1908, 5; February 18, 1908, 4; March 20, 1908, 12; June 2,1908, 5; June 7,
1908, 8.
43 Daily Picayune, June 17, 1908, 12; June 19; 1908, 5; McGuirk, Laws
Constitutional and Statutory, 10.
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rules. After hurried attempts to reverse the federal ruling, the belt agreed to conform to
ICC rules and put off the fight over jurisdiction. This allowed the New Orleans Public
Belt Railroad Commission to celebrate a ceremonial opening on August 2,1908 when a
locomotive traversed the length of the tracks. Interchange o f cars under public auspices
began several weeks later. The Daily Picayune noted “the innumerable obstacles
[which had been] encountered and overcome” and praised the efforts o f the Board o f
Trade, the Mayor, the Dock Board and the city council. “The present council. . . will
mark this administration as public benefactors for all time to come.” Construction cost
nearly $500,000, but the line became self-sustaining and remained so throughout the
history o f its operation. The city council passed a resolution o f thanks to the Leyland
steamship line which had added to the celebration, emphasizing the close relationship
between the belt line and the port.44
In 1905, James Porch wrote “We are confident it [the belt railroad] will prove a
money earner.” True to Porch’s prediction, the belt succeeded financially from the
beginning. Public belt equipment switched over 150 cars the first day, and management
announced plans for additional tracks within one month. The volume of business
required the upgrading o f phone installation. The opposition o f private lines diminished

44 Daily Picayune, August 4,1908, 1; August 15,1908, 5; John W Porch and
the Port o f New Orleans, 51-52; Daily States, August 3, 1908; A General Resume o f the
Composition, Functions, History and Operations o f the City o f New Orleans’s CivicOwned and Operated Terminal Railroad, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long
Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 1956),[no pagination]; Clerk o f City
Council to Behrman, August 4,1908, Behrman Papers.
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and, eventually, disappeared. Minor difficulties over equipment and the constant
jockeying over crossing and dock access did not detract from the accomplishment. In
1909, the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad switched approximately 80,000 cars, a
figure that more than doubled by 1914, and reached over 200,000 by 1915. Behrman
often boasted o f the belt’s success and low charges, claiming an average savings per car
o f $4.00, and a reduction in switching time from several days to twenty-four hours or
less. The belt administration was a financial success, but Behrman stated “it is not the
purpose o f the city of New Orleans to obtain a profit,” rather its purpose “[is] to
decrease the excessive charges and provide efficient belting service at the lowest
possible cost.” Businesses agreed that the belt had succeeded. Users of the services
praised the operations after only a few months o f activity. In fighting a railroad claim to
land, the belt pointed to the line’s success as a reason for the court to certify its
jurisdiction. In May, 1909 steamship agents approached Porch with a plan to implement
a barge unloading system, arguing that “railroads will not build [the facilities], therefore
agents depended upon the belt.” Though Porch carried the idea to the Commission, the
system was never built.45
By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the public nature o f the
belt became a fixture on the city’s river front. Though legal challenges lingered, the belt
45 The Key to the Commercial Situation, 14; Behrman, New Orleans: What It is
D o i n g . .., 14-15; The Behrman Administration: Work Accomplished During the Eight
Year..., 6; Martin Behrman, An Address by Honorable Martin Behrman, Mayor o f New
Orleans, Louisiana, at the Invitation o f the Society o f Economics, Tulane University,
New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Collection (New Orleans, 1913), 14-15; Daily
Picayune, March 19, 1909,4; March 26,1909, 4; May 8,1909, 7.
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leadership remained firm. In May, 1909, former city attorney Samuel Gilmore, now a
Congressman from the state’s Second district, returned from Washington, D.C., to argue
a case on behalf of the belt railroad. Gilmore had filed the case some years earlier, and
felt an obligation to see the litigation to the end. The Daily Picayune recalled the 1906
incident in which railroad crews tried forcibly to build a track on disputed land, but
Mayor Behrman, city Attorney Gilmore, and a court injunction saved the public interest.
Three years later, the case was still in court attracting “much interest. . . because of the
principle involved, namely the city’s control o f the river front.” The city eventually
won the case, but the judgment did not become final until after Gilmore’s death.46
James Porch deserved much of the credit for the success of the New Orleans
Public Belt Railroad because he mobilized the support o f commercial interests. He also
defined the principles by which the belt operated, including a strong commitment to
equity and efficiency. Mayor Behrman played the same role from the public side and
was especially valuable mediating among intense and occasionally violent parties. The
two worked as allies for five years seldom disagreeing, but in 1909 Porch resigned as
President Pro Tem. A possible conflict of interest, illness, the demands o f running a
business, and the strain of constant public service affected his decision. As the
operational demands of the belt grew, Behrman stepped in to assist in its reorganization;
Porch resigned just days later. There is no evidence that Behrman engineered the
resignation, but his day-to-day involvement with the Commission makes it likely that
46 Daily Picayune, May 23,1909, 7. Gilmore served only a short time in
Congress, passing away in 1910.
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Porch’s action represented a decision reached at least with the Mayor’s knowledge.
Commission members quickly nominated a replacement, but the Mayor objected to
filling the position so quickly and without consultation. The Commission agreed to
delay the vote. Within two weeks, W. B. Thompson, member o f the Commission from
the Cotton Exchange, who was developing a strong friendship with Mayor Behrman,
emerged as the new President Pro Tern. Porch remained a member and served for
another twelve years.47
Though neither Porch nor Behrman realized it at the time, their joint effort
symbolized an important aspect of New Orleans pragmatic progressivism. The belt
operation assumed functions previously allocated to private corporations. The
consensus in favor of a public belt did not represent an explicit, ideological statement in
support of socialism. To the contrary, Behrman’ memoirs reject the notion that the belt
represented socialism: “Public ownership of such facilities as .. .[the] public belt, was
condemned as ‘Socialistic’ and ‘radical’ ideas when I was young. Now hard boiled
bankers and business men all over the United States are strong for it.” Behrman held
contempt for socialism, but a strong appreciation for public works in support of
commercial development. In 1912, in his campaign for re-election, Behrman boasted
that his administration “built the Public Belt Railroad [after] years o f futile efforts [and
in spite of] severe antagonisms on the part of corporate interests.” The New Orleans
47 The Key to the Commercial Situation, 1-5; Daily Picayune, September 17,
1908, 5; November 11, 1908, 5; December 8, 1908,15; December 18,1908,4; Wilds,
James W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 52-56; Reynolds, Machine Politics in
New Orleans, 151-152.
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Public Belt Railroad joined the other great public works of the first decade o f the
twentieth century in defining the business climate, the political life, and the very
geography o f New Orleans. Its construction resulted from the consensus in favor of
progressive civic development and the effective leadership of Martin Behrman. The
railroad’s start of operations in 1908 highlighted the success of Behrman’s first term,
and provided ample proof to the business community that there was no danger in a
second Behrman term.48

48 The Behrman Administration: Work Accomplished. . . , 5; Kemp, Martin
Behrman o f New Orleans, 104.
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CHAPTER IX
MARTIN BEHRMAN, 1908-1912:
POLITICAL BOSS AS COMMUNITY LEADER

Political activity in the city and nation began to quicken in the summer o f 1908.
The national parties met in convention to determine presidential candidates, and
speculation grew in New Orleans about the fall municipal elections. Although the state
chose officials earlier in the year, an eventful legislative session affected the New
Orleans contests. A party primary became the required method of choosing the
Democratic candidate, ending the party convention system that the Regulars dominated.
The legislature also passed laws regulating gambling and bar rooms, giving hope to
those who proclaimed that a wave of moral reform would sweep the ring from power.
But the state elections and the legislature also solidified the power of Governor Jared
Sanders, the choice of the regular Democrats and a loyal friend to Martin Behrman.
Behrman enjoyed the normal advantages o f incumbency, as well as the
extraordinary successes of the past four years. In contrast to the Capdevielle
administration, which ended in 1904, Behrman’s term in office saw substantial progress
in the implementation of vital public works projects. The sewer, water, and drainage
systems had begun service, the Public Belt Railroad had started switching cars in
summer 1908, and the Dock Board had transformed the river front. In addition,
291
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Behrman, the city council, and the various city departments had made significant
improvements in the cleanliness o f the city, paved miles of previously primitive streets,
and, despite the national financial panic and recession, had presided over impressive city
expansion and a building boom. As early as July 3, 1908, the Daily Picayune
speculated that Behrman would head the ticket, “with no talk o f opposition” to the
Mayor or his principle lieutenants. Assuming no repetition o f the 1904 District
Attorney controversy, the Mayor seemed secure. Confident o f victory, Behrman left for
the Democratic National Convention in Denver. But he did not want to neglect his local
duties as campaign chairman for a local congressional district. Before he departed, he
reminded Choctaw colleague John Fitzpatrick to “look after the First Congressional
District Campaign Committee in his absence.” The announcement in mid-July that the
Republican Party intended to contest the city elections by appealing to “disgruntled
Democrats” did not attract much attention.1
Commissioner Smith of the Department of Public Works sat for a Daily
Picayune interview while Behrman was away, and he made the case for the
administration. During the Behrman years, Smith boasted, the city had acquired
“seventy-four head of livestock, five sanitary flushing machines, twelve sweeping
1 Behrman to John Fitzpatrick, June 26, 1907, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily
Picayune, July 3, 1908, 12; July 12, 1908,4; July 17,1908, 11. The city was quiet
during the Mayor’s absence, although Acting Mayor McRacken faced a unique problem.
“There came a request to City H a l l . . . for a permit to have a bull fight in this city, but
Acting Mayor McRacken was not disposed to issue it, understanding that the Mayor was
opposed to exhibitions o f this character. He decided to withhold the permit to await the
return of the Mayor.” Behrman declined to issue the permit as well. Daily Picayune,
July 20, 1908,4.
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machines, eleven four-wheel dump carts, one paper wagon, and an egg wagon” for the
collection of spoiled eggs. O f the $45,000 cost o f these improvements only $17,000
required new appropriations. The remainder had been financed out of savings. “My
earnest aim and effort, “ Smith asserted, “is to have the service conducted upon the strict
principles o f business.” He concluded with a plea for another term. Other office
holders speculated about the composition o f the ticket, but no caucus could be held nor
decisions made “until the return o f the big ones [bosses] from Denver.”2
While the Choctaw Club awaited the bosses return, jockeying for position and
advantage began among the Regular faithful. A conflict over which ward would name
the Civil Sheriff broke out between the Twelfth and Thirteenth Wards. Louis Knop of
the Seventh Ward “wanted something more [in salary] than coal gauger” and threatened
to challenge Commissioner Smith. Speculation suggested that Knop might “settle for
State Inspector of cattle at the slaughterhouse.” The Ninth Ward, a site of constant
intra-party fights since the death o f the elder Dudenhefer and the imprisonment of his
son, faced the loss o f important patronage in the Recorder’s Office if the various
factions could not get together.3
Behrman returned to the city on July 23, 1908. The national convention had
nominated William Jennings Bryan for the third time. Behrman preferred a different
candidate, but went along as a loyal Democrat. Choctaw member and newspaperman
Robert Ewing accompanied Behrman to Denver and returned as Louisiana national
2 Daily Picayune, July 19, 1908, 1; July 21, 1908, 8.
3 Daily Picayune, July 21, 1908, 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

294
committee member. Within a few days, the Mayor and ward leaders “harmonized”
almost all conflicts. No contests for the top positions emerged, although the primary
election would be necessary to settle minor judicial posts. The Twelfth Ward
surrendered the Civil Sheriff position, and the intramural factions o f the Ninth Ward
declared peace. Knop received the prize of the Civil Sheriffs office, securing Smith’s
renomination for Public Works. Even the Daily Picayune expressed admiration at the
smooth operation o f the Regulars.“There is reason for general congratulations on the
manner in which the primary scheme has worked,” suggested the Daily Picayune.
“There has been very little friction among the ward leaders, having apparently felt
satisfied with the administration of Mayor Behrman.. . . The opposition seems to have
faded away.”4
Behrman’s control o f the situation extended beyond the confines of the Choctaw
Club. The former traveling salesman, council clerk, and assessor now regularly worked
with the city’s commercial elite. As a result, the opposition faded, and the Mayor
quietly began to gather support, even from unlikely quarters. On July 29, 1908, the
remnants of the 1904 Home Rule Executive Committee met to consider the upcoming
campaign. Frank A. Daniels, chair of the committee, declared that he “was out of
politics” and would resign if the group sought to enter the mayor’s race. He added that
“many of those who were prominent in the movement four years ago have since become
4 Daily Picayune, July 23, 1908, 4; July 26, 1908, 4; July 28, 1908, 8; July 29,
1908, 5; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 178. Schott attributed the lack of
opposition to the power of Governor Sanders and the workings of the new primary law,
which favored the machine. Schott, “John M. Parker,” 110-111.
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supporters of Mayor Behrman.” A new reform group, the Independent Party, emerged
and proposed a merger with the Home Rulers, but a joint meeting proved more farce
than drama. Only five out o f thirty-four members of the Home Rule Executive
Committee attended. The Independents assembled a larger group, but not all wards
were represented. The members adjourned and authorized the chairman, R. A.
Tichenor, to draft a statement o f principles but delayed a decision on whether to
challenge Behrman. Even the Times-Democrat, perpetual enemy of the Choctaws,
offered a grudging endorsement of the Mayor, while condemning his colleagues and
organization.5
Final proof of the Mayor’s strong position came in a telegram sent to the DailyStates. William B. Thompson, Jr., prominent businessman and President o f the Cotton
Exchange, wrote the paper while on vacation in Bar Harbor, Maine, urging a second
term for Behrman. Thompson had graduated from University of the South at Sewanee,
attended John Hopkins, and received a law degree from Columbia. After a brief career
as a lawyer in Dallas, he returned to New Orleans to take over the family business upon
the death of his father. W. B. Thompson and Company was a cotton factorage business,
but the son expanded into other areas, including insurance. Thompson’s endorsement
symbolized both the Mayor’s success in attracting support and the unlikelihood of any

s Daily Picayune, July 29, 1908, 4, 11; July 31, 1908, 8; Kemp, Martin Behrman
o f New Orleans, 178-181. Chudacoff suggested that “reformers had little stamina
compared with their rivals” and noted that the “New York Reform Club had to suspend
its meetings [four years after its formation] for lack of a quorum.” Chudacoff, The
Evolution o f American Urban Society, 173-174.
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serious opposition. In his memoirs, Behrman complained that he had no real friends in
the Cotton Exchange crowd, but Thompson proved a loyal friend and political ally.6
Behrman expressed his gratitude to Thompson in a letter sent soon after word of
the endorsement became public. “When I assumed the reins o f government, there were
many representative citizens who feared that the city of N ew Orleans had taken a step
back,” the Mayor wrote, and, that many believed “the progressive march o f this
metropolis would be impaired most seriously based [on] their having heard o f me only
as a politician or ‘ward boss.’ I set out not only to maintain the progressive march of
our beloved city, but to quicken it.” When Thompson returned to the city, he repeated
his endorsement and identified the characteristics in Behrman he most valued—the
Mayor’s ability to build consensus and to mobilize public opinion. Thompson wrote
that citizens tend “to discourage all improvements because it is our humor to be
dissatisfied with whatever order or system may be in control.” He went on to praise
Behrman’s ability to overcome that constraint. “Your unostentacious discharge of your
duty, your fairness and your faithfulness have been fruitful. . . in inducing the most
thorough concurrence of opinion that I have known in my acquaintance with the
political history of New Orleans.”7

6 Daily Picayune, July 30,1908,4; Schott, “John M. Parker,” 100 quoting the
New Orleans Item, November 17, 1922; Kendall, History o f New Orleans, 2: 804. There
is no indication of political activity on the part of Thompson prior to the 1908 election.
He had only recently been elected president o f the New Orleans Cotton Exchange when
he endorsed Behrman.
7 Behrman to W.B. Thompson, July 30, 1908, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily
Picayune, August 8, 1908, 8.
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In spite o f the long odds, the Independents decided to oppose Behrman. A
headquarters opened, but the groups had difficulty finding a candidate to challenge the
popular Mayor. The Daily Picayune ridiculed the effort and claimed the “Independents
Still Hunting A Moses.” But on August 23, the group presented William G. Tebault as
its candidate for mayor. Tebault was forty-nine years old and claimed participation in
the Battle o f Liberty Place as a teenager, as well as more recent civic service in fighting
yellow fever. He owned a retail furniture business that was “known for [its] original
advertising.” Tebault quickly resorted to the standard reform rhetoric. He promised an
infusion of “$250,000,000 in capital to the city” as soon as the “system [of bosses] was
defeated.” He added that “the ring is frightened.” By early September, he issued a
platform calling for a clean city, honest elections, revision of city payrolls, frequent
audits, and “a liberal policy toward railroads and industry.”8
The Independents faced challenges more difficult than assembling a ticket and
platform. A new state law sought to discourage Democratic insurgents from running in
the party primary and, when they lost, bolting to enter the general election. To prevent
such rebellion, the law required independent tickets to file petitions prior to the
Democratic primary. Signatures could not include those who subsequently voted in the
primary. The Independents did not fulfill the mandates of the law. Immediately after
the primary, the state’s Board of Contests disqualified the New Orleans Independents
because several persons who signed the petition also took part in the just-completed
8 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 181-182; Daily Picayune, August 19,
1908, 5; August 23, 1908, 4; September 3, 1908, 5.
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Democratic election. Tebault challenged the decision in court and asserted his plans “to
run anyway.”9
The Regulars faced a momentary crisis when Vital Tujague, Chief Clerk for the
city’s Treasurer’s Office, admitted the theft of $30,000 o f municipal funds under his
control. (He used the money to support a gambling habit.) But Tujague’s brother agreed
to cover the shortfall, and Behrman immediately issued a statement claiming credit for
uncovering the theft. Several months prior to the discovery of the missing funds the city
had begun a series o f audits at the Mayor’ suggestion. The theft created no lasting
damage to the Regulars or to Behrman’s candidacy. The Independents, on the other
hand, found no judicial relief to the Board of Contests’ decision and lost an appeal to
gain a position on the ballot. Important supporters defected, but Tebault claimed he
“would run to the bitter end” and that “thee [Independent] League is stronger than ever,”
all evidence to the contrary.10
The Daily Picayune added to Tebault’s troubles by publishing a comparative
analysis of municipal expenditures that contradicted the standard reform claim of ring
profligacy. In a list o f per capita expenditures in major cities, New Orleans ranked near
the bottom at $20.93. The highest expenditures were in Boston ($48.52), New York
($43.39), and Washington, D.C. ($37.84). No one made the obvious point that low
expenditures reflected a lack of necessary public investment. But the reform elements

9 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 182; Daily Picayune, September 6,
1908; September 8, 1908,4.
10Daily Picayune, September 11, 1908, 1; September 20, 1908, 5.
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o f the city had for so long preached the necessity o f frugality that the statistics undercut
any argument for a change in administration. The statistics also showed the city was not
among the highest in indebtedness as well.
On October 3, 1908, the Independents lost another court challenge of the
decision that denied its candidate a place on the ballot. Undeterred, the group issued its
platform and vowed to fight on. Tebault promised the use “o f white labor for all public
works on the levees and handling commerce for New Orleans,” and the Independents’
platform “encourage [d] all negroes to return to cane, rice, com and cotton fields o f
Louisiana.” Although reluctant to reverse progress toward clean water, it also defended
“the rights [of citizens] to use cisterns” and committed the Independents to the efficient
management o f public utilities. But very few took Tebault’s campaign seriously. Late
in October, the Supreme Court o f Louisiana once again ruled against the Independents.
Tebault reminded the voters that a write-in vote remained an option, but on election day,
the insurgents drew only a few votes. Tebault recorded only eighty-nine votes, a
Socialist candidate 270 votes, and Behrman 26,897.11
The Regulars victory overshadowed defeat of the national Democratic ticket.
The Daily Picayune interpreted the presidential race as a contest between monopoly
power and the people, and proclaimed the “Trust Kings [were] Out for Taft.” City
candidates unopposed in the general election turned over surplus funds to the
organization for use in the presidential race. Regular John Fitzpatrick managed fund
11Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 182-186; Daily Picayune, September
20, 1908, 5; October 4,1908, 5.
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raising for the Bryan campaign and asked the Mayor to recommend “ a reliable man to
canvass for Bryan.” Fitzpatrick confidently predicted the election o f Bryan was “more
probable every day.” The Mayor personally contributed $100.00 to the fund. Although
the Democrats easily carried the city and the state, Taft won the national race.12
In reporting Behrman’s victory, the Daily Picayune offered a flattering recap o f
Behrman’s career and an assessment of his temperament. “His disposition [is] most
genial and he is charitable to a fault.” Two weeks after the election, the paper paid
tribute to his hands-on management style in an article titled “How the Mayor Does It.”
The paper cited two letters from the Mayor to members of his administration in response
to citizen complaints. The letter to Superintendent Earl of the Sewerage and Water
Board began “I met a delegation o f citizens” and went on to describe the need to
maintain the Melpomene Canal. The other communication went to Commissioner
Smith of the Public Works Department and described the need for a foot bridge over the
same canal at Roman Street. The Daily Picayune concluded “that there will be action
commenced after receipt of the letters may be assured.” Behrman paid tribute to the
outgoing council, issued a challenge to the new council to continue his first term’s
policies, and “after the hurrah and the celebration were over,” the Mayor later recalled,
“I went back to work.”13
12 Fitzpatrick to Behrman, August 18, 1908; Behrman secretary (W.P. Ball) to
Robert Ewing, September 17, 1908; Daily Picayune, October 29, 1908, 12; November
4, 1908, 1.
13 Behrman to City Council, December 5, 1908(?) (no date provided), Mayor’s
Correspondence; Behrman to City Council, December 8,1908, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Daily Picayune, November 4, 1908, 1; November 19, 1908, 5.
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At the first meeting o f the new council, Behrman reported on the auditors’
analysis of the municipal bookkeeping system and asked the council to support reform.
The press paid tribute to the Mayor’s experience and accomplishments and the initial
meeting of the council. The Daily Picayune noted the election o f the same set o f
officers who had served the previous four years, a “remarkable tribute to the general
efficiency o f city government.” Less generously, the Times-Democrat took issue with
Behrman’s characterization o f “a practically unanimous vote o f the people.” “It is true
that there was no opposition, b u t . . . political conditions destroyed any chance for
organization in opposition to the ring.” The anti-ring paper went on to give Behrman
credit for his knowledge of city government and “for the investigation initiated by him
to find the financial status o f the various city departments.”14
A more tangible tribute awaited Behrman upon his return from a Washington,
D.C., conference on December 18, 1908. Over 150 colleagues greeted him at his home,
held a banquet in his honor, and presented the Mayor with a magnificent silver service,
“243 pieces . . . worth $1,000.” The group lauded the Mayor “for his loyalty to the
Democratic Party,” his hard work to advance “up from the ranks,” and his service as
Mayor, including school construction and public utilities. Former Mayor Fitzpatrick,
Choctaw Club leader and state tax collector, generously proclaimed Behrman “the
greatest Mayor o f all time.”ls

14Daily Picayune, December 8, 1908, 5; Times-Democrat, December 8, 1908,
quoted in Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 188-192.
15Daily Picayune, December 19, 1908.
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Political events soon intraded on the Regulars’ victory celebrations. Robert
Davey, charter member o f the Choctaw Club and Member o f Congress for the Second
Congressional District o f Louisiana, died in late December, 1908. Speculation about a
successor began immediately and centered on City Attorney Gilmore, Lieutenant
Governor Paul Lambremont, and Tenth Ward leader Robert Ewing. Gilmore declared
his candidacy on January 1, 1909. His reform background in the Shakspeare and Flower
administrations had been forgiven by his loyalty to the Regulars since his 1899 election
as City Attorney. He had no opposition in his recent reelection campaign. Within two
days the Regulars affirmed his selection. Behrman personally chose Judge Isaiah D.
Moore to succeed Gilmore as City Attorney. Gilmore had served the city as a firm
believer in public ownership and carried the city’s cases against the railroads and the
private utility companies. Even after his election to Congress, Behrman called upon his
friend to argue cases on behalf of the city.16
Matthew Schott, biographer o f John Parker, characterizes Behrman’s second
term as one in which the city organization drew apart from the reform and commercial
elements o f the city. Specific issues arose to create conflict between the factions, and
subsequent political developments increased the perception of a break between the
groups. But most o f the Mayor’s second term followed the trends of his first. The
connections between the Mayor and the business community remained strong as he
strove to finish public work projects, upgrade the appearance of the city, and promote
16Daily Picayune, December 27, 1908, 1,6; January 2, 1909, 2; January 4, 1909,
7; May 23,1909. See Chapter VIII for Gilmore’s role in the Public Belt Railroad cases.
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New Orleans on the regional and national scene. Political and electoral differences
persisted and new ones would emerge. But on the essential elements o f the consensus in
favor of progressive civic development, Behrman and the commercial elite shared the
same agenda.17
As Behrman’s second term began, routine administrative and policy matters
absorbed the Mayor’s attention. He pursued delinquent payments from street railroads
to fulfill their obligations under the terms o f city franchises. Sensitive to criticism from
the Times-Democrat, he demanded testimony from a reporter who interviewed an
alleged deadhead employee of the Dock Board. Informed of a potential scandal at the
House o f Detention, the Mayor investigated and found that “Captain Morris Picheloup .
. . [was] using prisoners for personal business.” The Mayor referred the matter to
Commissioner of Police and Public Buildings, Alex Pujol, and the captain was
suspended. Behrman also appealed to the District Attorney to investigate rumors of
wrongdoing in other city departments. The Mayor echoed the concerns o f the Board of
Trade regarding high fire insurance rates in New Orleans and demanded the council
begin an investigation. In late January, 1909, the Mayor appealed to U.S. Senators
Murphy Foster and Samuel McEnery to intervene in Congress to “preserve the naval
station at New Orleans.” Together, these actions illustrated Behrman’s conception of
his role as Mayor in an active government: careful accountability in the expenditure of

17 Schott, “John M. Parker, 107-108.
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public funds, regulation o f private industry under franchise agreements, and promotion
of economic development.18
Less lofty aspects of the Mayor’s jobs also demanded Behrman’s attention. His
responsibilities as chief executive and political leader demanded constant attention to
the requirements of patronage. Behrman often prevailed upon subordinates and other
political figures to employ persons he recommended. The Mayor sent a list o f eleven
names to Sewerage and Water Board Superintendent Earl, suggesting they might “be
used as laborers. They are worthy and deserving.” He forwarded to Governor Sanders
the letter of a mutual friend and recommended that Sanders “issue to him a commission
and make him happy.” Even in a letter to his daughter, vacationing in Mississippi,
patronage questions intruded. He could get not a job with the Public Belt Railroad for a
Mississippi resident, the Mayor wrote. The law required all employees o f that public
agency to be Louisiana voters. But he suggested an alternative. “I may be able to get
him on the streetcars as a conductor or motorman. Let me know what he thinks.”19
The progressive trend toward regulation of morals became an immediate concern
to the Mayor in 1909. The Locke Law outlawing race track gambling and the Gay-

18 Behrman to Editor, Times-Democrat, December 12, 1908, Mayor’s
Correspondence; Behrman to Alex Pujol, January 6, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Behrman to City Council, January 12, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to
McEnery and Foster, January 25, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune,
January 13, 1909, 4; January 24,1909, 8.
19 Behrman to Superintendent Earl, Sewerage and Water Board, January 17,
1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Governor Sanders, February 25, 1909,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Nellie Behrman, September 8, 1908, Mayor’s
Correspondence.
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Shattuck Law regulating bar rooms went into effect at the start o f the year. Behrman
opposed both efforts, but was bound to enforce the laws. In a letter to W. J. O’Connor,
Inspector of Police, Behrman detailed the elements of “Shattuck-Gay” that required
enforcement, particularly the prohibition against issuing liquor licenses to women, and
allowing any “woman, girl or minor” to “serve in any bar room.” Behrman had little
use for prohibition, but remained polite to his constituents who thought otherwise. To
one such voter, Behrman expressed regret that “he would be unable to attend the annual
meeting o f the Carrie Nation Club.” Regarding the anti-gambling Locke Law, Behrman
asserted it would not suppress gambling, but would drive the practice off o f the
legitimate tracks and into the community at large where “ten times the size o f the police
force” could not suppress it.20
Some businessmen shared Behrman’s concerns and made a connection between
laws to control behavior and the economic condition o f the city. On January 5, 1909,
B.C. Casanas organized a meeting at the Grunewald Hotel and formed the Business
Men’s League to combat the perception that New Orleans had become “ultra
puritanical.” Such attitudes, Casanas feared, contributed to a depression in the local
economy and low employment:
20 Behrman to W. J. O’Connor, January 2,1909, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Behrman to Louis Ochs, February 16, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; Kemp, Martin
Behrman o f New Orleans, 231-239. Behrman’s attitude toward prohibition can be
inferred from a telegram to Governor Sanders at Vicksburg, Mississippi, October 28,
1909. The Governor was on his way to New Orleans and Behrman sent greetings. “My
sympathy is extended to the near-beer sufferers. Console yourselves with the
knowledge that oceans of the real stuff awaits your arrival here.” Behrman to Sanders,
October 28, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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These injurious effects have been produced by an erroneous report that has gone
abroad that the people of New Orleans are becoming ultrapuritanical and that
they have passed and would still further pass drastic blue laws that would curtail
the just liberties o f its citizens and make penal what has hitherto been considered
legitimate occupations and innocent amusement.21
The Business M en’s League was not the only commercial association mindful o f
the New Orleans economy. The 1909 annual meeting o f the Progressive Union
highlighted the group’s achievements and praised the Mayor for his “Buy at Home
Campaign” among city departments. But the mutual congratulations could not hide
apprehension about the city’s economy. The previous year, members agreed, “had been
one of business stagnation,” and President Philip Werlein promised efforts to bring
more business to New Orleans. The national financial panic and recession affected all
city businesses. Shipments declined in the port, the street railroad company faced
bankruptcy, and the city experienced difficulties in leasing property and selling
franchises. Both the Progressive Union and the Business Men’s League sought
additional advertising for the city, increased expenditures for promotional literature, and
the installation of a natural gas pipeline franchise to boost the local economy. The
Progressive Union fought adverse economic conditions with a campaign to identify
New Orleans as the “Winter Capital o f America” in the hopes of attracting tourists. The
Businessmen’s League lobbied for the restoration of winter horse racing and organized
underwriting for the revival o f the French Opera. Fearful of the effects o f adverse
21 Business Men’s League, Board of Directors Meeting, January 22, 1909,
Minutes, Reports and Related Miscellany, Business Men’s League, New Orleans, 19091911, University of New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Special Collections (hereinafter
cited as BML Minutes); Daily Picayune, January 6, 1909, 11.
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legislation on the city’s economy, the group issued a statement of opposition to calls for
“the complete suppression o f the liquor traffic in the state and other blue law
legislation.”22
The commercial and political leadership o f New Orleans had built up the
physical infrastructure of the city during the previous decade. The victory over yellow
fever and a strong building boom reassured city leaders who feared losing place among
the great cities of the nation. But 1907-1909 proved a difficult time, and the city sought
a variety o f solutions . Press comment advocated increased manufacturing in the city as
the path to economic growth. Businessman John M. Parker looked beyond the city and
promoted regional growth through the Southern Commercial Congress. City leaders
reached out to attract conventions and professional meetings to New Orleans, confident
that investment would soon follow visitors once the progressive nature of the city were
discovered. Special attention focused on the river and the port as the sources of
commerce, wealth, and international status. News that the city would host the Lakes-tothe-Gulf Deep Waterway Convention encouraged city businessmen to view New
Orleans as a commercial leader. The 1910 convention of the American Water Works
Association gave the city an occasion to show off its new water purification plant and
distribution system.23
22 Progressive Union Minutes, Annual Report o f Activities in 1908 by M. B.
Trevezant, Secretary/Manager, January 11, 1908; Board of Directors, BML Minutes,
January 22,1909; Board of Directors, BML Minutes, March 9,1909; Daily Picayune,
January 11, 1909, 5; March 3, 1909, 4; March 25, 1909, 5.
23 Progressive Union Minutes, Board of Directors, April 1, 1909; Progressive
Union Minutes, Monthly Report o f Secretary/Manager, May, 1909; Daily Picayune,
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Mayor Behrman retained a central role in the promotion of the city as well as in
the management of the major public works projects. Through 1910, he continued to
serve on the Board of Directors of the Progressive Union, although his attendance at
Board meetings declined. After receiving a number of citizen complaints, he urged the
Sewerage and Water Board to review the new water rates. He also worked tirelessly for
the sale of bonds to finish the water and drainage systems, although adverse financial
conditions allowed only $1,000,000 of the potential $8,000,000 to be sold. The city’s
efforts to change its method o f garbage disposal made progress when the Public Belt
Railroad agreed to haul garbage to a landfill. Eager for the city to expand, the Mayor
argued before the city Council on behalf o f the New Orleans Land Company, which had
opened the city to the north and developed the suburb o f Lakeview. Behrman supported
the company in its request for an extension o f city lighting, and cited both the work
performed in building streets and draining land and the company’s record in paying
taxes.24
In the summer of 1909, the Mayor took a long vacation to the West. During his
travels, he visited with mayors o f large cities and exchanged information on items of
mutual interest. In his absence, Acting Mayor McRacken filled in as chief executive,
but stayed in close touch with the Mayor. At Behrman’s instructions, McRacken
April 2, 1909, 4; April 4, 1909, 4; June 10, 1907.
24 Daily Picayune, May 26,1909, 12; June 11,1909, 15; June 12,1909, 5; June
25, 1909, 5; June 26, 1909, 5; Behrman to Hugh McCloskey, Dock Board, June 7, 1909,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to Public Belt Railroad Commission, June 7, 1909,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to City Council, July 6, 1909, Mayor’s
Correspondence.
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contacted Louisiana members o f Congress to promote the immigration station, which
Congressman Gilmore announced would be approved. The site o f the station was in
Algiers, Behrman’s home, and he took particular interest in the project. The Progressive
Union maintained a high level o f activity, even during the hot summer months. The
group attempted to improve sanitation by hiring an inspector at a salary of $75 per
month. The experiment only lasted three months. Upset at numerous complaints over
the inspector’s zealousness, the Board of Directors fired him in August. Both the
Progressive Union and the Business Men’s League worked on city promotion. The
Union planned a conference matching rural buyers with New Orleans dealers, and the
League published a pamphlet “advertising New Orleans as a commercial center.”25
The Mayor returned to New Orleans in late August. He praised the city o f
Seattle, which he had just visited, as “progressive” and cited its tripling o f population in
just ten years. Eager to see similar growth in New Orleans, the Mayor quickly resumed
his duties. He wrote to A.C. Wuerple, President of the New Orleans Land Company,
developers o f the north New Orleans area known as Lakeview, acknowledging the
company’s offer of a site for a new school “not less than $25,000 in value.” Behrman
also joined the Progressive Union’s effort to raise money to entertain the delegates o f
the upcoming Lakes-to-the-Gulf Deep Waterway Association and pressed city
departments to keep the city clean for the visitors to New Orleans. He emphasized his
25 Daily Picayune, June 29,1909, 5; July 11,1909, 8; July 11,1908, Section II,
15; July 29, 1909, 5; August 8, 1909, 5; Acting Mayor McRacken to Representatives
Gilmore and Estopinal and to Senator Foster, July 20,1909. The immigration site did
not obtain final approval until December, 1909.
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message by inspecting areas of the city without prior warning, looking for weeds,
clogged gutters, and other unsightly problems.26
City council business had accumulated during the Mayor’s absence. Many
pending actions reflected the concerns o f progressive sensibilities. Mindful o f the threat
o f disease-bearing mosquitos, the council voted to fumigate local schools prior to the
return of students from summer vacation. At the council’s urging, a citizens’ committee
began to raise funds for the establishment o f public baths. “Among the most prevalent
reform endeavors in southern towns and cities were clean-up and local improvement
campaigns,” and New Orleans joined the trend. The council heard from proponents o f
the city beautiful movement, who asked for funds to establish a tree nursery. Organized
into a new city Parking [Park] Commission, the movement at first wanted to locate the
new nursery in the New Orleans City Park. The Mayor asked former Mayor Paul
Capdevielle, President o f the City Park Improvement Association, to hear the
Commission request, but the meeting did not go well. Although the council initially
insisted that City Park surrender fifteen acres for the nursery, resistance from the
influential association led the council to reserve its decision. At the Mayor’s urging, the
council acquired sufficient land in another part of the city and located the nursery at the
new site. The resolution of the issue was typical of Behrman’s political skill. He
responded to the demands of the city beautiful movement, deferred to the City Park

26 Daily Picayune, August 23, 1909, 3, 5; August 24, 1909, 5; August 28, 1909,
4; Behrman to A.C. Wuerple, August 25, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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Improvement Association, and still managed to find an alternative method to satisfy the
parties.27
Behrman’s political skills led him safely through another problem in September
1909. Business interests upset over high fire insurance rates appealed to the Board of
Trade, which issued a report to the Mayor. One of the charges contained in the report
identified “the political influence in the organization and control of the Fire
Department.” The report recommended “a reorganization of the Board o f Fire
Commissioners,” that would free “the department. . . from the machinations o f ward
bosses.” The strong language came from a committee that included James Porch, the
Mayor’s colleague on the Public Belt C om m ission. The connection between the
organization of the Fire Department and insurance rates was tenuous, and Behrman
could have fought the committee’s conclusions and defended his administration.
Instead, Behrman thanked the Board of Trade for its work and accepted structural
change in the department. He pressed the city council and local architects to prepare a
new building code, and, by the end of the year, shared credit with the Board o f Trade as
insurance companies agreed to reductions in premiums of nearly forty percent.
Behrman’s actions in the fire insurance controversy coincided with the interests o f the
city’s commercial classes, but nothing in Behrman’s background nor his outlook on
politics suggested to the Mayor that those interests were in any way different from the
27 Behrman to Paul Capdevielle, August 27,1909, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Behrman to City Council, October 12, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune,
August 25, 1909, 5; October 13, 1909, 8; October 18,1909, 5; December 7, 1909, 6;
Grantham, Southern Progressivism, 288-289.
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interests of the city or its citizens. The booster spirit o f the commercial elite coincided
with the views o f Behrman and the Regulars. Only on rare occasions did the views of
the two groups diverge.28
There was no divergence when it came to promoting the economic future o f the
city. In the fall o f 1909, both the business and political leadership mobilized to support
the Lakes-to-the-Gulf Deep Waterways Convention. The meeting fulfilled multiple city
goals: promotion o f Mississippi River trade, appropriation of federal funds for dredging
and harbor improvements, and elevation of New Orleans to a leadership position among
commercial cities along the great river. A hospitality fund of more than $20,000 and
preferential rates on railroads made visitors welcome. Word that President Taft would
visit the convention added luster to the event and provided an opportunity to directly
approach the Chief Executive on behalf of city interests, such as the immigration
station. The presidential visit also became an occasion for the city to boast of its recent
improvements. Plumbing contractor C. C. Hartwell suggested in an advertisement that
“there are many interesting things in and around the Crescent City to show the
President, and none more important than the great sewerage and water system.”

28 Behrman to C.H. Ellis, President, Board of Trade, September 13, 1909,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, September 12,1909, Section I, 8; December
19, 1909,10; December 25, 1909, 11. Behrman submitted a new building code to the
city council in June 1910. Behrman to City Council, June 28,1910, Mayor’s
Correspondence.
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Hartwell added to those among readers who might need his services, “Are you
connected?”29
After the weeks of buildup, the visit itself prove anticlimactic. The President
approached New Orleans by way o f the Mississippi River, and the Daily Picayune hired
a boat to deliver copies of the newspaper to the Presidential party. A navy fleet
accompanied the President, but the flotilla ran four hours behind schedule. Parade
Chairman John P. Sullivan ordered the ceremonies to start, and the parade proceeded
without the honored guest while onlookers called out “Where’s Taft?” The President
arrived late, but delivered speeches at the Jesuit College and at Tulane University.
Before he departed the next day, Taft agreed to help the port, visited the potential site o f
the long-planned immigration station, and endorsed the aims of the Lakes-to-the-Gulf
Deep Waterways Convention.30
The convention highlighted the connection between New Orleans and the
Mississippi Valley. But the cities commercial interests also display strong support o f
Southern regional interests. John Parker worked to gain financial support for the
Southern Commercial Congress, founded in 1908 with the slogan “A Greater Nation
through a Greater South.” In addition to promoting tariff protection for southern
29 Daily Picayune, September 1, 1909, Section V, 1; September 2, 1909;
September 26, 1909; October 13,1909. Taft’s visit was his second to New Orleans. As
President elect in February, 1909, Taft attended a Carnival ball in New Orleans, played
golf, and delivered a speech to the residents o f the Confederate Soldiers’ Home.
30 Financial Statement, Lakes-to-the-Gulf Deep Waterway Convention,
Progressive Union Minutes, December 1,1909; Daily Picayune, October 31, 1909, 1;
November 1, 1909, 1. The performance of the French Opera company cost $1,027; the
Stag Smoker totaled $1,373.
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products, the Congress supported improvements to transportation infrastructure,
including river dredging and harbor improvements. The New Orleans Progressive
Union joined with the Congress. Responding to regional loyalty, the Union also worked
to alter the federal government’s design plan for the new post office in New Orleans.
Instead o f Indiana limestone, the Union and other city organizations lobbied for
“improved material” and eventually setded on Georgia marble as a substitute. A year
later, the lobbying succeeded, and the post office received the “finer,” Southern
material.31
The sheer volume o f civic voluntary activity, lobbying, fund raising, and
municipal promotion was impressive. But duplication o f efforts and the fatigue brought
on by constant pleading for dues, subscriptions, and donations wore on members of the
business community. During 1909 and 1910, the Progressive Union raised funds—in
excess o f normal dues—for convention hospitality, for a clean city campaign, and for
special activities for city merchants. The Union also considered proposals to underwrite
the French Opera season as well as to underwrite the Southern Commercial Congress.
Business Men’s League President Casanas authorized agents to solicit for membei ships
in the BML and, at the same time, chaired a committee city to raise funds for public
baths. The Anti-Tuberculosis League and the Good Roads Association also appealed to

31 Board of Directors, Progressive Union Minutes, November 11, 1909;
Secretary/Manager’s Report, Progressive Union Minutes, December, 1910; Behrman to
John M. Parker, November 4, 1909, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune,
December 1, 1909; December 12,1909. The post office subsequently moved to a new
location, but the building remains, now the site o f the Internal Revenue Service.
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the public for funds. And in 1910, fund raising for the proposed Panama Exposition
demanded attention. Some participants in all of these efforts complained, and a Joint
Conference met in late 1909 to consider merging at least some of the organizations. No
progress resulted, and the various exchanges and associations remained independent.32
On issues of good works, boosterism, and public improvements , the business
community had acted with virtual unanimity . But its solidarity broke down when the
interests of one business group collided with another. In those instances, the Mayor
either stayed out o f the dispute or chose to support the position most likely to benefit the
wider public. Two controversies in late 1909 and 1910 illustrated the potential for
disagreement between business groups. In one instance, President W. B. Thompson
cited the findings o f a Cotton Exchange committee that the railroads bringing cotton to
New Orleans for overseas shipment practiced rate discrimination. In addition to his role
as President of the Cotton Exchange (a position to which he was reelected in December
1909), Thompson was one of the Exchange’s representative to the Public Belt Railroad
Commission. Only one month earlier, he succeeded James Porch as President Pro Tern
o f that body. Railroad and steamship lines (which enjoyed cooperative agreements on
rates) denied Thompson’s assertions o f discrimination, but relations between the
Exchange and the transportation companies remained tense.33

32 Executive Committee, BML Minutes, February 2,1909; Progressive Union
Minutes, November 11, 1909; Daily Picayune, September 1, 1909, Section n , 4;
September 12, 1909; September 14,1909; November 12, 1909, 8.
22Daily Picayune, November 23,1909, 6; November 28,1909,4; December 12,
1909, 5; December 12, 1909, 5.
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Early in 1910, in another example of a breakdown in the normally placid
relations among business interests and government, private investors announced plans to
build a cotton warehouse on the river front, but outside of the jurisdiction o f New
Orleans. The plan contradicted the recommendations made by Thompson, and members
o f the Dock Board objected to the plan as well. President Hugh McCloskey assured
Behrman that “the Board of Port Commissioners would use every effort” to keep cotton
wharves in the city. The suspicion that the new facility would favor the Illinois Central
Railroad to the detriment of other lines generated opposition to the plan as well.
Behrman agreed that the plan threatened the city’s interests and mobilized the Regular
organization’s resources in the legislation to help in the fight. The Mayor also
supported Dock Board actions to support the imports o f coffee into New Orleans by
expanding public warehouse facilities, including the construction of two-story steel
sheds along the stretch of wharves dedicated to the handling of coffee imports. The
construction established a precedent for subsequent Dock Board actions that completed
not only a public cotton warehouse, but a public grain elevator as well.34
The two cases—alleged railroad discrimination and public versus private
warehouse facilities—demonstrated that business interests were not monolithic. The
ethic of private enterprise occasionally came into conflict with public interests. Not
only Behrman, but also public-spirited businessmen such as Thompson argued for the
34 Times Democrat, January 4, 1910; Daily Picayune, January 5, 1910, 6;
January 13,1910, 5; February 17, 1910, 6; February 25,1910,4; Hugh McCloskey,
President, Dock Board to Behrman, January 3, 1910, Behrman Papers. See Chapter VII
for details o f the private versus public warehouse controversy.
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public interest in such cases. The decision of businessmen to advocate for public
facilities did not deny the basis of private enterprise, but asserted that in particular
instances a public entity served business interests—widely defined—better than a single
corporation or combination. The essence of the consensus for progressive civic
development depended on the acceptance of a strong public role in the promotion of the
city’s economic future.
The business community remained respectful o f the Mayor’s record in spite of
occasional disagreements. In February 1910, Sol Wexler of the Whitney Bank,
provided his thoughts on government to the Daily Picayune. Only a year earlier,
Wexler had clashed with the Mayor over a Sewerage and Water Board bond issue, but
the incident had no lasting effect. “The first thing necessary to make a city great,”
Wexler said, “is that it shall be well governed. In this we are past fortunate for in Mayor
Behrman we have an administration that has few equals in the whole country.” The
Daily Picayune continued its defense o f municipal operations and Behrman’s role. The
paper argued that the important distinction in the public ownership debate was not
government versus private enterprise, but political versus business principles.
While municipal control has proved wasteful in many cities, this has been due
not to the fact o f municipal control but to the attempt to manage these utilities
along political instead of along business lines. There is no more reason why
municipal control should not prove successful than would ordinary private
control, provided only the same business principles are applied in both cases.
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The commercial leadership o f New Orleans accepted and, on occasion, welcomed
Regular political leadership because business principles coexisted with politics in the
new governmental agencies of the progressive era 35
Unfortunately for Behrman, his acceptance by the commercial leadership was
not matched by those citizens eager to improve the New Orleans moral climate. The
future of Storyville, the city’s “restricted,” district, became an issue in early 1910. The
Era Club announced it would join with the Progressive Union “to have the
neighborhood surrounding the terminal depot purged o f the present conditions which
makes entry into the city a disgrace to our citizens.” Perhaps not coincidentally, the
attack on Storyville coincided with a Progressive Union membership drive. The two
groups objected to the fact that trains entering the terminal passed along the southern
border of Storyville, and passengers not heeding the conductor’s discreet warning could
view the places o f business located along that section o f Basin Street. The Committee
on Municipal Affairs issued a report to the Progressive Union “complaining o f houses in
Storyville fronting Basin Street near the terminal” and submitted photographs of the
situation. Behrman declined to take action. He stated that “the railroads knew of
Storyville prior to locating [their] terminal,” and he denied the existence o f “a threat to
public morals.” He noted that no one from the railroads had filed a complaint, and he
preferred a policy that would keep the houses in a restricted zone.36
35 Daily Picayune, February 1, 1910, 6.
36 Daily Picayune, February 13,1910, 4; February 24, 1910, 15; March 20, 1910;
Report from Committee on Municipal Affairs, Progressive Union Minutes, March 8,
1910; Behrman to President and Board o f Directors, Progressive Union, March 18,
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The standoff between Behrman and those opposed to Storyville did not end the
controversy over the regulation of morals. The Business Men’s League, formed in
opposition to “puritanizing,” assisted the Mayor in his attempts to reduce the effects of
laws regulating gambling and bar rooms. He also faced a growing prohibition
movement in the state. In March 1910, the Business Men’s League received notice of
Anti-Saloon League activities in the upcoming session of the legislature. The Business
Men’s League took the lead in organizing the New Orleans commercial exchanges
against prohibition. The Mayor warned that prohibition would cause a loss of
$1,000,000 in tax revenue and make it “almost certainly impossible to bring the
proposed Panama Exposition to New Orleans.” Responding to a more broadly-based
community membership, the Progressive Union declined to join the Business Men’s
League in opposition to prohibition.37
Behrman may have tolerated gambling and drink, but on the subject of race he
was more likely to seek social control. In this respect, the Mayor’s views corresponded
with most southern progressives. In July 1910, black heavyweight John Johnson
defeated a white opponent. Racial unrest broke out in several cities where, in the words
o f the Daily Picayune, “negroes became obstreperous.” “It is to the credit o f New
Orleans,” the paper continued, “that nothing of the sort happened here” and consoled its
readers with the assertion that it was “only in the matter o f brute force, muscular power

1910, Mayor’s Correspondence; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 304.
37 Executive Committee, BML Minutes, March 19, 1910; Special Meeting,
Board of Directors, Progressive Union Minutes, April 2, 1910.
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and endurance that the negro is the equal of the white.” The Progressive Union wrote
the Mayor, urged him to ban motion pictures of the fight, and warned that “the proven
result o f this fight has been assaults, race clashes and disturbances and the inflammation
excited by these can easily lead to rape and lynching.” Behrman promptly responded
that he agreed with the Union’s position on the fight and had already prohibited the
motion pictures. When word spread o f the Mayor’s actions, he received congratulations
for the ban. Some months later, however, a riverboat company showed the film on one
o f its vessels. The river was under federal jurisdiction and outside o f the Mayor’s
prohibitions. New Orleans escaped racial unrest over the Johnson fight, but unrest of a
different sort emerged.38
Regardless o f individual views of morality and its effects upon business, all
factions in the city united behind one great cause in 1910—the effort to have the federal
government designate New Orleans as the site for the 1915 celebration of the opening of
the Panama Canal. The effort to obtain the exposition for New Orleans revealed that
political factions could join together on issues they perceived as important to the city’s
stature and future. Proponents o f both Regular and reform factions supported the
exposition and worked to acquire it for New Orleans. In addition, the efforts to
convince the federal government illustrated what the New Orleans leadership thought of
its own city. In the competition with San Francisco for the exposition, the arguments
38 Board o f Directors, Progressive Union Minutes, July, 1910; Behrman to Philip
Werlein, President, Progressive Union, July 8, 1910, Mayor’s Correspondence; John
Janvier to Behrman, July 8,1910, Behrman Papers; Daily Picayune, July 5,1910, 8;
January 19,1911, 4.
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and responses often showed the strengths and weaknesses o f the Crescent City. Finally,
the exposition campaign demonstrated both the limitations o f voluntary efforts and the
extent to which businessmen depended upon the direct financial and political support of
local and state government.39
The first committee in charge o f the exposition promotion consisted of twentyfive prominent citizens appointed by the Mayor. By early 1910, the committee had
given way to an exposition company o f which Janvier, Behrman, and others were
directors. Initial attempts to fund the promotional campaign depended upon private
enterprise. The company attempted to raise the necessary funds for the exposition
through stock offerings, but the subscriptions fell far short. Word reached New Orleans
that San Francisco would compete for the exposition and had raised substantial funds.
Behrman concluded that the city must take the lead in transforming the exposition
efforts into a public endeavor. On March 2, 1910, the exposition leadership announced
that at the next session o f the legislature, the city would seek “a small tax from the state”
to fund the 1915 exposition.40
In addition to public funding, Behrman mobilized personal lobbying on behalf of
the exposition. On March 5,1910, he appointed a group o f businessmen who traveled
to Washington, D. C., to promote New Orleans as the federally-approved site. Later in
the month, the Mayor asked for a special meeting of the Progressive Union Board of
39 Daily Picayune, March 3, 1910, 1,3. See Chapter V for the beginning of the
Panama Exposition effort.
40 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 239-243; Daily Picayune, December
23,1909, 5; March 3, 1910, 1,3.
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Director in order to pass a resolution in support of the exposition efforts. The Directors
agreed to the request and passed the resolution. The New Orleans Fat Man’s Club,
“formed by fifty who met the 200 pounds prerequisite,” also endorsed the Panama
Exposition and, for good measure, elected President Taft an honorary member o f the
club. After the return of the lobbying delegation from the nation’s capital, the Mayor
helped to organize a mass meeting in New Orleans in support of the exposition.
Governor Sanders attended, pledged the support o f the state towards the exposition tax,
and listened to Behrman commit the city to its share o f the public funding.41
By June 1910, the exposition leadership organized the World’s Panama
Exposition Company to carry on the fight. Charles Janvier served as Chairman of the
Finance Committee, Sam Blum, an active member of the Business Men’s League,
chaired the Publicity Committee, and insurance executive T. P. Thompson became
chairman of the Executive Committee. The Progressive Union and the Business Men’
League assisted in organizing support among their memberships. Information from the
state’s congressional delegation confirmed that Congress would select either San
Francisco or New Orleans as the official exposition site, and that the choice would be
made after Congress convened in December. The congressmen added that depth o f
financial commitment would be crucial and urged the company to spend the summer
months securing substantial support. The tenor of the competition became clear when

41 Behrman to Senator McEnery, March 3,1910, Mayor’s Correspondence;
Board o f Directors, Progressive Union, March 28, 1910; Daily Picayune, March 6,
1910, 9; March 29,1910, 6; April 4, 1910, 5; April 8,1910,1.
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San Francisco newspapers began criticizing New Orleans’ climate and health
conditions. The Daily Picayune promptly responded to the “slanderous and malignant
attacks . . . concerning the salubrity o f the climate of New Orleans and charging that
summer temperatures are extreme.” The paper continued that “fevers [are] no longer a
menace [in New Orleans], as is the oriental bubonic plague at San Francisco.” After
defending the city’s health, the paper added that if there were any problem, it could be
traced to “the increase in negro death rates.”42
The state legislature held its regular session in 1910, and the exposition played
an important part in the deliberations. Behrman later recalled that the state’s prohibition
lobby threatened to involve liquor regulation with the exposition tax, but Senator Joseph
Voegtle of New Orleans defused the issue. A bond issue to support the exposition
passed, and the legislature dedicated a three-eighths mill tax to service the bonds. To
boost the city’s chances o f success, the legislature passed a resolution to invite former
President Theodore Roosevelt to take a position at the head of the exposition company.
The city did well during the legislative session, but lost an important ally in the
exposition fight when Senator McEnery died on June 28,1910. What had been a
straightforward and noncontroversial process now became embroiled in the politics of
senatorial succession.43

42 Board of Directors, Progressive Union Minutes, June 21, 1910; BML
Minutes, August 1, 1910; Daily Picayune, June 19,1910, Section I, 1; June 24,1910, 8;
June 25,1910, 8.
43 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 239-244.
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Immediate speculation about the successor to McEnery focused on the governor.
However, Senator Foster and Governor Sanders both came from the same town. The
election of Sanders would violate an unwritten law of Louisiana senatorial politics that
dictated that the northern and southern sections o f the state would each have a senator.
In spite of explicit threats that “North Louisiana would be heard from in the elections of
1912,” the state legislature elected Sanders on July 6, 1910. Only twelve days later,
after the adjournment of the legislature, Congressman Samuel Gilmore passed away.
Behrman later noted that “the death started more politics,” and the organization quickly
settled on H. Garland Dupre, Speaker of the House and Assistant City Attorney in New
Orleans, as the successor. Dupre was only thirty-seven years old, but had attracted
attention throughout the state, and, at the time o f his selection, was considered a
possible candidate for governor. Behrman recalled “that with the exposition bill
pending in Congress, we needed a man of Dupre’s caliber.”44
The success of that bill depended not only upon congressional leadership, but
also upon the level of financial support. When the backers of the San Francisco
exposition “raised the stakes in Washington. . . New Orleans had to respond.” The
bond issue passed by the legislature proved insufficient, and the city requested a special
session of the state legislature to impose an additional special tax on city property
holders only. The directors of the exposition company offered to reimburse the state for

44 Behrman to City Council, July 26, 1910, Mayor’s Correspondence; Kemp,
Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 246-247; Daily Picayune, July 19, 1910, 1; July 21,
1910.
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the expenses of the special session but, Governor Sanders declined the offer. The extra
session took place in August, and members voted the new tax as requested. The Daily
Picayune made a sophisticated argument for the tax by opposing free riders on the
benefits of the exposition. The tax would “distribute a fair portion o f the burden on
property holders who will be greatly benefitted by the exposition but who have
subscribed nothing to the fund.” The company leadership appreciated the extra funds,
but feared the consequences of the impending turnover in the governor’s office when
Sanders departed for Washington. After an appeal to the Governor signed by the
company’s Board o f Directors (including Behrman), Sanders agreed to resign as senator.
To counter a rumor that he was in line for a high-paying job with the exposition,
Sanders announced he would accept no such position. He made it clear that he would
run for the Senate in the future. Acceding to the wishes of North Louisiana, Judge
James R. Thornton o f Alexandria took the seat in the Senate. Mayor Behrman watched
the events from a distance; he was in St. Paul, giving a speech on street paving at the
League of American Municipalities. Behrman was happy to report that the association
endorsed New Orleans as the site of the exposition.45

45 Special Meeting, Board o f Directors, Progressive Union Minutes, July 30,
1910; Board of Directors, BML Minutes, August 1, 1910; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f
New Orleans, 250-255; Daily Picayune, July 31, 1910, 1; August 1, 1910; August 15,
1910, 6; August 25, 1910, August 27, 1910, 5; Martin Behrman, Street Paving Problem,
Address by Honorable Martin Behrman, Mayor o f New Orleans La., Fourteenth Annual
convention of the League of American Municipalities, St. Paul, Minnesota, August 23
to 26,1910, University o f New Orleans, Earl K. Long Library, Louisiana Collection.
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During the months o f effort on the exposition, Behrman remained active in other
aspects of municipal government. He led efforts to attract the Amateur Athletic Union
competition to New Orleans, earning a Daily Picayune headline, “Progressive Chief
Executive Heads the List.” Later in the year, he traveled to Chicago to convince the
Knights Templar to bring their convention to the city. Though unsuccessful, he thought
the effort repaid by the publicity the city received. Back home, he hosted officials from
Camden, New Jersey, to examine the sewerage, water, and drainage systems. And in
March, the city announced it would plant “blue grass . . . on the mound o f the Clay
statue to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary o f its unveiling.” The Clay statute had been
moved to Lafayette Square during the Capdevielle administration because of increased
street car traffic on Canal Street. Mindful o f the interests o f local businesses, Behrman
promoted a “Buy at Home” campaign among city departments, though “he would not
want the city to pay more money to get the material here then it could be bought for in
the market generally.”46
In July 1910, in the midst of organizing efforts for the Panama exposition, the
political opposition to Behrman and Sanders began to coalesce around familiar reform
themes. The Charleston News and Courier published a lengthy editorial linking the
issues o f political environment and the proposed exposition. The South Carolina
newspaper claimed that “no city in the union is more completely at the mercy of an
organized political machine than is New Orleans.” The paper acknowledged

46 Daily Picayune, February, 25, 1910, 12; March 15, 1901; March 22, 1910, 5.
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Behrman’s’s qualities as “an able and honest man” who “saved the machine in the last
election.” But the editorial predicted “that New Orleans in the next election will make a
vigorous effort to throw off the yoke [of the machine].” The New Orleans TimesDemocrat picked up the theme and began to predict that the presence o f the machine
would have dire effects on the city’s chances for the exposition. Seeking to counter the
argument, the Daily Picayune published comparative statistics on national municipal
expenditures, calling New Orleans “the most economically governed city.”47
Although political developments at all levels of government held the public
attention in 1910, even greater interest focused on the continued fight for the honor of
holding the Panama Exposition. The ballot on the November congressional elections
included a state constitutional provision for the exposition tax. The amendment passed,
supported by both the city and other state parishes. James L. Wright, secretary o f the
World’s Panama Exposition Company, welcomed the vote and expressed his gratitude
on Thanksgiving Day. “Never before in its history has New Orleans been so well
advertised throughout the country, or her people so united on any proposition.” T. P.
Thomson, Chairman of the exposition Executive Committee, noted that private funds
and the proceeds o f the public taxes would provided approximately $10,000,000 with
which to lobby Congress for official designation as the exposition site. The New
Orleans effort adopted the argument that the city provided the logical point for the
exposition, convenient to the Panama Canal and to major United States population
47 Charleston New and Courier, quoted in Daily Picayune, July 26, 1910, 6; July
28,1910.
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centers. “The Logical Point” became the slogan for the publicity associated with the
lobbying campaign. City stationary showed a map o f cities with New Orleans at the
center. The exposition company published a series o f pamphlets, each titled “The
Logical Point,” for distribution to other cities and to members o f Congress.48
In December, 1910, Congress convened in Washington, D.C., and the House o f
Representatives Committee on Expositions took up the contest between New Orleans
and San Francisco. Even the national railroads took sides. A report that the Southern
Pacific favored San Francisco angered New Orleans politicians who had fought for
favorable treatment for the trunk line. A large group o f New Orleans business and civic
leaders traveled to the nation’s capitol to take part in the lobbying. Behrman joined the
group in early December. Preliminary indications favored the Crescent City, and
Chairman T. P. Thompson declared “victory in Washington is assured.” Not everyone
thought that victory was worthwhile. A Wall Street Journal editorial claimed that the
exposition would bring no real increase in wealth and concluded “we think Providence
should inflict this cross upon New Orleans [because] San Francisco had her earthquake
and fire.” The Daily Picayune answered that “such an exposition will bring into the
state a vast concourse o f people who have money to invest and are seeking opportunities

48 The Logical Point, Number 17, [n.d.], New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana
Division; Daily Picayune, November 24, 1910, 5. Census results in 1910 revealed that
New Orleans remained the largest city of the South, although its 1900 to 1910 rate o f
growth was a modest fourteen percent. The city’s population o f 339,075 in 1901
exceeded Louisville, the second largest city, by over 100,000. Atlanta, 154,839, had
less than one-half of the population o f New Orleans. Grantham, Southern
Progressivism, Table 11,277.
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for such investment.” The paper later reported that the Harvard Law School football
team, traveling in New Orleans, had endorsed the city as the best site for the exposition.
In early January, a mild earthquake in the San Francisco area, and the resulting
memories o f the 1906 disaster, provided the New Orleans delegation with ammunition
against the selection o f the California city. To counter San Francisco warnings about
New Orleans health conditions, the Daily Picayune reported on a war on rats in San
Francisco as part o f a an effort to reduce “the bubonic plague on the west coast.”49
A new delegation o f New Orleans business leaders “stormed Washington” as the
House committee began its work. Mayor Behrman, Cotton Exchange President W.B.
Thompson, and Unitarian minister H.E. Gilchrist provided testimony on the first day of
the hearings. To counter claims o f labor trouble in the Crescent City, union leaders of
New Orleans assured Congress that “labor conditions [in New Orleans] are eminently
pleasant and satisfactory. The selection of the city of New Orleans as a site for a
Panama Exposition would be of inestimable benefit and advantage not alone to the
general public, but very largely to the laboring man and all labor unions here.” San
Francisco added to the argument by claiming that construction jobs in New Orleans
associated with the exposition would go to “negro mechanics.” New Orleans countered
by publicizing the demand o f artists asked to exhibit at the exposition that the U.S.

49 Daily Picayune, December 2,1910,1; December 5, 1910, 5; December 12,
1910, 5 , 8; January 5, 1911, 1; January 6. 1911, 6; January 9, 1911, 8.
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government would have to bear the cost of earthquake insurance should the event be
held at San Francisco.50
The report of the House committee favored New Orleans by a vote of nine to six.
Faced with defeat in the House, San Francisco representatives attempted to bypass
normal Senate rules to expedite the process in that chamber, a move that New Orleans
considered “treachery.” More worrisome for New Orleans was the intervention of
President Taft, reported to be “working against New Orleans.” In a curious echo of
Populist rhetoric, the Daily Picayune darkly suggested that “Taft can’t ignore powerful
railroad combinations and Eastern syndicates.” Taft increase his pressure on
Republican House members before the final vote, and the Daily Picayune complained
that “Taft’s activities for San Francisco Are Notorious,” and that “President Taft, his
Cabinet and Wall Street [are] Working Against New Orleans.” The presidential
lobbying proved effective, and on January 31, 1911, the House voted 188 to 156 to
reverse the committee recommendation. Subsequent information suggested that Taft
had brokered a deal with California to support the exposition in San Francisco in
exchange for withdrawal of anti-Japanese legislation in California, which threatened
Taft foreign policy. Although at first New Orleans delegates vowed to fight in the
Senate, the city soon accepted defeat. Acting Mayor McRacken telegraphed Behrman
in Washington to offer condolences. “I can safely speak for the people of New Orleans

50 Acting Mayor McRacken and City Attorney I.D. Moore to Behrman, January
11, 1911, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, January 10, 1911, 1; January 12,
1911,1; January 13,1911, 4; January 15, Section I, 6.
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in saying that your noble and untiring efforts in their behalf commend the admiration
and excite the applause o f every man, woman and child in this community
notwithstanding apparent defeat.” A subsequent report in the New Orleans press
charged that San Francisco had obtained the exposition in part through the expenditure
o f over $100,000 for entertainment in Washington during the contest.51
Behrman returned to New Orleans several days after the defeat. The Daily
Picayune had previously noted his absence by commenting “there has not been that
spice and snap to the scene that is usual” and observing that City Hall awaited the
Mayor’s return “as the big rains are after a long dry spell.” Grateful for the help
received in Washington, Behrman and the Business Men’s League made plans to honor
the Congressmen on the House committee who had supported New Orleans, especially
Congressman Rodenberg of East St. Louis. Rodenberg agreed to visit New Orleans and
paid tribute to its leadership. “I have never met a finer set o f men than those who
represented New Orleans.” He offered hope that the city would get favorable treatment
from Congress in the future “because o f the feeling among the members that new
Orleans did not get what she was entitled to.” House committee members visited New
Orleans several months later and received loving cups from the grateful city. In a
private comment to Louisiana Senator Murphy Foster, Behrman expressed the opinion
51 Daily Picayune, January 21, 1911, 1; January23, 1911, 1; January24, 1911, 1;
January 26, 1911, 1,8; January 29,1911, Section I, 1; January 31, 1911, 1; February, 1,
1911, 1, 8; February 2, 1911, 1; February 3,1911, 1; February 4, 1911,1; February 5,
1911, 1; March 8, 1911,4; March 25,1911,4; Acting Mayor McRacken to Behrman,
January 21, 1911, Mayor’s Correspondence; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans,
239-240.
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that San Francisco had “put up a dirty fight,” and relations with San Francisco remained
strained as a result of the Washington contest. Tensions eased somewhat, however,
after an exchange o f telegrams. The San Francisco organizers expressed “appreciation
o f the chivalrous manner in which you have met a very trying situation. [We] respect
your abilities as fighters and organizers.” In the Mayor’s absence during the exposition
contest, James Porch had become president of the Progressive Union, and, for the first
time in over a decade, the Mayor was no longer on its Board o f Directors. On the other
hand, at the annual meeting o f the Choctaw Club, Behrman became a member o f the
club’s Board o f Governors.52
The effort to gain the exposition produced several important residual effects.
The business and political leadership united behind a single effort, regardless of political
affiliations. The city gained an awareness of its potential role in the commerce o f
Central and South America. Convinced that the city would benefit from increased
efforts to attract visitors, the Progressive Union subsequently established a Convention
and Tourist Bureau. The private funds raised by the exposition company were sought
for permanent city exhibits, but the company liquidated its assets after plans proved
impractical. Advertisements o f local retailers continued to refer to “the logical point,”
and interest in Latin America led local executives to found the Pan American Life

52 Daily Picayune, February 3, 1911,4, 11; February 10, 1911, 5; February 14,
1911,6; February 15,1911,9; Progressive Union Annual Meeting, January 9,1911,
Progressive Union Minutes; Choctaw Club to Behrman, January 15, 1911, Behrman
Papers; Behrman to Senator Murphy Foster, February 11, 1911, Mayor’s
Correspondence.
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Insurance Company. James Wright, secretary to the exposition company, became the
secretary to the new insurance venture. James Porch worked to established a shipping
line to service Central and South America. In July, 1912, a chartered vessel made a
voyage to Brazil and Argentina under the name o f the new line—the Mississippi Valley,
South American and Orient Steamship Company, also know as the Pan American Mail.
After delivering a full load of cargo, however, the ship was unable to obtain goods for
the return trip. Faced with an undercapitalized business, increasing charter rates, and
the antagonism of British shippers influential in the Latin American market, Porch
abandoned the effort in October, 1912.53
The Mayor, exhausted from the hectic events, fell ill and received visitors at his
home for several weeks. Unable to attend a banquet o f the Progressive Union, he
acknowledged the group’s plans to highlight the Public Belt Railroad and sent a
message praising the operation as “one o f our chief sources o f pride and
congratulation.” When in late March, 1911, local banks finally accepted $7,000,000 of
Sewerage and Water Board bonds, the president o f the Interstate bank remarked, “the
present Mayor is the best practical official who has held that office during the fifteen
years that I have lived in New Orleans . . . so we wanted to have these bonds sold during
his administration.” His comments started speculation that Behrman would not stand
for reelection, but the bank official denied that reading o f his remarks. Behrman left the
city for rest and recuperation amidst growing speculation about candidates, tickets, and
53 Daily Picayune, February 27, 1911,4; March 5, 1911, 5; March 29, 1911,5,6;
Wilds, James W. Porch and the Port o f New Orleans, 93-101
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political factions. He had served almost seven years as Mayor, and presided over
unprecedented modernization, reorganization, and promotion o f the city. His
administrations had successfully completed large parts o f the reform program, first
defined during the difficult years of the 1890s: a clean water supply, improved draining,
modem sewerage disposal, reform of the waterfront, establishment of a public belt
railroad, street paving and cleaning, expansion of public education, and the
establishment of the city’s reputation as an international commercial center. With the
possible exception of social pressure to govern moral conduct, such as regulation o f bar
rooms, suppression of gambling, and removal o f Storyville, and the constant
disagreement over the role o f patronage in government, the Mayor helped to conceive
and implement the progressive vision of an early twentieth century city. But successful
implementation of the reform agenda did not satisfy the reformers. The members o f the
Good Government League represented a political faction that had not seen success in
city or state elections since 1896. Fifteen years later, the League would not take comfort
in the achievements of the city, even those in which League members had played a
significant part. Only political victory would satisfy the League, and the process o f
demonizing Regular leadership and the city machine began in earnest in Spring, 1911.54

S4Behrman to City Council, May 9,1911, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily
Picayune, March 24, 1911, 4; March 31, 1911, 3; April 8, 1911, 3.
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CHAPTER X
POLITICAL POWER AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM:
COMMISSION GOVERNMENT COMES TO NEW ORLEANS

Mayor Behrman's political control remained steady throughout his first term and
most o f the second, but a challenge arose in 1910. In that year, on August 23, a headline
in the New Orleans Daily Picayune announced the emergence of a new faction within
the Democratic Party o f Louisiana. A meeting o f more than one hundred and fifty men
from throughout the state convened in New Orleans to condemn Governor Jared
Sanders and issue a manifesto of reform principles. Editors o f both the Times-Democrat
and the Item attended the meeting. E. H. Farrar, a prominent corporate attorney, who
became president of the American Bar Association two months later, chaired the
assembly, and Behrman nemesis John M. Parker served as third vice President. To
emphasize its commitment to the Democratic Party, the enthusiastic assembly named
the organization the Democratic Good Government League of Louisiana. Reform efforts
o f the 1890's had associated with racially suspect Republicans and Populists, hence the
necessity of emphasizing the connection with the Democratic Party. The proclamation
that the League was statewide in scope indicated a challenge to the Regulars that would
include politics outside of the city. The new organization’s platform called for a wide
range o f legislation, especially laws that would guarantee free and fair elections. The
335
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League looked first to the state elections scheduled for early 1912, but the Daily
Picayune observed “while there was no direct attack upon the city administration [in the
public speeches], the inference was plain that plans of the movement contemplated a
fight.” In fact, the League’s agenda and the speeches of the leadership singled out the
New Orleans political machine as a target. Parker, for example, directly challenged the
Choctaw organization. His motive, he said, “was to rid this state and city of the infernal
political machine which has been a menace ever since I was a boy.” Behrman and his
colleagues may have enjoyed an easy reelection in 1908, but Parker and the new League
made certain that 1912 would be different.

The League organized early, set its sights

on statewide and city goals, and launched multiple challenges to the power o f the
Regulars. Unlike the occasional and ineffective challenges to the political power of
Behrman and Sanders, the Good Government League seemed, in the words of one
Regular, “serious” and able to take advantage of “the unrest in the country parishes,”
possibly caused by resentment over the Sanders senatorial candidacy.1
The League repeated the familiar pattern o f reform versus Regular political
competition, whether within the Democratic Party or in the general elections. The
League’s formation and challenge to the Regulars recalled the fights over the lottery
system, which had divided the state into pro- and anti-lottery forces. In the 1890's,
Populists and Republicans joined forces at the state level to fight corrupt elections and
Democratic bossism. During the municipal elections of 1896, a combination of
1Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 250; Daily Picayune, August 23,
1910,1; August 24, 1910, 3; September 2,1910,1. Schott, “John M. Parker, 111-112.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

337
reformers upset by the excesses of a machine administration defeated the ring
candidates. The Democratic Good Government League followed much of the pattern
set by previous reform groups. These were ad hoc organizations brought together by
authentic outrage, political opportunism, and expediency. Few o f the reform
organizations had lasted beyond the elections for which they formed. The 1910
gathering, though, showed promise of more permanent success. Supporters o f the
League included many experienced politicians and financial supporters. It presented a
clear platform, chose strong candidates, and benefited from divisions within the
Regulars.
A listing of those attending the organizational meeting o f the Good Government
League showed fifty-six names; twenty-nine were present or former office holders. This
strong base of experience increased the League’s chances for success, but diminished its
ability to claim political innocence. The D aily Picayune admiringly described the
League’s first meeting, but expressed disappointment that “the inauguration [was]
somewhat spoiled by the presence of so many former office-holders.” In addition to the
politicians present, a number o f reform-minded attorneys from New Orleans attended,
along with the editors of the New Orleans Times-Democrat and the New Orleans Item two newspapers supportive o f anti-ring candidates. It was an auspicious beginning.
The reform movement, quiescent since 1904, once more affected state and city politics.
The new League did not challenge Behrman nor the Regulars on issues of policy. There
was no movement to turn the clock back on civic improvements, nor on the changes in
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government that had seen the successful development o f a new port and belt railroad.
The new League focused, instead, on the process of elections, the machinery of the
Regular organization, and the form of government that administered New Orleans. 2
Behrman’s political troubles extended beyond the formation o f the new faction.
Late in 1910, a patronage controversy erupted over selection o f a new public school
superintendent. From 1877 to 1908, both the state government and the city council
chose members o f the school board. Behrman, Capdevielle, Charles Buck (former
mayoral candidate), W. J. Kemaghan (Regular Dock Board member), Ernest B.
Krutschnitt (Chairman o f the State Democratic Central Committee), John T. Michel
(Secretary of State under Sanders), R. M. Walmsley (President o f the Board of
Liquidation), Charles Theard (member of the Board of Liquidation), and many other
prominent citizens and office holders participated on the board under that system. In
1906, the city prevailed upon the state legislature to increase local participation in the
selection of the school board. Act No. 6 provided for a board o f seventeen members
(one from each ward) and three city administrators—mayor, city treasurer, and
comptroller—to serve ex officio. The arrangement provided Behrman, and the Choctaw
organization, opportunities for increased political power and, more importantly, the
gratitude of voters whose districts received new schools. The Mayor worked to increase
school board tax revenues, helped to pass a license tax on bar rooms dedicated to
2 New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 24,1910. The New Orleans TimesDemocrat and the New Orleans Item were strong reform papers. Regular boss Robert
Ewing published The New Orleans States. The Daily Picayune dismissed the other
papers as the “partisan press” and tried to advertise its independence whenever possible.
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education, and persuaded the city council to appropriate funds for school construction.
During Behrman’s first term, the school board also increased teacher salaries and
expanded a program o f evening schools.3
In October, 1910, long-time Behrman ally Warren Easton, superintendent of the
New Orleans public schools, died after serving in that post since 1888. Unwilling to
accept the promotion of Easton’s assistant to the top position, Behrman tried to entice
James Aswell, director the state’s Normal School, to accept the position. Aswell had
served as state superintendent of education, but Behrman’s interest went beyond those
credentials. Aswell’s ambition to be governor was well known, and accepting the New
Orleans position would eliminate a gubernatorial candidate who might threaten the
Regulars’ choice for the highest state office. Aswell declined, however, and the Mayor
sought a new candidate, ignoring the calls o f reformers for a “non-political” school
board. The Mayor’s views on patronage enraged the reform elements, but he held his
position without guile or apology. “I am the head of the administration and the local
Democratic organization,” declared the Mayor. “The members of the school board were
nominated by that organization the same time I was, and I have a right to a voice in the
policies of the board . . . to the end that their execution shall reflect credit both on the
organization and on my administration.” To have his voice heard, however, Behrman

3 Donald Devore and Joseph Logsdon, Crescent City Schools: Public Education
in New Orleans (Lafayette: Center for Louisiana Studies, 1991), 120-146. Behrman
took a personal interest in many school issues, especially construction. See letter to
Behrman from the Mother’s Club o f Beauregard School, November 18,1907, Behrman
Papers.
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forced one member off the board and arranged a favorable appointment in his place.
With an majority now secure, Behrman nominated Joseph R. Gwinn, an associate
professor o f education at Tulane University.4
The Mayor’s handling o f the dispute was typically adroit. His choice o f Gwinn,
a uptown professor with connections to a parents’ reform group, protected him from
charges o f cronyism. And when parents mobilized a mass protest meeting, the Mayor
personally appeared to defend his actions. The Daily Picayune, at first antagonistic
toward the Mayor’s actions, began to defend the Mayor and new superintendent. For
his part, Gwinn reassured anxious parents and pledged to support reform o f the school
board. The Mayor echoed his call for reform and stole an issue from the reform element
by backing a smaller board to be elected at-large. The obvious evidence o f progress,
especially the number of new school buildings, demonstrated to the public at large, if
not to the Mayor’s uptown enemies, that the administration o f public education was in
good hands. But the Mayor’s political opponents continued to resist. The ward system
of school board representation became the focus o f protests, and, within two years, a
new “non-political,” five-member school board replaced the larger governing body.
The dispute over the size and composition of the school board, and the assumption that
politics could be taken out o f the system, paralleled the emerging discussion over the
structure o f city government. The transition from a ward-based system o f representation
to an at-large structure with limited membership was the central characteristic not only
4 Devore and Logsdon, Crescent City Schools, 134-135; Reynolds, Machine
Politics in New Orleans, 204; Daily Picayune, October 18, 1910, 8; October 29, 1910.
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o f the reform of the school board, but would also become part of the reform prescription
for city government—the commission.5
The Mayor’s opponents in the school board fight sought to protect education
from politics, or, at least, from the influence of Regular Democratic politics. Behrman
approached the superintendency as another opportunity to exercise his political power
and extend his influence. To the protesting parents, patronage in the school system was
evil per se. To Behrman, patronage represented an important means o f governing. And
not only school board patronage demanded his attention. Throughout the term of
Sanders, Behrman made use of his close friendship with the Governor to provide jobs
for associates. In August, 1910, for example, Behrman prevailed upon Sanders to
appoint Regular Herman Miester to the Fire Rating Commission. The Mayor’s position
as leader of the New Orleans Regulars increased his influence in patronage matters, but
the power of other ward leaders constrained his freedom o f action. The strict division o f
patronage within the city functioned to maintain order and prevent intra-organizational
disputes. The Mayor respected those patronage boundaries, but, beginning in 1910,
Tenth Ward leader Robert Ewing began to show disturbing signs of independence, if not
outright revolt.6
Ewing had become part of the Choctaw leadership in 1899 by supplanting the
Regulars’ choice in the Tenth Ward. He served as business manager for the Daily States
5 Daily Picayune, November 17, 1910, 1; November 24, 1910, 6; Devore and
Logsdon, Crescent City Schools, 136-139. The dispute over the size and composition o f
the school board paralleled the emerging dispute over the structure of city government.
6 Behrman to Sanders, August 15,1901, Mayor’s Correspondence.
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and later became publisher of that newspaper as well as one in Shreveport, Louisiana.
Ewing possessed a reputation for gathering patronage to the Tenth Ward, and, during
Behrman’s second term, controlled the operations of the city treasurer and the municipal
tax collection apparatus, among other offices. Ewing’s newspapers gave him a
disproportionate voice in the political affairs o f the Regulars, and he was not shy in
expressing his opinions nor in asserting his patronage rights. In Machine Politics in
New Orleans, Reynolds repeated the assertion o f the Daily Picayune that Ewing
controlled one-fourth o f all patronage available to the Regulars. His enthusiastic
exercise o f patronage power led to occasional conflict with the Mayor. “Finnegan of
Algiers, Oil Inspector for the Board of Health,” the Mayor wrote to Sanders, “died on
yesterday. [I] understand that Ewing is making claim for this place. This position is
allotted to me and I insist that the vacancy belongs to me.” On another occasion, the
Mayor protected the patronage rights o f another ward leader. “William J. Brady,
Constable First city Court, died last night. This is clearly a First Ward place. Don’t do
anything until you see [Assessor] Taylor Gauche.” The conflict with Ewing over
patronage would lead to more serious challenges to the Regulars’ authority.7
By the close of 1910, Behrman faced political problems on several fronts. The
Democrat Good Government League promised to run an anti-machine candidate in the
upcoming governor’s race, threatening the Mayor’s source of state power. Many
7 Behrman to Sanders, October 5, 1910, Mayor’s Correspondence; Behrman to
Sanders, December 2, 1910, Mayor’s Correspondence; Schott, “JohnM. Parker,” 104;
Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 167. Both Schott and Reynolds use the
word “insatiable” when describing Ewing’s attitude toward patronage.
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parents active in public education, and the influential women’s Era Club, objected to the
Mayor’s action in replacing Warren Easton. The Good Government League, in the
middle of the school board controversy, made clear that its political ambitions went
beyond the state elections and directly challenged the Mayor. The League placed John
Parker in command of the New Orleans campaign with instructions to organize the city
ward by ward. The leadership of the reform element called upon supporters to pay the
poll tax, and announced “the objective and purpose of the league . . . is to destroy the
system that makes bosses and rings possible.” And Robert Ewing continued to
demonstrate political independence from the Choctaw organization, raising the possible
of a internal challenge to the Mayor’s authority. Clearly, Behrman would not enjoy an
easy election should he decide to run for a third term.8
In the first decade of the century, the national progressive movement touched
municipal governments in a number of ways. Reformers examined not only the policies
and politics of local governments but the governmental structures as well. Unable to
obtain power in New Orleans by confronting Mayor Martin Behrman on substantive
issues and policies, the Democratic Good Government League determined to overthrow
the Democratic Regulars by first capturing the office of governor of Louisiana, and then
by changing the governmental structure o f New Orleans. The power of the Regulars
was more precarious than at any time since the 1890s, but the city organization met the

8 Daily Picayune, November 15, 1910, 10; November 18, 1910, 5.
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challenge o f the new reform League and accepted the trends in progressive
governmental forms.
Throughout 1910 and the following year, League spokesmen reiterated the
intentions o f the group: the destruction o f the boss system, and the deliverance o f the
state and city from Regular Democratic control. One important method of fighting the
Regulars involved the machinery o f elections. The Regular organization provided poll
commissioners, and the important position of Registrar of Voters, a parish official
appointed by the Governor, fell under the patronage arrangements between the Choctaw
Club and the state’s chief executive. During the period 1910 to 1912, the registrar was
William Ball, former secretary to Mayor Behrman. From Behrman’s triumph in 1904
until the 1912 gubernatorial race, elections in the city held little suspense, and the
evidence suggests that, at least in some wards, Regular commissioners were not above
padding the results by voting on their own the names of electors who had chosen to stay
home on election day.
In March, 1911, an election to the state Supreme Court shattered the Regulars’
complacency. Civil Court Judge W. B. Sommerville faced little opposition as he sought
to replace retiring Supreme Court Judge Francis Nicholls. The election took place
without incident, but several days later, the Good Government League brought charges
against a number o f Regular commissioners. The district Attorney received evidence
that vote lists included the names o f persons who later filed affidavits swearing that they
had not voted in the election. John Parker, chair o f the League’s City Campaign
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Committee, complained that “all I have ever asked is a square deal from the New
Orleans ring. If they will give us a fair and square election in 1912, and they lick us, we
won’t say a word, not a word.” Mayor Behrman did not defend the Regular
commissioners. He denounced electoral fraud and asked that all perpetrators face
prosecution. The district attorney indicted twelve men for fraud. All received jail
sentences o f six months in the parish prison. After sentencing, two prison officials were
indicted for alleged favorable treatment o f the prisoners, including issuing furloughs to
prisoners to visit their families.9
Further battles arose over the registration lists. The complex voter registration
law, Act 90 of 1908, allowed sworn canvassers to challenge the registration o f anyone
on the rolls. The Good Government League employed detectives to examine the rolls
and to challenge those suspected of fraud. In a city of over 300,000, it was common for
many voters to change addresses from one election to the next. This provided at least
one innocent explanation for what might otherwise seem fraudulent. But the League
anticipated more serious transgressions and spent months in 1911 investigating the
Registrar’s Office. League detectives identified approximately 3,000 records o f
“improper and illegal registration,” but admitted that most of the discrepancies involved
change of address problems with no clear pattern o f dishonesty. The League conflicts
with Registrar Ball took place against the backdrop of increased political speculation.

9 Daily Picayune, March 7, 1911, 5; March 16, 1911,4; March 17, 1911, 6;
April 13, 1911,6; April 19, 1911, 8; April 22,1911,4; June 23,1911, 5.
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The state Democratic primary, scheduled for January, 1912, would be contested by at
least two candidates—the nominee of the League and that of the Regular organization.10
At a rally at the New Orleans Athenaeum theater, the League promised
allegiance to the Democratic Party, a permanent organization, and a fight against “not
individuals, but against a system, which creates one-man power in our city and state.”
The league principles promised security of legitimate investment from “browbeating by
those in office,” restoration of the financial good names of the city and the state,
efficiency in government, education free from politics, an honest count in elections, and
a fight “not for interest, but for good government.” The Daily Picayune analyzed the
principles in an editorial. The paper, independent but generally supportive of Mayor
Behrman if not the Regular organization, declared the Good Government League
“largely inspired and animated by selfish personal motives,” but felt that political
opposition was healthy in that it would “arouse citizens to their political duties.” The
paper felt it unfortunate that “it [was] customary to speak and write o f politicians in a
contemptuous and reproachful tone and manner as if they were engaged in a calling at
least disreputable, if not disgraceful.” The Daily Picayune did “not believe that the
present city and state administrations are wicked, corrupt or unworthy, any more than it
believes that all the citizens arrayed in opposition to them are unselfish, pure and
blameless.” But the League rhetoric betrayed exactly that Manichaean view o f the
political world. Speakers at the league rally condemned the power o f the bosses and the
10 Terrence W. Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico: New Orleans Politics and
Municipal Reform in the Progressive Era, 1912-1926,” 37-39.
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“ballot stuffers.” One speaker gave advice to League members in the city who would
deal with Regular poll commissioners: “Peacefully if you can; forcibly if you must.”11
The League plan of confronting the Regulars in a two-way race went awry in
early April, 1911, when James Aswell, head o f the state Normal School, announced for
governor. His platform echoed many League themes: reduction of the appointive
power of the governor, efficiency in the delivery o f government services and education,
and the abolition o f “useless offices.” Although AswelFs candidacy seemed to pose the
greater threat to the League, the Regulars feared the third candidate as well. As they
searched for their own candidate, the normal unity o f the Regulars showed strain, and
Robert Ewing, powerful Regular leader in the New Orleans Tenth Ward, openly
supported the Aswell effort. The New Orleans vote might reach as much as thirty
percent of the total vote cast. Any split in the heavily controlled New Orleans returns
could assist the League candidate as well as Aswell.12
The League had trouble selecting its candidate for Governor. Most o f its wellknown leaders, such as John M. Parker, had disavowed any interest in elective office, in
an attempt to convince voters of the purity of their motives. By April, the League
decided upon Luther Hall, a north Louisiana jurist, whose recent election to the state
Supreme Court provided a safe haven from which to run. Hall agreed to carry the

11Daily Picayune, March 19, 1911, 1,8, 13. The talk o f abolition o f excessive or
useless state offices rarely resulted in action. After his election to the governor’s office
in 1920, Parker admitted that the phrase “useless offices” was “largely demagogic” and
that he could not find such offices in the state. See Schott, “John M. Parker,” 359.
12 Daily Picayune, April 2, 1911,3.
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League banner, but declared his independence of political factions. The northern part o f
the state harbored resentment toward the southern because of Sanders’s attempt for
McEnery’s senate seat. Hall and Aswell would benefit from that feeling, but might split
the available vote. In an effort to balance the League ticket, delegates to its convention
in New Orleans searched for “a Creole, from South Louisiana, and a good French
speaker.” Henri L. Gueydan fit the description, and the convention added him to the
ticket. In his acceptance speech, Hall struck familiar reform themes. The campaign
would be a mission against the machine. The “present, paramount, dominant issue,”
proclaimed Hall, “is whether this machine shall remain in power to continue its
exploitation of government functions.” In its review o f the speech, the Daily Picayune
called it “commonplace, made up o f platitudes and altogether disappointing.”13
The search for a candidate among the Regulars took several strange turns.
Efforts to convince Congressman Joseph E. Ransdell to run failed because he preferred
a Senate race against Murphy Foster. Congressman H. Garland Dupre o f New Orleans
had a safe seat in the House and chose to remain in that office. Another rumor
suggested that the Regulars would draft First District Congressman Albert Estopinal for
Governor. Even W. B. Thompson, Cotton Exchange President, was mentioned, despite
his lack of experience in electoral politics. The Regulars scrambled to find a candidate
because the natural successor to Sanders was John T. Michel, Regular leader from the
New Orleans Thirteenth Ward, and Secretary of State. Michel had announced for
13Daily Picayune, March 7, 1911, 5; April 6,1911,4; June 20,1911,3; June 21,
1911, 1,3; June 22,1911,1, 8; Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 28-29.
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governor in 1910, but suffered under at least two handicaps. A member of the Regular
caucus confided to the Daily Picayune that “Michel is a ward boss” and that “he can’t
speak.” The paper’s source defended Michel from both charges, pointing out that
Mayor Behrman was also a ward boss, but “the best mayor this city has ever had.”
Behrman had trouble speaking in public when he first ran for office but overcame his
reticence. There was speculation that the Regulars lacked confidence in a Michel
candidacy, but an alternative plan to send Behrman to Congress and let Michel run for
mayor did not materialize. Behrman wanted to run for a third term as mayor. The
Regulars prized loyalty, and Michel, whatever his weaknesses, had earned their support
and received the nomination. When the new candidate released his platform, the Daily
Picayune expressed surprise at its reform tone: honest elections, economy in
government, abolishment of useless offices, frequent accounting for state funds, and
reorganization of the state bureaucracy.14
The similarity of the three platforms reflected more than the banality of
campaign rhetoric. Secure in his base, Michel reached out to reform elements and those
areas o f the state outside New Orleans. Hall and Aswell echoed the prejudices of the
conservative newspapers and rural leaders most likely to effect votes. Hall also reached

14 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 248; Daily Picayune, April 23, 1911,
Section II, 16; April 26, 1911,2; June 18,1911, 3. Fitzmorris, in “Pro Bono Publico,”
rendered harsh judgements about Michel, describing him as “the epitome o f the second
class politician.” But Michel had won a statewide race for Secretary of State. For the
Regulars to function effectively, the ward leaders required at least some basic skills in
management, communication, and political judgement. See Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono
Publico,” 24.
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out to the city voters by repudiating the support of the Anti-Saloon League and coming
out in favor of local option. All candidates adopted platforms that reflected the
conventional wisdom o f their time, repeated the anti-government sentiments o f the
business classes, and “contained promises to the good people.”

In addition, the three

gubernatorial candidates opposed suffrage for women, although they supported the right
o f women to stand for election to parish school boards. In matters of style, however,
Michel suffered by comparison to his competitors. Aswell was young, active, an
effective stump speaker, and quick with a story to illustrate his points. Hall, a respected
judge before his entry into the race, had a keen legal mind and the rhetorical abilities
honed by long service in the courts.15
Michel was also at a disadvantage because of the peculiar election cycle. The
primary for governor and other state offices ran a the same time as primaries for both
U.S. Senate seats. The seat held by Murphy Foster was up for election, and the
incumbent drew the challenge of Joseph Ransdell. The seat made vacant by the death o f
Senator McEnery drew a larger field: Governor Sanders, south Louisiana Congressman
Robert Broussard, and Congressman Arsene Pujo from the southwest comer o f the state.
The three-way race took all o f the Governor’s energy, and support for Michel that the
Regulars might expect from Sanders was not forthcoming. The Senate races may also
have exacerbated the South-North split. If Foster won re-election and Sanders

15 Daily Picayune, June 25,1911, Section II, 16.
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triumphed in the race for the other seat, both Senators would be politicians from the
southern part of the state.
Finally, Michel’s candidacy bore the burden of his New Orleans connection.
Apart from League rhetoric about the evils o f the machine, Louisiana residents outside
of New Orleans often viewed the Crescent City with suspicion. The regulation of
saloons and the suppression of race track gambling had passed the legislature over the
objections of most New Orleans legislators. Though New Orleans Catholics shared
their religion with other South Louisiana residents, the majority of North Louisiana
residents were Protestant. New Orleans was an exciting destination, almost exotic to the
rural population of the state. But it was also the object o f distrust. In spite o f press
attempts to claim that it was somehow the right of New Orleans to finally have a
governor from its ranks, the remainder o f the state resisted rule by a Crescent City
politician.16
Behrman tried valiantly to promote the Michel candidacy. He limited the
damage caused by Aswell by confining the Regular revolt to Ewing. To avoid further
conflicts with the Tenth Ward leader, Behrman agreed to limit the split to the
gubernatorial candidacy only. Ewing would not be challenged by the Regulars, but his
apostasy would be contained. Behrman knew that he remained in control o f the city
vote. He had earlier written to Senator Foster and assessed the political situation. “I can
16Daily Picayune, April 9,1911, Section II, 5. This attitude toward New
Orleans and its politicians persisted throughout the twentieth century, fed at first by
Huey Long’s populism, and, subsequently, by resentment toward New Orleans’
perceived liberalism on the race issue.
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state to you positively that the League is making very little progress in the city. John
Parker is going around making different statements, and I feel quite sure that the people
will soon have him sized up for what he is worth, and with that the movement here will
be of almost no consequence.” Behrman had particular contempt for Parker, whose
erratic loyalty to the Democratic Party was well known. During the League campaign,
Parker acknowledged support of Taft in 1908, although he later claimed that he had
remained loyal to Sanders and Behrman. In 1904, “through an oversight,” Parker had
not paid the poll tax and did not vote. Behrman added his reassurances to Foster that
“every leader in the city will support you. You need have no fear at all.” The Mayor’s
assessment of the city situation was accurate, but he had little control over the country
vote.17
To further diffuse potential League issues, Behrman announced in June, 1911,
that the city Democratic organization “will purge the registration rolls in every ward.
The public can rest assured of one thing—that the regular organization is now engaged in
as thorough a purging of the registration rolls as is possible.” Each faction checked
names and addresses on the voter rolls against actual residents. By August, Registrar of
Voters William Ball bragged that the canvass had removed more names than the efforts
o f the Good Government League, but the work of the Regulars failed to quell the issue.
The registration fight became more bitter as the election approached. The League’s

17Behrman to Senator Murphy Foster, May 12,1911 and May 20, 1911,
Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily Picayune, May 27, 1911, 3; June 15, 1911, 7; June 23,
1911,3; July 2, 1911, Section n , 16.
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constant charges o f fraud provoked a Daily Picayune editorial. “It has been a rule o f the
various state political campaigns . . . for the self-seeking politicians who style
themselves ‘reformers’ [to] arrogate to themselves all the political honesty in the state.”
By November, Ball reported that 5,851 names had been purged. The Regulars reported
3,515 of those names; the League canvassers discovered 2,336. Most of the purges
resulted from voters changing residence; only 173 were discovered to be fraudulent, and
thirty-eight of those were from one precinct in the Eight Ward, known to be “reform
territory.”18
During the election campaign, the League began to show interest in more than
just overturning the boss system. Progressive reformers across the nation put their faith
in new forms of city government. By 1911, nearly 200 cities had adopted the
commission form; within a decade, that total would more than double. The commission
replicated features o f the business world and appealed to the reformers’ longing for
efficiency and simplicity in municipal government. Commission plans transferred
authority from ward leaders and district councilmen to commissioners elected at large.
The commissioners formed a board o f directors for the municipal corporation,
presumably free o f political obligations and machine pressures. In operation, the
commission plan was more complex, but it quickly became a favorite solution for
reformers who sought to oust machine rule. After League members began advocating
the commission form, the Daily Picayune reminded readers that the commission system
18Daily Picayune, June 23, 1911, 3; August 5,1911, 6; August 12, 1911,6;
November 9, 1911, 8.
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“now in vogue is not new to New Orleans,” since a commission governed the city from
1870-1882. That government proved “such a despotism that the people were eager to
get rid of it.” A visiting professor at the Tulane Summer Normal School praised the
commission form and detailed its success in Houston. To answer the objection that the
commission had once been tried in New Orleans, he asserted that “the commission rule
will not be a success if the political bosses are in power.” Visiting officials from the
Montgomery commission made the obvious point, that “when there is a good mayor and
council, there is no necessity [for the commission]. The strategy o f the League became
clear. After electing its gubernatorial candidate, thus eliminating one source of the
Regulars’ power, it would attempt to destroy the ward boss system by altering the form
o f government in the city. A commission would reduce the number o f elected officials,
and the reformers believed that the boss system would wither in the absence o f electoral
offices to dispense. Late in the state campaign, Parker admitted that the League would
not run a city ticket unless Hall was victorious.19
The campaign did not stop the Mayor from important initiatives. He took time
to support the Dock Board’s plans for a public cotton warehouse, only now coming to
fruition, and when long-time Dock Board President Hugh McCloskey resigned,
Behrman convinced Governor Sanders to name Cotton Exchange President (and
Regular supporter) W. B. Thompson to the vacancy. Behrman confidently left the city
to attend the National Municipal League Convention and delivered an address
19Daily Picayune, June 29,1911, 6; July 1,1911,4; January 11, 1912, 3;
Bradley R. Rice, Progressive Cities (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977), 53.
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describing the operation o f the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad. At the conclusion of
the convention, the association honored Behrman by electing him a trustee. The city
later hosted a meeting o f five southern governors at the end o f October. W. B.
Thompson addressed the group, arguing in favor of the public warehouse system for
cotton that would provide a means to gradually release the commodity onto the world
market. The Mayor’s participation and the governors’ conference highlighted the
prominence of the city and its chief executive. Behrman continued to participate in such
national associations, addressing the groups on various matters o f municipal
operations.20
The state election, however, dominated the time o f city officials. As the election
approached, defections from one camp to another became partisan news, demonstrations
of strength or weakness. “Joseph W. Dorsam, well-known coal merchant and
businessman,” reported the Daily Picayune, “has severed his connections with the Good
Government League.” Dorsam reported that “the Good Government League o f the
Eighth Ward is actuated solely by a desire to substitute themselves for those in power.”
W. B. Thompson delivered a speech on behalf of Michel, asking citizens “not to be
misled by the hue and cry and affirmations of holiness into believing that this is a
contest between light and darkness.. . . It is the same old effort of the ‘outs’ to gain
control o f political place and power.” The truce in the Tenth Ward broke down, and
James Henriques attacked Ewing claiming that the rebel leader drew power only from
20 Behrman to Sanders, September 23, 1911, Mayor’s Correspondence; Daily
Picayune, August 9,1911, 7; September 30, 1911,3; October 7, 1911, 4.
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his newspapers. Charles Buck, former candidate for mayor in 1896 and 1904, weighed
in on the side of the League, comparing the battle against the bosses to the battle against
“carpet bag rule.” City Treasurer Otto Briede, beholden to Ewing, fired Michel
supporters in his office. The Mayor’s secretary, Rudolph Huffi, supported Aswell. He
resigned his position with the Mayor “to avoid embarrassment,” and took a position in
the City Treasurer’s office, a Ewing stronghold. The Daily Picayune darkly warned
against the threat to the Democratic party posed by “Republicans and NearRepublicans.” Parker had voted for Taft, and League activist Donaldson Caffery “ran
against the Democrat [candidate for governor] Heard. Worst o f all the League
transgressions, James Wilkinson ran in 1892 as a Republican candidate, and, during the
campaign, had argued “for equal rights for whites and Negroes.”21
As the new year approached, additional conflict broke out over the voter lists.
To demonstrate the hypocrisy o f League attempts to purge the rolls, Ball released copies
o f the registrations forms for John Parker and H. Dickson Bruns, a physician long active
in reform campaigns. Ball showed that each form contained mistakes in calculating the
amount of time the gentleman had resided in New Orleans, sufficient under the law to
prosecute for fraud. Also, in the place provided for a listing o f party affiliation, the
Bruns application was conspicuously blank. After yet another challenge from Bruns
regarding the honesty of the rolls and lack of service from the Registrar, Ball responded

21 D aily Picayune, October 17,1911, 3; October 20,1911, 3; October 29, 1911,
Section I, 3; November 1,1911, 3; November 8,1911,6; November 17,1911, 3;
November 30, 1911, 3; December 12,1911,3; December 16, 1911, 8.
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with a “warm” letter. “You are one of those whose superior esteem o f themselves has
misled them into prating about public officials being public servants so much and so
often that you [have confused] public servants with private menials.” He went on to call
Bruns “a political eunuch” out to destroy the Democratic Party. Bruns decided not to
respond, but the League effort did not cease. League canvassers presented 600
additional names for removal on January 5,1912. On the same day, word came from
Acadia Parish that the League had attempted wholesale purges of the rolls in that parish
as well.22
The election took place January 23,1912. Results remained incomplete for
several days, but as country returns came in, it became clear that the League had done
better than the Regulars expected. Senator Foster lost to Congressman Ransdell;
Governor Sanders and Congressman Broussard faced a second primary. In the
gubernatorial race, the three-way contest left Aswell far behind. Michel and Hall would
enter a second primary. Closer examination of the results over the next few days further
discouraged the Regulars. Sanders withdrew, giving Broussard the Senate seat. Michel
trailed Hall by only 6,000 votes out of nearly 120,000. However, much o f Aswell’s
vote was anti-machine and would naturally go to Hall in a run off The efforts for
Michel by the city Regulars produced a 10,000 majority from the New Orleans wards,
but they could not overcome the country vote. After a few days of reflection and
consultation, Michel announced he would withdraw, and Hall became the Democratic
22 Daily Picayune, December 13, 1911,3; December 17, 1911,3; January 1,
1912, 3; January 2 ,1912,1; January 6,1912,3,4.
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nominee for governor. In the one-party Louisiana system, that was equivalent to
election as governor. Michel did not leave unrewarded. Regulars announced in early
March that the former candidate would become assessor for his uptown municipal
district, replacing a Regular office holder, whose apparently genuine illness opened a
spot for Michel at a crucial time.23
The defeat of Governor Sanders for Senate was a bitter disappointment for the
state’s chief executive. In 1910 he had resigned the Senate seat to assist New Orleans in
its campaign for the Panama Exposition. The city returns seemed a betrayal to Sanders,
but, in his memoirs, Behrman defended himself and the New Orleans Regulars.
Sanders, Behrman argued, had introduced the Locke Law to suppress race track
gambling and had cooperated with efforts to regulate saloons more carefully. Behrman
carried his ward for Sanders, but other leaders had not concealed their opposition to his
election. With Sanders, the sitting governor, angry at the city, Behrman quickly moved
to make friends with Hall, the governor-elect. At the meeting of the Democratic Sate
Central Committee at which Hall’s nomination would be certified, observers noted that
Behrman proudly escorted Hall into the meeting. Behrman later recalled that “some of
Hall’s wilder supporters immediately began to cry that their successful candidate had
‘gone over to the ring.’” Behrman denied that Hall had converted to the Regulars. The
Regulars enjoyed a majority of votes in the Democratic State Central Committee, yet let
it be known that Hall should be free to name the next chairman. In the organization of
23 Daily Picayune, January 24-28, 1912; January 30, 1912,1; March 3, 1912, 2;
Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 45-47.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

359
the state legislature, the Regulars from New Orleans controlled a crucial bloc of votes.
New Orleans supported Robert Butler of Terrebonne Parish for Speaker, a “Hall man,
but that is no longer regarded as a barrier to the support of the Orleans delegation.”
These demonstrations o f good faith undoubtedly improved relations between the
Regulars and the new Governor, but in his memoirs, Behrman refuted the charge that
Hall assented to Regular control, and asserted that Hall was “against the Regulars in
New Orleans” during his entire term.24
Regardless o f Hall’s attitude toward the Regulars, his effectiveness as a governor
depended on his ability to deal with the state legislature. Only four N ew Orleans
League candidates managed to win seats; the Regulars captured the balance.
Nevertheless, the League looked forward to that year’s legislative session and
anticipated success in its attempts to defeat the ring. The legislature provided the Good
Government League with crucial weapons to battle the city machine. New registration
and election laws made machine vote-tampering more difficult, though legislators loyal
to the ring diluted the harshest measures. In addition, reformers attempted to follow
through on their promise for a substantial change in the structure o f the city’s
government by replacing the mayor-council with the commission form o f government.25
Momentum for commission government began building after the state election
and continued through the legislative session of 1912. Only days after Hall’s election,

24 Kemp, M artin Behrman o f New Orleans, 259-261, 265-271; Daily Picayune,
January 28, 1912,1; February 9, 1912,3; March 5, 1912, 3; March 11, 1912,3.
25 Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 186-198.
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the Daily Picayune commented on the upcoming city elections. “Along with the rumors
of prospective candidates [ for example, Parker] there is an equally strong inclination
that a commission government might be handed New Orleans by the next session o f the
legislature.” Once again, the paper reminded readers to be wary o f the commission and
of its use in New Orleans during Reconstruction. The editors o f the Daily Picayune
softened their stand two days later, calling for “considerable discussion” regarding
commission government, and asking for details o f any plan. “Publico” responded to the
request with the outlines o f a commission government, printed by the Daily Picayune
February 12, 1912. It called for a mayor and four administrators to form an executive
board. Combined with a review board of seven taxpayers, the executive board would
choose other city officers. Whatever changes might occur, the paper opined, should be
ratified by the voters, although it seemed that “many citizens believe that the affairs of
this great city would be better conducted under [a] commission form of government.”
At the end o f March, the Good Government League “unanimously endorsed
commission government” and arranged for a public meeting and lecture to explain the
benefits o f the new form o f government. The next week, John Z. White of Chicago
spoke glowingly o f commission government. His Good Government League hosts
endorsed the “fights for commission government and the betterment of conditions in the
city” and appointed John Parker to lead the effort.26

26 Daily Picayune, January 30, 1912, 3; February 1, 1912, 8; February 12, 1912,
3; February 16, 1912, 8; March 27, 1912, 8; March 28,1912, 1; March 30, 1912, 6;
April 3, 1912, 8; April 4,1912,4; April 5,1912, 4.
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In June, 1912, League supporters proposed a bill to the legislature to redesign
the government of New Orleans along the new commission lines. The machine,
however, retained significant strength in the state’s legislative branch, and it found the
original draft objectionable, particularly those sections that reduced elective offices and
required extensive constitutional change. Ring loyalists presented a substitute for the
commission bill which, though it retained much o f the commission form, gave
considerable flexibility to those who would serve as commissioners. The Good
Government League objected to the substitution, but ultimately supported the revised
bill and an amendment to require a local referendum before the change in government
would go into effect. The legislature agreed to these changes and set the referendum
date for August 28, 1912. The acquiescence of the Regulars in this major structural
reform ran counter to at least one view o f the political culture o f urban machines. “The
hostility o f the ‘boss-immigrant-machine complex’ . . . to structural reforms” wrote John
D. Buenker, “has been . . . thoroughly documented.” Perhaps the relatively low level of
immigrants in New Orleans or Behrman’s confidence in his organization’s ability to
thrive under any political system were sufficient to deflect otherwise natural antagonism
toward the structural reform.27
The results o f the legislative session encouraged members o f the League, but
political developments were not as favorable. Although the Regulars had not supported
27 Daily Picayune, June 14, 1912 through June 28, 1912; Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono
Publico,” 68-71; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 193-195; John D.
Buenker, “Sovereign Individuals and Organic Networks: Political Culture in Conflict
During the Progressive Era,” 197.
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Governor Hall in the recent election, he began to accommodate the machine in several
ways, especially regarding appointments. The Governor faced a difficult financial
situation and needed machine support for an overhaul of the tax system. In addition, he
found himself drawn to Mayor Behrman and at odds with the self-righteousness o f
League members. Behrman later suggested that Hall and the Good Government
League leadership had a falling out over campaign finances. As the summer progressed,
presidential politics began to attract attention, and both Behrman and Hall could see the
advantage of cooperation in the election o f Wilson and control o f federal patronage.28
In July, 1912, national politics dealt an additional blow to League aspirations.
John M. Parker was a friend of Theodore Roosevelt. When the former president had
begun his challenge to President Taft for the Republican nomination, Parker declined to
switch parties and declared his loyalty to the Democrats. But Taft’s victory at the
Republican convention, and the subsequent third party efforts o f Roosevelt, changed the
situation for Parker. Although he was the chairman of the Good Government League—
officially a Democratic organization—Parker admitted that he would support Roosevelt’s
bid for a third term under the banner of the Progressive Party. On July 11,1912, Parker
officially resigned as leader of the city League efforts. Behrman later downplayed the
effects of Parker’s departure. “I do not think,” he wrote, “that the absence or the
presence of the Hon. John M. Parker anywhere would have affected me as much as one

28 Daily Picayune, August 22, 1912, 1; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New
Orleans, 206; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 260-265; Schott, “John M.
Parker,” 119.
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hundred votes,” but Behrman admitted that “general opinion” disagreed. The Item
called Parker’s move “desertion.” Although his hopes of nomination for vice-president
on the Roosevelt ticket did not materialize, Parker supported the Progressives in the
presidential election.29
Parker’s defection to the Progressive Party harmed the League in at least two
ways. It removed one o f the organization’s most effective spokesmen and organizers.
In addition, it presented the Regulars with ammunition to attack once again the party
loyalty of the League membership. In a state where voters identified such loyalty with
racial solidarity, this was no small weapon. The League carried the burden o f a reform
past that flirted with Republicanism on more than one occasion. To complicate matters
further, Parker’s replacement was Donelson Caffery. He had been a resident o f New
Orleans for only three years, and, in 1900, had run for governor on a fusion ticket,
supported by Populists and Republicans. The reconciliation between Colonel Ewing
and the Regulars also damaged the hopes of the League. Ewing served as national
committeeman to the Democratic Party and attended the convention that nominated
Woodrow Wilson. Behrman and the other Regular leaders postponed decisions on
parochial candidates until Ewing returned. Though the ring did not publicly disclose the

29 Daily Picayune, July 9, 1912, 1, 4; July 12, 1912, 1; August 13, 1912, 10;
Schott, “John M. Parker,” 121, 171-210; Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 95-100; Kemp,
Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 270.
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terms o f the agreement to the public, Ewing rejoined the regulars in time for the
parochial and municipal elections.30
Prior to the those elections, the city faced a referendum on the question of
commission government. Both political factions supported the change, although many
League members objected to the changes made to their original bill. On July 15, James
F. Coleman, Chairman o f the Executive Committee o f the League, announced that
organization’s support for the referendum. He regretted that the legislature did not
present the original League plan to the voters, but stated that the substitute—the Regular
bill—was a step in the right direction. With both sides on record supporting the
commission plan, there was little controversy over the referendum vote. The Daily
Picayune reported rumors that the League’s support for the plan was not sincere and
printed numerous editorials urging a high turnout in favor o f the plan, but the spirited
contest between the League and the Regulars for offices in Orleans Parish (the elections
for which would occur only one week after the referendum) held the public’s attention.
Mention of the commission plan was infrequent during the August campaign. Ward and
precinct meetings endorsed commission government, but almost as an afterthought,
when the campaign orators had finished extolling the virtues o f various candidates.31
30 Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, 37-38; Daily Picayune, July 9,
1912,4; July 12, 1912,1; July 18,1912, 3; August 4,1912, 3; Schott, “John M. Parker,”
185-189. League members later charged that the Regulars supported Luzenberg for
District Attorney because he was Ewing’s “favorite,” and that this was the price paid for
Regular unity. See the Daily Picayune, August 21, 1912, 6. Reynolds gives the
impression that Ewing opposed the ring during the city elections. This was clearly not
the case. Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 206.
31 Daily Picayune, July 16,1912, 9; August 9, 1912, 8; August 14, 1912, 3.
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The principal contest o f the parochial fight involved the election o f a District
Attorney. Parker’s successor as Leader of the Good government League, Donelson
Caffery, stood as the candidate o f the reform forces. The Regulars surprised political
observers by nominating Chandler C. Luzenberg. Regular loyalist Joseph Generelly had
expected the nomination, partially as a reward for his effective service in the state
legislature when the original commission bill was debated. When denied the ring
endorsement, Generelly bolted and ran as an independent. The split in the machine
ranks encouraged the League’s expectations of victory.32
Donelson Caffery was a former candidate for governor and the son o f a United
States Senator. His campaign oratory assailed the misrule o f the machine and
proclaimed the integrity o f the League alternative. Occasionally, his rhetorical excesses
embarrassed the reformers. He explained away a hasty call to arms in the middle o f the
election campaign, but rarely restrained himself when predicting the inevitable downfall
o f the ring. In a campaign speech in early August, he attempted to wrap the League in
the banner o f municipal reform and to identify it with the commission plan. “What is
the universal cry for the commission in New Orleans,” he said, “but a verdict o f the
people that the ring has made the old form of government abominable? What is the
half-hearted adoption of that cry by the ring but a .. confession that it has failed?” He
continued with a declaration of the purity of League motives. “Our motive is not office;

32 Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 195-205; New Orleans Daily
Picayune, July 19,1912,1; Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 101-103.
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it is to enlarge the political freedom and the commercial greatness o f o u r... city and
state.”33
Machine orators took a more cynical view of the League intentions. T hey
pointed out that Caffery had been a political candidate before and that his recent move
to New Orleans demonstrated political opportunism. In addition, League supporters
were hardly political newcomers. At the same time that Caffery was telling the crowd
that League motives did not include office, he was also extolling the support o f Edgar
M. Cahn, a veteran o f the reform fight of 1904. Dr. Henry D. Bruns, a close associate of
John M. Parker, addressed a League rally with the words, “This looks like old tim es.”
Bruns was in a position to know. A League spokesman had introduced him as a m an
“who has been fighting [along with] the reform movements for the last twenty-five
years.”34
The leadership o f the Good Government League in New Orleans reflected its
bias toward the business and professional classes. An executive committee o f te n
included seven attorneys and three men of commerce. At the ward level, the League
showed a more varied leadership. There were three attorneys and five men of
commerce, but there were also two clerks, a worker for the city, a contractor, a druggist,
a hotelier, and a car repairer. The leadership of the Regular organization generally held
government jobs, ranging from U.S. Congressman to clerk for the mayor. Only five

33 Daily Picayune, August 21, 1912,6.
34 Daily Picayune, August 21, 1912, 6; Matthew J. Schott, “Progressives Against
Democracy: Electoral Reform in Louisiana, 1894-1921,” 251.
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ward leaders, for example, held positions outside of government employment. These
included a publisher (Robert Ewing), a saloon-keeper, a transportation executive, a
grocer, and a contractor.35
League partisans traded charges with ring supporters on a number o f issues
during the campaign, but questions o f patronage frequently arose. Good Government
leaders viewed the machine as insatiable in its appetite for jobs. Colonel Ewing,
Regular boss in the Tenth Ward, had particular influence in obtaining positions for his
constituents, a talent that League members held up as an example of the evils of
machine rule. But supporters of the League were not ignorant o f the possibilities for
patronage. Governor Hall had distributed some jobs to the League forces and they
pressed for more during the campaign.
Donelson Caffery demonstrated the League’s ambivalence regarding patronage
issues during a precinct rally in the Tenth Ward. He condemned Ewing’s influence in
obtaining patronage and held up the machine’s treatment o f Joseph Generelly as an
example of ring duplicity. Yet in response to a question about jobs from a resident of
the ward, Caffery said that “the Good Government League may rest assured that they
35 Names of ward leaders were obtained from newspaper accounts o f the
election. Occupations were those listed in the New Orleans City Director for 1912. The
composition of the reform leadership (i.e., the executive committee and the state
organizers) tends to support the conclusions o f Samuel P. Hays regarding the origins o f
municipal reform. However, the occupations of the reform ward leaders suggests a
wider base o f reform leadership than is at first apparent. For insights into the origins of
urban reform see Samuel P. Hays, “The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in
the Progressive Era,” 157-169 and James Weinstein, “Organized Business and the City
Commission and Manager Movements,” Journal o f Southern History, 28 (May 1962):
166-182.
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will be remembered in this regard.” A few minutes later, as reported by the Daily
Picayune, Caffery promised the assembly that “after September 3 [the date o f the
election for District Attorney] the city will be run as any corporation on a business basis
strictly.” The Good Government League may have believed its own rhetoric regarding
government jobs, but patronage issues proved troublesome from the beginning o f the
campaign. An executive committee o f League members assigned potential jobs and
allocated places on the reform ticket, a process remarkably similar to that o f the Regular
caucus. Some members complained that the process passed over hard-working League
loyalists. Such disputes were not unique to the League, but the occurrence of patronage
arguments in the Good Government ranks undercut the righteous oratory condemning
the practices of the Regulars.36
Under the instructions of the League’s Executive Committee, the Fifth Ward
received the position o f Criminal Sheriff on the ticket. John Cruso won rank and file
support for the nomination, but the leadership would not support his candidacy because
o f the opposition o f the Times-Democrat. “We can’t afford to invite such opposition,”
commented a League spokesman, “and Cruso will be replaced.” Cruso operated a
saloon in which gambling was reported to take place in an upper room. During the state
campaign, a Regular spokesman charged that Cruso had gone over to the League
because the Mayor insisted on enforcing anti-gambling laws. In a similar manner, Dr.
John T. Jones, physician for the longshoremen’s and screwmen’s organization, learned

36 Daily Picayune, August 10, 1912, 3; July 18, 1912, 3.
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that League would not back him for the position o f coroner. Two weeks before the
parochial elections, the Daily Picayune reported additional disputes within the League
ranks. “There had been considerable dissatisfaction among the leaders and their
followers regarding the jobs and in some wards there were threats o f disaffections.”
Harry Moumey, speaking on behalf of the Regulars, addressed a meeting of Seventh
Ward loyalists and refuted “the idea that [Good Government League candidates] were
running for offices for honor and uplift of the city affairs.” J. C. Hicks, described as a
“convert from former reform movements,” said that League members were “largely a
bunch of office-seekers.” Behrman echoed these assessments o f the reformers and
dismissed them as “the outs wanting to get in.”37
Searching for an effective issue, Caffery accused the machine o f financial
impropriety in its dealings with the Sewerage and Water Board. The proceeds from a
bond issue had been deposited in two New Orleans banks; officers o f the institutions
included prominent machine supporters Charles Janvier and Sol Wexler. However, the
Board of Liquidation, a blue-ribbon panel which included many League supporters, had
approved of the financial arrangements. Most members of the Sewerage and Water
Board and the Board of Liquidation joined Mayor Behrman in condemning Caffery’s
charges.38

37Daily Picayune, July 18, 1912, 3; August 18, 1912,3, 8; August 14,1912, 3;
August 21, 1912, 6; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, xxii.
38 Daily Picayune, August 11,1912,6; August 13,1912, 4. Although some proLeague members o f the Boards were not enthusiastic about criticizing Caffery, most
went along with the Mayor.
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In the midst o f the heated parochial campaign, the public lost sight o f the
pending vote on the commission plan. The city’s newspapers predicted a low turnout in
the ratification vote and voiced concern that under such circumstances a minority could
reject the commission government. Editorials warned against overconfidence among
commission supporters, and the League and the regulars traded charges over the
sincerity o f each group’s work for ratification. The Daily Picayune reminded readers
that the plan put before the voters was not the bill that the League had proposed in the
state legislature, but the newspaper agreed with the argument o f the Regulars that the
Good Government League bill had been constitutionally inadequate. The editorial
urged support for the commission plan, stating that it included all the main features
needed for effective government. On the day before the ratification vote, another
editorial repeated arguments in favor o f commission government, including the
assertion that the new form would result in the election o f “the best men for the office”
and would reduce “ward influences and the old time conditions.”39
The result of the ratification vote proved that fears o f a low turnout were
justified, but the plan won by a wide margin. Out of approximately twenty-six thousand
voters, the commission plan triumphed by ratio of more than eleven to one. Wards
Three and Fifteen, strongholds of the Regulars, supported the plan by nearly twelve to
one; the pro-League Twelfth and Fourteenth wards voted in favor by a ratio o f about ten

39 Daily Picayune, August 9, 1912, 8; August 15, 1912, 8; August 17, 1912, 6;
August 20, 1912, 7; August 25,1912. On the reformers point regarding the election of
“good men” as office holders, see Weinstein, “Organized Business,” 173.
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to one. Downtown support was slightly higher than the uptown wards, but the
overwhelmingly favorable vote indicated strong support from all political factions.40
The vote for parochial offices followed the commission vote by one week. The
three-way race for District Attorney had attracted the most attention, but voters selected
from among candidates for thirteen offices, school board seats, and parish Democratic
committeemen. Only Caffery came close to defeating the machine candidate, assisted
by the Generelly-Luzenberg split. The machine majority in other races averaged four to
six thousand votes. Caffery stated that the patronage practices of the ring caused his
defeat and suggested after the election that the state should adopt an amendment to its
constitution disenfranchising city officials and workers. Turnout increased when
compared to the commission election; over thirty-six thousand New Orleanians
participated in the parochial vote, but even this figure was lower than the governor’s
race held earlier in the year. Observers blamed the three thousand vote drop off on the
summer heat and the absence of many voters. League partisans claimed that at least two
thousand o f the city’s “prominent people” were on vacation and that if the election has
been in October Caffery would have triumphed. Other League supporters blamed
Governor Hall for the ring victory, claiming that “if the distribution of the state places
had been made more promptly, it would have helped the parish fight.” A candidate who
lost in the parochial contest added, “I think they ought to hurry up with the jobs.”41

40 Daily Picayune, August 29,1912, 1.
41 Daily Picayune, September 5,1912, 1,3, 7, 8; September 6,1912, 3;
Fitzmorris, “Pro bono Publico,” 114-116.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

372
Voters of New Orleans faced another election in one month. According to the
terms o f the commission plan, an election would be held in early October to select a
mayor and four commissioners. All would be elected at large, and both the Regulars
and the League would offer full slates of candidates. Although the ring had won the
parochial elections, the commission plan seemed particularly suited to reform
candidates. Prominent businessman and reform advocate J. F. Coleman expressed
confidence in the outcome o f the municipal elections in spite of the earlier results. The
leadership of the League met immediately after the parochial elections to select a slate
for the commission contest. While the Good Government League and the ring decided
on candidates, the newspaper printed rumors of dissatisfaction among League
supporters. Although Joseph Generelly declared allegiance to the reform organization,
the League suffered from the defection o f other ward and precinct organizers. Within a
week o f the election, newspapers printed accounts of League members' overtures to the
ring. “It was stated yesterday that a number of League men who are disappointed and
alarmed about getting nothing through the League have been to the Regulars recently
and offered to come over with all their friends for a consideration of getting something
in the deal.”42
John Cruso, denied a place on the League’s parochial ballot, announced his
decision to join the ring; many precinct leaders followed his example. Cruso explained
his decision as the result of a patronage dispute. He complained of the League’s lack of

42 Daily Picayune, September 6, 1912, 3; September 12,1912, 3.
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effective organization, the defection of Parker, and the failure o f the leadership to follow
through on promises of jobs. The account o f the Daily Picayune was more colorful.
“Cruso [has] decided to leave the League after having failed to secure any of the plums,
peaches, and apricots promised him, and getting a box of lemons.” League troubles
were not limited to Cruso’s Fifth Ward. A dispute in the Eighth Ward caused ill
feelings among League supporters and increased defections. W.R. McCarthy, leader of
the League in the Eleventh Ward, also joined the Regulars. He complained of bad
management within the reform group and o f its failure to follow through on patronage
promises. In addition, Edward Nulty, Good Government League president of the Tenth
Ward, joined the ring. There were some defections of ring members to the ranks o f the
League, but no ward leaders of the machine went over to the other side.43
Publicity surrounding the commission plan emphasized the parallels between
business and efficient government. The identification of commissioners with business
practice put a premium on selection of candidates with business backgrounds. The close
race for District Attorney and the strong vote for the commission plan convinced
Regular leaders that the organization should draw its candidates from among city
businessmen. Regular leaders sought to avoid possible League charges of a politicized
commission by precluding city officials from seeking commission posts. Although
Behrman would lead the ticket as candidate for mayor, no other individual associated
with the ring’s political leadership would run for commissioner. The discipline o f the
43 Daily Picayune, September 13,1912, 3; September 14,1912, 3; September 15,
1912, 5.
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machine enabled its leaders to enforce such a decision. Otto Briede, a Ewing loyalist
from the Tenth Ward, was City Treasurer, and sought Ewing’s support to run for
commissioner. Briede reasoned that since he was not a ward leader, he should be
allowed to contest for a commission seat. But the caucus had “determined on the course
of eliminating active politicians. Mr. Briede could not see the point, but that was the
leader’s ultimatum.”44
On Thursday, September 19, less than two weeks before the election, the Good
Government League announced its choices for mayor and commissioners. A committee
o f sixty ratified the selections of the Executive Committee and presented the names to
the public. The ticket reflected the reform antecedents o f the League and the
commission system’s emphasis on business experience. Charles F. Claiborne led the
ticket as candidate for mayor. He was a descendant o f the first governor o f Louisiana
and a prominent city lawyer. Claiborne confidently predicted victory by three thousand
votes. He stated, “I am not a politician,” but admitted to frequent participation in prior
reform movements. He had served as councilman during the reform administration of
Mayor Shakspeare and returned to the council in 1896 during the administration of
reform mayor Walter Flower and the Citizen’s League. The four commission
candidates o f the League had similar political backgrounds, although all were
businessmen as well. Louis Pfister had been active in the drive for public ownership of
utilities and served on the city council with Claiborne during the Flower ad m in istration.
44 Daily Picayune, September 16, 1912, 3. The account emphasizes the role
played by Ewing, regular leader o f the Tenth Ward in spite of his earlier defection.
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George M. Leahy had also served on the reform council, and Andrew McShane was a
member o f the Fire Board during the same administration. Only Oscar Schumert lacked
a political connection with previous reform efforts. He was President of Fidelity
Homestead Association, but retained strong contacts with organized labor.45
The Regulars announced their ticket the following day. As expected, Behrman
lead the ticket as mayoral candidate: he predicted a regular victory of seven thousand
votes. The other four members, though, were newcomers to Regular electoral politics.
Determined to avoid the appearance of politics as usual, the ring demonstrated its ability
to attract prominent members of the community and to offer a business slate o f its own.
W. B. Thompson was a Behrman favorite, who had offered the Mayor crucial support in
1908. A graduate of Columbia University and a four-time President of the New Orleans
Cotton Exchange, he had served the city on both the Public Belt Railroad Commission
and the Dock Board. His social contacts included membership in the Boston, Pickwick,
and the Southern Yacht Clubs.
The other regular choices were nearly as impressive. Harold W. Newman was
also a lawyer turned businessman, an expert in stocks and bonds. A graduate o f Tulane
University, he was president of the New Orleans Stock Exchange and of the Young
Men’s Hebrew Association. E.E. Lafaye, although only thirty-two years old, was a
respected businessman and land developer. The fourth member of the commission

45 Profiles of the League candidates were printed in the Daily Picayune,
September 19,1912, 1. Candidates endorsed by the paper were given more complete
coverage on subsequent days.
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ticket was A.G. Ricks, a Confederate veteran over seventy years old. Ricks, ironically,
had served on the city council with Claiborne and other members o f the League ticket,
but had broken with the reform elements. He was connected to the city’s brewing
industry and served on the boards o f several financial institutions.46
The composition of Behrman’s ticket caused problems for League strategists.
The regular candidates were not ward leaders nor city department heads; their business
credentials were as impressive as, or exceeded, those o f the reform group’s candidates.
Only Mayor Behrman remained a plausible target. He was the leader o f the machine
and the embodiment of its patronage arrangements; yet the voters had already shown
their support for Behrman in two previous mayoral elections. To be successful, the
League needed issues other than the Mayor’s political connections. Donelson Caffery
attempted to turn the public against Behrman with charges of public corruption. He
held meetings with a New York detective who had exposed the New York City machine
and invited him to come to New Orleans.' Behrman diffused the issue, though, by
welcoming any investigation.47
At the time o f the municipal elections, the Regulars had controlled city
government for twelve years; Behrman had served eight years as mayor. Unfortunately
for the League, the city administration was responsible for impressive public
improvements in the areas of drainage, public utilities, promotion o f commerce,

46 For descriptions of the regular ticket, see the Daily Picayune, September 20,
1912,1,6.
47 Daily Picayune, September 19, 1912, 1.
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sanitation, and public health. The League might have claimed that the ring operated the
city inefficiently, or that patronage raised the cost o f improvements, but it could not
question the evidence that New Orleanians saw every day. The Regulars made use o f
their achievements by showing films of the improvements during public rallies. One
advertisement in the Daily Picayune promised “free admission, fine music, and no
speeches” while the audience would view moving pictures of public improvements
constructed during Behrman’s tenure.48
The Daily Picayune enthusiastically endorsed Behrman for mayor. During the
two weeks before the election, it printed numerous articles about the city’s progress.
Although it backed two League candidates for commission seats, it supported two
Regulars as well. Reports of campaign speeches showed a repeat of League rhetoric
about the evils of machine rule and pleas to the voters to recall the reform victories of
previous years. But the League failed to identify its ticket with the newly-adopted
commission plan or to build any public case that only a reform group could govern
effectively under the new municipal structure. The commission plan was in place after
legislative action and a referendum by the voters, but the city’s political alignments
showed no change from the pattern of the previous two or three decades.49
On October 1, Behrman and the entire Regular ticket easily defeated the League
candidates. The Mayor’s prediction of a 7,000 vote margin proved modest; the results

48 Robert W. Williams, “Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss o f New
Orleans, 1904-1926;” Daily Picayune, September 20,1912, 3.
49 Daily Picayune, September 21, 1912, 6

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

378
showed a Behrman majority o f over 9,000. The only bright spot for the League was the
showing of Andrew McShane, who ran ahead of Claiborne in every ward and polled the
highest total o f any reform candidate since the 1890's. Nevertheless, League members
were shocked at the magnitude of the defeat; one called it “not a defeat” but “a
massacre.” Post-election comment speculated on the future o f the League and the
reasons for its poor showing. Spokesmen for the reform group announced that they had
drawn up a charter to make the organization permanent, but realistic members assumed
that the League would die out as a result of the lost election. One member commented,
“They talk of charters and keeping the thing alive. That sounds nice in the official
journals, but it is all bunk. We are dead.” The Daily Picayune pointed out that the
reform vote had not increased since the 1904 election. League strategists consistently
overestimated their support, causing one election authority to state, “The whole trouble
is that some people have the idea they can win without votes.”50
The defeat o f the League resulted from several factors: the unity of the
Regulars, weak support from the Governor, the defection of Parker, lack of issues, the
flexibility of the Regulars, and a failure to translate the commission victory into a
mandate for new politicians as well as a new structure. The flexibility and pragmatism
inherent in Behrman’s view of politics allow the Regulars to coopt both the idea o f
commission government and the climate of change. Voters could see no reason for
replacing a successful and popular mayor. A League member, in enumerating reasons

50 Daily Picayune, October 2, 1912,1,6; October 3,1912, 1, 3.
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for his organization’s defeat, paid reluctant tribute to Behrman. Claiborne, he said, was
not the man “to lead this movement against a progressive like Behrman. Yes, I say
progressive. He is one. He is a ringster, if you will, but he is a progressive. I give that.”
Behrman parlayed that combination into five victories for mayor.51
The voters of New Orleans knew that progressive reform did not require the
adoption of a commission plan. Such reform was well under way by the time the Good
Government League seized upon the commission idea. The change in governmental
form promoted by the reform element was an effort to promote political change—the
overthrow of the Regulars—not policy change. Voters chose the Regulars because that
faction, under Behrman’s able leadership, had successfully guided the city’s consensus
in favor of progressive civic development.
The League’s effort to reform New Orleans politics had not been a total failure.
In its two years of operation, the Good Government League had achieved many o f its
objectives. The voters chose a League-backed candidate for governor, the legislature
passed a series o f laws revising election procedures, and the citizens of N ew Orleans
adopted a commission form o f government. But the League did not defeat bossism.
The Regular Democrats o f New Orleans accepted the new form of city government, kept
their organization intact, and soundly defeated League candidates for municipal office.
For New Orleanians, the adoption of a municipal commission altered the structure o f
their government, but the Good Government League did not transform institutional
51 Daily Picayune, October 3, 1912, 3; Chudacoff, The Evolution o f American
Urban Society, 161.
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reform into electoral victory. The city was the largest in the country to attempt
commission rule at that time. But the power and flexibility o f the New Orleans machine
enabled it to accept structural reform in government, while retaining its electoral
superiority. Until the reformers understood and practiced the exercise o f political
power, the machine would control the government o f New Orleans.52

52 Rice, Progressive Cities, 113-125; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans,
316. The pragmatism and flexibility o f the New Orleans Regulars regarding
commission government was not unique. Boss Crump o f Memphis “solidified his grip
on Memphis” after than city adopted commission government in 1909. The
organization of Tom Dennison in Omaha similarly adjusted to the new form of
government in 1912 by running candidates and “dominating that body for the machine’s
benefit.” See Chudacoff, The Evolution o f American Urban Society, 161-162.
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CONCLUSION

The victory o f Martin Behrman in the 1912 mayoral election marked a renewal
o f commission government in New Orleans, once tried in the Reconstruction era. In
early 1913, in an address to the Society of Economics at Tulane University, Behrman
spoke about the commission form of government as an experiment. He was uncertain
about its future and expressed some skepticism about its efficacy in large cities. But the
Mayor’s third term proved that he, and the Regular organization, could adapt to the new
structure, continue to win elections, and persist in the progressive policies started at the
turn of the century. By 1916, no serious political opposition to the Mayor had emerged,
and he easily won yet another term. It would be four years later, in the election o f 1920,
that Behrman, after four terms as mayor, lost to a reform candidate. After years o f
opposition to Behrman and the state Regulars, John M. Parker won the governor’s
office early in 1920. With his assistance, along with a breakdown in the normally
efficient Choctaw organization, Andrew McShane defeated Behrman, and the reform
faction enjoyed its first mayoral victory in the twentieth century.1

1Behrman, An Address by Honorable Martin Behrman, Mayor o f New Orleans,
Louisiana, Made at Invitation o f Society o f Economics, 8-9; Schott, “John M. Parker,”
317-408. For a thorough account of the Behrman administrations under the commission
government, 1912-1920, see Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 136-448.
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The third and fourth terms o f Martin Behrman followed the patterns set in his
first two terms. In spite of considerable progress, New Orleans had not conquered its
substantial problems. Street paving, general sanitation, and regulation o f street
railroads and other utilities remained difficult, if not intractable, issues. Public
resources were meager in the best o f times, and the city discovered no solution to the
constant demand for greater revenue. But the three major civic reforms o f the early
progressive era continued to thrive.
The Sewerage and Water Board made excellent progress on the water, sewerage,
and drainage systems during 1899-1912, but additional work remained. Connections
between residential property and the new systems occurred slowly. Not until 1925 did
sewer connections exceed ninety percent. Subsurface drainage and an extensive
network of canals gradually improved the ability o f the Board to remove rain water
from the streets, but the capacity o f the city’s pumps limited the effectiveness of the
system. New, higher capacity pumps provided the answer, and, by 1925, pumps
handled 13,000 cubic feet of water per second. By the same year, investment in the
infrastructure reached $30,000,000—nearly double the original estimate.2
The first decade of the reorganized Port o f N ew Orleans saw consolidation o f the
Dock Board’s authority, an enormous building program, and the beginnings of
important public facilities. The second decade expanded publicly-owned facilities,
including the completion of the public cotton warehouse, the building o f a public grain

2 The Waterworks, Sewerage and Drainage System o f New Orleans, n.p..
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elevator, and the construction o f special facilities for handling bananas, coffee, coal, and
lumber. Total tonnage handled by the port doubled from 5,000,000 tons in 1912 to
10,000,000 tons in 1920. By 1925, tonnage reached over 14,000,000 tons. By the early
1920s, the Dock Board completed the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal linking the
Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. These accomplishments occurred against a
backdrop of political intrigue. In spite of the Dock Board’s supposed isolation from
politics, wholesale changes in the membership of the Dock Board took place in 1916,
1919, and 1921.3
The Public Belt Railroad also thrived after the adoption o f commission
government, although the city and the Public Belt Railroad Commission fought to
establish authority immediately following the 1912 election. The courts upheld the
independence o f the Commission, and the commercial exchanges continued their
influence over its membership. The bureaucratic battles did not stop belt road
expansion. In 1912, it consisted of twenty-eight miles o f track; by 1925, it had
expanded to eighty-two miles. The railroad operated seven locomotives in 1912 and
sixteen in 1925. Tracks and switching locomotives served not only the Mississippi
River wharves, but also the new industrial and transportation sites along the Inner
Harbor Navigation Canal. In 1921, the Constitution of the State o f Louisiana authorized
the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission to take responsibility for a railroad

3 Cass, Facts o f Interest about the Port o f New Orleans, 18-21; Port Handbook
o f New Orleans, 8, 11.
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and automobile bridge across the Mississippi River, though the great project did not
reach completion until a decade later.4
The three public works projects did not exclusively depend upon the city
government for finances or leadership during the period 1912 to 1920. Behrman served
as president o f the Sewerage and Water Board and as president o f the Public Belt
Railroad Commission, and he took an active interest in both entities. Though not a
member o f the Dock Board, the Mayor often advised the governor regarding
appointments to that body. The reasons for Behrman’s defeat in 1920 had little to do
with his leadership in the areas o f public works or substantive policy disagreements.
The 1920 election replayed most of the themes o f New Orleans political factionalism:
antagonism o f reformers toward the boss system, calls for efficiency in government, and
reform o f registration and voting procedures.
A new, state-level reform organization—the Democratic Liberty League-joined
with a city reform group—the Orleans Democratic Association—to oppose the Choctaw
Regulars in 1920. Behrman had reason to fear the Orleans Democratic Association.
Unlike previous attempts at unseating the Regulars, the 1920 reform movement
compromised ideological purity in favor of practical politics. Among the members o f
the new association were found not only uptown reformers and commercial leaders, but
also disaffected Choctaws and ward bosses. John Patrick Sullivan, a former prominent
Choctaw, who had broken with the organization in 1913, eagerly led the Orleans
4 The Behrman Administration: Work Accomplished During the Eight Years. ..,
6-7; Port Handbook o f New Orleans, 42-43.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

385
Democratic Association. By election time, he was joined by Robert Ewing, once more
an apostate from the Regular cause. Behrman’s long tenure in office, and the decrease
in the number of elective offices under the new commission system, frustrated
ambitious Regulars, some o f whom aspired to municipal office. Adding to Behrman’s
troubles, Governor Rufus Pleasant opposed Behrman, and, in 1919, had begun a
program to reduce the Mayor’s influence over local patronage.s
Behrman also faced two other negative factors in the election of 1920. Never a
favorite o f the social control advocates of progressivism, the Mayor had refused
repeated requests to close Storyville. What uptown reformers and Baptist ministers
could not accomplish, however, the United States government did; in 1917, Storyville
was shut down, declared a moral hazard to military installations in the New Orleans
area. Yet the closing o f the official district did not end the vice associated with it.
Behrman received the blame, and in the months before the 1920 election, his
administration drew the ire o f local newspapers. One paper printed a lurid series o f
articles on the supposed corruption of young New Orleans schoolgirls. Behrman also
suffered from the natural decline in electoral support for an administration that had been
in power for so long a time. In spite of all the disadvantages, however, Behrman
almost won a fifth term. The sixteen-year incumbent lost by 1,450 votes out o f more
than 44,000 cast. Behrman attributed the defeat to three causes. He was ill for part of
5 Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 465-490; Bodet, “Sixteen years of Enemies is
a Lot o f Them,” paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Louisiana Historical
Association, 1992, 3; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans, One measure o f John P.
Sullivan’s talents was his ascent to national office in the Elks at the age of 35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

386
the campaign and lost valuable time recuperating in Biloxi. He blamed Parker for
hypocritical use of patronage to defeat the Regulars, particularly jobs controlled by the
dock Board. And Behrman recognized the inevitable accumulation of enemies over the
course o f his four mayoral terms. “No matter what you do in public office,” Behrman
later recalled, “you still make enemies. Sixteen years of enemies is a lot o f them.”6
Behrman did not retire quietly to his Algiers home. He won election to the state
constitutional convention in 1921 and waited for an opportunity to vindicate his record.
Some satisfaction arrived in 1922 when his long-time antagonists at the New Orleans
Item became disillusioned with the performance of the new mayor, Andrew McShane.
The Item also broke with Governor Parker for his refusal to carry out a promised civil
service bill. Behrman began to write a series o f columns for the Item detailing his
political career, which also had the effect o f keeping his name before the public.
Although he retired as chair of the Regular organization, Behrman remained active in
the caucus. When a fight over the Regular leadership of the Fourteenth Ward caused a
split in the organization, Behrman stepped in and reasserted his authority. At the same
time that Behrman consolidated his power, public attitudes towards the reformers began
to parallel those of the former mayor. The good intentions o f the reforms was not
6 Bodet, “Sixteen Years of Enemies is a Lot of them,” 10-11; Devore and
Logsdon, Crescent City Schools, 164; Herman Deutsch, “La Politique,” in Chase, et. al.,
Citoyens, Progres et Politique de la Nouvelle Orleans, 1889-1964 (New Orleans: E. S.
Upton, 1964); Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 488-515, Kemp, Martin Behrman o f
New Orleans, 305-316; Williams, “Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss o f New
Orleans, 1904-1926,” 118-130; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 208-213.
Fitzmorris provided slightly different election figures which put McShane’s majority at
1,365.
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matched by a practical knowledge o f politics nor by any apparent administrative
abilities.7
The Regulars nominated Behrman for a fifth term in late 1924. His enthusiastic
supporters adopted the slogan, “Papa’s Coming Home!” to welcome him back to the
campaign trail. He faced two other candidates: Paul Maloney, who had split from the
Regulars, and Mayor McShane. In a spirited contest, the Times-Picayune%and the Daily
States endorsed Maloney, but the Item, though an adversary o f Behrman for years,
endorsed the former Mayor. Behrman’s platform promised to deliver what McShane
had failed to provide, particularly street paving, and pledged an ambitious transportation
program that included bridges across the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. He
also advocated development of the New Orleans lakefront, better regulation o f private
utilities, and enlargement o f City Park. In the first ballot, Behrman received 35, 837
votes. He outpolled Maloney by slightly more than 2,000 votes, but failed to obtain a
majority. McShane’s vote was only 4,654. Unable to sustain an additional election
against Behrman, and discouraged by reports o f his supporters going over to the side o f
the former Mayor, Maloney withdrew and Behrman won election. The headlines

7 Schott, “John M. Parker,” 385-387; Kemp, Martin Behrman o f New Orleans,
320; Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 618-633.
8 The Times-Democrat and the Daily Picayune had merged operations in 1914,
creating the Times-Picayune.
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proclaimed “Papa’s Back,” but his return last barely eight months. He took the oath of
office in early May, 1925, and died on January 12, 1926.9
Behrman and the Regular Democrats dominated New Orleans political and civic
life during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The southern variety of
national progressivism flourished in New Orleans during that time because of, not in
spite of, the leadership of a political machine. In an era of increased specialization and
organizational development, the New Orleans Regulars honed the skills o f professional
politicians, who knew how to win elections for the purpose of gaining power, and public
administrators, who knew how to use power in order to effectively run government.
Their skills brought New Orleans into the new century by nurturing a consensus in favor
of progressive civic development. The consensus promoted the construction of muchneeded public services, the reconstruction of the city’s docks, enhancement o f the
municipal economy, and improvements in transportation, education, and public health.
New forms of government mobilized public finance, public administration, and the
assistance of professional expertise in the service of the progressive agenda.
The reform faction of New Orleans deserves credit for advocating and, in some
instances, initiating the legislation that encouraged municipal progress. During the
years that followed the takeover of city government by the Regulars, the reform faction
9 Deutsch, “La Politique,” in Chase, et. al., Citoyens. . . ; Kemp, Martin
Behrman o f New Orleans, 335-341; Fitzmorris, “Pro Bono Publico,” 637-670. The
election cycle differed from earlier contests due to a change in state law, which sought
to move the New Orleans mayoral election from proximity to the governor’s race.
Thus, McShane’s term was extended, and Behrman was elected to a term that would
have extended to 1930.
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claimed such credit in urging its return to power. There is no way o f knowing whether
or not the reformers would have been successful implementers of the progressive
policies. But their record, in office and in opposition, suggested that the reformers were
uncomfortable with political power, suspicious of democracy, and less than attentive to
the details of public administration. Even when holding political office, reformers could
not transcend their view on the necessity of disinterested officials. Independent boards
and commissions provided the bridge between their uncertainties and the necessities o f
modem governance. The reformers occasionally attempted to copy the Regular
organization, but in their commitment to oppose patronage, reformers cut off their
leadership from the practical side o f power and administration. In its organization, the
League fell far short o f what was necessary for political permanence The contribution o f
the reformers to New Orleans, apart from their advocacy of progressive policies while in
office 1896 to 1900, consisted mainly of mobilizing support for the community
consensus for progressive civic development.
The Regular administrations by no means solved all of the city’s problems, nor
were all aspects of national progressivism adopted. But New Orleans in 1912 was a far
more modem city than the New Orleans of 1896. The New Orleans Regulars were not
reluctant to seek political power, nor were they reticent about the practice of public
administration. Weak on theory, they embraced pragmatism and flexibility. Alert to
public opinion, the Regulars adopted progressive initiatives and adapted to evolving
forms o f governance. In the Regular organization, power flowed from patronage, the
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influence of the elected leadership, and its day-to-day connection with voters and the
machinery of government. Most Regular leaders held offices that kept them in touch
with voters and provided constant information useful to administration. Whether
through boards, commissions, or new forms o f municipal government, the Regulars
persisted at the work necessary to transform New Orleans. By all sensible measures,
that work involved progressive policies. New Orleans did not require a reform
government to adopt those policies.
The progressive civic consensus of 1896-1912 transformed New Orleans, mainly
as a result of the public works projects initiated and implemented by both political
factions. The new sewerage, water, and drainage systems improved public health,
enhanced the appearance of and quality of life in the city, and, most o f all, secured a
stable public health environment. No longer would the yellow fever pose a threat to the
city’s inhabitants. Increased drainage capacity also allowed the expansion o f the city,
especially to the north, towards Lake Pontchartrain, and to the east, along the route o f
Bayou Gentillly. Although significant residential development in those areas would not
take place until after World War I and later, the city’s new infrastructure made those
new neighborhoods habitable.
The commercial developments along the river front similarly transformed the
city. The work of the Dock Board cleared away the last remnants o f the nineteenth
century wharves and landings. The Board constructed modems sheds and docks along a
new levee system. Responding to changing patterns o f international trade, the Board
expanded the port and built special cargo facilities for the coffee, banana, and lumber
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trades. Asserting its full legal authority, the Board upheld public control o f the river
front’s vital commercial assets and expanded the role o f public facilities with the
construction of the Board-owned cotton warehouse, a grain elevator, and the Inner
Harbor Navigation Canal.
The Dock Board’s interests extended to river front transportation and coincided
with the efforts of the city to establish the Public Belt Railroad. The improvements at
the port could not stand alone. Construction of the belt transfer system for cargo was a
crucial ingredient in the transformation o f the port. The New Orleans Public Belt
Railroad assured that river front commerce, vastly expanded by the efforts of the Dock
Board, would move easily among port facilities and between the docks and the various
railroad lines serving the Crescent City. The Public Belt also preserved competition
among the private railroads by preventing any one or more companies from securing
favorable treatment in the port. As the business of the Public Belt grew, so did its
responsibilities. Its tracks expanded as the port grew, spurs connected new industrial
sites, and the Public Belt built the first railroad crossing of the Mississippi at New
Orleans.
The policies leading to the transformation of the city in the years 1896 to 1912
illustrated many of the tenets of southern progressivism: municipal reform, dependence
upon experts, changes in voting laws, regulation of railroads, economic development,
new forms o f governance, public health, and promotion o f education. New Orleans also
joined the ranks of cities which adopted the commission form of government, a reform
which embodied the quintessential progressive elements. Less laudably, the city
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conformed to southern progressivism by operating a government “for whites only” in
which blacks lost the right to vote and suffered the indignities of a solidly .Tim Crow
society.
Among the wide range of progressive era initiatives, the New Orleans city
government-under the control of Regular Democrats for most of the period—embraced
most with enthusiasm and resisted only those associated with strict control o f behavior,
such as prohibition and suppression o f gambling. The avoidance o f strictures on
personal behavior did not disqualify the Regulars from inclusion among the ranks o f
southern progressives. No southern or national progressive embodied every single
notion of the movement. In spite o f an inclination for historians to posit a necessary
connection between reform elements and progressivism, the evidence clearly shows that
the city’s Regular Democrats were responsible for the New Orleans progressive civic
consensus. The Regulars were members of the machine, bosses, and “ringsters,” but
they were also southern progressives.
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